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Abstract 
 
This thesis addresses the issue of how monetary policy may influence non-financial 
firms’ investment behaviour in a commodity dependent developing country. The Peruvian 
experience over the last two decades is particularly interesting because of the non-conventional 
exchange rate intervention implemented by the Banco Central del Peru since the beginning of the 
1990s.  
The thesis is organised in two parts. Part one critically reviews the evolution of the 
extensive theoretical literature on the “commodity trap” since the Prebisch and Singer 
hypothesis. It compares and contrasts the developmental effectiveness of two monetary policies 
alternatives to inflation targeting, namely Peg-Export-Price (PEP) target and the Real-Exchange-
Rate (RER). It also shows how, however, these two alternative proposals overlook the issue of 
dollarisation. Second, part one also reviews the recent empirical literature on the financialisation 
of primary commodities and its effects on the cycle of commodity dependent developing 
countries. Part one concludes with sketching the theoretical framework of the thesis which relies 
on a Minskyian framework. 
Part two illustrates the empirical findings of the thesis relative to the current monetary 
policy and its effects on a sample of 117 Peruvian firms. It concludes that the RER solution is 
not effective and that the PEP solution is not applicable. Part two also demonstrates how the 
current monetary policy favours firms which are more dollar exposed, namely domestic 
conglomerates and multinational corporations. 
The thesis concludes that to escape the commodity trap, a change in the structure of the 
economy would be necessary; this would require a more active role of the central bank with 
respect to credit supply and in line with industrial policy. Nevertheless, the country’s political 
economy conditions, such as the interests of the powerful conglomerates cannot be ignored. 
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Chapter 1 – Introduction 
 
1.1 Introduction and motivation 
In early 2003, I was a “money manager”, when I started to receive some telephone calls 
from my counterparties, the salesmen of the major banks, who wanted to sell a new product: they 
were referring to the derivatives on primary commodities. 
Since those days, primary commodity prices have risen dramatically. Just to put some 
data into prospective Figure 1.1 shows the Economist price index (dollar based 1845-50 = 100).
1
 
During the four decades before WWI and the two decades prior to 1972, nominal prices were 
relatively stable. Movements in the index reflect various events: for example, the rise in cotton 
prices consequent to the shortfall in supplies caused by the US Civil War of the 1860s, the rapid 
rise in commodity prices during and just after the WWI and their sharp decline in the Great 
Depression, the rise during WWII, the upturn during the booms of the 1970s, and the rapid boom 
and slump periods during the 1980s and 1990s. The 2003-2008 boom is unique. 
 
Figure 1.1: Nominal commodity price index (1845–2010) 
 
Source: The Economist (2011) 
                                                 
1
 The index contains 25 items, but excludes crude oil and precious metals. The weights for each commodity vary by 
year. However, for the year 2005, the Food components constitute about 55% of the index (15 items). Non-Food 
agriculture is about 15% (3 items). The Industrials are about 30% (7 items). 
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In order to explain this extraordinary boom one needs to consider the long-term evolution 
of capitalism since the Great Depression. Minsky labelled the first years after the Great 
Depression as “paternalistic capitalism”: until WWII, the US government provided the main 
source of external financing. After this, because of changes in the financing structure and 
because of the privatisation of the US pension system, which released considerable amounts of 
funds to be managed privately, a new form of capitalism emerged. This was dubbed “money 
manager capitalism” (Minsky and Whalen, 1996). Figure 1.2 shows how money managers 
increasingly invested in primary commodity futures since 2003. Historically, primary commodity 
futures were used by producers and traders to hedge against price risk. However, since 2003, the 
primary commodity derivative market shows a clear dominance of money managers.  
 
Figure 1.2: Sample of investment funds dedicated to the commodity market (Billion of US$) (1997-2010) 
 
Source: Bloomberg (2011) 
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Commodity prices are crucial for commodity dependent developing countries (CDDCs). 
These countries are integrated into the international economy through primary products. Usually, 
small commodity dependent economies rely on undiversified productive structure and export 
basket. As a result, their business cycle is very volatile. Obviously, the smaller the country the 
more sensitive it is to external balance movements. The impact of commodity price volatility 
affects the economy at both micro and macroeconomic levels. Specifically, in term of monetary 
policy, CDDCs have to face two peculiar problems as a consequence of the fact that 
commodities are traded in US dollars. Firstly, their economies tend to be dollarised. Secondly, 
the exchange rate tends to be unstable because of the volatility of the price of the commodities 
exported. 
Consequently, the exchange rate policy is supposed to play a key role in the macro-
management of the economy since it can be a fundamental developmental instrument as proved, 
for example, by the late developers in East Asia (Chang, 2002; Wade, 2003). In the case of 
CDDCs, the exchange rate policy should aim to facilitate a diversification of the export sector 
away from the commodity dependence towards the non-traditional export sector. 
Peru is a commodity dependent country: primary commodities form almost 70 percent of 
total exports of which 55 percent is metals (mainly Copper, 33 percent, and Gold, 18 percent), 
nine percent of agricultural (mostly fishing) and five percent of oil (WDI, 2011). 
Peru’s history is particularly rich in terms of exchange rate policy as it has implemented 
almost all possible exchange rate regimes. It adopted a floating system in the 1950s after a 
negative experience with a peg in the 1940s. A de facto fixed exchange rate started in 1954 when 
the central bank significantly increased its interventions in the foreign exchange market to keep 
the currency competitive. A deterioration of the balance of payments due to the term-of-trades 
decline caused a devaluation of 20 percent in 1958. A de jure peg was introduced in 1961 which 
lasted until a 44 percent devaluation in 1967. The crisis in the early 1970s induced a new 
devaluation with a switch to a crawling peg system in 1978 (when the real exchange rate 
depreciated by about 60 percent). This was kept until 1985 to maintain competitiveness. In order 
to fight inflation, Peru changed to a fixed exchange rate but, in July 1990, inflation reached 5,000 
percent. Thus, in August 1990, the regime was changed to a dirty floating. In January 1993, a 
16 
 
new legal framework was introduced to sanction the independence of the central bank and make 
price stability its only objective.  
Since the beginning of the 1990s, the smoothing of the nominal exchange rate through 
foreign exchange interventions keeps the real exchange rate fairly stable. This policy impedes 
sudden jumps around long-term trends: there has been a period of devaluation in the late 1990s 
because of the East Asian crisis, and a period of appreciation during the commodity boom phase 
(with the exception of 2009 because of the Great Recession).  
However, besides its shifts in monetary policy, the Peruvian recent economic history is 
scattered with dramatic events as well: at the beginning of the 1990s, the economy was 
experiencing hyperinflation at 7,500 percent, the fiscal deficit was of about 7,8 percent of GDP 
and total external debt was 79 percent of GNI, growth rate was around -5.1 percent (WDI, 2011). 
The 1990s seemed to have brought a recovery: in 1997, inflation fell below 10 percent and was 
kept at around 2 percent until 2010; in 2007, the average annual growth rate, despite some 
volatility at the turn of the millennium, was of about 6 percent, and total external debt went down 
to 33 percent of GNI. In 1997, for the first time, Peru experienced a fiscal surplus of 0.2 percent 
of GDP and most importantly, saving went from 18 percent at the beginning of the 1990s to a 25 
percent of GDP in 2007; in the same years, investment went from 16 percent of GDP to 23 
percent of GDP (WDI, 2011). More recently, the country has benefited from the last commodity 
boom as shown in the Figure 1.3. 
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Figure 1.3: Peruvian real growth (percentage) (1990-2010)  
 
Source: IMF (2011) 
 
This background introduces the main objective of this thesis which is an investigation 
into the developmental role of the exchange rate in a CDDC. In this thesis, economic 
development is understood in terms of the process of moving from a set of assets based on 
primary products to one based on skills, technology and knowledge. To be more specific about 
this process and with respect to Latin America, it is necessary to refer to the significance of 
linkages from primary product exports to manufacturing and the quality of industrialisation 
under Import Substitution Industrialisation during the two world wars and Great Depression 
(Amsden, 2001). However, industrial policy should not be generally defined; it should be drawn 
from the specific economic conditions of the reality under consideration. A suggestion, in this 
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questions, hypotheses and methodology. Finally, the fourth section presents the structure of the 
thesis and a short description of each chapter. 
1.2 Thesis objective and possible limitations 
The thesis attempts to make an original contribution to the existing literature in four 
ways. First, following the Post-Keynesian tradition, the thesis critically reviews the policy 
paradigm shift from Monetarists to New Keynesians. The originality stems from an application 
of the Post-Keynesian critique of these two models applied to the issue of dollarisation, which is 
typical of CDDCs. Furthermore, the thesis reviews two alternative exchange rate policies, 
namely Real Exchange Rate (RER) target and Peg the Export Price (PEP) target which are better 
designed for CDDCs. By representing them in equation forms, the thesis shows that they are 
very similar. 
The second theoretical contribution stems from the review of the literature: mainstream 
economics adopts a simplistic definition of money; as a result, it is unable to address the 
complexity of dollarisation as part of the monetary system of the economy which limits the 
effectiveness of monetary policy. Accordingly, this thesis attempts to present an alternative 
analytical framework based on the Keynesian notions of liquidity preference and uncertainty. 
This is then adopted in the empirical part of the thesis where, thanks to an original graphic 
representation of liquidity, it is shown that, because of its narrow mandate, the Peruvian central 
bank did not implement any counter-cyclical monetary intervention either during the 
international financial crises of the late 1990s or during the Great Recession.  
The third contribution is empirical: the Peruvian central bank has actively used the 
exchange rate irrespectively of the policy paradigm formally adopted. Foreign exchange 
interventions did not lead to any change in the structure of the economy. This result has to be 
read in conjunction with the highly concentrated structure of the Peruvian economy dominated 
by a few large conglomerates and foreign multinational corporations. These have shown no 
interest in investing in the non-traditional export sectors and are the only firms which can access 
international credit market.  
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The fourth contribution is methodological: the effects of financing conditions and 
exchange rate manipulations in shaping the structure of the economy are explored using a mixed-
method analysis. The use of mixed-method studies is still very limited because of the positivist-
deductive ontological basis and closed system of mainstream economics (Lawson, 1997). The 
use of mixed-methods and triangulation methods is consistent with the heterodox tradition in 
general. This thesis combines flow of funds analysis at macro level, interviews with policy 
makers, advanced panel data econometrics at micro level. It uses a database I compiled from 
balance sheet data and financial notes from the annual audited reports of 117 non-financial firms.  
It is also important to mention three criticisms that could be raised against this study. 
First, this thesis suggests that the monetary problems of a CDDC may be overcome if the 
structure of the economy is diversified away from the primary commodity prevalence. This 
would imply the adoption of a pervasive industrial policy aimed at the development of non-
traditional export sector. However, whether there are the political economy conditions for an 
industrial policy that should encourage such a diversification is an issue overlooked in this study. 
Rather, the thesis suggests that the Peruvian conglomerates may actually oppose a state 
intervention in this direction. In other words, even though the thesis seems to aim to a particular 
recommendation, it does not address the issue of whether this could be, in fact, adopted. This 
neglect is also reflected in the theoretical framework: a theory of the state in general and of 
policy formation in particular is not addressed. On the contrary, the overall aim is to present a 
case in open polemic with mainstream economic theory which supported two, only apparently 
different, monetary policy paradigms. These were unable to address the peculiarities of a CDDC. 
Second, the thesis could be criticised for its partiality with respect to three aspects. 
Firstly, despite its critique of mainstream economics for separating fiscal and monetary policies, 
the thesis focuses only on the monetary side. Secondly, despite identifying different channels by 
which the real exchange rate can influence the economy, the labour channel is not taken into 
account in this thesis because of limited time and resources. This is a major issue since the focus 
of development is the increase of per capita GDP levels. However, the research focuses on the 
role of the financial channel in the structural change of the economy. Third, the literature review 
is, given the high numbers of works on the subject, necessarily incomplete. The works to review 
were chosen in order to tease out key elements that are then discussed in the rest of the thesis. 
20 
 
Lastly, on the methodological point of view, the rich contextual information provided 
comes at the cost of a potential loss of generality and replicability of the analysis to other 
countries. Moreover, even though the use of mixed-method triangulation has attempted to 
provide sound results, not all results have been triangulated: as a consequence, those results 
which were not triangulated are somehow weaker. However, the methods chosen for this thesis 
has been motivated by the author‘s understanding of economic reality as an open and complex 
system. Therefore, generalisations across objects and time are not given and depend on very 
specific preconditions. However, this issue does not prevent generalisations per se, but does 
involve a thorough and critical analysis of whether these preconditions are prevalent. 
 
1.3 Research questions and hypotheses 
This thesis was guided by two overarching research questions and relative hypotheses. 
Research question 1 Since there has been a paradigm shift from monetary target to 
inflation target, the aim of the first research question is to identify what was the most effective 
paradigm in terms of development for a CDDC. This question reflects the idea that monetary 
consensus is designed for developed industrial countries, but it is implemented in developing 
countries too with, perhaps, some adaptations (see chapters 2 and 5).  
 The first hypothesis related to this research question is that, since there was not 
actual shift in developed countries from monetarist to New Keynesian monetary 
policy, so there was not a paradigm shift in developing countries. I contribute to 
this Post-Keynesian general critique by showing how both paradigms dealt with 
dollarised economies (chapter 2).  
 The second hypothesis corresponds to the first one but it is of an empirical nature: 
the Central Bank of Peru does not change its de facto policy despite a de jure 
change from the monetarist to the inflation target (chapter 5). In actual facts, the 
central bank tackles the issue of dollarisation by trying to stabilise the nominal 
exchange rate. 
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Following the first research question and relative hypotheses, a sub-question is set: since 
the exchange rate policy has an active role for partially dollarised economies, I ask whether there 
is an impact of the real exchange rate on the economy, or in other words, whether the changes in 
the economy are shaped through the channels by which the exchange rate should in theory 
operate. The hypothesis related to this question is that there is no change in terms of the finance 
channel.  
Research question 2 The second research question follows from the first one. Since the 
inflation targeting (IT) is not being developed to deal with the issues of the CDDCs, the thesis 
poses the question of whether there is a valid alternative.  
 The first hypothesis is that the RER target is preferred to the IT target from the 
theoretical point of view. The thesis shows that, theoretically, the RER target is 
preferred to the alternative PEP target: it may allow the diversification away from 
commodity dependence by stimulating the development of non-traditional export 
sectors because of its counter-cyclical nature (chapter 2). 
Following the second research question and relative hypothesis, a sub-question is set. 
This focuses on the empirical application of the RER target. The hypothesis related is whether 
the stabilisation of the exchange rate implemented through foreign exchange interventions by the 
Peruvian central bank has an effect on the structure of the economy. This hypothesis is tested in 
chapter 6: there is no evidence that the structure of the economy changes and diversifies away 
from commodities.  
 As a result, a further sub-hypothesis is conceptualised: the RER target is not 
successful in diversifying the economy because of the embedded/underlying 
structure of the economy. This hypothesis is tested by verifying who the 
beneficiaries of the exchange rate interventions are. 
To conclude, the outcome of the first hypothesis is that RER target is preferred to PEP 
target. However, provided that the RER target appears to fail empirically, then it is worth testing 
whether the PEP target may be valid at least from the empirical point of view. This hypothesis is 
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rejected because the problems of the PEP target sketched out at theoretical level (chapter 2) are 
then verified in an empirical simulation (chapter 8). 
 
1.4 Thesis Structure 
Apart from this introduction, this thesis is divided into eight chapters. 
Chapter 2 reviews the literature on commodity prices stabilisation in order to present the 
main problems which CDDCs have to face in macro-managing their business cycle. More 
specifically, in terms of monetary policy, this chapter critically reviews mainstream theory which 
is shown to be inadequate for CDDCs. I review both the monetarist and the New-Keynesian 
models adapted to partially dollarised economies. In particular, the IT framework amplifies the 
pro-cyclicality of CDDCs’ business cycle since it is associated with a free floating exchange rate 
regime. I then review two alternative propositions: the RER target and PEP target.  
Chapter 3 outlines an alternative analytical framework for the analysis of the business 
cycle of a CDDC and the transmission mechanism of monetary policy. To achieve this, the 
chapter clarifies two issues from the theoretical point of view. Firstly, a new theoretical 
framework is needed in order to explain the price fluctuations of the latest commodity boom. A 
Minskyan framework is adopted. Secondly, the chapter draws from the Post-Keynesian tradition 
to analyse the complex dimension of dollarisation, by defining two forms of liquidity to describe 
the monetary policy in partially dollarised economies. Finally, the chapter outlines the channels 
by which the real exchange rate can affect the economy. In particular, three channels are 
identified. Adapting Minsky’s Financial Instability Hypothesis to CDDCs, this thesis focuses 
only on the finance channel determined by the effects of exchange rate fluctuations on firms’ 
balance sheets. 
Chapter 4 describes the approach and methods adopted in the following two empirical 
chapters. The chapter begins by explaining the method used to assess the structural 
transformation of the real and financial sectors in Peru discussed in chapter 5. This is the flow of 
funds analysis approach, a system of national accounts designed to bring the financial activities 
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of an economy into explicit relationship with one another and into direct relation to the non-
financial activities that generate production and income (Board of Governors of Federal Reserve 
System 1975/1996). The second part of the chapter describes the mixed-method approach used to 
identify the effect of the Peruvian exchange rate policy on non-financial firms analysed in 
chapter 6. At first, the data on 117 non-financial firms is analysed by an advanced dynamic panel 
data econometric method, then they are elaborated through the creation of a database which 
allows investigating firms’ capital structure and fragilities in a qualitative way following a set of 
categories. 
Chapter 5 begins the empirical part of the thesis by contextualising the Peruvian 
monetary policy in historical terms with a particular focus on the issues of dollarisation and 
inflation stabilisation. The chapter shows how the Central Bank of Peru has followed the 
consensus on monetary policy shifting from the monetarists to the New Keynesian frameworks. 
Given the dramatic changes that the Peruvian economy had to experience throughout the period 
(i.e. hyperinflation, opening of trading and capital accounts, currency flights), the flow of funds 
analysis provides additional insight validating the theoretical conjectures derived in chapter 3. It 
follows that the Peruvian monetary policy can be explained applying the two forms of liquidity 
defined in the theoretical chapter. 
Chapter 6 presents the empirical finding related to the effects of the Peruvian exchange 
rate policy for 177 listed non-financial firms. The chapter combines two types of analyses. First, 
it identifies the effects of both depreciations and appreciations of the Peruvian currency on firms’ 
investments. Second, it presents a qualitative analysis derived by a database I created by 
investigating the firms’ capital structure according to three types of categorisation of the data set: 
analysis of different activities by sectors, analysis of the tradables and non-tradables sectors, and 
analysis of different types of ownerships. In the last section, it follows an analysis of the 
structural development of the Peruvian economy during the entire period. 
Chapter 7 closes the circle in terms of possible exchange rate solutions for CDDCs by 
simulating, for Peru, two exchange rate policies. Both Peg the Export Price (PEP) and the Peg 
the Export Price Index (PEPI) are analysed in both nominal and real terms. The disappointing 
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results, as anticipated in the literature review, lead to the re-assessment of the exchange rate as an 
actual developmental tool for commodity dependent countries. 
Chapter 8 concludes with a summary of the findings, the theoretical and policy 
implications for the Peruvian economy and with avenues for future research. 
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Chapter 2 – Literature review on monetary policy for CDDCs 
 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents a critical review of the issues related to the monetary policy of 
CDDCs with the aim of preparing the ground for the alternative theoretical framework presented 
in chapter 3 and the subsequent empirical part. The chapter shows that the issues around the 
monetary policy of CDDCs are various and complex, and, above all, are partially neglected by 
mainstream economic theory, whose inadequacy is discussed and some possible alternatives are 
presented. 
Apart from this introduction, in the second section of the chapter, I will provide a brief 
historical introduction explaining how the ideas of stabilising commodity prices, and related 
instruments, have been overtaken, both in theory and in practice, by laissez faire policies. Today, 
the neglecting of the Keynesian counter-cyclical ideas leaves consumers and producers with the 
only possibility of hedging their risk in the derivatives market. As a consequence, a review of 
empirical studies is carried out in order to understand the behaviour of commodity prices since 
the break down of the Bretton Woods system and the abandonment of those policies which 
attempted an international stabilisation of commodity prices. Given that CDDCs may have a 
different basket of commodities to export, I will also focus on some studies aimed to determine 
whether raw commodity prices tend to follow the business cycle , regardless of their type (e.g. 
agricultural or metals), or they do not tend to co-move. This section leads to the conclusion that 
volatility of commodity prices has increased in the last decades accentuating, as a result, the 
issues of economic stability of CDDCs. 
The third section moves to monetary policy. I will critically review the two mainstream 
paradigms, namely the monetary target and the inflation target frameworks which were 
successively adopted in Peru during the period under consideration. I will extend the Post-
Keynesian critique of these two paradigms with respect of the issue of dollarisation. 
The fourth section reviews two possible alternative solutions to the current IT monetary 
policy consensus framework, which will be proven not suited for CDDCs for its pro-cyclical 
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nature. The first solution is to manage the exchange rate counter-cyclically in order to stimulate 
the diversification of the export basket away from primary commodities. The second solution is 
proposed by Frankel (1999, 2003) who provides a way to peg the exchange rate in order to 
maintain commodity revenues constant throughout the business cycle, tempering the volatility of 
the cycle of CDDCs. 
In the fifth section the above two alternative proposals will be compared in an original 
way through a series of equations. The section will show that the two solutions are similar in 
analytical terms; however, the proposal of managing the RER is preferred for its long-term 
developmental implications. 
The sixth section will focus on the possible developmental role of the exchange rate for 
developing countries. 
The final section will summarise the chapter, draw some conclusions and introduce the 
third chapter. 
 
2.2 The debate on the instability of commodity prices since Keynes 
Throughout the history of economic thought, different schools have covered the issue of 
commodity prices stabilisation: the main focus of the analysis has concentrated on trends and 
volatility of primary commodity prices and on the casual connection between price of exports 
and macroeconomic variables. The evolution of the literature on primary commodities is 
interlinked with the evolution of technical (mainly econometric) instruments and with the 
historical rise and dismantles of policies (various stabilisation measures and collapse of the 
Bretton Woods system).  
This section is organised in terms of chronological evolution of the literature and 
corresponding policy prescriptions. The discussion starts with the debate between Keynes and 
Hayek and various proposed instruments; it then moves to Prebisch and Singer and to the 
empirical studies on the declining terms-of-trade. The collapse of the Bretton Woods system 
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introduces the literature on volatility, and finally the investigation on the relation between 
primary commodity prices and macro variables leads to the inquiry into the business cycle. 
The issue of stabilising commodity prices originated in fierce debates around policy 
including between Keynes (1938) and Hayek (1943):  
“...the fluctuations in the prices of the principal raw materials which are produced and 
marketed in conditions of unrestricted competition are quite staggering...My proposal is, 
therefore, that the Government should offer storage to all Empire producers of specified raw 
materials, either free of warehouse charges and interest or for a nominal charge, provided they 
ship their surplus produce to approved warehouses in this country. The Government would not 
become the outright owners of the stocks in question, which would remain in the ownership of the 
depositors, who would run the risk of price changes and would be free to remove and dispose of 
the stocks at any time or to deal in them against warehouse warrants.” (Keynes, 1938, p.450) 
Shortly thereafter, Hayek concentrated on the monetary implications of commodity prices 
fluctuations in “A Commodity Reserve Currency”, followed by Keynes’ reply, “The Objective of 
International Price Stability” on the same issue of the Economic Journal (Jun-Sept, 1943). From 
opposite perspectives, both studies promoted international cooperation to coordinate international 
demand and supply. Keynes was pro-government intervention while Hayek had in mind an 
alternative to the Gold Standard inspired by the famous Wall Street investor Graham (1941). 
Hayek writes: 
“The basic idea is that currency should be issued solely in exchange against a fixed 
combination of warehouse warrants for a number of storable raw commodities, and be 
redeemable in the same “commodity unit”...With this system in operation an increase in the 
demand for liquid assets would lead to the accumulation of stocks of raw commodities of the most 
general usefulness. The hoarding of money, instead of causing resources to run to waste, would 
act as if it were an order to keep raw commodities for the hoarder's account. And as the hoarded 
money was again returned to circulation and demand for commodities increased, these stocks 
would be released to satisfy the new demand”. (Hayek, 1943, p.173) 
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Since the first studies, heterodox economists after Keynes concentrated on various 
proposals such as buffer stocks, export restrictions and multilateral agreements aimed at the 
stabilisation of either prices or quantities of primary commodities. These recommendations were 
based on the idea of transferring the risk of price changes from producers and consumers to 
governments. 
Several instruments of commodity prices stabilisation policy were implemented 
throughout history. 
Buffer Stocks refer to the institutional buying and storing of commodities during 
production surplus, and selling in case of shortages. A buffer stock can be applied to one 
commodity or to a basket of commodities. Typically, governments or marketing boards store or 
incentivise the storing. The more general proposition of using a basket of commodities to 
stabilise output and prices as a whole was set forth by Graham (1941; 1944): that the surpluses of 
goods, which should be regarded as greater wealth, could cause so much damage in the Great 
Depression was perceived as paradoxical. However, mainstream economists opposed the use of 
buffer stocks arguing that the operational costs was higher than the use of monetary reserves, and 
the accumulation of quantity output unused by the market disrupted the functioning of the market 
and induced moral hazard. 
Reserve Currency Graham (1944) also supported the creation of a commodity reserve 
currency. This would work effectively like a Gold Standard. However, the backing up currency 
would not be a single volatile commodity, e.g. gold; rather, an entire basket of commodities. 
Gold and money fluctuate in their purchasing power of staple commodities. The “gold reserves” 
which previously determined the supply of money in the Gold Standard would be replaced with 
the very “commodity reserves” of the ever-normal granary, thus anchoring the money supply to 
real purchasing power, impervious to political manipulation (as in the modern system) and far 
more stable than a single commodity (as in the Gold Standard). This idea was resumed by Kaldor 
et al. (1964) in the 1960s and especially after the break of Bretton Woods. Recently, Hall (1982) 
and Yeager (1983) have continued to propose various aspects of Graham’s scheme and the recent 
resurgence of interest in “sound money” and economic stability, particularly in light of the East 
Asian crises of 1997-8. 
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Export Restrictions Commodity prices are stabilised through the control of quantity 
marketed by production or export quotas. The risk is taken on by individual countries rather than 
by an international institution. All major producers and consumers need to comply with the 
scheme in order to discourage outside or extra-quotas producers to take advantage of it. 
Mainstream economics has always shown little sympathy for these measures and since the trade 
policies enforced by General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), countries shifted from 
quotas to tariffs. 
International Agreements Multilateral contracts specify a maximum price at which 
producing countries are obliged to sell stipulated quantity to consuming countries and minimum 
price at which consuming countries are obliged to buy those quantities. International Commodity 
Agreements (ICAs) have been attempted since the collapse of commodity prices during the great 
depression in the 1920s. The Second World War made economists and politicians of developed 
countries aware of their vulnerability in terms of supply of primary commodities. Several 
international commodity agreements have been signed since then, for both temperate zone and 
tropical products in an attempt to moderate the perceived power of the producing countries. 
Today ICAs are not en vogue: the need for considerable start-up capital and for the existence of 
“normal” market conditions at the outset, built-in flexibility to deal with changes in market 
requirements, the chances of being outwitted by the market if the target prices are not credible, 
difficulties over the choice of currencies to denominate target prices and the need to control the 
agreement determine their unfeasibility. 
Contingency Financing: IMF’s Compensatory Financial Facility and EU’s Système de 
Stabilisation des Recettes d’Exportation (Stabex). The Compensatory Financial Facility (CFF) 
was established in 1963 by the International Monetary Fund to facilitate countries affected by 
temporary exogenous shocks, but from 1983 the access limit has been reduced. Stabex was 
established by the European commission in 1973, but abolished in 2000. 
Besides the above mechanisms, a more radical solution for countries producing primary 
commodities was derived by the famous Prebisch-Singer hypothesis (for example, Prebisch, 
1950). This was based on the empirical findings that the prices of primary commodities relative 
to manufacturing goods tend to decrease over time with consequent loss of income. The resulting 
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policy implications suggested import-substitution industrialisation: “Import substitution is the 
only way to correct the effects on peripheral growth of disparities in foreign trade” (Prebisch, 
1959, p253). In a nutshell, developing countries had to move away from the prevalent production 
of primary commodities and diversify their productive structure. 
However, since the gradual dismantle of the stabilisation policies, following the break of 
the Bretton Woods system, additional empirical studies have attempted to find further evidence in 
support of commodity secular trends and various price patterns: the Prebisch-Singer hypothesis 
has been tested by a number of studies where extra analytical complexity has been added by 
including more sophisticated data and new econometric techniques. However, the overall result 
has been controversial. For example, Grilli and Yang (1988) worked extensively on the quality of 
data by extending the study to 1900 non-fuel primary products, and found that prices decline 
relatively to manufacturing goods sold in the United States and exported by other industrialised 
countries. On the contrary, with the development of unit roots tests and inclusion of structural 
breaks, more recent studies, based on the indexes generated by Grilli and Yang (1988), failed to 
detect the trend. Cuddington and Urzua (1989) identified a structural break only after 1920 and 
found no evidence of a downward trend in relative prices. Hadass and Williamson (2001) 
estimated the terms of trade for 19 developing and industrialised countries, between 1870 and 
1940: the difference in the performance between core and peripheral countries appeared to be 
true, but not due to the terms-of trade; rather it was the result of the asymmetric impact of quasi-
permanent price shocks. This orthodox literature subscribed to the idea that stabilisation policies 
are not necessary, and that, in any case, the effectiveness of stabilisation funds depends on 
whether shocks are permanent or not: stabilisation policies can only be effective in the short-
term. 
Therefore, since Prebisch and Singer, much of the empirical debate has developed on 
whether the non-stationarity of real commodity prices takes the form of a deterministic trend, or 
there are structural breaks in the trend. Spraos (1980) noted that the trend is very sensitive to the 
choice of time period, and when the original series used in Prebisch (1950) is prolonged beyond 
1950, the downward trend of the periphery’s terms of trade disappears. The controversy about the 
declining terms of trade remains still unresolved. However, over the last 140 years, it seems that 
real primary commodity prices have declined of about one percent per year. They followed a non 
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smooth process with occasional changes by as much as 50 percent per year (Cashin and 
McDermott, 2002). Consequently, the literature has concentrated more on volatility. 
In the literature, volatility tends to be associated with business cycle fluctuations: a more 
recent stream of studies focused on the cyclical behaviour of commodity prices. Cuddington 
(1992) and Reinhart and Wickham (1994) studied the duration and persistence of commodity-
price cycles. They applied the decomposition technique developed by Beveridge-Nelson that 
defines the terms of deviation of the series from trend. This is an alternative to the classical cycle 
approach (Watson 1994), which deals with data levels, hence avoiding the subjective choice of 
which de-trending method to use. Price booms (slumps) are so described as period of absolute 
increase (decrease), not as periods of above-trend (below-trend) growth in the series. According 
to Cashin and McDermott (2002), who have used the classical approach, there have been 18 
completed cycles from 1862 to 1999, where a cycle includes one boom and one slump. The 
observation is that: “the amplitude of price movements increased in the early 1900s, while the 
frequency of large price movements increased after the collapse of the Bretton Woods regime” 
(Cashin and McDermott, 2002, p.175).  
The relevance of commodity prices for the business cycle of a country has been revealed 
by Bidarkota and Crucini (1999). Blattman et al. (2004) examined the price behaviour of 42 
commodities and found that the most important feature over 70 years (1870-1939) is not the long-
term drift, but their volatility. In fact, volatility across products varies by more than a factor of 
ten. Commodity prices experienced the highest average growth and lowest volatility from 1890 to 
1909, and the highest volatility and slowest growth during the interwar years. In addition, within 
each period, some primary products were very volatile (such as tobacco and coffee), while others 
were more stable (such as iron and wheat). Furthermore, while some commodity prices rose 
(such as tobacco and wool), others decreased (such as rubber, which was supplanted by cheaper 
synthetics in the interwar period). Other researchers have analysed whether, with different 
volatility, commodity prices co-move within the same business cycle (Bidarkota and Crucini, 
1999). 
Accordingly, orthodox theory concentrated on how current and expected values of 
macroeconomic variables such as inflation, industrial production, and interest rates affect current 
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and future demands and supply of all commodities. For example, higher interest rates should 
decrease real commodity prices if one considers the convenience yield
2
 from holding inventory 
relative to treasury yield. In addition, speculators are encouraged to allocate away from 
commodities to treasury bills (Frankel, 2006). Pindyck and Rotemberg (1990) tried to verify 
whether the co-movement of commodity prices could be explained by macroeconomic variables 
or there were excess movements due to inefficient commodity market structure (i.e. herding 
behaviours of commodity traders).
3
 They run a correlation analysis of prices of commodities 
which are supposed to be the least related for the period 1960-85.
4
 This means that they cannot be 
substitutes or complements, or not co-produced or used as major input for the production of 
another commodity.
5
 While Pindyck and Rotemberg (1990) found that prices tend to move 
together despite macro considerations, Deb et al. (1996) reached an opposite conclusion. Cashin 
et al. (1999) joined the debate using a different measure of co-movement, “concordance”, which 
measures the proportion of time when the prices of two commodities are synchronized in the 
same boom or bust period. The result, based on an extended period of time (1957-99), shows co-
movements only for oil and gold which may be explainable by the desire to hold gold during 
inflationary periods. 
However, the existence of co-movements is not a clear phenomenon as orthodox would 
argue: volatility gets dispersed in various types of commodities. For example, today, market 
investors know that agricultural commodities have a lower beta than energy commodities relative 
to market composite index because agricultural commodities are less durable.
6
 
In conclusion, attempts to stabilise primary commodity prices came to a halt with the 
collapse of Bretton Woods. Higher commodity price volatility since the 1970s was due to the 
closing down of domestic marketing boards and the ending of international commodity 
                                                 
2
 The convenience yield was introduced by Kaldor (1939, p.6): “The yield of stocks of raw materials…consists of 
“convenience”, the possibility of making use of them the moment they are wanted”. 
3
 This case then represents a rejection of the standard market clearing competitive storage model of Samuelson 
(1971). 
4
 These are: wheat, cotton, copper, gold, crude oil, lumber and cocoa. 
5
 “Examples of joint production include coffee and cocoa in Cote d’Ivoire, copper and lead in the former Soviet 
Union and substitution between wheat (beet) sugar, cotton and maize in agricultural production in many parts of the 
world. An example of joint consumption includes copper, zinc, gold and lead to produce metallic alloys” (Deb et al., 
1996, p. 280). 
6
 In finance, the beta of a stock in a portfolio is defined as a number describing the volatility of that asset relatively 
to the volatility of the benchmark. 
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agreements during the 1980s and 1990s (Maizel, 1997). With the end of stabilisation measures, 
producers and consumers were left with the only option of hedging against price fluctuations 
through the use of derivatives, mainly futures. 
 
2.3 Shifts in the monetary policy paradigm with reference to a partially dollarised 
economy 
The previous section highlighted, more or less implicitly, how the evolution of the 
literature on primary commodity prices was affected by changes in policy such as the collapse of 
Bretton Woods or the removal of marketing boards while, relatively little attention has been 
dedicated to monetary policy in CDDCs. As a result, a number of issues have been neglected. 
Among these, it is the issue of dollarisation, which this section deals with. 
Generally, the literature has extensively debated the effectiveness of monetary policy 
within a closed economy context with only one currency in circulation and a developed financial 
system typical of industrialised countries. 
However, the persistence of inflation in the 1970s created an opportunity to revitalise the 
idea of the quantity theory of money which allowed Friedman to found the “new monetarism”. 
This was based on a series of econometric studies (for example, Friedman, 1959) aimed at 
proving the close correlation between money supply and income money. Thus, it was argued 
that, in order to stabilise the economy and avoid inflation, it is crucial to secure a steady growth 
in the money supply, not a steady rate of interest. 
However, the short-lived implementation of the monetarist measures to control credit in 
the USA and in the UK (e.g. Monetary Control Act 1980 in the USA) were rapidly abandoned 
and followed by a return to a traditional policy of regulating interest rates (Kaldor, 1982). 
Nevertheless, the breakthrough of the new monetarists in the International Financial Institutions 
informed policy recommendations to developing countries: targeting money growth became the 
monetary approach enforced in the stabilisation programmes until the 1990s, when the New 
Keynesian inflation targeting regime was introduced. 
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However, most developing countries have to face the problem of dollarisation, which is 
even more evident in case of CDDCs since primary commodities are priced and traded in dollars. 
By the 1970s, emerging countries were flushed with dollars borrowed from western banks and 
dollarisation has never disappeared since. Actually, in Peru (chapter 5), dollarisation tends to 
increase in periods of crisis. 
Despite the dominant role of dollarisation in many countries, this section surprisingly 
reveals that within mainstream theory, of both Monetarists and New Keynesians, there has been 
no real effort to formulate or redefine a monetary theory with a dual-money or dual-currency 
economy.  
Famously, a Post-Keynesian critique of both New Keynesians and Monetarists argues 
that their understanding of monetary phenomena is based on an incorrect interpretation of 
Keynes which originated the neoclassical synthesis framework. This section contributed to this 
critique with respect to dollarisation. Indeed, this phenomenon is interpreted just as an additional 
exogenous element of the monetary system not contemplated in the basic case of a closed 
developed economy. Therefore, the conventional wisdom is that central banks can conduct an 
independent monetary policy even in a partially dollarised economy. 
Thus, the aim of this section is to demonstrate that, despite the change in monetary policy 
consensus, from the monetarist monetary target to the New Keynesian inflation target 
implemented since the 1990s, in reality central banks still have only one option to ameliorate the 
disturbing effects caused by dollarisation in conducting their policies: given the constraints 
imposed by a partially dollarised economy, they can only smooth exchange rate volatility. This 
mainly follows from their theoretical and institutional framework. Post-Keynesians argue that 
both monetary targeting and inflation targeting frameworks are theoretically weak. This section 
contributes to reach a similar conclusion for the specific case of partially dollarised economies. 
The structure of this section is the following. In the first two sub-sections, I will review 
both monetarist and New Keynesian monetary models and introduce the corresponding Post-
Keynesian critique. This review is necessary because Peru experienced the monetary paradigm 
shift from the monetary target to the IT target (chapter 5). In the third sub-section, I will review 
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theories on dollarisation. Again, Peru had to deal with dollarisation since the adoption of the 
monetarist model (chapter 5). The fourth sub-section is a critique of such interpretations of 
dollarisation which leads to the conclusion that Monetarists and New Keynesians conceptualise 
dollarisation in very similar ways and neglect its complexity. However, in the theoretical chapter, 
I will show that Post-Keynesians offer a framework to develop an alternative perspective which 
provides a different understanding of the issues in relation to macro stabilisation in a partially 
dollarised economy. 
 
2.3.1 The essence of the monetarist model and the Post-Keynesian critique 
The monetarist model 
The monetarist basic model presents two well known versions. The Pigou (1917) version 
shows the classical mechanism of “direct effect” by which the money supply directly affects 
private sector spending where money supply is assumed to be exogenous (     ). Money 
demand is proportionate to money income which is given by the Cambridge equation (   
  ). The direct relationship is derived by the assumption that 1/k, the velocity of money, is 
constant since payment arrangements are mainly determined by institutional and social habits 
which tend to change very slowly. Therefore, the money market is in equilibrium if     ; that 
is, if money supply changes, then income needs to change to return to equilibrium. The causality 
is determined by the assumption of exogeneity of the money supply. 
The other version of the quantity theory of money is the Fisher (1911) equation MV=PT. 
Here, the assumption is that in equilibrium output is constant given the flexibility of wages and 
prices which guarantee full employment of resources. Then, if both V and T are considered 
approximately constant, which means a stable money demand, the above equation links money 
to price and not to output levels, this means that money supply determines inflation. 
Within this monetarist model, the government is supposed to control money supply 
through the monetary base M0. The control of money supply is determined by the link between 
bank deposits, which are liabilities of commercial banks to their customers, and bank reserves, 
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which are assets of commercial banks and liabilities of the central bank. This link is the money 
multiplier. Thus, the transmission mechanism of the monetary policy during a monetary 
expansion can be represented by the following flow diagram (Figure 2.1). 
 
Figure 2.1: Transmission mechanism of monetary policy according to Monetarists 
 
 
The central bank can influence the money multiplier by either determining the minimum 
reserve requirement (rr) at the central bank, or by changing the monetary base M0, assuming that 
the excess bank reserves are small and constant over time, and that the public’s preference of 
currency over deposit (cc) does not change (equation 1).7 
 
  
  
   
 
           
          (1) 
                                                 
7
 The multiplier equation is given by the combination of two definitions. M0, the monetary base, is the sum of two 
components: 1.    is the currency in the hands of public indicated as part of the money aggregate ccM, and 2.   are 
bank reserves which are the sum of required reserves rrD, which are part of the deposits, and excess reserves.  
Thus                                       (2) 
M is the sum of two parts:  M=   +D= ccM +D       (3) 
The process continue utill excess reserves are eliminated and there is equilibrium between 
actual reserves and required reserves  
Other banks' deposit and excess reserves increase 
Banks with increased deposits have excess reserves which can be used for new loans or  
purchases 
Deposits increase 
 M0 is increased/injected due to open-market purchase of securities by the central bank 
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The standard textbook explanation of monetary policy effectiveness is based on the IS-
LM model (Hicks, 1937). The two schedules define the equilibrium of the whole economy, but 
each of them is assigned to a particular policy: the LM schedule defines the equilibrium of the 
money market and it is influenced by monetary policy; the IS schedule defines the equilibrium of 
the goods market and it is influenced by fiscal policy. 
The Post-Keynesian critique of money growth targeting 
This Post-Keynesian critique is associated with a different idea of the nature of money 
according to which, money is endogenously determined within the economic system. 
First, the Post-Keynesian approach is based on a complex link between money, credit and 
finance. The development of financial institutions depends on the evolution of the characteristic 
of money, since “in a modern capitalist economy the institution of money is inextricably tied to 
the institution of banking” (Minsky 1986a, p.346). Thus, money has to be contextualised: it “can 
only be studied in an historical and institutional context” (Davidson, 1982, p.241). For this 
reason, Post-Keynesians refuse to adopt a particular model which “can solve all economic 
problems for all times and circumstances” (ibid, p.8). 
Second, the economic system shows three essential characteristics: the existence of 
uncertainty, the existence of irreversible time (production takes time and agents commit well 
before the outcome can be predicted) and the existence of contracts denominated in money 
which bind agents (money and contracts are related), as money is “a link between the present 
and the future” (Keynes, 1997, p.294). 
Third, and as a result of both points above, in such a dynamic production system, money 
can be introduced in three possible ways. First, because of the production process itself, credit is 
indispensable; consequently the analysis of credit-granting institutions is extremely important. 
Second, money can be introduced into the system by fiscal and open market operations by the 
monetary authorities. Third, money can be created or destroyed because of overseas flows 
(Arestis, 1988). For example, within an open economy model, the degree of openness and the 
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exchange rate regimes are important factors for demand and supply of finance and money (Dow, 
1987). 
As a result of this conceptualisation of money, the Post-Keynesian transmission 
mechanism goes in the opposite direction compared to the monetarist one (Kaldor, 1982; Moore, 
1988b), see Figure 2.2. 
 
Figure 2.2: Transmission mechanism of monetary policy according to Post-Keynesians 
 
 
Therefore, the origin of money supply is in the banks: “banks are in the business of 
selling credit” (Moore, 1988a, p. 49); “banks create credit money whenever they extend loans” 
(ibid, p.xii); “loans constitute the majority of money” (Arestis, 1988, p. 63). 
In addition, as opposed to the monetarist unidimensional approach, Post-Keynesians deal 
with the complexity and various shapes of money as “bank credit should be viewed as a package 
of loan terms, to emphasise the multidimensional nature of loan contracts” (p. 25, Moore, 
1988a). This is particularly clear with respect to inflation: “Monetarists do not recognise the 
distinction between demand- and cost- inflation. They argue rather that costs are derived from 
Quantity of money supplied is endogenously credit-driven and demand-determined  
Supply of credit-money depends on the price (interest rate) not on the quantity of 
reserves 
Loans make deposits 
 Banks provide new loans to the public before having excess reserves. New loans 
depend on public demand (bank borrowers). 
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prices, and prices rise due to excess demand in some or all markets as a result of an excess 
supply of money balance” (Moore, 1988a, p.123). For Monetarists, inflation is just the result of 
“too much money chasing too few goods”, which, again, is the result of their simplistic definition 
of a commodity/fiat money economy, overlooking the “promise to pay fiat money” (ibid, p.19, 
my emphasis). 
This simplistic approach to money presents at least two problems in policy terms especially 
for CDDCs, namely the choice of which monetary target to stabilise and which instrument the 
monetary authority should control. The lack of distinction between credit-money and 
commodity-money implies the selection of the wrong instrument in practice “...even when a 
precise definition of the money supply was chosen...there was the largely unforeseen difficulty of 
regulating the movement of this chosen magnitude by the habitual instruments of central banking 
policy” (Kaldor, 1982, p. xii). 
Second, with respect to the control of money supply, Post-Keynesians have identified an 
asymmetry between money-creation and money-destruction: the central bank can easily increase 
the monetary base by open market purchases. However, the opposite is not as easy since banks 
do not always have marketable securities to sell. Banks’ portfolio composition is made up of 
marketable and non-marketable assets. Generally, bank loans may be illiquid, non-tradable in the 
secondary market, and made at the initiative of the borrower (i.e. they are demand-determined). 
Thus, if banks have liquidity problems they can refer to the central bank which retains its duty of 
lender of last resort. As a result, the central bank cannot restrict the growth of money nor can it 
control outstanding stock of credit. It can only rise “the minimum supply price at which it stands 
ready to supply reserves necessary to guarantee system liquidity” (Moore, 1988a, p.109). 
However, the central bank control over money was further limited since the historical 
transformation of banks started in the 1960s: liability management allows banks to finance new 
loans by issuing Certificate of Deposits (CDs), both domestically and in the Eurodollar market, 
or selling securities under repurchase agreements (Repos) which are not controllable by the 
central bank. Crucially, then, not even the cash component of money can be controlled; the 
supply of additional cash cannot influence its distribution between banks and the public. Even 
admitting, as the neoclassical synthesis suggests, that it is possible to exercise a strict control of 
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the monetary base, changes in this aggregate can cause massive movements of the interest rate 
which may cause structural changes in the financial system making the money multiplier 
unstable (Kaldor, 1982; Moore, 1988b).  
Third, Post-Keynesians maintain that the IS-LM model is based on an inappropriate 
interpretation of Keynes (Minsky, 1986a). Keynes used the quantity theory of money only as a 
way to explain the idea of liquidity preference. The neoclassical synthesis neglects the role of 
financial institutions: “the elements of Keynes that are ignored in the neoclassical synthesis 
are...the special properties of economies with capitalist financial institutions...The neoclassical 
synthesis emphasizes equilibrium and equilibrating tendencies, whereas Keynes’s theory 
revolves around bankers and business making deals on Wall Street” (Minsky, 1986a, p.103). 
Furthermore, the neoclassical framework misses some fundamental dynamics: first, the rigid 
separation between monetary and fiscal policy does not allow the inclusion of the dynamic inter-
relationship between both policies. In this case, there is no “fudged” solution. Second, it cannot 
cope with price changes. The problem has been “fudged” by expressing the demand for money 
function in real terms (a rise of nominal money supply at full employment cause the price level 
to rise causing no shift of the LM curve in real terms). So, changes in nominal money have no 
effect on real output, but only on prices, as for the classical dichotomy. However, there is no 
theory behind the a priori division between price and output. Third, it ignores the fundamental 
role of changes in expectations (Chick, 1973).  
The static character of the neoclassical synthesis and the neglect of the role of expectations 
are criticisms shared by New Keynesians. The New Keynesian model is where we turn now. 
 
2.3.2 The inflation target model and the Post-Keynesian critique 
The model 
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Stemming from the difficulty in implementing a monetary target regime, a new 
consensus guided by New Keynesians emerged (i.e. Svensson, 1998; Taylor, 1993; Woodford 
1998). 
In a nutshell, the new synthesis based on the New Normative Macroeconomics (Taylor, 
1993; Clarida et al. 1997), maintains that monetary policy is implemented by changes in interest 
rate which, given the assumption of nominal price rigidities, are non-neutral. Its theoretical 
foundation is a new interpretation of the IS-LM framework which differs from the traditional one 
because of its micro foundations in which aggregate variables are derived from the private sector 
optimising behaviour. This is determined by rational expectations, the introduction of which 
makes the credibility of the central bank an important issue (Romer, 2000). 
Furthermore, the perceived failure of the traditional fixed-prices IS-LM model in dealing 
with the 1970s inflation led to the inclusion in the model of the aggregate supply (AS) schedule. 
In the new IS-LM-AS model, higher output brings higher inflation through firm’s mark-up 
directly or through wages indirectly (i.e. inflation is demand-pull). Therefore, the new-consensus 
model can be summarised by three New Keynesian equations, where LM is replaced by MP 
(Monetary Policy), in its simplest formulation (Romer, 2000). 
The first equation defines the aggregate demand or the IS relationship. In the simplest 
formulation used by Allsopp and Vines (2000), the current output is negatively related to the real 
rate of interest where yo covers all autonomous growth components: 
y= yo – βr + u        (4a) (IS equation) 
In the more sophisticated version of Goodhart (2006), E is the expectations operator: 
ỹ = y – y* = f(Eỹ, r – Eπ) + u      (4b) (IS equation) 
where ỹ is the output gap, y is current real output, y* is the natural, or equilibrium, or sustainable 
level of output, r is the nominal interest rate, π is the rate of inflation and u is the error term.  
The second equation is the aggregate supply or price equation. As mentioned above, the 
aggregate supply equations evolve directly from the optimising behaviour of households and 
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firms, thus current economic behaviour depends crucially on economic agents’ expectations. The 
formulation was derived by Calvo (1983), moving away from the traditional Keynesian sticky 
price definition: 
dπ/dt= f(Eπ,   )+ v      (5) (AS equation) 
The aggregate supply equation (5) shows that there is a positive change in inflation when the 
output gap increases. Nominal prices are considered not completely flexible given, for example, 
the inclusion of imperfect information (Stiglitz and Greenwald, 2003). When prices remain 
persistently high the equation is still valid and the output gap is closed thanks to the inclusion of 
forward-looking expectations (Romer, 2000). In actual fact, this is a variant of the expectations-
augmented Phillips curve (Lavoie and Seccareccia, 2004). 
The last equation (Equation 6) describes the central bank’s reaction function (Taylor, 
1993) in which the interest rate is adjusted with reference to the output gap and the difference 
between the inflation rate and its target: 
 r = ro + b (π – π*) + c         (6) (MP Equation) 
where π* is the target inflation rate. 
Overall, the model can be graphically represented in a way similar to the standard IS-LM 
representation (Romer, 2000). It is a fully recursive model, inflation is inherited from the past 
and determines real interest rates, which, in turn, determine output. The output gap determines 
next period inflation (Lavoie and Seccareccia, 2004). 
In reality, central banks use more sophisticated models that include expectations and lags. 
When applied to small open economies, these models consider trade, capital flows and the 
effects of the real exchange rate by inserting additional assumptions: for example, the law of one 
price holds and the interest rate spread follows the uncovered interest parity (Clarida et al., 
2001). Therefore, the equilibrium in the foreign exchange rate market is given by the equality of 
net trade flows and net capital flows. So, for example, if the real interest rate rises, investment 
and net capital outflows decrease. The IS curve shift to the left and the real exchange rate 
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depreciates, causing an increase in exports with the IS curve that tends to be flatter than in a 
closed economy (Romer, 1999). These models include an exchange rate channel: if the 
uncovered interest parity condition holds, changes in interest rates immediately affect the 
exchange rate. These, in turn, cause an expenditure switching effect on demand, depending on 
the relative elasticities of domestic and foreign goods. 
This subsection showed how the focus of the inflation targeting model is on the interest 
rate rather than on the quantity of money. Post-Keynesians have criticised this model based on a 
specific interpretation of the liquidity preference. This is discussed in the following sub-section.  
 
The Post-Keynesian critique of inflation targeting 
It may be worth mentioning that the Post-Keynesian school is not represented by an 
entirely homogeneous monetary theory. The horizontalists argue that money demand is 
horizontal: money is endogenously driven by the real economy. Banks just transmit the real 
sector demand which is accommodated by the central bank, so that the interest rate is not an 
outcome of private sector portfolio decisions.
8
 Given that money supply can fluctuate, the central 
bank has full authority to set the interest rate, which is later marked-up by banks in their 
interaction with the private sector (Lavoie, 1984; Moore, 1988a; Wray, 1992). A different Post-
Keynesian view (Minsky, 1975; Dow, 1996; Chick and Dow, 2002; Kregel, 1980) maintains that 
interest rates are not exogenously set by the central bank, rather they are partly endogenous: 
banks do not passively accommodate private sector demand for money, rather they act according 
to their own liquidity preference and balance sheet considerations.  
Besides its diversity, the Post-Keynesian critique of IT points to its neoclassical nature, to 
its unoriginality and to its simplistic idea of money, clearly manifested in the explanation of 
inflation: in general, Post-Keynesians see the inflation targeting model as a new version of the 
neoclassical synthesis. For example, there is only a single possible equilibrium, restrictive 
monetary policy leads to lower inflation with no long-run impact on real interest rates and 
                                                 
8
 There is an extensive debate on the shape of the money demand curve and on the degree of its inclination, for 
example, see Goodhart (1989). 
44 
 
economic activities; expansionary fiscal policy leads to higher inflation, higher real interest rates 
have no impact on real activities in the long-run (Lavoie and Seccareccia, 2004). The aggregate 
supply curve is generally downward sloping implying that low inflation rates are beneficial for 
growth. 
Nor does the model represent a significant novelty in comparison to Monetarism: first, 
this new framework was the result of a synthesis between endogenous money and the 
mainstream. This is nicely highlighted by Lavoie and Seccareccia (2004): “Ironically, this 
endogenous money hypothesis was pinned to some aspects of Milton Friedman’s old-line 
macroeconomics, in particular the traditional vertical Phillips curve with inflation expectations, 
thus giving rise to what has been called the new consensus, in monetary economics, also 
sometimes dubbed the New Keynesian Synthesis. However, it could as just be called Wicksellian 
economics” (p.3). 
Second, the model is associated to monetarist features: the variant of the Phillips curve 
(equation 5) can be considered as equivalent of the NAIRU (Non-Accelerating Inflation Rate of 
Unemployment) as shown by Arestis and Sawyer (2002; 2004a, 2004b). The equation is 
accelerationist because the inflation rate accelerates when the demand growth rate exceeds the 
natural rate of growth; the trade-off between inflation and unemployment or between inflation 
and output is only in the short-run (Lavoie, 2004). As a consequence, the supply of money is 
exogenous and a money growth rule has been replaced with a real interest rate targeting rule: 
“Paradoxically, the new consensus is simply a variant of monetarism, but without any causal 
role for money. The new consensus is monetarism without money!” (Lavoie, 2004, p. 23). More 
specifically, the natural real interest rate is assumed to be controlled by the central bank that is 
supposed to be able to set real interest rates through the absolute control over the shortest 
nominal rates. In reality, however, the setting of interest rates is not an entirely domestic matter 
independent of exchange rate and international interest rates (Arestis and Sawyer, 2004b). 
Third, the model maintains a unidimensional approach to money that, again (see section 
2.3.1), is clear with respect to inflation. This is only demand-pulled, since interest rates are used 
to control aggregate demand. Inflation is addressed in new Keynesian models as a result of 
temporary shocks which can cancel each other out in the long-run. There is no possibility for 
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permanent inflation increases which may be due to wage increases or change in expectations 
(Arestis and Sawyer, 2004b). 
On the contrary, Post-Keynesians maintain that inflation can have other sources: it can be 
cost-pushed because of the effects of an increase of world prices (or increase in commodity 
prices) or because of a shortage in specific sectors (Fontana and Palacio-Vera, 2002).  
 
2.3.3 Dollarisation according to mainstream economics 
In the previous section, I reviewed the paradigm shift from the old monetary target to the 
new IT consensus. The theories discussed above were put forward for advanced countries with 
developed financial systems. However, many CDDCs, and Peru among them, face the problem 
of dealing with a monetary system with two currencies in circulation, the domestic one and the 
US dollar. The focus of this sub-section is to explain how Monetarists and New Keynesians have 
considered the specific problem of dollarisation, with a particular attention to the transmission 
mechanism and the effectiveness of monetary policy. 
This sub-section first illustrates the monetarist theoretical and empirical approaches to 
dollarisation which focuses on the asset side. Second, it reviews the New Keynesians’ 
contribution to the issue with their additional analysis of the liability-side of money. Finally, I 
will consider some conclusions on the effectiveness of monetary policy in partially dollarised 
economies, which will be relevant for the empirical part of this thesis. 
Monetarists conceptualise dollarisation consistently with their definition of money: they 
distinguish transaction dollarisation and financial dollarisation reflecting two definitions of 
money, as a medium of exchange and as a store of value, respectively. This distinction 
corresponds to two empirical models, the currency-substitution model and the asset-substitution 
model. Finally, they consider real dollarisation which reflects the definition of money as a unit of 
account. Accordingly, the effects of the various types of dollarisation are considered to be 
different. These three types of dollarisation are explained hereafter. 
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Transaction dollarisation is studied in the currency-substitution model. Generally, the 
model is based on the idea that, in the presence of assets denominated in two different currencies, 
individuals shift their real balances from one currency to the other, depending on the prevailing 
opportunity costs. 
The model is related to the debate on the stability of money demand (Miles, 1978)., 
which is problematic for the forecast of the monetary target: changes in velocity of money are 
only due to the instability of money demand since money supply is assumed to be stable and 
controlled by the monetary authority. Historically, this debate emerged after the break down of 
Bretton Woods, when the US dollar became the international medium of exchange (Giovannini 
and Turtelboom, 1992). A floating exchange rate is the only guarantee of a country’s monetary 
independence. In this case, the only source of instability of money demand is due to sudden 
changes in the velocity of money, as happened in the major industrialised countries in the 1970s 
(Brittain, 1981). On the contrary, with a pegged exchange rate regime, a country is subject to the 
monetary policy of the anchor country; hence, shocks affecting the pegged currency are 
immediately transmitted to the domestic currency: any instability in money demand is explained 
by the existence of dollarisation. 
Additionally, currency-substitution may create instability also on the supply side: 
provided that inflation is caused by changes in money supply and that a quantity of money can 
be transferred across borders, then change in money supply in the USA can affect inflation in the 
dollarised country unless the dollarised country adjusts its money supply (Miles, 1978). 
The generic formulation of the model (Brittain, 1981; Ortiz, 1983; Ramirez-Rojas, 1985; 
Rojas-Suarez, 1992) is used to test currency substitution and it is based on the following demand 
for money equation: 
                              (7) 
Where   is the real money balance of the domestic economy, y is real income, E(π) is 
expected inflation and E(e) is the expected depreciation of the exchange rate. 
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Hence, dollarisation is measured as the ratio between the real domestic money balance 
(  ) and the foreign real money balance (  ). A simplified version of the model used is: 
  
  
    
  
  
                        (8) 
Where  
  
  
 represents the relationship between the domestic and foreign inflation which 
can be referred to the PPP exchange rate formulation, and    and    are the expected returns of 
the two currencies (Girton Roper, 1981). 
The above equations reveal the idea that, in a context of high inflation and expectations 
of exchange rate depreciation, residents tend to protect the value of their wealth by increasing 
their holding of foreign currency vis-á-vis domestic currency. 
As a result, exchange rate fluctuations are considered to be a primary source of 
dollarisation. For example, Ortiz (1983) sustains that, in Mexico, elasticity of substitution 
between domestic and foreign currency increases in periods of floating exchange rate more 
because of the currency risk than because of interest rate spread. This is considered to be the case 
whatever the exchange rate regime (Calvo and Veigh, 1992). 
In terms of policy implications, since dollarisation leads to a loss of seniorage, currency-
substitution models highlight the danger of financing a budget deficit out of inflation tax. In 
other words, fiscal discipline is at the core of the monetarist view. However, given the lack of 
fiscal discipline in the developing world, dollarisation is seen as a way around exchange rate risk 
caused by underlying political risk (Ortiz, 1983) and lack of government credibility (Schmidt-
Grohe and Uribe, 2001; Chang, 2000; Chang and Velasco, 2002).  
The more the dollar is a perfect substitute of the domestic country,
9
 the less the monetary 
policy is independent (Miles, 1978): dollar money held in foreign currency deposits in the 
domestic financial system represents a potential outflow and an interference with monetary 
                                                 
9
 Two currencies are perfect substitute when they are equivalent of one world currency: “In that case there is the 
equivalent of one world currency, just as when central banks make currencies perfect substitutes on the supply side 
by fixing exchange rates...an increase in the nominal money supply in either country will increase the real balances 
used in both countries and cause the price level in both countries to rise by precisely the same amount” (Miles, 
1978, p.432). 
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policy. Whether these deposits should be considered part of the financial system depends on their 
use: if these deposits are used to facilitate international trade transactions and replace deposits 
held abroad, they do not interfere with monetary policy. On the contrary, if they are used as 
monetary outflows, then the demand for foreign money changes relatively to the demand for 
domestic assets, and this is a monetary interference and it has an immediate impact on the 
balance of payments (Ramirez-Rojas, 1985). 
Finally, currency dollarisation has been defined by two main characteristics: symmetry 
and reversibility. It can be symmetrical when both residents and non-residents hold both 
currencies, asymmetrical when there is no demand for domestic currency by non-resident 
(Ramirez-Rojas, 1985). It can be reversible if, with expected decreasing inflation rates, residents 
switch back to the domestic currency. Empirical evidence shows that currency substitution is 
neither fully symmetrical, nor reversible (Muller, 1994). 
As anticipated in the introduction of this sub-section, the second type of dollarisation, 
financial dollarisation, is associated with asset-substitution models. In general, these models use 
portfolio theory. They can explain capital mobility, but cannot explain currency substitution 
(Thomas, 1985). The asset-substitution model is obtained by accounting for the difference 
between returns on domestic and on foreign financial assets (e.g. domestic and foreign bonds) 
when dollar assets are preferred to domestic assets for storing wealth. In this case, the liquidity 
offered by various types of assets depends on capital liberalisation and financial sophistication. 
Therefore, most of the literature on financial dollarisation has been developed in the 1990s, when 
many developing countries have liberalised their capital accounts. 
From a New Keynesian perspective, this type of dollarisation is seen as a response to 
volatile domestic prices rather than to high levels of inflation. Financial dollarisation depends on 
both volatility of real cash flows from domestic assets (which, in turn, depend on price 
volatility), and volatility of foreign assets (which depends on volatility of real exchange rate). As 
a result, according to this argument, on the one hand, policies designed to enhance 
competitiveness through real exchange rate stabilisation may favour dollarisation. This is 
because they artificially reduce real exchange rate volatility relatively to price volatility; on the 
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other hand, inflation targeting with floating exchange rates discourages dollarisation (Ize and 
Levy Yeyati, 2003). This point will be further discussed in chapter 3 and 5. 
The third type of dollarisation, the real or index/price dollarisation, refers to the fact that 
prices and salaries are indexed to exchange rate fluctuations. This is generally associated with 
high pass-through: if wages and prices tend to fluctuate with the exchange rate movements then 
agents tend to switch to the dollar to maintain their income balances more stable. Thus, countries 
with high inflation and lower degrees of indexation tend to suffer from high real dollarisation 
(Guidotti and Rodriguez, 1992).  
The monetarist analysis of dollarisation illustrated above is entirely asset-based. It was 
only after the Asian crises of the late 1990s that the New Keynesians developed a critical view of 
its incompleteness. The concept of liability dollarisation came about to stress the importance of 
the public and private sector vulnerabilities due to foreign borrowing (Calvo, 2000; Edwards, 
2001). This led to the inclusion of a balance sheet channel in the transmission of the monetary 
policy which recognised an effect of liability dollarisation on aggregate output (Calvo and 
Reinhart, 2002). Therefore, the inclusion of the liability-side leads to an implicit reduction in the 
ineffectiveness of monetary policy.  
However, most of the empirical analysis within this stream of studies does not 
concentrate on the effectiveness of monetary policy: first, despite many dollarised countries 
having managed to defeat inflation, they have not experienced a significant decrease in 
dollarisation (a ratchet effect). This is seen in high inflation countries, as “a costly process of 
development, learning and applying strategies to beat inflation” (Muller, 1994, p.14). Among 
these strategies, the literature highlights how financial innovation has tended to accommodate 
dollarisation: it has been not unusual in dollarised countries, to see the introduction of 
instruments to rapidly switch between saving deposits in different currencies, the possibility of 
using various money substitutes and overdrafts, portfolio optimisation methods and the use of 
American Depositary Receipts (ADRs) to flight towards foreign assets (Mueller, 1994; 
Mongardini and Mueller, 2000; Havrylyshyn and Beddies, 2003). This contradicts those who 
believe that “financial repression” is the cause of dollarisation in economies with high inflation 
(Savastano, 1996). 
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Second, Reinhart et al. (2003) find an increase in dollarisation worldwide in the last two 
decades. They also show that inflation has been higher and more volatile in countries with higher 
dollarisation: real dollarisation increases the exchange rate pass-through which leads central 
banks to intervene in the foreign exchange market (fear of floating, see sub-section 2.4.1). This 
point will be further discussed in the empirical part of the thesis.  
In conclusion, the conventional wisdom indicates that central banks can conduct an 
independent monetary policy in case of real and/or financial dollarisation: an important role is 
then assigned to the exchange rate and its strong impact on inflation expectations and real 
activity. Only in the presence of transaction dollarisation, it is argued, monetary policy loses its 
effectiveness because the relevant interest rate for inter-temporal consumption decisions, and 
thus aggregate demand, is the dollar interest rate (Batini et al., 2008). 
 
2.3.4 A critique of the mainstream views on dollarisation 
This section presents a critique of how dollarisation has been addressed by the monetary 
target and the inflation targeting models. 
First, the monetarist approach has been developed around the commodity-money view 
where dollarisation is conceptualised exclusively on the basis of dollars as asset-money: both 
transaction and financial dollarisation concentrate on two different forms of the same definition 
of (asset-) money. The way in which dollarisation is generally measured illustrates this point: 
transaction dollarisation is measured by the amount of cash and cheque payments in dollars 
(ATM withdrawals, cheques, interbank transfers and direct debits). Financial dollarisation is then 
generally measured as a ratio of broad money in the banking system and credit to the private 
sector. Finally, real dollarisation is indirectly measured by the pass-through rather than by the 
estimation of the quantity of foreign currency liabilities in the private sector and the direct effects 
on the production economy in terms of prices and wages. 
Second, in order to show how dollarisation further substantiates the Post-Keynesian 
critique of the monetarist model with respect to the transmission mechanism (section 2.3.1), I 
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add an additional currency to the model, indicated by the superscript $. By adding the dollar 
components to equation (2), it is possible to derive the money multiplier. 
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Dividing (9) by (10): 
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           (12) 
 
Where   = Local currency in the hands of public  
   
 = Dollars in the hands of public 
 D= Deposits   
    = Deposits in dollar 
   = Local Bank Reserves (sum of required reserves and excess reserves) 
   
 = Dollar Bank Reserves (sum of required reserves and excess reserves) 
 d= public’s preference of local currency/deposit ratio 
   = Local bank reserves over deposit ratio 
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   = public’s preference of dollars/deposit ratio 
   
 = Dollar bank reserves over deposit ratio 
 DR = ratio of dollar deposit to local currency deposit 
    = money multiplier in a dollarised economy 
 
The money multiplier now depends also on    and on the dollarisation rate DR, assuming 
that   
  remains a policy variable. As a result, in case of dollarisation, in order to keep the control 
over the money supply, the monetarist model needs a number of (even stronger) additional 
assumptions: the dollarisation of the economy will have to stay constant in the short-term, and 
the public’s preference of maintaining a currency-deposit ratio will have to remain 
simultaneously constant for both currencies. In reality, dollarisation may increase or decrease in 
the economy as preferences change. Thus, dollarisation vindicates the Post-Keynesian criticism 
of the idea that money supply cannot be controlled. 
Third, following the critique of the IS-LM reviewed in section 2.3.1, I also show below 
the effects of dollarisation on the transmission of monetary policy. By adding the dollar 
component to the domestic supply in the money market schedule, I adapt the LM schedule to 
account for dollarisation as shown in Figure 2.3. 
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Figure 2.3: LM schedule in case of dollarisation 
 
 
In the bottom-left quadrant, providing that there is still more domestic currency than 
dollars in circulation, and that the dollar real interest rate is generally lower than the local interest 
rate, the economy will present two income levels Y
$
<Y. From the top left, the two levels of 
income match the total quantity of money in local currency and dollar terms (transaction 
dollarisation). Under the assumption that money supply (of both currencies) is fixed, and that, in 
equilibrium, money demand is the sum of transactions and speculative balances, the top right 
shows the levels of speculative money   
  and MSP  corresponding to the interest rates in both 
currencies in the bottom right. The figure in the bottom left quadrant represents two LM 
schedules, one for each currency. This shows how monetary policy is not able to control the 
dollarised part of the economy. In other words, even if the central bank can establish the interest 
54 
 
rate of the dollar reserve deposit of banks, it cannot decide the yield of the other dollar products. 
These are subject to the dollar interest rate that is determined by the Federal Reserve in the USA 
and in the capital market. 
Finally, in a dynamic context where the dollar supply varies (the dotted lines in the figure 
starts to shift) with trade and capital flows, transfers in and out between local currency and dollar 
will make multipliers, velocities and monetary aggregates (of both dollar and domestic currency) 
volatile. To further illustrate this point, let us consider the case of increasing dollarisation. If this 
is caused by persistent high inflation, then the LM
$
 schedule will converge to the LM schedule as 
the public exchanges local currency for dollars (or accumulates dollar and spends local 
currency). This puts pressure on the exchange rate which can exacerbate inflation if devaluation 
is significant. In this case, the central bank has the only choice of intervening in the exchange 
rate market to contain inflation and to discourage exchange rate speculations which would cause 
liquidity issues in the domestic banking system. 
The reminder part of this sub-section is dedicated to the New Keynesian framework: 
here, it appears that dollarisation can only enter into the model from the IS equation in the form 
of an exogenous variable. Dollarisation does not interfere in either the MP (in the formulation of 
the interest rate) nor in the AS schedules. 
To account for dollarisation within the New Keynesian framework, I derive the IS 
equation from the Banco Central de Reserva del Perú (BCRP) inflation targeting framework 
(Rossini and Vega, 2007). This will be further discussed in the empirical part. 
Thus, the modified IS equation will be: 
          π     
               (13) 
Where    is the real US interest rate and RER = e + (      10 
                                                 
10
 The real exchange rate (RER) is calculated as the nominal exchange rate (e) adjusted by the difference in inflation 
between the US (  ) and the domestic economies. 
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Therefore, the foreign real interest rate has a negative relationship with the growth rate; a 
positive shift in the exchange rate has a negative relationship with growth. In terms of variables 
this means that:  
                           (14) 
which can be transformed in  
r = g (y, E ,   , e,    )           (15) 
Now, I rewrite equation (7) of the monetarist model as follows: 
                        (16) 
Since the expected rate of depreciation in PPP terms depends on the differential of the 
domestic and foreign inflation, and that the exchange rate in terms of uncovered interest rate 
parity depends also on the foreign interest rate, it is possible to transform equation (16) as 
follows: 
              
               (17) 
By confronting equations (14) and (17), it is possible to conclude that the inclusion of 
dollarisation in the model confirms the similarities between Monetarists and New Keynesians: 
the novelty of the new consensus is the modified IS schedule to account for the effect of 
dollarisation. 
The inevitable conclusion is that, in order to avoid unexpected changes in the IS curve, 
the monetary authority has to smooth exchange rate fluctuations. This becomes part of the 
central bank’s optimisation problem, as confirmed by the empirical literature on transaction 
dollarisation: dollarisation contributes to exchange rate volatility and consequently undermines 
the chances of targeting domestic nominal prices. This forces the monetary authorities to 
intervene in the foreign exchange market in order to attempt an indirect stabilisation of domestic 
prices (for example, Artis and Gazioglu, 1986; Calvo and Vegh, 1992; Savastano, 1992). 
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To sum up, this section has revealed that, according to the conventional wisdom, central 
banks can conduct an independent monetary policy even in a partially dollarised economy. This 
section reviewed both monetarists’ monetary target and New Keynesians’ inflation target 
showing that the two frameworks incorporate dollarisation in similar ways, i.e. as an exogenous 
factor to add up in an open economy context. In essence, they both link dollarisation to exchange 
rate volatility (depreciation) in a mono-dimensional way. Therefore, within these models, the 
only way to control the disturbances created by dollarisation is to smooth the exchange rate 
volatility by intervening in the foreign exchange market. However, this leads to a policy 
dilemma. 
In conclusion, following mainstream theory, central banks have to face the dilemma of, 
on the one hand, intervening in the foreign exchange market to stabilise the economy, or, on the 
other hand, not intervening because a pure floating exchange rate regime, in the context of the IT 
framework, should lead the economy to de-dollarise. The issue of choosing the right exchange 
rate policy for CDDCs is the focus of the next sections. The theoretical chapter, chapter 3, will 
present an alternative conceptualisation of dollarisation which will then be used in chapter 5. 
 
2.4 Alternatives to the current policy paradigm: RER and PEP versus the IT target 
Just before the last commodity boom started in 2003, many CDDCs started to adopt the 
inflation targeting framework. At the turn of the century, monetary stability issues become more 
urgent since many developing countries gave up their nominal anchor provided by an exchange 
rate peg: within the choice of alternative nominal anchors such as nominal output, monetary 
targeting or inflation targeting, the latter predominated. In developed countries, exchange rate 
pegs and monetary targets were replaced by regimes based on implicit or explicit inflation 
targets. In general, developing countries, including the commodity dependent ones, moved in the 
same direction. 
Mainstream theory interprets this migration from exchange rate peg toward inflation 
targeting within its specific framework: with flexible exchange rates, the appreciation of the 
currency due to a commodity boom acts counter-cyclically, since profitability in the export 
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sector is eroded and domestic consumers enjoy lower imports prices. This automatic stabiliser 
implies an adjustment away from commodity producers (Clements and Fry, 2006). On the 
contrary, currency depreciation may lead to inflation because of the increased prices of imported 
goods. It also argues that, when financial markets are not well developed, the central bank may 
experience difficulties in sterilising foreign exchange reserves accumulated through its 
intervention. 
Furthermore, the migration towards inflation targeting also provides support to the so-called 
“two-corner hypothesis” according to which countries have been pushed to either fixed peg or 
free floating regimes (Frankel et al., 2001), dismissing intermediate arrangements (Fisher, 2001). 
However, most countries face the actual problem of mixing inflation and exchange rate 
objectives with a problem of combining inflation targeting with the flexibility of the exchange 
rate: in practice, not many countries adopt a pure free floating regime; we will see that Peru 
positions itself between the two corners. Generally a de jure free floating regime may still be 
tempered by central banks’ interventions because the market may push the exchange rate too far 
from its underlying economic fundamentals, the so-called “fear of floating” (Calvo and Reinhart, 
2002). A difference between de jure and de facto exchange rate regimes, then, is detectable in 
case of significant interventions by the central bank. These interventions are explained by the 
“exchange rate protectionism”: a country protects its tradable goods sector relative to the non-
tradable goods by forcing its exchange rate to devalue or contrasting its appreciation via 
intervention (Corden, 1981; Masalila and Motshidis, 2003). South Korea has implemented this 
kind of policy after the 1997-8 financial crisis (Eichengreen, 2004). On the contrary, depreciation 
can have a negative impact on the capital account when dollarised liabilities are accumulated 
because of the “original sin” (Eichengreen et al., 2003).11 
However, the current monetary policy fails to propose a proper counter-cyclical approach, 
which, during a commodity boom, should encourage a movement towards a more balanced 
productive structure by diversifying away from the commodity sector. It is the struggle to turn 
around a “commodity curse” (Sacks and Warner, 1997) into a strength that, because of the poor 
economic performances of CDDCs, led to the so-called “commodity trap” literature (Deaton, 
                                                 
11
 This is defined as “the inability of a country to borrow abroad in its own currency” (Eichengreen et al. 2003, p. 
3). Dollarised liabilities or the outstanding external debt increases in local term under devaluation. 
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1999; UNCTAD, 2002).
12
 By the same token, export diversification is even more important 
during periods of recession caused by falling commodity prices: increasing traditional primary 
export may further depress the market, resulting in a continuous self-destructive deterioration of 
the terms of trade.  
Counter-cyclical monetary policy would play an essential role in the way out of 
underdevelopment. Consensus has been criticised by the supporters of RER target: 
“The intra-cycle movement of the real exchange rate should be instrumental to ensuring 
competitiveness of a country’s burgeoning industries and sectors. Adopting clean floating 
generates the nominal exchange rate movement pro-cyclical to the major export product 
price – an appreciation in the upturn and a depreciation in the downturn of the cycle. There 
is no guarantee that clean floating makes the real exchange rate converge to the one that 
could serve the overriding objective of diversification” (Nissanke, 1993, p. 65). 
In this section, I emphasise the issues associated with the IT framework in relation to the 
characteristics of CDDCs. Here, the focus is not on the IT in general, but it is rather on the 
adjustments to macroeconomic mechanisms related to commodity price shocks typical of 
CDDCs. First, these are reviewed under the IT framework, and, second, I compare the results 
with the alternative Real Exchange Rate (RER) targeting. A detailed comparison between 
inflation targeting and RER is presented in section 2.4.2. This comparison allows me to tease out 
the pro-cyclicality of the IT framework and consequently, its inadequacy for CDDCs. The 
section concludes with an analysis of advantages and disadvantages of the RER target relatively 
to inflation target and will introduce a further comparison between the two alternatives to 
inflation target, namely managed RER and Peg Export Price (PEP). 
To conclude, the effects of the commodity curse can be reduced through the adoption of 
RER targeting which may be a more sensible option for many CDDCs. However, a 
diversification of the commodity basket is an effective solution to both long-term decline and 
                                                 
12
 Among the causes of the commodity curse, the supply management argument maintains that the price fall of 
commodity prices during the 1980s was mostly the result of the increase in supply relatively to a stable demand 
(Maizels et al., 1997). As a consequence, many countries applied structural adjustment programs that allowed their 
currencies to depreciate. This, in turn, encouraged greater exports to cover the trade balance, causing commodity 
price deflation. 
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volatility of commodity prices; the increase of non-traditional exports, and so a radical 
diversification, remains the final long term strategy for development. This argument will be 
taken up in the concluding chapter. 
 
2.4.1 The new-consensus on monetary policy stance and the control of inflation 
This section is a brief introduction to the next sub-section which compares IT and RER 
targets by originally formulating both models in equation terms. The new-consensus on 
monetary policy analysed in the previous section is what central banks around the world tend to 
adopt. Inflation targeting is defined in the New Keynesian Perspective as a monetary policy 
carried by interest rate movements which are non-neutral in the real economy given the 
assumption of nominal price rigidities. The interest rates movement are established by the 
monetary authority’s reaction function which results from an optimisation problem, it minimises 
a loss function on the squared differences of inflation and its target, and of the observed and 
potential output (see equation 6 above). 
The adoption of a monetary rule for an open economy has been obtained by extending the 
original formulation developed for the USA (Taylor, 2001; Clarida et al., 2001). It is a two sector 
(tradable and non-tradable) model of a small economy in which domestic and foreign goods are 
imperfect substitutes. The increase of domestic real interest rates determines an appreciation 
(thus the term-of-trade changes) that induces an expenditure switching effect on demand. The 
term-of-trade is positively correlated with the output gap. 
Since this framework has been developed for closed developed economies, it does not 
include commodity prices: monetary rules tend to measure inflation net of commodity prices. For 
instance, core inflation does not consider energy or food prices (Frankel, 2006). Among the 
different choices of price targets, the domestic consumer price index has been preferred to export 
prices because in large industrialised countries instability is associated more with domestic 
factors. However, as shown in the previous section, export prices are likely to be more 
destabilising than domestic prices in CDDCs.  
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2.4.2 Comparing IT and RER: macro adjustments to trade shocks and path to 
development 
The present sub-section illustrates some critical considerations which will be further 
developed in the empirical part, namely the comparison between two different policy proposals 
IT versus RER stabilisation. Following Edwards (1985), below I express the relevant economic 
relations in terms of variables, parameters and equations in order to compare and contrast IT in 
relation to RER under different trade shock scenarios. This exercise will lead to the conclusion 
that RER stabilisation is the preferred exchange rate policy. 
 
Variables 
NS = Nominal Exchange Rate is defined as domestic currency units per unit of foreign currency 
T= Terms-of-Trade  
im
otc
Nim
Nex
I
E
P
PP
SP
SP
P
P
T
)1(
/
/  
   (18) 
EP =price of exports in foreign currency 
exP = price of exports in local currency 
IP =price of imports in foreign currency 
imP = price of imports in local currency 
CP = price of commodity in foreign currency 
cP = price of commodity in local currency 
OTP = price of other tradables in foreign currency 
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otP = price of other tradables in local currency 
fT
P = price of tradables of the foreign economy 
TP = price of tradables of the local economy 
fN
P = price of non-tradables of the foreign economy 
NP = price of non-tradables of the local economy 
dP = general price level of the domestic economy 
fP = general price level of the foreign economy 
M = nominal money  
Y  = real income 
R= Foreign reserves 
C= domestic credit as sum of loans to commercial banks and government claims 
F= fiscal deficit or government borrowing 
O= other assets of central bank excluding government claims 
tx = rest of factors influencing exchange rate 
cQ = quantity of commodities sold 
ti = rest of factors generating real income 
T = tax on commodity revenues  
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t = other government income 
G= government spending 
 
Parameters 
1 = weight of reserves related to changes in M (see eq.19)  
2 =weight of reserves related to changes in CP (see eq.19) 
 = weight of balance of R relative to C (see eq.20) 
1 =weight of F (see eq.21) 2 =weight of O (see eq.21) 
α= weight of the non-tradable sector. Where 0 < α <1, such as if α=0 there is only tradable sector 
(see eq.22) 
β= weight of the non-tradable sector for the foreign economy (see eq.18) 
 =weight of import traded goods. Where 0 <   <1, such as if  =0 no goods are imported (see 
eq.23) 
 =weight of M (see eq.24) 
 =weight of Y (see eq.24)  
 = weight of the commodity export sector in the total export sector (see eq.28) 
 
One of the key instruments of the new-consensus monetary policy, with respect to the 
trading sector, is the management of foreign currency reserves. The central bank accumulates R 
thanks to the increased commodity revenues due to a higher Pc. In this way, a buffer is built to 
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defend the currency from depreciation during the burst periods. However, reserves also reflect 
money supply through the money multiplier. Thus, foreign reserves is a function of money and 
commodity prices: 
CPMR 21            (19) 
A change in reserves has an impact on nominal money forcing the central bank to 
sterilise. This has an influence on the domestic credit: 
CRM )1(  
         (20) 
Inflation targeting implies an independent central bank to avoid government pressure and 
keep borrowing costs low. However, domestic credit creation is linked to fiscal deficit. This can 
be considered exogenous since revenues heavily depend on commodities exports: 
C= 1 F + 2 O  (21)    Where GtPTQF cc   (21b) 
The adoption of stabilisation funds is a way of allowing commodity prices to endogenise 
fiscal policy (Budnevich, 2002), so that these funds can be used in a counter-cyclical way. 
I will now compare the consequences of trade shocks (i.e. imports and exports price 
shocks), for IT and RER respectively. 
Inflation targeting as a nominal anchor 
Import Price shock (import price increase) 
An increase of import prices PI deteriorates the terms-of-trade (equation 18), if SN does 
not compensate negatively (appreciation). An increase of PI induces an increase of domestic 
inflation dP  in both tradable (sum of commodity sector and other-tradable) and non-tradable 
sectors which can be defined below: 
TNd PPP )1(          (22) 
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Where the price of tradable is 
eximT PPP )1(          (23) 
And the price of non-tradable is 
YMPP TN          (24) 
Where the price of tradables in local terms is a direct source of inflation for the non-tradable 
sector.
13
 The real income is given by the commodity revenue (quantity sold times price) and 
other factors: 
tcc iPQY          (25) 
During a commodity boom, inflation tends to increase because of the income effect in the 
non-tradable sector (equation 24). Higher nominal interest rates are required, generating a 
nominal exchange rate appreciation (decrease of SN and temporary improvement of the terms-of-
trade). However, this induces an expenditure switching negative effect on demand: a reduction of 
economic activity and cheaper imports bring inflation down, but may generate a new 
deterioration of the trade balance if the appreciation influences the volume of exports. 
Export Price shock (commodity price decline) 
A negative EP shock (decrease of export price), given mainly by a drop in the commodity 
price C
P
, deteriorates T. In a free-floating exchange rate regime the commodity-currency link is:
 
14
 
tCN xPS           (26) 
                                                 
13
 This is the definition used by Edward (1985) which reflects a monetarist stance. 
14
 A commodity currency is defined as a currency of a commodity-exporting country whose value has a strong 
correlation with commodity prices. Most of the empirical evidence has been written following econometric models 
of co-integration between a trade weighted basket of commodity prices and its country real exchange rate (Cashin et 
al., 2003). 
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Currency depreciates as the commodity price decreases. However, the effect of 
depreciation in the aftermath of a commodity burst may induce upward pressure on inflation due 
to the increase of import prices as imNI
PSP 
; depreciation may facilitate exports of other 
tradables (as OT
P
 decrease), the expansion of which is difficult to implement during a period of 
lower commodity revenues, especially if the decrease of commodity prices is due to lower global 
growth. Furthermore, when prices of the exported commodities start to turn downwards, 
international credit availability diminishes as a result of the expected decrease of income 
revenues. This pushes bond yields up making re-financing more expensive while credit agencies 
downgrade the country. In extreme cases, the IMF becomes the only available refinancing 
option. 
 
Real Exchange Rate as a real anchor 
Similarly to the N
S
, here the RER ( RS ) is defined in such a way that an increase of the 
index represents a depreciation in real terms. Stabilising the real exchange rate means targeting 
the product of the nominal exchange rate and the ratio of foreign prices to domestic prices: 
d
f
NR
P
P
SS 
  (27)  Where   TN
fTfN
d
f
PP
PP
P
P
)1(
)1(





  (28) 
Similarly to the previous section, it is important to understand the adjustment mechanism 
to trade shocks in the case of RER targeting. 
 
Import Price shock (import price increase) 
If RER has to remain constant (or within a band), when f
P
increases there are two 
possible adjustments: first, N
S
 needs to decrease (appreciation consistently with IT), otherwise 
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there are gains in competitiveness because RS  increases too (real depreciation). Second, d
P
 
needs to increase to retain RS = constant (maintain competition) and N
S
= constant (maintain 
stable nominal exchange rate). 
The conclusion is that an optimisation problem arises when choosing between stabilising 
either inflation or nominal exchange rate. That is, if foreign prices increase, in order to keep 
export competitive, local prices need to rise when the nominal appreciation is limited to favour 
exports.
 
A series of studies have analysed this trade-off in the 1990s (see, for example, Montiel 
and Ostry, 1991); a cash-in-advance model based on a simple representative-consumer explains 
that targeting a more depreciated RER requires higher inflation today than in the future (Calvo et 
al., 1995). In conclusion, a managed RER regime provides more stable terms-of-trade, and can 
allow continuing development of the other-tradable sector during a commodity boom. 
 
Export Price shock (commodity price decline) 
A decrease in C
P
, given that f
P
is exogenous and generally less volatile than C
P
, implies a 
lower domestic inflation pressure due to lower revenues. That translates in a RS  depreciation. 
Similarly to the IT case, because of the commodity-currency behaviour, this is re-enforced by a 
higher N
S
(depreciation) in case of floating exchange rate regime: depreciation should favour the 
export of other-tradables, but, in practice, it may re-enforce the decline of commodity prices in 
the case of over-supply. This is the reason why the development of the other-tradables sector 
becomes a crucial strategy that would allow a shift from commodity revenues dependence to a 
more diversified source of income. 
 
2.5 Comparing the alternatives to IT: PEP and managed RER targets 
Once advantages and disadvantages of the managed RER relatively to the IT regime have 
been clarified in the previous section, this section reviews two policy proposals alternative to IT 
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and it is organised as follows. First, Frankel’s PEP (Peg the Export Price) idea is discussed in 
both the nominal and the real versions. I made these two explicit since this distinction is not 
always clear in his writings (Frankel, 1999; 2003); second, I derive a managed RER regime; 
third, the latest Frankel’s adjusted proposition (Peg the Export Price Index) will be considered 
(Frankel, 2005). Finally, I will concentrate on the capital account and how financial development 
influences the two alternative proposals of PEP and managed RER. 
 
2.5.1 Frankel’s proposal (PEP) 
To avoid the case of export price shock described in the previous sub-sections, Frankel 
(1999, 2003) proposes a way to stabilise commodity revenues by pegging the exchange rate to 
the commodity price, or index of a basket of commodity prices. This solution has never been 
implemented; however empirical simulations show its effect (Frankel, 2002; Setser, 2007). I will 
run some simulations for Peru in the empirical part of the thesis. 
However, this solution presents a number of problems: firstly, other variables such as 
inflation and the exchange rate will be influenced by the volatility of the commodity exported 
which does not guarantee nominal stability. Also, commodity prices are difficult to forecast (see 
section 2.2). As a result, even though PEP automatically overcomes shocks due the price of the 
commodity exported, it fails in dealing with other external or internal shocks. Therefore, in order 
to maintain external balance, the government is forced either to adopt fiscal contraction to reduce 
demand for import or to borrow to fund imports. Under a prolonged pressure, this may force the 
abandonment of the peg. So, if initially the commitment to the peg may be perceived as credible 
by traders and investors, it may not be so at a later stage. 
Secondly, as the tradable sector is the sum of the commodity sector and other-tradable: 
otcT PPP )1(           (29) 
By pegging the exchange rate to the commodity export price, it is assumed that   (the 
weight of the commodity export sector in the total export sector) is almost equal to one: the 
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volatility of the commodity price is transmitted to the exchange rate and the increased instability 
of the exchange rate disrupts the development of the other-tradable sector. Furthermore, if 
inflation is dominant in the non-tradable sector, Nd
PP 
 because α=1 (equation 22), then an 
increase of the export commodity sector may lead to Dutch disease. 
Lastly, if all countries apply this proposal simultaneously, commodity prices become 
endogenous. As a consequence of the fall in commodity prices, then currency depreciations 
imposed by the pegs can lead to global increase in exports (supply) which depresses the price 
further (Maizels et al., 1997). 
 
Pegging exchange rate to the nominal export price (nominal anchor) 
I will now show the impact of the PEP proposal on the real exchange rate. Frankel’s main 
objective is to peg the export price in order to guarantee constant revenues in local currency 
terms. Below I formulate the relevant relations for a commodity dependent country: 
exP = constant=k  
but, given NEex SPP    then 
CEN PkPkS //          (30) 
It is necessary to note that the basic relations and the logic are those of Frankel (1999; 2003) but 
the taxonomy follows Edwards (1985) as in the rest of this section. 
 
Substituting into the real exchange rate equation (27), and considering equations (22) and (24): 
YMP
P
P
k
PYMP
P
P
k
PP
P
P
k
P
P
SS
T
f
CTT
f
CTN
f
Cd
f
NR
 





)1()()1(
 (31) 
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For simplicity of illustration it is better to consider the reciprocal of (31) and use equation (29): 






















fff
ot
f
cC
fff
TC
f
TC
R P
Y
P
M
P
P
P
P
k
P
P
Y
P
M
P
P
k
P
P
YMP
k
P
S
 )1(1
(32) 
In summary: 
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          [a] [b]      [c]       [d] 
This means that the difference between the real exchange rate and the nominal exchange 
rate is determined by the term between parentheses. This is given by the sum of four sectors: [a] 
the commodity sector which is determined by its price, [b] the other-tradables sector determined 
by its price, [c] the monetary sector determined by the supply and demand for money and [d] the 
real sector defined by the real income. 
 
Pegging exchange rate to the real commodity price (real anchor) 
To overcome the problem of the terms-of-trade deterioration in case of high domestic 
inflation, as it tends to happen in the case of IT previously discussed, Frankel (2003) seems to 
prefer a real target. This is the main idea of the second proposal. Therefore, the exchange rate is 
pegged to the commodity price and discounted by domestic inflation. In this way, a generalised 
inflation trend, which affects both the domestic and foreign economies, does not influence the 
peg. The peg follows the real detachment of the commodity price relatively to other prices. The 
real exchange rate is defined as: 
RS = -k 
d
C
P
P
           (34) 
Thus, I transform the real exchange rate as in the previous case: 
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It is possible to obtain a reciprocal form analogous to equation (33): 
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In summary: 
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But if real income is mostly given by the commodity sector, so we can disregard ti in equation 
(25), then: 
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This result in equation (39): 
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This means that the reciprocal of the real exchange rate is pegged to the term between 
parentheses. In the case of equation (37), this is given by the sum of four terms: [a] the nominal 
exchange rate, [b] the other-tradables sector determined by its price, [c] the monetary sector 
determined by the supply and demand for money and [d] the real sector defined by the real 
income. In the extreme case of a single sector economy, the reduced version, equation (39), 
merges the term [d] with the nominal exchange rate, since real income is determined by the 
volatility of the nominal exchange rate if production is constant. 
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In order to compare the various proposals in sub-section 2.5.3, I now formulate, using the 
same taxonomy and method, the third proposal based on the managed RER. 
 
2.5.2 The way out of commodity curse: managed RER (Edwards) 
Nissanke (1993) suggests a way to pursue RER stabilisation by keeping the real exchange 
rate in a range: 
“… a modified PPP crawl can be a most practical framework to follow, whereby the 
nominal exchange rate is altered with regularity to keep the real exchange rate constant with 
several discretionary provisos incorporated to allow an adjustment in response to permanent 
real shocks” (pp.66-67). 
Without designing the ex-post NS adjustment process in detail, it is likely that the 
intervention in the foreign exchange market will be frequent to allow small movements in order 
to maintain the currency volatility under control. The periodical manipulation of NS allows to 
keep the RER around its target. 
This type of proposal is consistent with the definition Edwards (1985) provides for the 
real exchange rate even though he “uses the 1970-vintage Chicago definition of the real 
exchange rate as the price of traded goods in terms of the price of non-traded goods” 
(Williamson, 1994, p.14).
15
 
Edwards’ definition is: 
N
fT
NR
P
P
SS       (40) 
Thus, following the same process of transformation used for the previous proposals: 
                                                 
15
 Williamson (1994) further comments on the mainstream character of Edwards’ work: “This definition seems 
natural to those who have worked primarily with non industrial countries whose exports are predominantly primary 
products subject to the low of one price, and whose export volume is determined by the supply offered on the world 
market at a parametric world price rather than by the demand forthcoming at a quoted price. In such an economy 
the relative price of non-tradable goods determined the incentive to produce exports” (pp.14-15). 
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The reciprocal is: 
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The final equation is very similar to equation (33); this means that the difference between 
the real exchange rate and the nominal exchange rate is determined by the term between 
parentheses. In this case too, the latter is given by the sum of four sectors: [a] the commodity 
sector which is determined by its price, [b] the other-tradables sector determined by its price, [c] 
the monetary sector determined by the supply and demand for money and [d] the real sector 
defined by the real income. 
 
2.5.3 Analysis and comparison of the stability properties of each proposal 
I will now compare each proposal starting from the equations previously derived. The 
sub-sections are organised as follows: firstly, I compare RER with nominal PEP versus managed 
RER (Edwards); secondly, I compare RER with real PEP versus managed RER (Edwards); 
finally, for completion, I will analyse the Edwards/Frankel’s PEPI proposal. 
 
RER with nominal PEP target versus managed RER (Edwards) 
The drawbacks of Frankel’s nominal target have been highlighted before, but in this 
section additional considerations will be drawn on the RER: the only difference between 
equation (33) and (42) are the terms inside the parenthesis. The two equations become identical 
when two conditions are satisfied simultaneously. 
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Firstly, they are identical when ffT
PP 
, which is possible when the inflation of the 
non-tradable foreign sector is zero, or very low. This means that the trading partners of the 
commodity dependent developing country are developed countries capable to adopt IT when the 
price of non-tradable is kept low (in reality, consumer goods are often imported from 
industrialised countries which may have adopted IT successfully). The second condition is 
verified when α=1, which occurs when the domestic inflation is caused only by the non-tradable 
sector. 
In summary, the two equations become identical when domestic inflation is only due to 
non-tradables and foreign inflation only due to tradables. However, in Frankel’s proposal the 
price of tradables can create inflationary problems because N
S
 reflects the commodity price 
volatility, thus this volatility is transmitted to imported consumption good prices. For this reason, 
it is likely that this type of peg does not guarantee a stable nominal anchor, thus α is generally 
much lower than one. 
In this interpretation, the two proposals are different only in the N
S
management which 
emphasises, as previously noted, the different objectives of the two solutions (commodity 
revenue stabilisation versus exports diversification).  
The comparison between the two proposals is summarised in the next comparative box 
(Table 2.1) in which the stability properties of each term of the two different targets are shown. 
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Table 2.1: Comparative box 1 between RER with nominal PEP and managed RER 
 RER with nominal PEP target Managed RER (Edwards) 











fff
ot
f
c
NR P
Y
P
M
P
P
P
P
SS
 )1(11
(33) 









fTfTfT
ot
fT
c
NR P
Y
P
M
P
P
P
P
SS
 )1(
11
(42) 
  
NS  It is pegged to CP , so it reflects its volatility. NS  
It is adjusted ex-post with regularity to keep the RER constant. This 
implicitly means that NS volatility can be smoothed. 
f
c
P
P
 
This term is affected by stabilisation as cP  is maintained 
constant. fT
c
P
P
 
This term maintains same volatility of CP , given that NCc SPP 
,unless NS  compensates. Clearly, the instability of this term becomes 
less relevant for the real economy if the domestic economy shifts 
towards a more diversified export mix in which  decreases. 
f
ot
P
P)1( 
 
This term is stable only in a mono-export sector (commodity) 
economy where   is almost one. Otherwise, given that
COTNOTot PkPSPP /  , is unstable discouraging the 
development of the other tradable sector. 
fT
ot
P
P)1( 
 
This term is the object of stabilisation. It is more stable because 
targeting the Real Exchange Rate maintains the other-tradable 
sector competitive. 
fP
M
 
In order to maintain the peg, reserves will have similar 
volatility of commodity prices. This may have a significant 
impact on domestic credit. (See eq. 19 and 20). Depending on 
the degree of financial development the change in reserves can 
be sterilised. However, this term represents a source of 
instability because of reserves volatility (more in the next 
section). 
fT
P
M
 
The adjustment mechanism ex-post of NS determines the volatility of 
reserves. However, in a managed currency regime this term should be 
more stable than the other proposal. Financial deepening is less crucial 
in terms of sterilisation issues; however some form of capital control 
maybe needed to protect the peg. 
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Y
 
This term is the object of stabilisation objective relative to 
commodity revenues. If α is close to one, as the price of 
non-tradable is more influential for inflation, then this 
term became similar to the other proposal. If the 
NS
volatility is transmitted to tradable prices, then α 
decreases reducing the oscillation of this term. 
 
fT
P
Y
 
In this term commodity revenues follow the path of the commodity 
cycle. This term will be more unstable in the short-run because income 
reflects commodity prices fluctuation, more stable in the long-run 
when economy is more diversified. 
Nominal income is stable when the all process, which involves also 
NS , has reached a more balanced equilibrium. 
Note: in bold is highlighted the stabilisation objective.        Table 2.1: Continued 
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RER with real PEP target versus managed RER (Edwards) 
This section is dedicated to the comparison of the two real targeting proposals 
summarised by the equations (37) and (42).  
Three general observations are relevant here. Firstly, observing the denominators of both 
equations, if we assume that fT
P
(mainly manufacturing) is less volatile than C
P
, then the terms 
of the equations (42) are supposed to be more stable than those in equation (37). Secondly, the 
variable N
S
nearly disappears in the Frankel’ proposal: it becomes a less important source of 
volatility given that is pegged to C
P
. Thirdly, considerations on α remain the same as in the 
previous section. 
In the next box the stability properties of each term of the two different targets are compared in 
detail. 
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Table 2.2: Comparative box 2 between RER with real PEP and managed RER 
 
 RER with real PEP target managed RER (Edwards) 
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 One variable less in this solution means that there is an easier 
optimisation problem especially if equation (39) is considered.  
NS  
This variable multiplies all terms, therefore becomes relevant in 
addition to real exchange rate target the adoption of a managed 
nominal exchange rate policy.
16
 
NS  The volatility impact of the exchange rate which is pegged to 
commodities declines as the economy shifts away from 
commodity dependence.  
fT
c
P
P
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T is the object of stabilisation. Thus this term benefits from 
the RER targeting even tough 

is supposed to decrease 
over time. 
C
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It is a volatile ratio because of the denominator. This term 
shows that otP is affected by the volatility of commodity prices 
if the structure of the economy shifts more towards other-
tradable. 
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Clearly this term is less volatile and allows for a progressive 
                                                 
16
 There is a case when N
S
 and RER management are almost incompatible. For example, if a deflation trend develops in foreign countries, then competitiveness 
is guaranteed by nominal devaluation. If the devaluation does not facilitate importing lower foreign prices, but the general domestic price level remains sticky 
then further and further depreciation is needed to maintain the export sector competitive.  
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decrease of  

 moving towards other tradable. 
CP
M
  
Regarding foreign reserves volatility and the importance of 
financial development, same considerations of the previous 
comparison are valid. However, the volatility of M caused by 
reserves fluctuation due to C
P
volatility is smoothed thanks to 
the denominator which is the source of the volatility.  The 
variation of nominal money is sort of “standardised”. 
fT
P
M
  
Same considerations of the previous comparison are valid. See 
Table 2.1. 
CP
Y
  
From equation (39) this term can be almost reduced to an 
additional parameter to add to NS when the economy is 
very commodity dependent. As far as the economy becomes 
more diversified this term adds unwanted disturbances. 
fT
P
Y
  
Same considerations of the previous comparison are valid. See 
Table 2.1. 
Note: in bold is highlighted the stabilisation objective.         Table 2.2: Continued 
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Frankel’s PEPI proposal 
For the sake of completeness, this sub-section reviews the Peg Export Price Index (PEPI). 
Frankel (2005) extended his proposal for the case of countries which produce and export more 
than one commodity. Commodity prices do not necessarily co-move (see section 2.2); the 
exchange rate moves following the price of the major commodity exported, it can negatively 
influence the revenue of another uncorrelated commodity sector. For this reason, the peg needs 
to be set as an index with weights calculated for each significant commodity revenue. 
Furthermore, this solution works as inflation anchor better than PEP: the exchange rate will be 
less volatile because the volatility of a single commodity price is diversified away by the other 
components of the index. However, the higher the number of weights policy makers consider, 
the less effective the peg becomes to stabilise the income flows related to a particular 
commodity. 
Thus, the nominal PEPI would be created in the following way: 
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The real PEPI would be: 
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2
2
1
1 
d
C
d
C
P
P
k
P
P
k        (44) 
where: 
1CP = Price of commodity 1 in foreign currency 
2CP =Price of commodity 2 in foreign currency 
1k = Weight of peg in relation to commodity one 
2k = Weight of peg in relation to commodity two 
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An additional advantage of this proposal is that weights can be adjusted to benefit one sector 
relatively to another. This can be applied to a minor commodity sector or it can be extended to 
other tradables. In terms of diversification, this multidimensional approach allows the addition of 
a possible manufacturing sector in order to encourage infant industry. The central bank needs to 
add an additional weight for a specific industry, so that the nominal index becomes 
M
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And the real exchange rate can be written as 
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where 
MP = Price of the manufactured commodity in foreign currency 
Mk = Weight of peg in relation to the manufacturing commodity 
 
In the case of PEPI with the infant manufacturing industry sector, the price of tradable TP  is 
given by a new version of equation (29) as 
ototMMccT PPPPP   ...2211               (47) 
Thus the RER is given by 
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The last equation points to the increasing complexity of the formulation, and thus the 
analysis, of the real exchange rate; it underlines the crucial task of the central bank to define all 
the weights in order to avoid macro-mismanagement of the economy. However, once the new 
framework has been established, the PEPI proposal offers a better anchor to inflation (relatively 
to PEP) and a possible tool to promote diversification by manipulating the weights.   
A final shortcoming to this proposal, however, which is relevant to the subsequent 
discussion, concerns the diversification of the export basket. In the case of Peru, this proposal 
could have limited applicability since more than half of the export basket has shown similar price 
trends (they are mainly metals) with significant co-movements. 
 
2.5.4 How financial development influences the two alternative targets 
In the development and analysis of the previous proposals there is the assumption that the 
stabilisation of inflation or the real exchange rate is managed by the balance sheet of the central 
bank. However, some factors are rather affected by financial development.  
The mainstream literature on the effects of financial intermediation on economic activity can 
be classified into two opposite viewpoints: the empirical growth literature (efficient allocation of 
savings) and the banking and currency crisis literature (destabilisation and fragility, where 
monetary aggregates, such as domestic credit, are among the best predictors for crises) (Loayza 
and Ranciere, 2005). The first view empirically illustrates the positive effect of increases in 
private domestic credit on GDP (King and Levine, 1993).
17
 The second view argues that credit 
expansion is strongly associated with financial and currency crises (Kamisky and Reinhart, 
1999). The two respective sets of policy advocate financial liberalisation on the one side 
(Roubini and Sala-i-Martin, 1992) and restrictions on the other (Gavin and Hausmann, 1998). 
More specifically, with respect to the link between financial development and real exchange 
rate, capital inflow (outflow) causes real exchange rate appreciation (depreciation) in late 1970s 
and early 1980s in Chile, Argentina, Mexico and Venezuela (Harbenger, 1985). However, the 
                                                 
17
 Domestic credit is measured by M2/reserves in Calvo and Mendoza (1996). 
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degree of appreciation varies across countries (e.g. in Latin America more than in Asia) (Calvo 
el al., 1996); also, less financially developed countries, it is argued, should opt for less flexible 
exchange rate regimes (Aghion et al., 2006).
18
  
The inclusion of the capital flows in the formulation of the exchange rate must be 
reflected in equation (9), which becomes 
tCN uKPS           (26b) 
where  K = capital flows 
Thus, there is an extra variable which needs to be managed in order to maintain the 
stabilisation objectives described above. For this reason, some form of capital control is probably 
needed. This is well explained by the “impossible trilemma” which postulates the impossible 
coexistence of fixed exchange rate, total capital mobility and monetary policy independence 
(Mundell, 1963). Therefore, with a pegged or highly managed exchange rate, the central bank 
loses its control on interest rates: an interest rate hike would attract capital flows which offset the 
action of the central bank. 
To see how financial development may affects the previous analysis, parameters and 
ratios of equations (20), (21) and (21b) need to be reconsidered in case of capital mobility: 
1)  2 in equation (21) becomes more relevant as other credit (O) is influenced by capital 
flows in terms of both quantity and price (rates). Thus, there is a direct influence on 
money supply.  
2) Real income is affected by the change in money supply and its velocity. Financial 
products may become available, shifting consumer behaviour via inter-temporal choices 
and wealth effect. 
3) Government budget is affected. Counter-cyclical spending will have to take into 
consideration the impact of capital flows in the economy. 
                                                 
18
 “the more financially developed a country is, the better it will do with a more flexible exchange rate. The volatility 
of real shocks relative to financial shocks also matters…” (Aghion et al., 2006, p.3). On the contrary, the orthodox 
literature states that greater is the relative volatility the more flexible should be its exchange rate. Financial 
development is defined as private domestic credit /GDP or liquid liabilities/GDP. 
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Effects on Frankel’s proposal 
While the exchange rate is pegged to the export price, capital flows will create an additional 
element of disturbance. The amount of reserves has to mirror the change in capital flows to 
maintain the peg, equation (19) becomes 
KPMR C 321          (49) 
Therefore, the management of reserves becomes potentially even more unstable compared to 
what was shown in the Table 2.1 (comparison boxes 1) and Table 2.2 (comparison boxes 2) (see 
the analysis of the term
CP
M
  ): the volatility of M is affected by both changes in C and R as per 
equation (20). In addition, the real income Y, and thus the term
CP
Y
 , is affected by the more 
unstable nominal money which can cause 
NP  fluctuation as per equation (24). The conclusion is 
that some sort of capital control would be welcomed. 
Effects on managed RER proposal 
The fact that NS needs to be managed ex-post in order to keep volatility low implicitly points to 
the idea that capital controls are needed also in this case. However, some capital flows in the 
form of direct investment can be allowed for the development of the other-tradable sector which 
is the primary objective of the monetary policy. This may accelerate the process towards a more 
stable Y. 
 
2.6 The Real exchange rate as a developmental tool: effects on firms investment 
Since targeting the real exchange rate appears to be the preferable choice, in this section of 
the literature review it is worth investigating how the real exchange rate has been seen as a 
developmental tool. The effects of a managed exchange rate on the development of the economy 
will be at the centre of the investigation in the empirical part of this thesis. 
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The literature on the exchange rate as a developmental tool is generally based on 
equilibrium theories aimed to define undervaluation or overvaluation, low volatility and high 
volatility. Consequently, there are different views on the allegedly correct competitive real 
exchange rate level and why this is not delivered by market forces. The theoretical analysis of 
the channels through which real exchange rate levels could affect economic growth and 
development is relatively recent. The real exchange rate has not been at the centre of classical 
economic growth theories (e.g. Lewis, 1954) or the neoclassical growth models
19
 or even the 
Keynesian models (Kaldor, 1957). In reality, the first growth models have been developed for 
closed economy, and they have just been extended to open economies at a later stage. The 
export-led growth model adds the distinction between tradable and non-tradable sectors and the 
impact of demand and supply conditions (Eichengreen, 2008). The introduction of externalities 
such as spillovers and learning-by-doing overlooked the exchange rate (Frenkel and Taylor, 
2006). Also,the developments of intra-country trade flow analysis of Economic Geography did 
not expand on the role of the exchange rate. In this literature, factor prices and the location of 
production are important determinants of trade flows (Overman et al., 2001) while the role of 
exchange rate is not taken into account. The only literature that mentions some theoretical 
aspects is a recent one that deals with policy advice (Dooley et al., 2005; Bresser-Pereira, 2004; 
Eichengreen, 2008). 
The empirical literature on the relevance of the exchange rate focuses on two main areas, the 
level and the volatility of the real exchange rate. From this emerges the consensus view that a 
combination of a stable and competitive exchange rate should enable a country to spur growth 
and development by capitalising labour force, savings and foreign direct investment 
(Eichengreen, 2008). 
On the one hand, the level of the real exchange rate is considered in relation to a policy 
orientated toward undervaluation which stimulates export-led growth. The debate on the 
exchange rate generally addresses the question of what is its correct value which guarantees the 
maximisation of the rate of growth (Williamson, 2007). The costs are political tensions between 
countries, accumulation of low-yielding foreign reserves and, possibly, inflation. The level of the 
real exchange rate may be affected by the particular absorption of the economy due to different 
                                                 
19
 See Romer (1994) for an overview. 
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spending characteristics of the public sector (which tends to increase more non-tradable prices 
with infrastructure spending) relatively to the private sector (which tends to increase more 
tradable prices) (Eichengreen, 2008). Some studies recognise that the depreciation of the 
exchange rate needs to happen for a significant length of time in order to produce an impact. For 
example, Rodrik (1993) notices that an induced depreciation in Korea during the 1957-59 was 
eroded by inflation, but a second and lasting depreciation in 1962-64 had benefits on growth. 
On the other hand, the debate around the volatility of the nominal exchange rate evolves on 
the possible consequences which may discourage trade and investment. However, the link is not 
proven. Ghosh et al. (1997) find no relation in a sample of 136 countries during 1960-89, and 
Bailliu et al. (2001) report that a relation exists. More specifically on the RER, a positive relation 
is reported by Dollar (1992), Hausmann and Gavin (1995) and Belke and Kaas (2004), but this is 
contradicted by Ghura and Greenes (1993) and Bleany and Greenaway (2001). 
The inconclusiveness of these results highlights the difficulties of cross-country studies 
based on different periods and different ways of measuring the real exchange rate. Moreover, 
various specification problems may arise: for example, Aghion et al. (2006) combine the effect 
of volatility with financial fragility as this can have a dramatic cost in terms of growth. Thus, not 
only volatility matters but the link between volatility and financial development becomes crucial 
in assigning a role to the exchange rate in relation to growth. Unsurprisingly then, also the 
literature aimed to analyse only a specific determinant of growth has revealed contradictory 
responses. For example, on the impact of real exchange rate volatility on investment Ghura and 
Greenes (1993) and Bleaney and Greenway (2001) find no impact. Instead, Servén (2002) and 
Aghion et al. (2006), who focus on productivity rather than accumulation, find a negative impact. 
They agree that the effect is more pronounced for countries with a less developed financial 
system providing an argument for those supporting finance as a valid provider of hedging 
instruments. 
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More specifically, since the 1998 Asian crisis and the creation of the third generation crisis 
model,
20
 the effects of an exchange rate depreciation on the investment decisions of firms has 
been investigated. This may happen through different channels. 
Firstly, a real depreciation can have expansionary effects as it may increase the operating 
profits of the firms in the export sector. It also increases the costs of the imported goods and 
therefore favours the tradable activities within the economy (competitiveness effect). This effect 
depends on the price elasticity of export and imports. If a large fraction of imports is inelastic, 
the higher costs of inputs and capital goods may offset the positive effects of the export and 
tradable sector. Empirical literature has given mixed results: Ghei and Prittchet (1999) and 
Duttagutta and Spilimbergo (2000) show exports increase after a currency depreciation. On the 
contrary, Agénor and Montiel (1996) and Reif (2001) show the contractionary effects of a real 
exchange rate depreciation, due to the cost-of-input mechanism Bleakley and Cowan (2002), 
Carranza et al. (2003).  
Secondly, a large real depreciation reduces the networth of firms with a high level of 
currency mismatch. To expand on this channel, as the risk of depreciation increases, the firm is 
likely to experience higher costs of borrowing, which is likely to affect investment and therefore 
aggregate demand. This is defined as balance sheet effect. The Peruvian economy has 
traditionally exhibited a high degree of dollarisation. This, in fact, involves risks for the economy 
because it may generate currency mismatches in the balance of economic agents. This issue will 
be further addressed in the section dedicated to Peru. The theoretical literature on this channel is 
huge: along the lines of Krugman (1999) and Aghion et al. (2001), these models show, as a 
common feature, the existence of multiple equilibria. This feature was used to explain the fact 
that most Asian countries experienced large currency depreciations without ex-ante significant 
changes in macroeconomic fundamentals. Finally, the depreciation can also create financial 
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 Following Bleakley and Cowan (2002), the third generation models can be classified in three groups.  For 
McKinnon and Pill (1998), foreign borrowing by domestic banks leads to the crisis when the government withdraws 
its implicit guarantee, while for Radelet and Sachs (1998) the excessive reliance on short term debt leads 
corporations vulnerable to “panic”. Finally, a third group (Krugman 1999a, 1999b; Aghion et al., 2001) sees debt 
denominated in foreign currency as a key protagonist behind this kind of crises. For these studies the stage for the 
crisis is set by currency mismatches between liabilities and incomes at firm level. A drop in the “net worth” of the 
company is then caused by a depreciation of the exchange rate. 
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stress in the economy as non performing loans may increasingly threaten the stability of the 
financial system.  
Given the theoretical channels through which the responses of the economy to variations of 
real exchange rate may materialise, the net result out of these different effects is a question that 
needs to be investigated empirically using firm level data (see chapter 4 and 6). Given the 
diversity of possible outcomes, it is unsurprising that the empirical findings have been mixed. 
Bleakley and Cowan (2002) analyse a sample of firms in five Latin American countries during 
the 1990s and found that firms with dollar denominated debt increased their capital expenditure 
during periods of exchange rate re-alignment, suggesting that the competitiveness effect may 
dominate the balance sheet effect. Aguiar (2002) found that the Tequila crisis provoked a severe 
balance sheet effect which translated into a reduction of investment. An interesting more 
disaggregated effect is found by Forbes (2002) in a sample of 12 depreciation episodes across 
different countries: firms with high indebtedness tend to have lower income growth, but 
exporters have better performance after depreciation. 
 
2.7 Conclusions 
This chapter has reviewed the relevant literature for a further investigation of the monetary 
policy for CDDCs. In particular, it identifies two issues which are predominant: the increasing 
volatility of commodity prices after the break down of the Bretton Woods system and the partial 
dollarisation of the economy. However, the mainstream theoretical monetary policy framework 
adopted by CDDCs was not developed around these issues, but it was inherited from developed 
industrial countries. In particular, developing countries followed the shift in paradigm adopting 
the monetarist model at first, and the New Keynesian model more recently. Following the Post-
Keynesian critique not only have I highlighted the limitations of both paradigms, but I also 
showed how particularly weak they are if applied to a partially dollarised economy. 
Moreover, the chapter reviewed two alternatives to the IT New Keynesian monetary policy 
model. The necessity of searching for alternatives is driven by the inadequacy of the IT model in 
facilitating counter-cyclical policies aimed to reduce the volatility of the business cycle of 
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CDDCs. In particular, the inclusion of a floating nominal exchange rate offers limited protection 
against trade shocks and, as a stabilisation mechanism, it is pro-cyclical in nature. IT is not a 
developmental framework: it does not lead towards an economic development away from 
commodities.  
Therefore, I reviewed two alternative policies which could be better fitted to CDDCs. I 
compared PEP and RER targeting. Even though Frankel’s proposal, the PEP target, is designed 
specifically for CDDCs and, therefore, has consideration for export prices, it does not achieve 
domestic price stabilisation and does not provide a solution to the “commodity curse”. These 
problems will be empirically proven in the last part of the thesis in which I run a simulation of 
PEP and PEPI to Peru. For these reasons, the RER target is a preferable choice. 
I reduced the two proposals to similar equations so that they could be easily compared: 
observing the final forms of each proposal, it is clear that they can be expressed by the same 
independent variables. This leads to believe that if they are tested by using the same data set, one 
can get similar results. Any differences would be given by their different constraints. Thus, it is 
the policy objectives that ought to determine the instruments. Instruments will determine the 
relevant factors and the theory that will be the basis for the policy. This is the reason why a 
policy orientated specifically to the stabilisation of the RER is better suited than the PEP 
proposal, as the final aim is to use the exchange rate not to stabilise the income revenues 
provided by the commodity sector, but to develop the non-traditional sector and diversify the 
export sector away from commodity dependence. However, this approach inherits the limitations 
of the framework developed by Edwards (1985): namely, variable space (tradable, non-
tradables), and no significant role for the interest rate with the exclusive consideration of the 
money supply. Rather, in the new consensus, the role of the interest rate is emphasised 
(Woodford, 2003). 
In conclusion, this chapter argued that designing a monetary policy framework specifically 
for CDDCs is the right path to follow if one wants to tackle the specific issues related to from 
such dependency on commodity prices volatility. Furthermore, the chapter also addressed the 
inability of mainstream economics to conceptualise dollarisation. An alternative way to theorise 
it is presented in the next chapter and implemented in chapter 5. Finally, the chapter supports 
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Frankel’s main objective. In the remaining part of thesis I will focus on the RER proposal given 
its developmental potential. 
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Chapter 3 - A theoretical framework 
 
3.1Introduction  
After the literature review presented in the previous chapter, the present chapter sketches 
out the theoretical framework of this thesis. This refers to the Post-Keynesian tradition. 
Since the object of this thesis is an investigation into the developmental role of the 
exchange rate, it seemed appropriate to start this chapter with the transmission mechanism of 
monetary and fiscal policies. In the next section, an adaptation of this transmission mechanism is 
presented. The adaptation is necessary in order to account for the peculiarities of CDDCs where 
a prominent role, within the evolution of the business cycle, is played by commodity price 
volatility. 
Within the macro-management of the commodity business cycle, however, it is also 
important to have a theoretical framework able to interpret two of the most pressing issues for a 
small open economy whose income largely depends on the export of one or a few primary 
commodities. One of this refers to a recent development of the derivatives on commodities 
market, namely the transformation of commodity futures into an asset class. Some impressive 
data about this development have been highlighted in the introductory chapter. This chapter 
contextualises it within a Minskyan framework. 
The second issue refers to the older phenomenon of dollarisation. The relevant literature 
has been reviewed in the previous chapter where it was discussed in relation to the volatility of 
commodity prices. In the third sub-section, dollarisation is conceptualised in terms of liquidity 
preference, and an original categorisation distinguishing internal and external liquidities is 
presented.  
Overall, then, next section provides an illustration of the theory supporting the empirical 
chapters in tackling the question on how the Peruvian central bank deals with price volatility, 
dollarisation and liquidity. 
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The above discussion, however, remains abstract, despite the attempts, within the chapter, 
to integrate it with actual examples. As a result, this theoretical framework needs to address the 
question of how the management of the exchange rate can be an effective developmental tool. 
The third section concentrates on this aspect providing a theoretical account of the various 
channels through which the exchange rate can be used as an actual developmental tool. These are 
the labour channel, the external balance channel (both considered for the sake of completeness, 
but not addressed in the empirical part) and, finally, the finance channel. The latter one is 
conceptualised in Miskyian terms and will form the theory underpinning an analysis of the 
stabilisation of Peru in the first empirical chapter. Additionally, this channel will be further 
investigated by analysing micro data of 117 non-financial firms in the second empirical chapter. 
Finally, the fourth section of this chapter draws a summarising conclusion. 
 
3.2 The macro management of the commodity business cycle 
This section sketches out the theory of reference used to interpret the peculiarities of the 
Peruvian economy. The first sub-section addresses the transmission mechanism of monetary and 
fiscal policies and the corresponding challenges the country faces in periods of booms and busts. 
However, an attempt to draw a comprehensive theoretical framework cannot underestimate two 
further issues which may be conceptualised, to use the Minskyan taxonomy, as additional 
sources of fragility, namely, commodity derivatives as a new asset class and dollarisation. 
 
3.2.1 Transmission mechanism of monetary and fiscal policies in a CDDC 
I depict the transmission mechanism of monetary and fiscal policies in a typical CDDC in 
a diagrammatic form in Figure 3.1 This shows the macro mechanisms involved in a commodity 
cycle. The starting point is the middle area which reflects the centrality of commodity prices; the 
upper part describes the links with fiscal policy and the bottom part shows the links with 
monetary policy. Initially, it is important to distinguish between various types of commodities 
not only because commodity prices have different cycles and volatility patterns, as discussed in 
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the previous chapter, but also because they are produced with different labour to physical capital 
ratios. Moreover, the commodity sector may be privately or publicly owned and in the hands of 
domestic or foreigner owners. 
The cycle is generally driven by the price of one or more exported commodities: a boom 
is visible in left hand-side and a burst on the right-hand side of Figure 3.1 (next page). Here, 
boom and bust refer to commodity prices; this language is considered appropriate because 
commodity prices tend to follow the dynamics of financial markets as theorised in the next sub-
section. 
Let us consider the boom. First, despite the unsuccessful experiences of many CDDCs 
during the 1970s and 1980s, commodity booms are seen as a good opportunity for growth, since, 
generally, they improve the trade balance (Bevan et al., 1999; Adam et al., 2004). The chain 
sequence of commodity prices, increase of commodity prices and trade surplus is shown in 
Figure 3.1 moving from the centre to the left. The importance of macro-management policies 
seem to be even more relevant during a boom in terms of opportunity to permanently increase 
income (Dehn, 2000). 
Nevertheless, the first issue a CDDC country faces in the presence of a commodity boom 
is related to its spending ability: a sudden increase in export receipts may reveal absorptive 
capacity bottlenecks which lead to the key issue of drawing the line between savings and 
investment. The domestic economy should absorb the increase of income gradually and then use 
it effectively over an extended period of time. The risk is that the windfall is spent in low-return 
investments and the economy is not able to use it appropriately (Nissanke, 1993). 
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Figure 3.1: Transmission mechanisms of commodity prices into monetary and fiscal policies 
 
Second, different issues arise depending on whether the windfall is spent by the private or 
by the public sector (Bevan et al., 1999). The private sector’s spending will cause the so-called 
income effect (on the left side in Figure 3.1), which may create inflationary pressure in the non-
tradable sector as the import price of most of the tradables is determined outside the country.
21
 
Also, the appreciation tends to cause a resource shift (resource effect) from the tradables to the 
now more profitable non-tradable sector. An analysis of both tradable and non-tradable sectors 
will be carried out in the second empirical chapter in which the different profitability of the two 
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 However, in contrast with the prediction of the Dutch disease literature (see for example, Corden, 1984), the 
inflationary pressures may not materialise in the absence of short-term supply bottlenecks (Nissanke, 1993). 
94 
 
sectors will be shown. On the contrary, if the public sector is able to appropriate the windfall, it 
may trigger euphoria which will lead to a domestic credit expansion to finance public 
expenditure, and will cause a further appreciation of the exchange rate if the government spends 
on non-tradables (Nissanke, 1993). 
Third, the left top part of Figure 3.1 addresses the saving of the windfall. As a way of 
implementing saving policies, since the 1990s, many countries have established Commodity 
Stabilisation Fund (CSF) to be used as fiscal countercyclical buffer during bust times. 22  In 
general, if the windfall is saved, part of this saving may be allocated to foreign assets: domestic 
investment can only be directed towards real assets, given the limited development of the 
financial sector (Collier and Gunning, 1999; Masson and Pattillo, 2005). This should be 
considered within a more general issue of inter-temporal optimisation: these countries face a 
complex issue of portfolio management with many dimensions, since optimisation is about 
domestic/net foreign investments and liquid financial/real productive assets within an open 
economy context of current and future risk/return space. 
Fourth, as shown on the left bottom side of the figure, the central bank can intervene in 
the foreign exchange market to limit the appreciation of the currency, and, with respect to the 
other side of its balance sheet, the central bank should sterilise these interventions by issuing 
local bonds to avoid inflationary pressures. However, a shallow local financial market limits this 
policy instrument: interest rates can rapidly increase as a consequence of sterilisation leading to 
higher debt service costs (Dehn, 2000; Adam et al., 2004). These issues will be considered in the 
first empirical chapter. 
Fifth, in terms of fiscal policy, the upper part of Figure 3.1 shows how the volatility of 
commodity revenues may create serious challenges for the country. Government investments 
tend to exceed savings accumulated during boom periods, and expenditure is only reduced at a 
very late point during the burst when its impact on the economy becomes too harsh. As discussed 
under the second issue above, ownership of the commodity sector is crucial: if it is publicly 
owned, its revenues are direct; if it is privately owned, its revenues tend to be lower and accrued 
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 Generally, these funds consist in assets held in commercial banks in foreign currency or hold in reserve deposit at 
the central bank (Fasano, 2000). 
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via taxation; in case of foreign ownership, profits are normally repatriated. Generally, the 
ownership, and the associated dependence on the external balance, underlines the difficulty of 
budget planning.  
Let us now consider the busts. First, the decline in price has immediate negative 
consequences on the trade balance and on government revenues too. Second, when financing is 
mostly needed, capital markets become less liquid and credit more expensive as the country 
credit rating deteriorates. Debt management tends to show a pro-cyclical pattern which results in 
disruptive consequences: at the height of the boom, the international capital market is flooded 
with capital and liquid assets, the CDDC shows high credit worthiness and a correspondingly 
high value of its currency: it is at this time that debt is incurred. In a similarly pro-cyclical 
fashion, the bust proceeds overwhelmingly: sharp depreciation and low credit rating makes 
refinancing and debt rescheduling very expensive or even impossible, given the country’s over-
leverage (Nissanke, 1993). 
Under these conditions, the fiscal deficit can be financed by the central bank surrendering 
its independence (Jha, 2001). The bottom right of the diagram shows how currency reserves are 
generally used to avoid currency depreciation, especially if the exchange rate is pegged, to avoid 
the instability caused by devaluations. Even in a floating exchange rate regime, the central bank 
may either use reserves to avoid depreciation and/or it can rapidly increase interest rates in the 
attempt to avoid deterioration of foreign investor’s sentiment and sudden stops (Calvo, 1998). 
However, an orderly depreciation of the exchange rate is supposed to bring back the trade 
balance to surplus.  
As anticipated in the introduction of this chapter, there are two crucial phenomena which 
affect volatility of commodity prices and the monetary side, at the centre and the bottom of the 
Figure 3.1 respectively. These are the recent developments of the market of commodity 
derivatives and dollarisation which will be addressed in the next two sub-sections respectively.  
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3.2.2 Commodity Futures as an asset class 
The analysis of the price fluctuations of the latest commodity cycle, and in particular of 
the 2003-2010 boom, reveals how commodity markets appear to have changed once more. 
Consequently, the literature reviewed in the previous chapter does not provide a satisfactory 
answer; a new theoretical framework which involves the role of financial markets is needed. 
More generally, the recent expansion of financial markets is here assumed to be part of 
the general evolution of capitalism in different stages. The current stage is said to be dominated 
by “managers of funds” (Minsky and Whalen, 1996). Their necessity to hedge against financial 
risks, such as rises in interest rates or exchange rate movements, drives money managers’ search 
for new asset classes. An asset class is defined as a category of assets, a collection of securities 
which show analogous characteristics, behave similarly and are often subject to the same 
regulation. These may be cash equivalent, stocks and bonds. The increase in trading of 
commodity derivatives .since the early 2000s, which was described in Chapter 1, and the 
transformation of these instruments into a new asset class have been related to two possible 
causes: first Masters and White (2011) report that institutional investors have increasingly used 
commodity futures to hedge against equity risk. Nevertheless, they argue that while commodity 
derivatives were natural hedgers against inflation, their hedging against equity has been less 
effective. The second cause is the search for higher yields in an environment characterised by low 
interest rates (Masters and White, 2011). 
As a result, the commodity futures market can be looked at as an example of a new asset 
class:  traditionally, the market was used for commodity producers and consumers in order to 
hedge against future price movements. Today, a significantly increasing part of the total value of 
the commodity future contracts is in the hand of money managers. The result is that the 
characteristics, in terms of price movements and volatility, of the underlying physical commodity 
markets are subject to the financial market as a whole (Masters and White, 2008; Wray, 2008). 
This process can be described in terms of financialisation of a market operated by money 
managers (Wray, 2018). Financialisation is defined as “a process whereby financial markets, 
financial institutions, and financial elites gain greater influence over economic outcomes” 
(Palley, 2007, p. 1).  The Unctad Trade and Development report (2009) describes the 
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financialisation of commodity markets in the terms of the presence of financial investors on 
commodity future exchanges. 
For a deeper analysis of this transformation and its effects on CDDC, it is necessary to 
investigate the behaviour of the actors involved, the money managers, the transformation of the 
marketed asset, the commodity futures, and their effects on the underlying asset, the physical 
commodity. 
First, there are mainly two groups of financial investors, active managers and passive 
index managers. While the first group has been around for many years, the latter group is 
relatively new and, with the injection of large funds in recent years, has contributed to the boom 
(Master and White, 2008). The effects have been extraordinary. The number of future and option 
contracts outstanding on commodity exchanges has increased about five fold and the notional 
amount of outstanding over-the-counter commodity related contract increased of about 20 times 
during the same boom period (UNCTAD, 2009). This indicates how commodity derivatives have 
become a new asset class. 
Second, the identification of a new asset class by financial investors depends on a series 
of factors related to the way in which financial investors act and on the circumstances of that 
specific market. The interaction of these two sets of factors changes over time and indicates how 
markets do not exist in abstract but have a concrete evolution that needs to be investigated 
(Minsky, 1986a). On the one hand, on the financial side, the commodity market has become 
particularly attractive after the severe equity bear market of the period 2000-2002. De-regulating 
policies and “financial innovation” interacted in the Minskyan way: Minsky witnessed what he 
dubbed as a “deregulation mania” (Minsky, 1986a, p.198) during the 1980s which “eliminated 
the regulations that once restricted competition among institutions, instruments, and markets” 
(Minsky, 1986b, p. 12). At the same time, Minsky was aware that financial innovation had 
“greatly increased the kinds of assets and liabilities available to banks, other financial institutions, 
and financial markets. As a result, the connections between financing instruments, prudential 
regulations…have changed (Minsky, 1986b, pp. 12-13). This change of the financial structure 
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contributed to the evolution of capitalism into its present stage of money-manager capitalism 
(Minsky and Whalen, 1996, p. 3).
23
 
Wray (2008) employs Minsky’s analytical framework to analyse the financialisation of  
the market of derivatives on commodities operated by money managers: thanks to the 
deregulating effort of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission in the US, money managers 
innovatively extended their asset class selection to existing financial instruments, namely 
derivatives on primary commodities (Wray, 2008).
24
 This allowed the pervasiveness of financial 
markets to create a new asset class. The results are a diffuse usage of swap contracts between 
investors and investment banks, and the cancellation of speculative position limits.
25
 
Furthermore, traditionally, the derivatives on commodities have been considered as a natural 
hedge against inflation, since energy and food prices have a strong component or secondary 
effects on consumer price indexes. Derivatives on commodities have also shown a low 
correlation with bond and equity markets (Gorton and Rouwenhorst, 2005). However, its low 
correlation with other markets was also due to its under-utilisation by financial investors: the 
overall historical size of the market in terms of total nominal size of transactions has been 
marginal relatively to bond and equity markets.
26
 But this lack of correlation has tended to fade 
with the expansion of the market, since investors exploited the new asset class in order to “make 
on the carry” (Minsky, 1986a, p. 211).  
On the other hand, on the real side, commodity derivatives have been chosen as a new 
asset class by speculators also because the underlying physical commodities were experiencing a 
boom since 2002. Their price increase was expected to support prices in the derivative market. 
This market was used, until then, only by producers and traders of the underlying commodity to 
hedge the price risk. Empirical evidence supports the idea that there is always a “fundamental” 
reason on which the financial market builds its euphoria (Minsky, 1986a). In fact, both exchange-
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 The American economy was initially in a stage of commercial capitalism “during which external finance was used 
mainly for trade, this structure has evolved into its present stage of “money manger capitalism, where financial 
markets and arrangements are dominated by managers of funds” (Minskyt and Whalen , 1996, p .2) 
24
 In this case the innovation was not an instrument innovation; it was an innovative use of an existing instrument. 
25
 During the 1990s, at the peak of money-manager capitalism, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission 
(CFTC) granted Wall Street firms exemptions from speculative position limits, by which banks were allowed to 
hedge over-the-counter swap transactions (CFTC, 2007). 
26
 The under-utilisation of a market may be due to different characteristics of the underlying commodities, especially 
high transport and storage costs. 
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traded commodities and non exchange-traded commodities, commodities not included in 
commodities indexes and traded over-the-counter, have seen a major increase in price 
(UNCTAD, 2009). Nevertheless, generally, once the market expands, its low correlation with 
other markets tends to fade: the recent sub-prime crisis has unveiled an increasing correlation 
between price movements of bonds, equities and commodity derivatives (Silvennoinen and 
Thorp, 2010). 
Third, the dramatic increase in both the physical and the financial commodity prices leads 
to the question of whether the derivative market has driven the spot price up or vice versa. The 
most popular explanation for the price increase of the physical commodity is given by the 
“fundamental” imbalance between demand and supply originated by the growth of China and, to 
a less extent, of India, which caused metal and energy prices to rise (Gros, 2008). Geopolitical 
factors, such as the Middle East crisis, have contributed to the increase in energy prices too 
(Winters and Yusuf, 2007). 
Finally, the physical market is subject to speculation as well. For example, Wray (2008) 
mentions how British Petroleum monopolised 90 percent of all TET propane supplies 
withholding some quantity off the market to drive prices up. Previously, Veneroso (1998) 
reported one million metric/tons (out of the 17-18 million produced every year) of copper 
missing, disappearing into un-recorded inventories in China. 
To conclude, in the recent history of commodity markets, two phenomena have a 
particular significance. Firstly, the disappearance of price commodity stabilisation policies and 
the reliance on market forces to determine prices: the post Bretton-Woods era has developed 
significant price changes in terms of both volatility and trends. This phenomenon has been 
reviewed in the previous chapter. Secondly, this chapter has shown that through financial 
innovations and de-regulation, the commodity futures have become an investment asset class. As 
a result, the participation of money managers has aligned this new asset class to equities and 
bonds in such a way that it has assumed their typical characteristics associated to booms and 
busts, including volatility and pro-cyclicality. 
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The above discussion was necessary to explain the increased volatility of commodity 
prices which, in general, has crucial effects on the transmission mechanism of monetary and 
fiscal policies, by influencing the central part of Figure 3.1. Now, I turn to the issue of 
dollarisation which affects the entire lower part of Figure 3.1. 
Finally, it is necessary to consider, with respect to exchange rate dynamics, the issue of 
financial and currency crises: Harvey (2009) considers three situations which can lead to strong 
exchange rate depreciations: first are deviations of the actual exchange rate away from agents‘ 
mental model; second, deviations of the returns on financial assets from returns real returns (this 
is derived from Keynes); third,  agents raise short-term and foreign loans increasing debt to 
income ratios along the Minskyian financial fragility. 
 
3.2.3 Dollarisation as an issue of liquidity and structure of the economy 
The previous chapter addressed the limitations of the literature in conceptualising 
dollarisation. This is particularly relevant for the Peruvian economy since the dollarisation of 
broad money (measured as a ratio of broad money) has been consistently high in recent history: it 
was 65 at the beginning of the 1990s, reached 70 at the turn of the century and it is now at around 
40. Since dollarisation is an issue for the effectiveness and the autonomy of monetary policy, it is 
important not only to investigate its causes but also its possible remedies. As a result, this thesis 
considers dollarisation as a complex and multi-dimensional phenomenon: this section, first, 
assumes that dollarisation is determined by demand and supply of foreign currency; second, it 
defines dollarisation with respect to two dimensions of liquidity, namely, internal and external. 
On the demand side, dollarisation can be considered with respect to the Keynesian 
liquidity preference: 
“Thus if currency notes were to be deprived of their liquidity premium by the stamping 
system, a long series of substitutes would step into their shows – bank-money, debts at call, 
foreign money, jewellery and the precious metals generally, and so forth”(Keynes, 1997, p.358) 
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In contextualising the demand for money in an open economy, this chapter considers 
Kregel (1982), who, in interpreting Keynes’s work, explains how the liquidity preference, i.e. the 
preference for sterling, influences the decision to take positions in foreign currency assets in 
terms of their spot and forward prices relatively to the domestic (sterling) prices. The domestic 
currency is an asset class and its demand is determined by its net return relatively to other 
currencies. Like the interest rate is determined by the market premium for liquidity within a 
closed economy, so the exchange rate is determined by the net return relatively to a foreign 
currency. 
The net return of holding an asset can be expressed in term of the asset itself or in terms 
of another asset. In the first case, the benefits are determined by the yield (the satisfaction of 
holding and/or the capacity to produce the asset), the cost of carrying (the need to store the asset), 
and a liquidity premium (the security of disposal in terms of its marketability) (Chick, 1983). 
In the second case, the comparability between asset returns needs a common denominator, 
a single money standard, the use of which implies the consideration of an expected appreciation 
of the assets in terms of the money standard. It is in these terms that wealth holders can choose 
within a range of assets defined in the dimensions of yield, liquidity and carrying cost (Kregel, 
1982). 
Notably, liquidity preference is related to time and, with it, to uncertainty. Post-Keynesian 
exchange rate theory emphasises the role of expectations and short-term financial flows (Chick, 
1983, Harvey, 2001, Dow 2002). For Harvey (2009) expectations are formed under fundamental 
uncertainty, so they are context and time specific. Famously, Keynes indicated three motives for 
demanding money: the transaction motive (similar to the neoclassical view of money, Minsky, 
1986a), the precautionary motive, ”the desire for security as to the future cash equivalent of a 
certain proportion of total resources” (Keynes, 1997, p. 170) and, finally, the speculative motive, 
“the objective of securing profit from knowing better than the market what the future will bring 
forth” (ibid.). 
With respect to the definition of dollarisation, the precautionary motive, as further defined 
by Keynes, seems very appropriate:  
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“To provide for contingencies requiring sudden expenditure and for unforeseen 
opportunities of advantageous purchases, and also to hold an asset of which the value is fixed in 
terms of money to meet a subsequent liability fixed in terms of money, are further motives for 
holding cash” (1997, p.196, my emphasis). 
Within the above discussion, the demand side of dollarisation can then be interpreted in 
terms of liquidity preference, as a shift from a money asset into another money-asset. This should 
not be confused with asset-side dollarisation discussed in the previous chapter. Rather, here 
dollarisation can be also explained in terms of holding an asset to meet “subsequent liabilities”. 
With respect to an open economy, Dow (1987) incorporates two main features of 
Keynesian monetary theory: the instability of expectations and the role of money as a refuge from 
uncertainty. Accordingly, the economic cycle depends on changes in expenditure based on 
changes in the marginal efficiency of capital (MEC). Finance is crucial in investment planning 
and depends on the liquidity preference of financial institutions. A downswing is characterised by 
a run towards liquidity (i.e. higher liquidity preference), stimulated by expectations of falling 
asset prices. More precisely, the demand for money increases significantly, while the liquidity of 
non-money assets declines, when the market becomes less active and capital losses emerges. The 
current flow of money may be insufficient because banks do not longer extend credit because of 
businesses’ capital losses. 
On the contrary, during an upswing, liquidity preference declines as the asset market 
becomes more active and capital gains are expected. When this phase continues, then cushions of 
safety in exercising finance are reduced and financial fragility increases (see also Kregel, 2008). 
Financial markets amplify the swings in the MEC. Thus, optimistic expectations are dangerous 
when financing is highly geared. Higher interest rates set by the central bank can be the cause of 
collapsing confidence in highly speculative markets, which would erode the capacity of banks to 
provide further finance (Minsky, 1986a). 
When applied to a small open dollarised economy, this overall framework can be used to 
explain two peculiar issues. A possible shift between domestic and foreign currency denominated 
assets and non-money assets further complicates the picture. By holding dollar cash balances, the 
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responsiveness of the demand for domestic money to changes in domestic liquidity decreases. 
Also, the demand for liquidity is less sensitive to expected returns in comparison to a closed 
economy: for example, domestic non-money assets can be switched to foreign non-money assets 
in case of expected lower returns. Furthermore, an economy with consistently higher expected 
returns relatively to other countries, will attract capital inflows regardless of the liquidity 
preference of financial institutions (that is tighter financing conditions) than other countries 
(Dow, 1987). 
In case of dollarisation, then, the economy has to deal with two sub-sets or forms of 
money liquidity, one in domestic money and the other in foreign money. Their interaction gives 
rise to complicated patterns of liquidity preference. 
Dollarisation creates a hierarchy of assets: Peruvian soles are the riskiest with both 
country- and currency-risk; internal dollar-denominated assets carry country-, but not currency-
risk; finally, external dollar-denominated assets, i.e. assets held by Peruvian residents abroad, 
carry neither of the two risks. As a result, whenever there is a situation of uncertainty, during 
hyperinflation or during international financial turmoil, there is a run towards less risky assets 
with conversion of soles into internal dollar-denominated assets and from internal dollar-
denominated assets towards external dollar-denominated assets. Therefore, returns in dollar on 
both financial and real assets can be fully realised only if taken outside the country. 
On the supply side, domestic liquidity depends on the central bank, by supplying money 
to the banking system, on the agents who switch in and out of the domestic assets and, centrally, 
on the international dollar-liquidity. Of course, the degree of openness, that is the size of the trade 
and financial account, determines the flows and supply of foreign currency in the economy.  
Changes in expectations on exchange rate influence the liquidity of domestic money and, 
consequently, the dollar liquidity in circulation (Dow, 1987). The degree of rigidity of the 
exchange rate, ranging from pure fixed to pure floating, not only influences the domestic 
independence of the monetary policy, but it also accounts for the presence of the central bank in 
its daily activities in the foreign exchange market. The more the central bank intervenes, the more 
the spot/forward price is guaranteed on each side of the transaction, and the more liquid is the 
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exchange. The problem of fixed exchange rates then is to guarantee the size rather than the price 
of the transactions, thus currency crises happen when the exchange rate is no longer credible 
because of low central bank’ reserves. On the contrary, in a floating exchange rate regime, the 
balance of payments does not have an impact on money supply even though the exchange rate 
has indirect effects on the supply of liquidity. As a result, firstly, inflation changes through 
import prices and consequently alters the real value of money supply. Secondly, even though the 
nominal transactions in the foreign exchange market cancel each other, they may have different 
maturities. So, for example, foreign purchases of domestic long-term assets matched with 
domestic purchases of deposits in foreign banks represents a decrease in domestic liquidity (Dow, 
1987). 
The above discussion is needed to highlight the point that, between the two extremes of 
pegged and pure floating, the central bank can identify its space and guarantee exchange rate 
liquidity when it is needed. In terms of monetary policy choice, the intervention in the foreign 
exchange market “...is not a special case but rather a logical necessity, arising out of the nature 
of money and finance...” (Moore, 1988, p. xi). 
Nevertheless, liquidity is very complex to define. It has various forms and degrees 
(Nesvetailova, 2007). In the reminder of this section I sketch out an original categorisation based 
on the divide between internal and external liquidity which may be particularly relevant for the 
theory underpinning this thesis. Liquidity can be in domestic currency and foreign currency, 
expressed in assets and liabilities.  
Now, assets and liabilities are related, as assets may have to be liquidated to pay for 
liabilities and liabilities issued to finance the accumulation of assets. The notion of inside and 
outside money in the private or in the public sectors can help to explain this dynamic: bank 
financing of the private sector by purchasing new claims is defined as creation of inside money, 
while outside money is issued in exchange of government securities, foreign assets or fiat money 
(Gurley and Shaw, 1960). 
The following definition of liquidity is relevant to the above mechanism:  
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“If a desire to increase spending were to lead the private sector in aggregate to attempt 
to liquidate its claims, and if all those claims were claims on other members of the private 
sector, these assets would not be liquid: the outsideness would be part of the source of liquidity” 
(Chick, 1973, p.81). 
For this reason, dollarisation can be thought as a form of “outsideness” with respect to 
liquidity: if dollarisation decreases liquidity in domestic currency, then keeping the exchange 
rate stable may be seen as a way to get part of that liquidity back. 
Thus, the liquidity that the central bank is in charge of can be analysed along two 
dimensions, internal liquidity and external liquidity related to the foreign currency market 
(Figure 3.2): internal liquidity is given by credit circulating in the banking/financial system, 
which can be divided into local currency and foreign currency (vertical axis). For the supply of 
credit the role of interest rates is crucial in relation to the relative profitability of assets and the 
liquidity of lenders’ portfolios. External liquidity deals with the exchange rate regime. The less 
flexible the exchange rate is, the more the central bank intervenes, the more the relative liquidity 
between the two currencies is guaranteed (horizontal axis). 
 
Figure 3.2: Monetary policy following the definitions of internal and external liquidities 
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The higher the dollarisation in the economy, the higher the percentage of credit of foreign 
currency relatively to domestic-denominated credit on the vertical axis, the more rigid the 
exchange rate has to be in order to guarantee liquidity in the foreign exchange market. In the first 
empirical chapter, this chart will be drawn for Peru. This will provide an additional framework in 
analysing the monetary policy of the Peruvian central bank. More specifically, external and 
internal liquidities are associated to the business cycle, they are both determinants of, and 
determined by, it. Chapter 5 shows how they move according to international financial market 
behaviour and relatively little controlled by the Peruvian central bank. 
In the presence of dollarisation, the transmission mechanism of the monetary policy may 
change: an increase of the interest rate activates a switch from dollars towards soles, however, in 
the case of dollarisation, this possible switch is counter-balanced by the precautionary motive, 
because of which the public tends to hold more dollars. 
Nevertheless, because of the challenges it poses, dollarisation is often undesired, as 
discussed in the previous chapter. However, once an economy is dollarised, then it is too 
simplistic to prescribe a solution based on a floating exchange rate and on the development of a 
liquid domestic bond market. The difficulties related to de-dollarisation are direct consequences 
of its complexity. As shown in the previous sections, the higher the dollarisation in the economy, 
the less effective the monetary policy becomes, and this effect cannot be minimised only by 
stabilising the exchange rate. This thesis argues that de-dollarisation may only be achieved once 
the economy moves towards a more stable growth path. This argument will be taken up in the 
concluding chapter. 
 
3.3 RER as a tool for development and its channels 
In the previous chapter, the management of the RER has been identified as a policy tool 
to diversify the export sector away from commodity dependence. From a theoretical point of 
view, following Frenkel and Taylor (2006), I can identify three main channels by which the RER 
can affect the economy: labour (real wages), external balance (imports and exports) and finance 
(external debt). 
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3.3.1 Labour Channel 
This sub-section briefly sketches the research directions regarding the labour channel just 
for the sake of completeness: for reasons of space and focus, however, this channel is not 
investigated in the empirical part of this thesis. 
First, this channel focuses on the effect of RER on real wages. For a given productivity 
levels, saving and investment are a function of real wages, which in turn depend on the exchange 
rate (Bhaduri and Marglin, 1990). In this way, while both Keynes (1997) and Kalecki (1939, 
1971) consider real wages as an endogenous variable in a closed economy, it is possible to 
explore the case of an open economy in which the real wage rate becomes exogenous. The 
Kaleckian mark-up pricing rule is still valid: the higher the mark-up, the lower the real wage, the 
higher the share of profit. Therefore, similarly to the case of a closed economy, there are two 
possible conclusions depending on the elasticity of investment to changes in profit margins 
(Bhaduri and Marglin, 1990). However, it is worth noting that the above is a particular 
interpretation of the Kaleckian mark-up: alternatively, the average mark-up is considered to be 
determined by the amounts of investments, the fiscal deficits, trade surplus and capitalist 
consumption. The Kaleckian mark-up can be seen as a mark-up on “prime” which is labour and 
raw material (Mair et. al., 2002) 
If investment is irresponsive to changes in profit margins, a lower real wage 
(depreciation) is recessionary because the decrease in consumption does not compensate 
investments (the under-consumption thesis). On the contrary, higher real wage (appreciation) 
compensate lower investments (consumption-led growth), but it is capacity-constrained in the 
long-run. If debt is used to finance consumption then it may be considered as savings 
displacement (Bresser-Pereira, 2004). If, on the contrary, investment is elastic to changes in 
profit margins, then lower real wages increase profits and investments, which in turn benefit 
from higher demand and, as a consequence, capacity expands (investment-led growth).
27
 
Therefore, given a change in real wages, the different time lags to the adjustments in 
consumption and investment determines the outcome.  
                                                 
27
 This depends on the size of the domestic market versus the foreign trade sector. Domestic market is generally 
relatively small in CDDCs. 
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The second aspect to consider beside the effect of RER on the level of real wages is that 
on employment. Frenkel (2004) recognises two main channels. Firstly, the macroeconomic 
channel which has a short-term influence of RER on the level of activity and employment (this is 
typical of orthodox theories). For example, a more depreciated RER encourages a more intensive 
use of labour given the relative price gains of this factor measured in foreign currency. Secondly, 
the development channel which explains the long-term influence of RER on output growth is 
reflected on investment in tradable activity (Williamson, 2007; Rodrik, 2003). For instance, a 
more depreciated RER stimulates tradable activities and increases their profitability; Rodrik 
(2003) identifies two main developmental effects of RER: an initial push for growth in the short-
run and a more sustainable growth in the long-run depending on institutions. Frenkel (2004) adds 
an additional channel, the unemployment channel. This explains the influence of RER on labour 
intensity of output mainly in the tradable sector. This happens in the short-term as consequence 
of shifts in relative prices due to changes in RER: in the short-term there are three main price 
changes: (1) the labour/capital goods price ratio is considered because imported capital goods are 
a very significant share of imports; (2) the imported inputs/labour price ratios; (3) the price of 
wages measured in foreign currency (very important in tradable sector). In addition, it is 
important to notice that the RER also influences the non-tradable sector as employment/output 
ratios are still given by the shifts in relative prices. This happens especially when imported 
capital goods are used by the non-tradable sector. 
 
3.3.2 External Balance Channel 
The discussion about the responsiveness of investment to profit changes of the previous 
sub-section can be integrated by adding the elasticities of exports and imports in order to include 
the effects of the exchange rate on revenues and imported input prices (Bhaduri and Marglin, 
1990).
 28
 Since tariffs and subsidies are relatively less used in recent times, the exchange rate has 
become more relevant in contemporary trade policies.
29
 
                                                 
28
 Changes in the nominal exchange rate impact the price of imports and exports. 
29 Using the same variables defined in the previous chapter: 
  (1)Where t = tariff )1( tSPP NIim 
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Thus, the effect of the exchange rate on investment depends on the time lag between the 
changes in real wages and the changes in exports/imports.
30
 The conclusion is that, through 
devaluations, capacity utilisation can only increase in an exhilarationist regime 
(investment/profit-led growth) in which real wages are repressed and profits are boosted by an 
increase in price competitiveness. On the contrary, the effect is ambiguous in a stagnationist 
regime (consumption/wage led growth). Furthermore, the more open an economy is the more the 
trade effect provides an exhilarationist feature. This analysis remains limited to the short-term 
horizon and does not considers the dynamic case in which both capacity utilisation and real 
wage/profit share are endogenous, that is the case of non-linear IS schedule if we want to use 
textbook terminology. 
The second empirical chapter of the thesis will investigate the effect of devaluations on 
investment (competitiveness effect) for non-financial firms within the Peruvian economy.  
 
3.3.3 Finance Channel 
Currency mismatches in the balance sheets of firms determine the effects of exchange 
rate movements.
31
 A firm suffers from currency-mismatch if a significant fraction of its debt is in 
foreign currency, and its flows of income as well as its assets are mostly in domestic currency. In 
such a situation, a significant depreciation deteriorates the firm’s net worth (balance sheet 
effect). This affects investment and, consequently, aggregate demand. From the theoretical point 
of view, Minsky (1986) can offer a valuable insight for the analysis of the dynamics of firms’ 
balance sheets.  
                                                                                                                                                             
  (2) Where s= subsidy 
30
 The changes in exports/imports due to change in the exchange rate may depends on the Marshall-Lerner condition 
(1944): starting from a position of equilibrium in the current account a devaluation will improve it if the sum of the 
price elasticity of demand for imports and that of exports is greater than one. Vice versa, if this sum is less than one, 
devaluation will deteriorate the current account. The model was improved by Stern (1973) by relaxing the 
assumptions of less than infinity supply elasticity and initial balanced trade. 
31
 The literature on currency mismatches has been confusing for some time; the following quote clarifies the issue: 
“Original sin is the inability of a country to borrow in its own currency. In contrast, the literature on currency 
mismatches, as we read it, is concerned with the consequences of these problems” (Eichengreen et al, 2003, p. 21). 
)1/( sSPP NIim 
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Famously, Minsky (1986) defined three financing postures: hedge, speculative and Ponzi. 
Hedge financing is a position in which a firm's expected cash flows always exceed the financing 
costs and operating expenses and its margins of safety are quite wide. A firm is in a speculative 
position if its net present value is positive, but its expected cash flows are not sufficient to meet 
all financial commitments in all periods. Finally, Ponzi financing is the posture in which a firm 
has to borrow funds just to meet its current cash flow commitments, including the payment of 
interest on its outstanding debt.  
A firm's financial position can change form hedge to speculative and eventually to Ponzi 
if macroeconomic variables changes, in a closed economy, typically, if the interest rate changes. 
Increasing interest rates can do so by reducing the present value of the firm's current cash flow 
and increasing its cash flow commitments. A creditor bank will typically respond to a 
deterioration of the financial position of its debtors by reducing its lending. Firms will then be 
forced to sell their assets to meet their current cash flow commitments precipitating the economy 
into a debt-deflation crisis. Minsky developed this theory in a closed economy context. Since 
then, Kregel (1998) and Arestis and Glickman (2002) developed this view in an open economy 
context: the above scenario could also result from a depreciation if firms have a high proportion 
of imported inputs or of foreign debt. 
Theoretically, then, the adaptation of the Minskyan theory to an open economy context 
depends on the determinants of fragility arising from the firm’s financial structure. Essentially, in 
a closed economy, Minsky presents two criteria to identify the fragility of a speculative unit, 
namely, its need to roll over finance and its interest rate vulnerability. Moreover, openness can 
be considered one of those “financial innovations” which Minsky identifies as seeds of the 
inherently fragile capitalist economies. In an open economy, a unit which has to serve its debt in 
foreign currency is vulnerable to changes of the exchange rate as well. In this case, a firm is 
doubly vulnerable; hence it can be called “super-speculative” to use the taxonomy of Arestis and 
Glickman (2002). 
I extend this idea to a CDDC including all the pro-cyclical issues so far presented: 
because the exchange rate moves with the commodity price, and these exchange rate fluctuations 
have an impact on firms, in a partially dollarised economy, what can be considered an entirely 
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equity-financed hedge firm, in reality, can arguably be speculative. The contemporary presence 
of both commodity dependence and dollarisation points out to the identification of an extra 
dimension of vulnerability: the inclusion of the commodity market makes the firm triply 
vulnerable. The term “hyper-speculative” may indicate this. 
In the second empirical chapter I will analyse the balance sheet of non-financial firms 
using this framework in order to identifying possible fragilities in the structure of the Peruvian 
economy. 
 
3.4 Conclusions 
This theoretical chapter stemmed from the idea that the transmission mechanism of 
monetary and fiscal policies is central to the analysis of the policy challenges that a CDDC faces. 
This has been conceptualised at the beginning of the chapter and contextualised within the macro 
management of the commodity business cycle. Given the centrality of the volatility of the 
commodity prices, a theoretical framework underpinning the macro-management of the 
commodity business cycle cannot prescind from an analysis of the recent evolution of the 
commodity future market. Similarly, the importance of dollarisation in a small open economy of 
Latin America such as Peru cannot be overestimated. These issues will be analysed, empirically, 
at both macro and micro levels, in the first two empirical chapters. 
Finally, this chapter addressed the managed RER as a developmental tool and described 
in details the channels from the exchange rate to the real economy. It eventually concentrated on 
the financial channel which will be addressed in the empirical part of the thesis.   
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Chapter 4 - Methodological Overview 
 
4.1 Introduction 
The last two chapters were concerned with a critical review of the literature on monetary 
policy for CDDCs and with the theoretical framework. This chapter describes methods and data 
which will be used in the following two empirical chapters. 
In terms of method, this thesis is an in-depth study of a single phenomenon (i.e. the 
developmental implication of commodity price and real exchange rate fluctuations in Peru) with 
the purpose of elucidating features of a larger class of similar phenomena (i.e. monetary policy 
effects on the business cycle of CDDCs), but not in the sense that its findings will be 
extrapolated and uncritically applied to other events. The hope is that, by providing an example, 
this thesis will shed light on how CDDCs require ad hoc policy prescriptions. So far, these have 
been addressed in an unsatisfactory way by homogenised theories. In this respect, then, Peru 
provides a critical instance, that is one in which the research will provide a rigorous challenge to 
existing theories (Gerring, 2004). Hence, this thesis may provide guidance for an alternative 
framework (sketched in the previous chapter) which can be used in the investigation of similar 
phenomena. 
Apart from this introduction, the chapter has four sections. The second section describes 
the flow of funds method used in chapter 5 to study the interaction between the real and financial 
sectors which determined the business cycle of the Peruvian economy and its transformation 
during the period under consideration. The section illustrates how the flow of funds can be 
adapted to investigate, more specifically, the flows related to dollarisation. Finally, the 
limitations of this method are discussed. 
The third section describes the mixed-method used in chapter 6 to analyse the balance 
sheet data of 177 non-financial firms. The mixed-method combines a dynamic panel data 
econometric analysis and a descriptive analysis based on 117 firms’ data. 
The fourth section illustrates data sources, data triangulations and data problems. 
113 
 
The fifth section summarise the chapter and introduces the next empirical chapters. 
 
4.2  Flow of funds analysis and its limitations 
The interaction between the financial and the real sectors plays a determining role in the 
structural changes of the Peruvian economy. In particular, the flow of funds analysis allows an 
assessment of the impact of fiscal and monetary policy on both sectors during the period under 
consideration in which the economy experienced significant reforms. 
The flow of funds is a system of national accounts which depicts the flow of financial 
instruments within different sectors of the economy. This enables the researcher to determine 
how sector deficits are financed and how surpluses are used. All data are represented as a 
percentage of GDP so that it can be easily compared over time and with other countries. The 
starting point of this analysis is provided by the representation of a series of charts representing 
the aggregate saving-investment gap. For the case of Peru, I will analyse saving and investment 
of the domestic economy in relation to the rest of world, assessing how gross fixed capital 
formation, gross savings and rest of the world savings have changed over time (Dawson, 1996; 
2004). Generally transactions are considered from the rest of the world point of view as if it was 
a closed system: the rest of the world savings is equal to the current account balance with 
reversed sign. Once the general trends are identified, the economy is then divided in different 
sectors. The number of sectors is limited by data availability; the minimum number is three, 
government, private sector and the rest of the world. The objective is to identify net lending and 
borrowing positions (defined as difference between savings and investments) of each sector and 
the financial instruments involved in the process (Dawson, 1996). 
In the second step, the aggregate analysis of the flow of funds is typically illustrated in 
matrix form. Columns represent economic sectors, rows indicate from top to bottom income and 
expenditure flows and balance-sheet flows. The balance is net worth at the end of the period. 
Both rows and columns sum to zero, thus ensuring that “everything comes from somewhere and 
everything goes somewhere” (Godley and Lavoie, 2007, p.xxxiv). A negative sign indicates a 
flow of funds from the sector, and a positive sign a flow to the sector. For example, a negative 
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sign represents a use of flows such as the purchasing of consumption good or financial asset; a 
positive sign represents a source of funds such as receipt of money from a sale of good or asset. 
Thus, applying Dawson’s methodology to the Peruvian set of data available, the outcome 
of the second step will be a financial flow of funds matrix with five sectors, as shown in the 
following table.  
 
Table 4.1: Financial flow of funds matrix 
 
Source: adaptation on Dawson (1996) 
 
The aim is to show the interlocking nature of financial flows (Godley and Lavoie, 2007). 
Columns are divided in three main areas. The public sector of the domestic economy is formed 
by the government and the central bank. The latter is only a small portion of the government 
sector, but because of its decisive role in money circulation, it is shown separately. The private 
sector is divided into the production (firms), the household, and the financial (for simplicity, 
banks) sectors. The column of the rest of world is formed by four components: lending through 
the acquisition of government bonds which is reflected in two rows (one for the domestic 
denominated debt, and one for the dollar denominated debt, in the foreign claims row), lending 
by the acquisition of private claims (FDI and portfolio flows) and the offsetting item foreign 
claims. The column of the government reveals the various funding instruments (issuance of 
internal, BG, and external debt, BGE, and privatisation, PC). The private non-bank sector borrows 
Rest of the World Σ
Central Bank Government Banks Firms & HH
Net Lending Ig-Sg Ip-Sp - Current Account 0
Foreign Claims +R -BGE +AF -BFE -R+BGE+BFE-AF 0
Domestic Debt +BG -BG +BG +BG 0
Private Credit -PC -PC +PC -PC 0
Govermant Deposit -DG +DG -DG 0 0
Money and Quasi-Money -M -M +M 0 0
Net Worth -NWCB -NWG -NWB -NWP -NWRoW 0
Σ 0 0 0 0 0 0
Public Sector Private Sector
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via private credit (PC is equity or FDI) or via external debt (foreign claims) and place funds into 
currency and deposit (i.e. into money and quasi-money with banks, M). 
Each row represents the flows in a specific financial instrument. The top row is formed 
by the net lending positions of the three sectors identified in the first step. The second row, 
foreign claims, reveals the link between the rest of the world flows, calculated as residuals, and 
the various sectors of the domestic economy (government external debt, private external debt, 
banks and the offsetting changes in reserves at the central bank, R). The third row reveals the 
dynamics associated with internal government debt (BG) which appears in the central bank 
(especially from sterilisation practice) or banks balance sheet, while the residual is hold by the 
rest of the world. The fourth line is dedicated to the private claims. This is provided by the 
banking sector, by the public sector and by the rest of the world. Private credit originating in the 
rest of the rest of the world is formed by foreign direct investments and portfolio flows. Portfolio 
Investments enters the private sector as equity purchased through the stock market. The reminder 
of this section discusses the limitations of the flow of funds analysis. 
Since 1950s, the flow of funds method has become an important tool of social accounting 
(Dawson, 1996). However, it has only been more systematically applied to developing countries 
by Post-Keynesian researchers from the 1990s; for example, Dawson (1992) reviews saving and 
investment in order to verify the effectiveness of monetary and fiscal policy in Indonesia; Holsen 
(1995) applies the method to identify the impact of a series of reforms in Kazakhstan aimed to 
rapidly liberalise the economy. 
However, this method presents some limitations: first, “accounting identities do not a 
macro model make” (Easterly, p.12, 2002). Second, especially for developing countries, data 
may be limited and not reliable. For example, ideally, data should be recorded at market values, 
but, they are usually derived from changes in balance-sheet values which are evaluated at 
historical cost (i.e. at the price of acquisition of assets and liabilities). Data are limited because 
firms and banks are reluctant to reveal the actual state of their business; they hide off-balance 
sheet activities which, in many cases, are of a very relevant size. Third, smuggling and informal 
activities escape from the accounting system. 
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Additional problems appear in partially dollarised economies: dollarisation can only be 
expressed by adding private credit, money and quasi-money in foreign currency: as highlighted 
in the literature review (chapter 2), dollarisation is measured only in terms of assets. As a result, 
these are the only available data. In reality, a better understanding of the effects of monetary 
policy should consider dollarisation in its multidimensional form and include both assets and 
liabilities in foreign currency for the various sectors. Additionally, with dollarisation, money 
contracts in domestic currency may be referring to the exchange rate. Dollars are held to hedge 
“subsequent liabilities”, so dollarisation extends beyond the mere use of dollars. In a dynamic 
system, it would be crucial to determine which sector of the economy is more dollarised and how 
various sectors exchange dollar rather than domestic currency. In other word, dollarisation is 
present in different varieties and degrees, but also may be classified in terms of interlinked assets 
and liabilities in the different sectors of the economy.  
Following Godley and Lavoie (2007), I construct a matrix (table below) which shows 
financial and real dollarisations through financial and tangible assets as they appear in the 
balance sheet for each sector of the economy. 
 
Table 4.2: Dollar balance sheet matrix of the dollarised monetary system 
 
 
CH and CF are the foreign cash balances of households and firms; OH, OF, OB are the off-
shore balances of the Household, Firms and Banks sectors respectively. DH, DF, DCB are the 
Household Firms Banks Government Central Bank
Foreign Currency Cash +CH +CF +R
Net Foreign Cash Held Abroad (off-shore) +OH +OF +OB
Foreign Currency Depo +DH +DF -DH-DF+DCB -DCB
Foreign Currency Bank Loans -LB -LB +LB
Foreign Currency Firms Bonds +BF -BF +BF
Foreign Currency Governament Bonds and Loans +BG +BG -BG +BG
Foreign Currency Assets +AF +AF +AF
Tangible Capital in Foreign Currency +KH +KF +KB
Private sector Public Sector
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deposits of Households, Firms and Central Bank. Similarly for each sector, L stands for loans, B 
for bonds, A for assets and K for tangible assets. 
The assets of the public sector are foreign reserves and foreign government bonds; the 
liabilities are foreign cash deposits held at the central bank. The household sector assets from the 
top of the table are the dollar cash held domestically and abroad, the dollar deposit (which 
represents a liability for banks), the dollar bonds issued by domestic firms, the dollar bonds or 
loans of the government, other foreign assets (foreign bonds and equities) and tangible assets 
bought in dollars (i.e. real estate and consumer durable goods). The liabilities of the household 
sector are the bank loans in foreign currency.  
The production sector is generally different from the household sector because of its 
ability to issue equity. However, having focused only on foreign currency stock, this difference 
disappears since, generally, equity denomination is in local currency. On the contrary, tangible 
assets are similar to non-dollarised economy as buildings, machines and inventories can be 
valued in dollars. All sectors can have assets in foreign currencies (i.e. equity, bonds) if the 
financial account is liberalised. 
The matrix would point out two main characteristics of a dollarised economy. Firstly, 
dollars tend to spill over all sectors and their presence allows for official and non-official flows 
in and out of the economy (OH, OF, OB). Secondly, traditionally, the lack of reliable data for both 
assets and liabilities has constrained the measure of dollarisation in empirical studies: the 
standard asset-side measure of dollarisation is the sum of foreign bank deposits of household and 
firms (DH, DF), and credit to the private sector (LB) only. On the liabilities side, the external debt 
has been the only measure for dollarisation. 
Thus the matrix showed in Table 4.1 will be modified and adapted to the Peruvian case in 
the following way: I split private credit, money and quasi-money in local and foreign currencies. 
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Table 4.3: Financial flow of funds matrix with dollarisation for Peru 
 
Source: adaptation of Dawson (1996) and of Godley and Lavoie (2007) 
 
In conclusion, a flow of funds analysis that includes dollarisation would facilitate an 
investigation into the potential distributional implications of a particular monetary policy and 
support its formulation. In the reminder of the thesis, balance sheet of non-financial listed firms 
will be analysed to extrapolate some information about the flows of dollars. 
 
4.3 The mixed-method 
The method of analysis adopted here is based on triangulation which, in social research, 
implies combining together more than one set of insights in an investigation (Denzin, 1970). In 
particular, using Denzin’s taxonomy, this thesis will be using different forms of triangulation. 
Methodological triangulations, which involve the combination of different methods, are defined 
as with-in method and in between method. The first one refers to the use of different varieties of 
the same method. For example, this thesis applies this method when panel data are analysed with 
the same econometric technique, but with different specifications. The second one, in-between-
method triangulation, involves the combination of different methods. For example, it involves 
the combination of qualitative and quantitative analyses. In this case, triangulation is between 
different quantitative methods by using both regression analysis and business cycle analysis (a 
Rest of the World Σ
Central Bank Government Banks Firms & HH
Net Lending Ig-Sg Ip-Sp - Current Account 0
Foreign Claims +R -BGE +AF -BFE -R+BGE+BFE-AF 0
Domestic Debt +BG -BG +BG +BG 0
Private Credit -PC -PC +PC -PC 0
Peruvian Soles -PcSoles -PcSoles -PcSoles
Dollars -PcDollars -PcDollars -PcDollars
Govermant Deposit -DG +DG -DG 0 0
Money and Quasi-Money -M -M +M 0 0
Peruvian Soles -MSoles -MSoles +MSoles
Dollars -MDollars -MDollars +MDollars
Net Worth -NWCB -NWG -NWB -NWP -NWRoW 0
Σ 0 0 0 0 0 0
Private SectorPublic Sector
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mixed of flow of funds and capital structure). This allows completing the investigation carried 
out through the use of econometric technique which is restrictive for both theoretical and 
methodological reasons. Additionally, data triangulation is used: this gathering data from 
different sources (i.e INEI, Conasev, Proinversión) in order to fill the gaps due to partial data 
sets. 
The empirical part corresponding to the balance sheet analysis for non-financial firms 
presented in chapter 6 will be divided in two parts. Firstly, following Arellano and Bond (1991), 
balance sheet data is analysed through the dynamic panel data method. This method is 
characterised by estimating instrumental variables through the Generalised Method of Moments 
(GMM) technique. The advantages of considering a dynamic panel data are numerous: contrary 
to a simple cross-section panel method, estimation is no longer biased by any omitted variables. 
The so-called instrumental variables allow the inclusion of endogenous variables among the 
exogenous variables such as lagged investment or sales which, in general, otherwise, would be 
autocorrelated. The idea behind instrumental variables is to find a set of variables, called 
instruments, which are both correlated with the explanatory variables and uncorrelated with the 
disturbances. Furthermore, the use of instrumental variables potentially allows consistent 
estimation when variables on the right-side are measured with error. The panel set data is formed 
by a high number of firms (117) and a short-time dimension is appropriate for this type of 
estimation.  
The linear dynamic panel data specification is given by: 
                      (1) 
with    <1 and i=1,2,...,N and t=2,3,...,T where T is small and N is large. By first-
differencing this specification, the individual effect due to each firm is removed because     is 
assumed with finite moments and with E(   )=E(      ) = 0 for s≠t. The first differentiation 
produces an equation of the form: 
                      (2) with    <1 and i=1,2,...,N and 
t=3,4,...,T 
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The last equation may be estimated using GMM techniques. Efficient GMM estimation 
of this equation will typically employ a different number of instruments for each period, with the 
period-specific instruments corresponding to the different numbers of lagged dependent and 
predetermined variables available at any given period. The two-stage instrumental variables 
GMM technique is the optimal choice for this type of regression. 
The GMM estimator   is given by 
                                   (3) 
Where Z is a matrix formed of sets of predetermined instruments for individual firms 
using lags of the dependent variable: 
 
 
    =   (4) 
 
 
 
Assuming that     are not autocorrelated, the optimal GMM weighting matrix for the 
differenced specification    is given by: 
     
 
 
        
 
    
  
          (5) 
Where H is a (T-2) square matrix which has twos in the main diagonal, minus one in the 
first subdiagonals and zeros otherwise.  
Given estimates of the residuals from the one-step estimator, one may want to calculate 
the new weighing matrix, the so called two-step process: 
    0 0 ... 0 ... 0 
0         ... 0 ... 0 
... ... ... ... ... ... ... 
0 ... ... ...     ...       
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          (6) 
The tests associated with this method are: 1) the Sargan Test, called also Hansen J 
statistic, of over-identifying restrictions which has a null hypothesis of “instruments as a group 
are exogenous”. Thus, the higher is the p-value of the Sargan statistic the better; 2) the 
autocorrelation tests of the first order, AR(1), and second order , AR(2). Generally, the first order 
needs to present p-value less than 0.05 while the second order test, which is more important since 
it tests the null hypothesis of no autocorrelation in levels, has to be bigger than 0.05. 
Secondly, an analysis of the business cycle is also carried out in order to complete and 
enhance the quantitative analysis of the previous part. Initially, because of the exchange rate 
stabilisation policy, RER fluctuations are analysed in terms of price trend from peaks to troughs 
in relation to different historical and economic phases. In doing so, I managed to identify four 
different phases: this will be described in section 6.1. Additionally, non-financial firms’ data is 
used here again for a qualitative analysis. Besides sectors, other categories are tradable/non-
tradable and ownership (foreign/domestic/conglomerates). To identify these categories a back 
and forth analytical method has been developed from the analysis of the previous category. 
Taking into account the different phases of the RER and the business cycle, this investigation 
was necessary to complement the econometric analysis which relies on fixed categorisation. 
Rather, this second enquiry uses ad hoc categorisations. 
The creation of the various categories followed different stages: as discussed, the first 
stage considers sectors of activity; in the second stage, data are then grouped in tradable/non 
tradable. This is so because the focus of the analysis is on the relation between RER fluctuations 
and the development of different sectors, with RER defined in terms of tradables and non-
tradables. However, by analysing the results and the annual reports of the firms it was clear that 
one firm may operate across different sectors of the economy. For example, if a firm is a 
conglomerate which operates in different sectors, it will be difficult to categorise it under either 
tradable or non-tradable. A third stage categorisation considers that, in the specific case of Peru, 
liberalisation of the capital account and privatisation led to numerous changes of hands 
throughout the entire period. As a result, there were changes amongst those firms more exposed 
to exchange rate fluctuations and, consequently, amongst those which mostly benefit from the 
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interventions of the central bank in the forex market. For these reasons, a categorisation by type 
of ownership, which may include various firms under the same owner, is needed.  
In summary, the first categorisation used is by sector activity. As previously mentioned, I 
integrate INEI data with the CONASEV sample data. The INEI data are published using the 
classification described by the table below which has been used in the creation of the CONASEV 
database (see Appendix B, second column database B).  
 
Table 4.4: Sector and industry classification used by INEI 
Sectors Sub-sectors 
Agribusiness Farming and Agricultural 
 Agro industry 
Commerce Consumable fuels retailing 
 Electricity and water retailing 
 Food and drinks retailing 
 Consumer durables retailing 
Construction Materials productions 
 Real Estate 
Electricity and Water Generation, distribution of electricity 
and water 
Fishing Fishing Industry 
Manufacturing Food Industry 
 Textile Industry 
 Furniture Industry (Wood and metals) 
 Paper Industry 
 Non-metal products Industry 
 Basic metal Industry 
 Metallic product Industry 
 Other products Industry 
Mining Mining sector 
 Hydrocarbon sector (production, 
refinery, commerce) 
Services Transport and communication 
 Tourism 
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The sector analysis is followed by the tradable and non-tradable categorisation in which 
the tradable sectors are Agribusiness, Commerce, Fishing, Manufacturing and Mining; the non-
tradable sector is formed by the remaining sectors. 
As discussed, the Peruvian economy is dominated by large conglomerates which invest in 
different sectors of the economy. For this reason, it can be useful to categorise each firm by 
ownership rather than by sector because financial decisions are made at a conglomerate level, 
rather than by discrete production processes. As a result, the degree of exposure to exchange rate 
fluctuations changes not only in relation to the business cycle for each sector, but also because of 
changes in ownership. 
In order to take into consideration this issue, firms’ ownership (shown in the last column 
of Database B in Appendix B) have been categorised following the criteria below: 
 Domestic Conglomerates: firms belonging to a domestic group 
 Foreign Ownership: firms with majority stake in equity held by foreigners 
 Mixed Ownership: firms with no majority owner but with fragmented ownership 
in domestic large capital, family or small domestic capital, and foreign capital 
 Private and Domestic Ownership: firms owned by private individuals/families or 
domestic capital not linked to any domestic or foreign group 
 Semi-Public: firms which have been partially privatised  
From database B, each firm has been allocated using the categories above as shown in the 
following table: 
 
Table 4.5: Classification of detailed ownership of database B into broader ownership categories 
Ownership as in Database B Final Groups 
Banda Domestic Conglomerate 
Bentin  Domestic Conglomerate 
Brescia Domestic Conglomerate 
Domestic Conglomerate Domestic Conglomerate 
Ferreyros Domestic Conglomerate 
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Ferreyros and Mixed Domestic Conglomerate 
Fishman Domestic Conglomerate 
Foreign Conglomerate Foreign Ownership 
Foreign Firm Foreign Ownership 
Hochschield Domestic Conglomerate 
Lindley Domestic Conglomerate 
Menchelli Domestic Conglomerate 
Menchelli, Wiese and others Domestic Conglomerate 
Mixed Ownership Mixed Ownership 
Private Ownership Private and Domestic Ownership 
Romero Domestic Conglomerate 
Romero –Raffa Domestic Conglomerate 
Semi-Public Semi- Public 
Wiese Domestic Conglomerate 
Raffo Domestic Conglomerate 
Domestic Ownership Private and Domestic Ownership 
Cosapi Domestic Conglomerate 
Raffo and Mixed Domestic Conglomerate 
 
Therefore, the variables analysed so far are presented again following the categorisation 
by conglomerate (see Appendix C). Data categorisation takes into consideration the ownership 
year by year, and consequently a firm is moved from one category to another if its ownership 
changes overtime. The database formed by this categorisation allows cross-referencing of two 
categories (i.e. sectors and ownership), so for the following analysis we will take into 
consideration changes over time that can be reported in the examples below as tables. 
 
Table 4.6: Database summary of categorisation by ownership and by sector for the year 1991 (number of 
firms)  
 
Source: Appendix C 
Count of 1991 Column Labels
Row Labels Domestic Conglomerate Foreign Ownership Mixed Ownership Private and Domestic Ownership Semi - Public Grand Total
Agribusiness 5 1 7 4 17
Commerce 9 6 2 17
Construction 7 1 8
Electricity 3 1 6 10
Fishing 2 1 1 4
Manufacturing 11 12 5 8 1 37
Mining 6 5 4 15
Services 1 3 1 3 1 9
Grand Total 41 31 19 18 8 117
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Table 4.7: Database summary of categorisation by ownership and by sector for the year 2009 (number of 
firms)  
 
Source: Appendix C 
 
4.4 Data 
The primary data used in this thesis are gathered from government institutions. Most of 
the macro data regarding growth and investments are from the BCRP and INEI database. 
Unfortunately, the central bank holds only foreign direct investments and gross fixed 
investments at aggregate level. However, during my fieldwork, I managed to obtain foreign 
direct investment data by sectors from the government’s agent Proinversión. This data will be 
used to perform a triangulation with other sources. Still, this was not satisfactory given that data 
collected by Proinversión depends on the voluntary declaration of companies. 
Therefore, there are several reasons to justify the collection of data at micro level and the 
creation of a database. For example, balance sheet data can provide additional indications on the 
level of investments by sectors. Moreover, firms’ reports include the net debt US dollar balance, 
in terms of liabilities minus assets in US dollar, which can provide an indication of firms’ 
sensibility to exchange rate fluctuations.  
All micro data have been gathered from Comisión Nacional Supervisora de Empresas y 
Valores (CONASEV), the stock market regulatory agency of Peru, during fieldwork. Generally, 
data are available in electronic format since 1999, but archives of the commission had to be 
Count of 2009 Column Labels
Row Labels Domestic Conglomerate Foreign Ownership Mixed Ownership Private and Domestic Ownership Semi - Public Grand Total
Agribusiness 4 5 7 1 17
Commerce 9 6 2 17
Construction 7 1 8
Electricity 7 1 2 10
Fishing 2 1 1 4
Manufacturing 8 16 5 8 37
Mining 5 6 4 15
Services 1 4 1 3 9
Grand Total 36 45 19 15 2 117
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consulted for data of the 1990s. The period of analysis spans from 1991 to the last available year, 
2010. The total number of firms available was about 200, but not all the companies lived 
throughout the period, so firms with less than five years of data have been excluded. Moreover, 
some firms had to be excluded in order to avoid double counting because they were subsidiaries 
of firms already accounted for in the sample. Therefore, excluding Banks and other Financial 
Institutions (see Database B listed in Appendix B for firms’ detailed information), the final 
number of firms used is 117 (these are listed in Appendix C). These firms form the database I 
created to run the analysis described in the precious section. For each company, and for each 
year, I have gathered data from yearly audited reports from the following sections: the Balance 
General (Balance Sheet), the Estado de Ganancias y Perdidas (profit and loss account) and the 
Notas a los Estados Financieros (Notes to the Financial Statements). All the data collected are in 
thousands of current Nuevos Soles with the exception of the quantities of assets and liabilities in 
foreign currency which are in US dollars. The dollar balance gathered are net of derivatives 
(forwards). 
Once collected, data presented a number of problems: first is the absence of consecutive 
data. Some reports are missing for particular years; therefore the information referring to the year 
“t-1” has been reconstructed from the year “t” given that the report of each year shows the 
previous year data. However, the previous year data are expressed in current year terms, so 
values have to be discounted by the inflation rate which is indicated in the Notes to the Financial 
Statement. For few points, values have been linearly interpolated given the gap of a single year 
“t” between two years (“t-1” and “t+1”).  
Second, some firms do not presents their “Notes to the Financial Statement”, which show 
assets and liabilities in foreign currency. 
As a result, the amount of data available varies for each firm. The following table (Table 
4.8) shows the number of firm for which data are available for each year. The first column 
represents the number of firms per year with available balance sheet data; the second column 
represents the number of firms per year which reported net debt dollar balance (called Risk in US 
dollar in the Table 4.8): 
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Table 4.8: Data available by year for the database (number of firms)  
 
Source: Appendix C 
 
Values extracted from the Balance Sheets Statements and the Profit and Loss Accounts 
are: 
 Investments: defined as the firm’s expenses in land, equipment, machinery, 
buildings during the year. 
 Total Assets 
 Total Liabilities 
 Current Assets 
 Current Liabilities 
 Operating Profit 
 Net Profit 
Variables extracted from the balance sheets of the firms are combined to determine the 
financial ratios listed in Table 4.9 below. 
Balance Sheet Data Risk in USD 
1991 60                                        53
1992 69                                        63
1993 74                                        66
1994 83                                        75
1995 96                                        86
1996 104                                      95
1997 107                                      101
1998 115                                      113
1999 116                                      115
2000 116                                      114
2001 115                                      113
2002 116                                      114
2003 111                                      108
2004 108                                      106
2005 105                                      103
2006 102                                      98
2007 102                                      98
2008 99                                        95
2009 97                                        92
2010 95                                        90
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Table 4.9: Financial ratios used for the database 
Leverage Total Liabilities/ Total Asset 
Liquidity Current ratio = Current Asset/Current Liabilities 
Profitability ROA = Operating Profit/ Total Assets 
Solvency Net Profit/Total Debt 
 
Third, it should be mentioned that the publicly listed companies are the largest firms in 
the country. This may be a problem in terms of representativeness of the sample in relation to the 
whole economy. However, since large firms generally tend to have easier access to the US dollar 
market, either through their volume of exports or in terms of financing through US dollar debt, 
this selection bias serves the purpose of the investigation. Large firms are exactly the firms 
which are more affected by fluctuations in the exchange rate. 
Fourth, and in relation to the previous point, the INEI sector data are compared with 
CONASEV database in order to verify the sectoral representativeness of the latter. This is 
especially important because of the presence, in the Peruvian economy, of large size 
conglomerates. In order to proceed with the investigation, the micro data had to be 
representative. Following Carranza et al. (2003), for each sector I compare the share of GDP 
with the sum of individual firms’ assets and sales as proportions of the economy’s total assets 
and GDP. As it will be discussed in chapter 6 the sectoral structure of the economy has not 
changed throughout the period under consideration. However, the representativeness of 
CONASEV listed companies at sectoral level changed: the Agribusiness is under-represented; 
the Utility and the Mining sectors are over-represented. The issue of the CONASEV sectoral 
representativeness will be taken up in chapter 6. These limitations should be considered when 
results will be presented. 
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Table 4.10: Comparison of assets by sectors of CONASEV sample and GDP share by sector (percentage)  
 
Source: CONASEV (data manipulated by author), INEI (2011) 
 
Furthermore, the process of sectoral classification has been problematic in some cases: 
conglomerates’ subsidiaries are often involved in many different sectors, as a result, they could 
not be easily placed in any sector. For example, Saga Falabella operates in Commerce, 
Construction and Tourism. The issue has been resolved by identifying the core business of each 
individual conglomerate in terms of investments and/or sales.  
Finally, data are aggregated either in real terms, by using the GDP deflator base year 
2005 for Peru and United States, or as a percentage of GDP to facilitate the comparison of the 
significance of the data from one cycle to another. Data are added for each categorisation (i.e. by 
sectors), but are also analysed by averaging the number of firms by each category (i.e. average 
value for the Construction sector) in order to check whether the dynamic panel data have an 
effect on the overall results (i.e. by averaging the total value for each category by the number of 
firms per year, it is smoothed the effect of firm joining the sample or dropping off the sample 
during the sample period). It is clear that these strategies are not rigorous in terms of sample 
representation but, by confronting different results, the aim is to obtain a general idea about the 
phenomena under investigation (i.e. what happens to investments if the sample is analysed by 
different categorisation). 
 
CONASEV Sample INEI Sectors
1996 2006 1996 2006 1996 2006
Agribusiness 7% 5% 3% 1% Agribusiness 8% 8%
Commerce 18% 13% 26% 16% Commerce 15% 15%
Construction 5% 8% 5% 6% Construction 6% 5%
Electricity 21% 17% 11% 7% Electricity and Water 2% 2%
Fishing 3% 1% 3% 1% Fishing 1% 1%
Manufacturing 9% 13% 14% 26% Manufacturing 15% 15%
Mining 14% 29% 19% 33% Mining 5% 6%
Services 23% 13% 20% 9%
Transport and Communication, Restaurants 
and Hotels, Private Health and Education 17% 16%
Other (Financial Services and Insurance, and 
Government Services) 33% 32%
TOTAL 100% 100% 100% 100% TOTAL 100% 100%
Assets by Sectors Sales by Sectors GDP Share by Sectors
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4.5 Conclusions 
This chapter presented an overview of the methods employed in the empirical analysis of 
this thesis.  
More specifically, the flow of funds method has been introduced and extended to the case 
of a partially dollarised economy; then, the method’s limitations have been discussed. The flow 
of funds analysis will be used in chapter 5, where the monetary policy of the Peruvian central 
bank will be analysed and contextualised in relation to the dramatic process of stabilisation 
which Peru experienced since the hyperinflation of the late 1980s. 
In the third section of this chapter, I presented the mixed-method used in the analysis of 
the 117 non-financial firms’ data which will be used in chapter 6. This consists in combining a 
dynamic panel data econometric analysis which assesses the relationship between real exchange 
rate and investments, and a qualitative analysis of the same firms’ data which will provide 
additional information on the behaviour of these firms. The qualitative analysis will be based on 
an original database. 
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Chapter 5 - The monetary policy of the Central Bank of Peru since hyperinflation 
 
5.1 Introduction 
The election of a new government in 1990 under the presidency of Fujimori signed a 
significant turning point for the history of Peru. This event coincided with the implementation of 
central bank independency and the sanctioning of its responsibility in terms of money stability. 
The Banco Central de Reserva del Peru (BCRP) formally adopted a monetarist monetary 
target during the 1990s and then switched to a New Keynesian inflation targeting in 2001. 
However, instead of maintaining the exchange rate free of floating, the BCRP has continuously 
intervened in the foreign exchange market throughout the entire period. This practice stands out 
as an anomaly for the inflation targeting framework. This chapter discusses the Peruvian 
monetary policy under both the above models. Once the general background of the monetary 
policy paradigm shift has been sketched out, the chapter introduces two analyses which are 
alternative to the standard mainstream account: the first is achieved thanks to the flow of funds 
method, the second is presented through an original representation of liquidity.  
The chapter is divided in six sections. Following this introduction, the second and third 
sections focus on the monetary policy of Peru including the exchange rate policy operational 
terms: it appears that the BCRP was forced to smooth the volatility of the exchange rate because 
the economy was partially dollarised. In doing so, it was trying to achieve simultaneously two 
goals, inflation reduction and exchange rate stability. The sections show, empirically, that for a 
highly dollarised open economy the only policy option that the central bank can effectively 
implement to guarantee price stability is to manipulate the exchange rate. Given this fundamental 
role of the exchange rate volatility, this chapter will contextualise the exchange rate policy 
through the period 1990-2010: the second section discusses the monetary instability culminated 
with the hyperinflation and collapse of the economy at the end of the 1980s. This sets the 
conditions for the following monetarist policy frameworks. From this, it will then address the 
adoption of the new consensus framework, inflation targeting, which was adopted in 2001 and 
still maintained until today. This is addressed in the third section. 
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The fourth section assesses the monetary policy effectiveness, within the broader 
dynamics of the business cycle, from the end of the 1980s to 2010. The flow of funds analysis 
provides an alternative lens under which hyperinflation, stabilisation, and the policy of the 
central bank can be explained. The whole period will be divided in three: the hyperinflation of 
the 1980s, the period from 1991 to 2002 characterised by stabilisation ending in stagnation, and 
the following commodity boom period until 2010. This analysis will tease out the credit 
dynamics, money and liquidity in both domestic and foreign currencies; this will lead to an 
alternative interpretation of the monetary policy based on the idea of internal and external 
liquidities developed in the theoretical chapter. This new interpretation will shed light on the 
policy of the central bank and confirms the findings of the flow of funds analysis and will be 
illustrated in the fifth section. The sixth section draws some conclusions. 
 
5.2  The disease and the cure, from hyperinflation to the Washington Consensus 
The aim of this section is to analyse the background of the Peruvian economy just before 
the important turning point of the Fujimori government in 1990. The stabilisation process, which 
Peru experienced in the 1990s, assumes great importance considering that, at the end of the 
1980s, Peru was in a macroeconomic chaos: inflation reached about 7,500 percent, fiscal deficit 
was of about 7,8 percent of GDP, total external debt was around 80 percent of GNP, with a 
heavily dollarised economy, and all with an underlying negative real growth rate of 11.6 percent 
(WDI, 2011). In addressing the long stabilisation process started in 1990, this section will focus 
mainly on two aspects, namely dollarisation and hyperinflation, and it is divided into two 
periods, the years when hyperinflation hit and dollarisation increased, and the years after the 
“shock therapy” in 1990. 
 
5.2.1 The road to dollarisation and hyperinflation 
The collapse of the economy came about during the so-called heterodox government of 
García (1985-1990), but it is generally recognised that this was the culmination of a longer 
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process (Jimenez, 2010; Parodi Trece, 2000). The length of this process is accompanied by the 
progressive dollarisation of the economy. This started to increase significantly in Peru 
throughout the 1970s when, under the military government of Morales Bermudez (1975-80), 
inflation went from about 20 to 70 percent. Most importantly, petrodollars started to enter in 
Latin America: this contributed to double the external debt from about 16 percent of GDP in 
1973 to 42 percent of GDP in 1979 in Peru. With the first democratically elected orthodox 
government of Belaunde (1980-85),
32
 this trend continued until the 1980s debt crisis. At the 
beginning of this government, the current account was balanced and there was no fiscal deficit. 
However, the sudden trade account liberalisation induced an enormous increase of imports, 
especially consumer goods which caused the external balance to move into deficit.
33
 Public 
investment and consumption were dependent on external debt, while a series of mini-devaluation 
were supposed to slow demand (imports) with the effect of controlling inflation and re-aligning 
the real exchange rate. In reality, since the economy was heavily dollarised, the effect of this 
policy was muted and inflation continued to rise. Simultaneously, the increase of international 
dollar interest rates had a devastating impact on public finance for all Latin American countries, 
and Peru was no exception. The country experienced no growth in 1982 and a negative real grow 
rate of 12.6 percent in 1983.
34
 By 1983, more than half of bank deposits were in dollars (Table 
5.1). Thorp (1987) defines the process of dollarisation in Peru in those days as a “proper defence 
mechanism” (p.64). 
 
                                                 
32
 This is the second government of Belaunde: he was in power during 1963-68 when he tried to implement the ISI 
model. Despite the ideological differences, both his governments kept an expansionary fiscal policy funded via 
external debt. 
33
 See Memoria BCRP 1988 for data. 
34
 In 1983, the economy was also badly affected by el niño which caused an estimated loss of (current) 1,500 
millions of US dollars. 
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Table 5.1: Dollarisation, inflation and changes in exchange rate (percentage) (1981-1991) 
 
Source: IMF (2011), *De la Rocha (1998) 
 
As a response to the failure of the orthodox administration, an heterodox government led 
by García was elected in 1985, under the idea that a radical change was needed, according to 
which, and contrary to the orthodox approach, prices had to be managed in order to control 
inflation; monetary and fiscal expansionary policies were needed to resume growth. Monetary 
policy aimed, through low interest rates, to compensate the loss of mark-up paid by firms, which 
had to accept price rigidities. Fiscal policy had to stimulate domestic demand which, in turn, 
would favour the expansion of production eliminating bottlenecks and, consequently, bring 
deflation. The fiscal deficit was viewed as a consequence of inflation, not as its cause, as the 
monetarists argued (Parodi Trece, 2000). Most importantly, García tried to establish a mutual 
beneficial agreement between the government and the biggest 12 economic groups, the so-called 
12 apostles.
35
 These conglomerates were supposed to commit to increasing their investment in 
exchange for a series of government subsidies. This was given by a system of multiple exchange 
rates and tariffs. Peruvian conglomerates were extremely powerful, inserted in all sectors of the 
economy, and in charge of a number of banks. 
                                                 
35
 These were: Romero, Raffo, Brescia, Nicolini, Wiese, Bunge & Born, Picasso, Rothshield, Aries, Betin, 
Ferreyros, Lanatta Piaggio. 
Inflation Change in Currency (-depr.)
In Peru Including Deposit Abroad *
1981 27 37 75.4 -32.6
1982 35 49 64.4 -48.8
1983 40 57 111.2 -56.4
1984 49 65 110.2 -60.1
1985 30 55 163.4 -59.2
1986 11 36 77.9 0.0
1987 10 39 85.8 -57.7
1988 32 70 667.0 -93.4
1989 21 54 3398.7 -90.5
1990 47 76 7481.7 -99.0
1991 58 73 409.5 -46.2
Dollarisation Ration of Broad Money
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The short-term results of these policies were positive: inflation started to decline, deposits 
in foreign currency were confiscated and the economy de-dollarised thanks to the prohibition of 
holding foreign currency.
36
 Nevertheless, soon, external and fiscal balance started to deteriorate 
while private investment was not picking up as desired since conglomerates’ banks were not 
providing credit to smaller companies. In 1987, García decided to take control of credit by 
proposing the nationalisation of the banking system (Vasquez Huaman, 2000). 
The consequences were dramatic o In order to avoid dollar flight and to encourage dollar 
repatriation, at the end of the decade, foreign deposits in the country were allowed again, but it 
was too late: firms and citizens could acquire dollar deposits outside the country, the ratio of 
broad money to GDP decreased during the period, and after 1988 foreign deposit increased 
(Table 5.1) (Quispe, 2000). The parallel exchange rate increasingly diverged from the official 
nominal exchange rate as uncertainty on the domestic currency increased (Table 5.2). 
 
Table 5.2: Nominal exchange rates (official, CBME
37
 and un-official or parallel) (1982-1991) 
 
Source: BCRP (2011), IMF (2011) 
                                                 
36
 In reality, the drop of dollarisation in the official statistics might also be due to flight of dollars held abroad and 
not registered. 
37
 CBME stands for Certificados Bancarios de Moneda Extranjera. This is the exchange rate used by the banking 
system on small deposits. 
Official - Parallel CBME - Parallel
Soles/$ 1982 0.99           0.99           1.00           1.0% 1.0%
1983 2.27           2.31           2.35           3.5% 1.7%
1984 5.70           5.82           5.82           2.1% 0.0%
Intis/$ 1985 13.95         17.38         17.38         24.6% 0.0%
1986 13.95         17.45         20.03         43.6% 14.8%
1987 33.00         62.82         92.00         178.8% 46.5%
1988 500.00       1,749.50     1,700.00     240.0% -2.8%
1989 5,261.40     12,643.24   12,940.00   145.9% 2.3%
1990 516,923.00 516,922.57 547,500.00 5.9% 5.9%
New Soles/$ 1991 0.96           0.96           0.97           1.0% 1.0%
End of the period Exchange rate vs. $ dollar
Currency 
denomination
Year Official CBME Parallel
Difference in %
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In 1985, the currency was re-valued by 1,000 and the Peruvian inti replaced the sole. A 
new revaluation by 1,000,000 was introduced in 1991 and the inti was replaced with the new sole 
(Table 5.2). However, repeated devaluations had to be contained as fighting inflation was given 
top priority. Consequently, the real exchange rate appreciated substantially at the end of the 
1980s and beginning of the 1990s, remaining substantially unchanged until today (Figure 5.1). 
 
Figure 5.1: Bilateral RER (Index July 1985=100) (1981-2009) 
 
Source: author’s calculation from BCRP (2011) 
 
5.2.2 The election of Fujimori and the war to inflation 
The previous sub-section highlighted two particular issues emerged in the 1980s: the 
increasing dollarisation of the economy and the appreciation of the real exchange rate culminated 
with the hyperinflation at the end of the decade. This sub-section focuses on the monetary policy 
adopted during the so-called disinflation period (1991-2001) in which the BCRP followed a 
monetary target model (De la Rocha, 1998). 
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The 1990 elections were characterised by the rejection of the old parties that had 
dominated the political scene of the 1980s which led to three years of hyperinflation, deep 
recessions and violent social upraises.
38
 A last minute turn-away from the right-wing 
independent candidate, the Nobel Prize writer Mario Vargas Llosa, who represented the orthodox 
“shock therapy”, favoured a moderate agronomist, Alberto Fujimori. 
Following a neo-populist campaign, Fujimori was elected with no parliamentary 
majority. A double agreement was needed: on the one hand, an alliance with the army to avoid a 
coup d’état and fight the revolutionary movement Sendero Luminoso. On the other hand, 
relations with major financial actors were established. Once in power, Fujimori abandoned his 
promises and, with a government formed by technocrats close to the financial elite, implemented 
a drastic austerity orthodox program (Parodi Trece, 2000). 
A programme to fight inflation was announced in August 1990: all exchange rate controls 
were eliminated, a single exchange rate was restored, current and capital accounts were opened 
up, and price controls were lifted. Furthermore, interest rates were freed and banks’ reserve 
requirements were gradually lowered. Peru adopted the principles of universal banking by 
privatising public banks and implementing Basel standards. The stock market was privatised and 
mutual funds started to operate when the reformed pension system offered the possibly to opt for 
a private pension (De la Rocha, 1998). To tackle the fiscal deficit, it was argued, subsidies were 
eliminated. This implied a corrective inflation of 397 percent in the month of August 1990 alone, 
which clearly hit mostly the poorest part of the population who was the electoral basis for 
Fujimori. As mentioned, a fiscal reform was implemented in order to reduce public expenditure, 
so that the repayment of interests on the external debt, denied during the García administration, 
could be resumed.
39
 
In monetary terms, policy was implemented via market-based instruments with open-
market operations. Direct credit from the central bank was discontinued in 1991 and discount 
                                                 
38
 Between 1985 and 1990, almost 10,000 people were killed in political conflicts, 3,496 strikes led to an estimated 
loss of about 91,277 hours per worker (Apoyo, 1990).  
39
  The plan to re-integrate Peru in the international financial market was agreed after the first repayment in October 
1990. This forced another price adjustment in the following December/January. The entire reform followed IMF 
advices, but was not under the IMF surveillance. For this reason, it was called shadow programme (Parodi Trece, 
2000).  
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window borrowing was rapidly reduced. Reserve requirements for domestic currency liabilities 
decreased from 45 percent in 1990 to nine percent in 1993. The priority was to re-gain control of 
money issuance, which implied changes on two fronts. First, internally, the government could 
not be funded by the central bank. Second, externally, the system of multiple exchange rates had 
to be abandoned providing, under a free floating system, a single market where agents could 
exchange currencies. In this way, it was possible to implement a restrictive monetary policy 
which would cause deflation, according to the monetarist model: the central bank could only 
issue the monetary base by buying dollars and selling soles. The control of the monetary base 
implied a reduction amount of soles sold by the central bank and a consequent trade-off between 
a reduction of inflation and a currency appreciation. This could be observed in the first months 
after the reform (Figure.7.2). 
To summarise, the change of the monetary stance had no impact on the exchange rate 
policy, the real exchange rate continued to appreciate maintaining the policy of the late 1980s 
when the exchange rate was considered a nominal anchor for inflation. 
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Figure 5.2: Monthly changes in inflation, devaluation and monetary base (1989-1991) 
 
Source: author’s calculation from BCRP (2011) and IMF (2011) 
 
A proof that an exchange rate appreciation was favoured during these years is provided 
by the fact that, initially, there was supposed to be a devaluation of 450,000 intis/dollar in 
correspondence to the general increase of prices. However, this only translated in practice in an 
increase of 300,000 intis/dollar (Parrodi Trece, 2000). It took the whole 1991 to reduce inflation 
to about 400 percent, since further increases/adjustments in controlled prices continued during 
the year to cover fiscal expenses.
40
 
Simultaneously, the liberalisation of the financial account created an influx of capital into 
the economy and pushed the exchange rate downwards. This allowed the central bank to increase 
                                                 
40
 For example, petrol price increased by 5.5% in April, 3.4% in May and 24.2% in June. Drinkable water and 
electricity increased respectively by 83.8% and 20% in June. Electricity increased again by 27% in July (Parodi 
Trece, 2000). 
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its dollar reserves via small interventions. In the next chapter, the effects of the exchange rate 
policy will be discussed in more details. 
The reform continued under a state of emergency. The congress granted Fujjimori 150 
days in 1991 in which he could legislate by emergency, avoiding parliamentary discussions. 
Nevertheless, in April 1992, the President decided to get full power with an autogolpe. Despite 
his popular consent, the international community forced Fujimori to run elections in November 
1992 when he received a majority of 74 percent (Parodi Trece 2000). Ironically, 74 percent was 
the inflation rate at the end of 1992, a year in which the economy was affected by capital flight, a 
credit crunch, and hit by el niño. 
In summary, this second section has provided a historical background of the Peruvian 
economy since the 1980s. While the economic scene was dominated by hyperinflation (during 
the 1980s) and stabilisation (during the 1990s), the political scene is characterised by 
problematic government-business relations. These were analysed within the developmental state 
tradition by Schneider (2004). While a review of the literature on developmental state (Chang, 
2002; Johnson, 1982; Woo-Cumings, 1999; Amsden, 1989; Wade, 1990) is beyond the scope of 
this thesis, it provides a powerful framework for the analysis of government-business relations. 
According to this tradition, state autonomy, defined in terms of state independence from 
particular interests, is an essential pre-condition for successful developmental state interventions. 
Schneider (2004) emphasises the lack of autonomy of the Peruvian governments from specific 
interests also with respect to various degrees of authoritarianism. 
41
 
The next sub-section will address the new role assigned to the central bank and the 
monetary policy adopted during the Fujimori government. 
 
5.3 The monetary policy since the independence of the central bank 
After the emergency period and the electoral victory of Fujimori in 1992, the monetary 
policy remained the same, as recommended by the International Financial Institutions. However, 
                                                 
41
 The developmental state literature has been criticised by Fine (2006). 
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in 1993, the central bank became formally independent within a new de jure framework that 
sanctioned price stability as its only objective (De la Rocha, 1998).
42
  
After this, two periods can be distinguished, one until 2001 when the monetary target was 
adopted, and a second one from 2001 until 2010 during which the central bank implemented 
inflation targeting. The next two sub-sections addresses these two periods respectively. 
 
5.3.1 The monetary target years (1993-2001) 
During the first period, between 1993 and 1997, liberalisation led to capital inflows 
which financed the negative trade and current accounts. The latter was heavily affected by the 
interest payments on the external debt. This was the period of privatisation and increase of 
foreign private investments and was followed by a more difficult period, between 1997 and 
2001, in which the Russian and Asian crises caused a withdrawal of foreign capital inflows, and 
the phenomenon el niño had an effect on many sectors of the economy.  
During these years, the CBRP adopted a monetary target approach: the level of liquidity 
and money growth had to be compatible with the inflation objective, given the macro-economic 
scenario. Within the model, the supply-side was derived by forecasting sectors’ growth rates; the 
demand-side was calculated by anticipating consumption and investment growth levels for both 
private and public sectors. Therefore, it was established an annual target for inflation, not to be 
disclosed to the public, so that anticipation and sudden changes in the demand for money could 
be avoided. Consequently, a consistent intermediate target was identified, money base growth, 
through money demand forecasts (De la Rocha, 1998). Since 1992, it was established that the 
central bank and the ministry of finance had to announce La Cartas de Intension (letter of intent) 
the financial and monetary policies aimed to reduce inflation.
 
From 1994, the annual inflation 
target was going to be announced to the public (Table 5.3). 
                                                 
42
 The “Ley Organica” (Organic Law) was adopted by the central bank in 1992, but the Peruvian constitution 
changed in 1993 establishing the fight to inflation as its unique objective. The constitution defined the case for 
impeachment for the Board of Directors following the Organic Law under the following: 1) financing the public 
sector (except indirectly through the secondary market with a ceiling of 5% of precious year monetary base 2) 
financing any state developing bank 3) granting guarantees 4) granting credit to any particular sector of the economy 
5) establishing multiple exchange rate system (De la Rocha, 1998). 
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Table 5.3: Published inflation targets and respective realised inflation (percentage) (1992-2001) 
 
Source: IMF (2011) and Rossini (2001) 
 
Unlike many other Latin American countries, Peru ruled out the peg of the exchange rate 
as a consequence of both capital mobility and lack of international reserves.
43
 The choice of the 
monetary intermediate target was preferred to the alternative interest rate target which was 
considered difficult to implement because of rapid deflation and shallow financial markets (De la 
Rocha, 1998). 
Therefore, the intermediate target chosen during this period was the base money growth. 
In order to establish the target, the rate of growth of the money aggregates was calculated 
following the Fisher equation (see literature review): 
Δ M = Δ P + Δ Y - Δ V       (1) 
Where M = liquidity, P = Target inflation, Y= sustainable output growth, V = estimated 
velocity of money. Thus, it is possible to derive the intermediate target given the multiplier: 
  M0 = M/m        (2) 
                                                 
43
 In reality, during the second half of the1990s, both Argentina and Brazil managed to keep a pegged exchange rate 
by accumulating international reserves through an increase of public external debt (Schorr, 2003). The Peruvian 
government, however, ruled out an increase in public debt.  
Declared Inflation Target Consumer Price Inflation Wholesale Price Inflation Published Document
1992 73.5                             57.2                             
1993 48.6                             47.6                             
1994 15.0 - 20.0 23.7                             17.9                             Carta de Intencion (May 1994)
1995 9.0 - 11.0 11.1                             10.5                             Carta de Intencion (July 1995)
1996 9.5 - 11.5 11.5                             9.4                               Carta de Intencion (May 1996)
1997 8.0 - 10.0 8.6                               7.4                               Carta de Intencion (May 1997)
1998 7.5 - 9.0 7.2                               7.3                               Carta de Intencion (April 1998)
1999 5.0 - 6.0 3.5                               4.9                               Carta de Intencion (May 1999)
2000 3.5 - 4.0 3.8                               4.3                               Programa Monetario (Jan 2000)
2001 2.5 - 3.5 2.0                               1.4                               Programa Monetario (Jan 2001)
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Where M0 = base money, m = multiplier given by the estimated preference ratio for 
currency and bank reserve coefficient (see literature review). 
As discussed in the literature review, monetary targeting presents many problems since 
the above relations are unstable. Observing the Peruvian data (Table 5.4), it is evident that, even 
after 1993, when inflation was under control and the new monetary framework at regime, 
monetary policy based on monetary targets was difficult to manage. If we populate the above 
model with actual data, the resulting GDP growth rate would be substantially different from the 
actual GDP figures, particularly from 1992, 1994 and 1995 (see error row, Table 5.4). 
More specifically, the instability of money velocity disallowed the applicability of the 
first equation. Velocity suddenly dropped in 1994, given an increase of the money aggregate 
relative to nominal growth, and in 1995, because nominal growth decreased more than the 
monetary aggregate. For the same reasons, the money multiplier appeared particularly unstable 
in 1994. 
These behaviours are explainable by two conflicting forces: on the one hand, the central 
bank wanted to decrease the growth of the monetary base in order to control inflation; on the 
other hand, financial deepening re-enforced the endogeneity of money since the liberalisation of 
the capital account allowed commercial banks to access foreign credit. This can be shown by the 
change in monetary aggregates in the year 1994 (Table 5.4). 
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Table 5.4: Monetary variables for the central bank model and GDP real growth (1992-2001) 
 
Source: BCRP (2011) and IMF (2011) 
 
In addition, the post-liberalisation deepening of the financial sector caused sudden 
changes in the multiplier (Table 5.5) leading to an initial decrease of the preference currency 
over deposit ratio (see chapter 2). As a result, the multiplier was pushed upwards and its 
volatility increased because of the unstable nature of the effective reserve requirements. Theses 
suddenly increased during the years of the Russian and Brazilian crises in 1998-1999. 
 
Table 5.5: Money multiplier and its variables (1992-2001) 
 
Source: BCRP (2011) 
 
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
dM - Monetary Aggregate (M2) 95.1 51.5 73.0 47.0 24.2 19.2 15.4 1.7 6.0 6.9
dP - Inflation 73.5 48.6 23.7 11.1 11.5 8.6 7.2 3.5 3.8 2.0
V - Velocity -13.7 1.7 -17.7 -16.5 -8.7 -3.6 -8.5 3.1 0.7 -4.9
(1) Real Growth = dM -dP+dV 7.9 4.6 31.5 19.3 3.9 7.1 -0.4 1.4 2.9 0.0
(2) Nominal GDP 68.5 54.1 42.3 22.7 13.4 14.9 5.6 4.9 6.7 1.7
Real GDP = Nominal GDP - Inflation -5.1 5.5 18.6 11.5 1.8 6.4 -1.7 1.4 3.0 -0.3
(1)-(2) Error 13.0 -0.9 12.9 7.8 2.1 0.7 1.3 -0.1 0.0 0.3
dH - Monetary Base 68.9 50.0 39.8 40.7 15.3 13.7 12.5 6.7 6.0 3.2
m - multiplier 15.6 1.1 23.7 4.4 7.8 4.9 2.6 -4.7 0.0 3.6
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Multiplier m (M1/M0) 2.11 2.41 2.09 2.05 2.25 3.19 4.27 3.79 3.73 3.52
Preference ratio for Currency c 44.7 43.0 37.5 36.1 31.6 29.6 31.3 32.9 31.5 30.2
Effective Reserve Requirment 16.0 8.0 6.1 10.6 9.3 8.5 10.6 10.5 8.8 8.0
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Once defined the model used by the central bank, a way to fully understand the de facto 
policy of the BCRP during the 1990s is to observe its operational instruments. These were: 
1) intervention in the money market through CDs (since 1994); 
2) intervention in the foreign exchange market which are sterilised through issuance of 
CDs; 
3) rediscounts, a provision loan, for temporary liquidity shortage; 
4) reserve requirements on foreign currency deposits and interest paid were used to 
control expansion of monetary aggregates in foreign currency; 
5) the repo market was created in order to inject liquidity in the monetary system (since 
1997); 
6) swaps: the central bank could buy foreign exchange from the financial sector and 
could sell it the day after (since 1997). 
With the 1993 change in the monetary framework, the BCRP started to use instruments 
which were market-based. Since 1994, the central bank operated through CDs (CDBCRP, Table 
5.6) for two purposes: to allow contractionary operations and to sterilise foreign exchange 
interventions. However, in general, foreign exchange interventions are sterilised through 
issuance of CDs to avoid an increase of base money when the central bank buys foreign 
currency. In this case, the increase in assets of the central bank is balanced through the sale of 
dollars to the private or to the public sectors. The latter can absorb the foreign currency either 
into the treasury, if it needs to cover external payments, or into the deposits at the central bank. 
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Table 5.6: Flows of CDs to the private sector (Millions of nuevos soles) (constant prices base year 2005) (1992-
2001) 
 
Source: BCRP (2011) 
 
The extensive use of both the above instruments in Peru confirms that, under a money 
target framework in a highly dollarised economy, the central bank is forced to maintain the 
exchange rate stable to guarantee monetary liquidity in the financial system as it was discussed 
in the chapter 2.
44
 
After the first months following the adjustment shock, the Peruvian central bank always 
intervened in the foreign exchange market until the end of the monetary target regime in 2001. 
The absence of liquid private and public assets in domestic currency forced the BCRP to use 
intervention as means to control base money growth (Rossini and Vega, 2007).
 
Throughout this 
period, the central bank intervened on a daily basis and in both directions so that the exchange 
rate regime could be safely classified as a de facto dirty floating (Figure 5.3). The result of 
stabilising inflation and the intervention in the foreign exchange market worked in favour of a 
stable real exchange rate in the 1990s. 
 
                                                 
44
 Since then, this is also explicitly mentioned by the Money and Foreign Exchange Committee in charge 
of running daily operations at the central bank. The Committee decides on: 1) the amount of dollars to trade in the 
foreign exchange market 2) whether to auction CDs and what amount 3) the discount rate (Rossini, 2001). 
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Flows of CDs in the private sector 0.00 11.68 337.71 90.61 -389.15 573.15 -351.00 67.40 995.70 506.10
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Figure 5.3: Central Bank interventions in the foreign market and reserve accumulation (Millions of US$) 
(1992-2001) 
 
Source: BCRP (2011) 
 
However, these interventions were small between 1992 and 1994, but became larger in 
subsequent years in order to avoid a significant appreciation of the exchange rate caused by large 
capital inflows (see next section for an analysis). This allowed a rapid increase of foreign 
reserves, which had reached low levels during the hyperinflation crisis until the Brazilian and 
Russian crises in 1998-1999. 
A further monetary policy instrument is the ratio of reserve requirements in foreign 
currency: this deals with the dollarised part of the economy by trying to control the supply of 
dollars. Generally, reserve requirements help the central bank to sterilise large capital inflows 
and to control the availability of lending funds in the financial system. These requirements are 
used to prevent the expansion of monetary aggregates in foreign currency. They also form a 
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cushion of safety of liquid assets which may be necessary in case of sudden capital outflow. In 
1993, in Peru, the marginal reserve requirement for foreign currency deposits was 45 percent. In 
1998, with the Russian crisis, this was initially lowered to 35 percent and subsequently fixed at 
20 percent in order to increase liquidity in foreign currency. In 2004, when there was plenty of 
liquidity thanks to the commodity boom and financial inflows, the requirement was increased 
back to 30 percent. 
To conclude this discussion, it is worth nothing that there is a vast empirical literature on 
Peru that addresses the entire modus operandi of the BCRP (De la Rocha, 1998; Quispe, 2000, 
2001). In general, this identifies three main channels of momentary policy transmission, namely, 
money, credit and the exchange rate. First, the money channel attributes the main role to the 
money base which allows changes in CDs rate and consequential changes in discount rate, 
growth of liquidity in domestic money and foreign money. This channel seems to be effective 
under the condition of dollarisation seen as asset substitution and not as currency substitution 
(Quispe, 2000). According to De la Rocha (1998), dollars are used as a store of value rather than 
for transaction purposes, a conclusion reached by analysing the compositions of current account, 
saving deposits and time deposits in both soles and dollars, and the withdrawal frequency which 
is defined as the average withdrawal to average balance outstanding. Consequently, a weak 
transaction dollarisation minimises the disturbances caused by dollarisation, thus the monetary 
policy through the money channel can be effective. Quispe’s (2000) findings are that narrow 
money, base money and money in circulation, are the best predictors for inflation under the 
hypothesis of asset substitution. Base money is mainly composed by household cash holdings. 
Second, the credit channel is considered to be weak: high capital mobility and degree of 
substitution between equity and bond, as sources of funding, reduce monetary policy 
effectiveness. However, higher levels of financial intermediation improve it. In theory, there is 
the possibility of a strong credit channel since most of the Peruvian companies are of small and 
medium size and they do not participate in the capital markets. However, it is hard to identify the 
interactions and dynamics of domestic and foreign credit simultaneously. Moreover, there is no 
control on external funding. The only marginal influence could come from changes in reserve 
requirements. 
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Finally, the exchange rate channel is considered to be strong given the higher 
dollarisation of the economy. However, since foreign and domestic assets are assumed to be 
substitutable, there are strong doubts that the central bank has the full ability to control inflation 
through foreign currency interventions. As a result, these interventions tend only to smooth the 
exchange rate volatility and are considered to be only a support to the monetary target (Quispe, 
2001). 
 
5.3.2 The migration to and establishment of inflation targeting (2001-2010) 
The end of the 1990s was difficult for many emerging countries because of the 
international context. However, Peru had to survive a political crisis too. The year 2000 was time 
for election, and Fujimori won for the third time, despite the constitutional two-presidency limit. 
Accused of corruption and electoral fraud, Fujimori flew to Japan and sent his resignation via fax 
from a Hotel in Tokyo; he is currently in prison in Peru. President Toledo won the next elections 
and remained in charge until 2005, and then García took power until 2011. 
In 2000, the BCRP gradually shifted monetary policy starting to target banking reserves 
at the central bank; in 2001, for the first time, the economy experienced deflation and the BCRP 
officially acknowledged that the monetary base was difficult to predict and showed low 
correlation with inflation. Eventually, in 2002, the BCRP officially adopted the standard IT 
framework: the interest rate had to be stabilised at first; so, for the first two years, the central 
bank used a corridor for the interbank interest rate and, after 2003, the centre of the corridor 
became the proper target (Armas and Grippa, 2005; Rossini and Vega, 2007). 
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Figure 5.4: Interbank interest rate as annual percentage (1994-2010) 
 
Source: BCRP (2011) 
 
As discussed in chapter 2, inflation targeting was conceived for developed countries with 
a sound financial system and no dollarisation. The BCRP had no choice but to adopt an 
adaptation of the IT model considering the possible effects of dollarisation on aggregate demand 
(Rossini and Vega, 2007; Moron and Winkelried, 2005; Vega et al. 2009). In terms of 
transmission mechanism of the monetary policy, because of dollarisation, additional attention 
had to be paid to the balance sheet channel, especially after the credit crunch of the late 1990s. 
Generally, a real devaluation can induce contractionary effects: the Peruvian devaluation of 
about 25 percent of the nominal exchange rate between 1998 and 1999 created a problem for 
those (many) firms which had their debts in dollars. This balance sheet channel has been 
investigated by a number of empirical studies (Carranza et al, 2003; Jimenez, 2003; Saldaña and 
Velasquez, 2007). They all agree that a real devaluation has a negative impact on investments for 
non-financial firms. 
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I briefly discuss this channel here because it is included in the central bank model 
described below. However, I will further analyse the effects of the real exchange rate fluctuation 
in the next chapter. 
As discussed, the only difference between the general IT model and its adaptation to a 
dollarised economy is in the IS equation below. 
ỹ =     
       
              
             
      (3) 
The first term represents the inverse relation between real interest rate gap and output gap 
as in the standard version discussed in chapter 2. The nature of this relation should be 
endogenous to the domestic economy. In the Peruvian model, the long-term real interest rate is 
obtained by discounting the nominal interest rate by the expected core inflation. In turn, the 
nominal long-term interest rate is calculated by adding a liquidity premium to the financial 
market short-term interest rate. Furthermore, the expected core inflation is derived by a 
combination of rational and adaptive expectations. Thus, the real interest rate gap is given by the 
difference between the real interest rate just described and the long-run equilibrium interest rate. 
Most interestingly, under the assumption of uncovered interest parity, the long-run 
equilibrium interest rate depends on the external USA interest rate, on the bilateral real exchange 
rate and an interest rate risk premium.
 45
 This implies that dollarisation, which may vary with 
dollar interest rate and the real exchange rate, sneaks into this first term which should deal only 
with the domestic economy. This highlights the problem of creating a model which should be 
both consistent with the standard formulation of IT and should incorporate dollarisation. The 
contradictory nature of the problem is recognised by the central bank: 
“...the interventions of the Central Bank have the purpose to smooth the path of the 
exchange rate. When we tried to incorporate dollarisation in the IT framework in order to 
include the effects of the exchange rate policy, we were criticised by established researchers like 
                                                 
45
 The bilateral real interest rate is calculated using the nominal exchange rate versus the US dollar and the inflation 
rate in the USA, the multilateral real interest rate is a weighted average of the bilateral real exchange rates of the 
main trading partners of the country. 
152 
 
Svensson...” (Marco Vega, Deputy Manager, Economic Research at BCRP interviewed at the 
BCRP, translated by the author) 
It is interesting to note that the BCRP does not follow the standard formulation of the 
uncovered interest rate parity, according to which interest rate movements cause exchange rate 
adjustments. In fact, while, generally, rational expectations would generate jumps in the nominal 
spot exchange rate, which are acceptable in a free floating regime, the BCRP uses adaptive 
expectations to simulate the smoothing effect of its interventions.  
The second term of the equation represents the exogenous effect of the foreign real 
interest rate. This is calculated by deflating the USA nominal interest rate by the expected 
inflation (following the same definition used for the domestic real interest rate in the previous 
term) and by adding the expected devaluation of the exchange rate versus the dollar (following 
the currency substitution model discussed in the literature review): an expected devaluation is 
equivalent to an increase of foreign interest rate which decreases aggregate domestic demand. By 
including this term, the BCRP takes into account the effect of a contractive depreciation. This 
concerns especially the non-tradable sector which may hold dollar loans and receive income in 
soles. Interestingly, according to the central bank, these concerns are even more serious since the 
segmentation of the foreign exchange secondary market does not allow the non-tradable sector to 
hedge its currency exposure (Rossini and Vega, 2008). 
The third and fourth terms, respectively, include the changes in the bilateral real 
exchange rate for the balance sheet effect, and a multilateral real exchange rate for the net export 
channel. These are of opposite sign: to explain this, we can consider that depreciation can induce 
positive effects through the export channel, but will have negative implications through the 
balance sheet channel. The central bank acknowledges that this is an approximation since both 
effects are non-linear and asymmetrical with respect to appreciations and depreciations.
46
 
                                                 
46
 The model also includes another term which is not reported in equation (3) related to the effects of fiscal impulses 
to the economy. The error terms will include all possible external shocks like terms-of-trade or sudden world GDP 
drops. 
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In the second equation, the aggregate supply follows the standard version used for an 
open economy: it includes the effects of imported inflation, but there is no particular reference to 
dollarisation. 
     
                        (4)  
where inflation core in a abbreviated form is: 
            
               ỹ)     (5)  
where imported inflation (pass-through) is a function of this type: 
  
                                                        (6) 
The last equation, not included here but discussed in the literature review, the Taylor rule, 
maintains his standard form to determine the nominal interest rate. 
To sum up, as highlighted in chapter 2, when the IT model is adopted for a dollarised 
economy there are two main features which stand out: firstly, the only place where dollarisation 
can be included remains the IS equation. Secondly, foreign exchange interventions to smooth the 
volatility of the exchange rate are a very important and effective policy instrument. The 
interventions of the BCRP during the period are shown below (Figure 5.5). Therefore: 
“It is important to notice that interventions are symmetrical in terms of directions as the 
BCRP aims to show its commitment to the exchange rate policy.” (Marco Vega, Deputy 
Manager, Economic Research at BCRP interviewed at the BCRP, translated by the author) 
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Figure 5.5: BCRP interventions in the foreign exchange market and reserve accumulation (Millions of US$) 
(2001-2010) 
 
Source: BCRP (2011)   
 
The operational problem of intervening in the foreign exchange market is due to its 
sterilisation given that one instrument (CDs) is used for two purposes (sterilization and control of 
interest rates) simultaneously: 
“The issuance of CDs to sterilise intervention may move away the interest rate from its 
target. This limitation implies that the BCRP may decide not to sterilise when interventions are 
very significant favouring a possible increase of inflation. There is a trade off inflation-
intervention.” (Marco Vega, Deputy Manager, Economic Research at BCRP interviewed at the 
BCRP, translated by the author). 
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In summary, this section explained the monetary policy implemented by the Central Bank 
of Peru since its independence: the distributional implications of these policies in terms of 
sectors and business ownership will be discussed in the next Chapter.  
In the next section I will analyse the above periods using the flow of fund analysis. 
 
5.4 Bridging the real and the financial side: a flow of fund analysis 
The aim of this section is to provide an alternative interpretation of the Peruvian business 
cycle for the periods discussed so far. The flow of funds analysis will explore the link between 
the real and the financial realms and will shed some light on the functioning and structure of the 
Peruvian economy to be used in the next chapter. The main finding is that factors related to 
credit availability and financial flows significantly influenced the real side of the economy 
during the period: they contributed to both inflation, until late 1980s, and to stabilisation, later. 
The bridge between finance and real has a significant impact during the commodity boom. 
Following the method described in the previous chapter, the analysis starts with the 
aggregate level, it continues by disaggregating the different sectors and it closes by analysing in 
detail the instruments used to finance each sector. There are three broad periods: the 1980s with 
the raise of dollarisation and hyperinflation, the 1990s characterised by the Fujimori 
administrations with the reforms of the fiscal and monetary policies, and, finally, the 2002-2010 
period in which inflation targeting was adopted while the economy experienced a commodity 
boom. 
 
5.4.1 Analysis of the investment-saving gap at aggregate level 
At aggregate level, saving and investment are analysed for the domestic sector and for the 
rest of the world sector. Figure 5.6 shows gross capital formation as a proxy of domestic 
investment, gross domestic saving and the rest of the world saving are defined as current account 
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balance with a negative sign. The saving investment gap appears to be negative throughout the 
period until the commodity boom.  
 
Figure 5.6: Fixed capital formation and saving (percentage of GDP) (1985-2010) 
 
Source: BCRP (2011), IMF (2011) 
 
The period of higher dependence on the rest of the world saving is in the late 1980s under 
the García regime (1985-1990) and during the first Fujimori government (1990-1995). The 
increase of investment during the first phase of the Fujimori government is evident, but it 
declines constantly until the last period with the commodity boom, saving and investment 
increased approximately to the level of 25 percent f GDP. 
 
5.4.2 Analysis of the investment-saving gap at sector level 
The analysis starts by deriving the flows between the Peruvian economy, which is 
divided into two parts (public and private sectors), and the rest of the world. For each sector the 
analysis presents the net lending positions as the difference between the sector’s gross domestic 
saving and gross fixed capital formation. 
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Starting from the government sector, Figure 5.7 shows that the level of gross fixed capital 
formation has been constant over time, at around five percent of GDP. The increase of 
government borrowing during the second half of the 1980s is matched by a decrease in saving 
reflecting the expansionary stance of the government. Unsurprisingly, mainstream economists 
blamed a badly managed expansionary fiscal policy for the increased borrowing to recommend a 
policy (and government) change (Parodi Trece, 2000): during the Fujimori administration, the 
lending position has always been kept close to zero because of the fiscal discipline and an 
improved tax collection. However, gross domestic saving followed pro-cyclically the 
development of the Peruvian business cycle: the government moved from a net borrowing to a 
net lending position at the end of the 1990s, and then returned to a net lender position during the 
commodity boom. 
 
Figure 5.7: Government fixed capital formation and saving (percentage of GDP) (1985-2010) 
 
Source: BCRP (2011), IMF (2011) 
 
The analysis of the private sector in Figure 5.8 shows the moment during the García’s 
government in which the pact with the 12 major conglomerates failed: investment mildly 
increased until 1988 and declined rapidly afterwards. It is interesting to notice that during this 
period saving increased. This could be explained with the restrictions on dollar deposit, but it 
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may have also been the symptom of a missing synchronisation between the financial and the real 
sectors: despite an increase in saving, investment, measured as gross capital formation, declined. 
After 1998, investments declined significantly, but the private sector continued to save. Only 
with the rise of inflation and the capital flight, savings declined dramatically until 1991, when, 
with the first Fujimori administration, private investment resumed and, thanks to capital inflows, 
the economy experienced negative gross domestic savings. However, in 1997-1998, the 
international financial turmoil interrupted this trend which resumed only after the start of the 
commodity boom in 2005-2006. 
 
Figure 5.8: Private sector fixed capital formation and saving (percentage of GDP) (1985-2010) 
 
Source: BCRP (2011), IMF (2011) 
 
Finally, the net position with the rest of the world (Figure 5.9) was consistent with what 
has been said so far, Peru maintained its position of net borrower through the whole period; it 
became net lender only during the commodity boom. Borrowing increased especially during the 
first part of the García mandate in 1986-87 and during the first period of the Fujimori 
administration when Peru experienced a huge influx of capital. A more detailed analysis follows 
in the next section. 
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Figure 5.9: Rest of the world net lending (percentage of GDP) (1985-2010) 
 
Source: BCRP (2011), IMF (2011) 
 
5.4.3 Analysis of the financial instruments for each sector 
For each sector the investigation continues by analysing the financial instruments 
involved in the net lending positions. I will illustrate each sector and each instrument in Figure 
5.10 which shows sources and uses of each sector’s net balance and the development of the flow 
of funds matrix described in Table 4.1 (Appendix A shows the matrices for each year). The 
dotted line represents a sector’s liability (borrowing flows) which must be equal to the total sum 
of the instrument used for each sector, given by the solid lines (lending flows). The flow of funds 
analysis will follow the periodisation illustrated in the previous section. 
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Figure 5.10: Flow of funds Peru 
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Starting the analysis for the period which led to the hyperinflation, the flow of funds 
matrix (Figure 5.10) shows that the García’s government net lending position (see second 
column from the left hand side named Government) were financed by exceptional funds (debt 
reschedule or refinancing) in foreign currency and by issuance of government debt in domestic 
currency (shown by the second and third rows, government net foreign claims and net 
government debt respectively). When García declared that he had no intention to recognise the 
external debt accumulated by his predecessor, foreign banks (mostly US) activated a hard 
currency flight. The decline of foreign exchange reserves shows the effort of the central bank to 
contain the devaluation of the inti (first column, second row). 
With respect to the private sector, private claims and net lending positions of the rest of 
the world (financial account and reversed current account) of the 1980s show that capital flight 
was a standard practice. The progressive increase of dollarisation reported in the previous section 
happened in conjunction with an almost constant capital flight and current account deficit which 
constitute an important determinant to the devaluating pressure and imported inflation (Jimenez, 
2010). 
 
Figure 5.8: Financial account and current account (percentage of GDP) (1980-1991) 
 
Source: IMF (2011) 
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The combination of capital flight and the shrinkage of credit/money represented the 
perfect storm. For this reason, at the end of the 1980s, the pact with the 12 conglomerates to 
guarantee the liquidity of the credit system was crucial. In order to understand this point, it is 
necessary, following the discussion in the methodological chapter on the inclusion of 
dollarisation, to break down the composition of both credit and money flows in domestic and 
foreign currencies. Observing Figure 5.11, which shows the private credit in both currencies, it is 
clear that credit was cut off when the pact was broken in 1987 until the government resigned as a 
result of an economic crisis. Credit started to resume only from 1992, but just in dollars, leading 
to a further increase in dollarisation. 
 
Figure 5.11: Private sector credit in domestic and foreign currency (percentage of GDP) (1984-2010) 
 
Source: BCRP (2011) 
 
Money aggregates in both domestic and foreign currencies in the banking system 
provided in Figure 5.12 confirm the picture. From 1987 to 1991, money in domestic currency 
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declined progressively and increased only later, during the commodity boom. Overall, the central 
bank tried to maintain the control over domestic money during the 1990s in order to stabilise 
inflation. 
 
Figure 5.12: Money and quasi-money in domestic and foreign currency in the banking system (percentage of 
GDP) (1984-2010) 
 
Source: BCRP (2011) 
 
However, the distinction between the two currencies implies further considerations: the 
total amount of money in both currencies did not change significantly until 1989; an expansion 
of the monetary base in the domestic currency happened between 1985 and 1987, but it was too 
small to justify hyperinflation. Similarly, the decrease in the monetary base started in 1987 did 
not cause any decrease in inflation. On the contrary, inflation continued to increase; furthermore, 
the lack of credit after 1987 cannot be explained in terms of liquidity preference if only the 
domestic currency is considered. Since money growth was not the culprit, then capital flights and 
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credit restrictions to the private sector by the banking sector had to play a crucial role. In the end, 
higher liquidity preference was not in domestic currency, but it was in dollars (see figure 5.13). 
 
Figure 5.13: Monetary base in domestic currency and money in foreign currency at the BCRP (percentage of 
GDP) (1984-2010) 
 
Source: BCRP (2011) 
 
As a consequence, rather than a result of fiscal discipline, like the International Financial 
Institutions had sustained (Singh, 2006), hyperinflation was a more complex phenomenon 
strongly conditioned by credit and money available in both currencies. 
From the flow of funds matrix, it is also possible to see the policy changes after the 
election of Fujimori: the opening up of the capital account initiated a reversal of the process with 
the expansion of credit and the increase of money in circulation. The new government marked an 
increase in liquidity as foreign banks, and their dollars, returned in conjunction with expectations 
of renewed business profitability of the major conglomerates. The rest of the world could finance 
the government buying government by dollar-denominated debt so that the foreign-claim 
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position reached a negative balance as soon as the effect of exceptional finance disappeared. The 
position continued to deteriorate until the commodity boom period (second row, net foreign 
claim, of Figure 5.10). The central bank managed to maintain the monetary base relatively under 
control thanks to foreign capital inflows into the country (private claims of the rest of the world, 
fourth row). 
Thus, with the liquidity problem solved, hyperinflation disappeared. Following the 
practice of the IFIs, the government lending position was balanced by cutting expenditure; this 
reduced public investments to less than five percent of GDP, by increasing and improving tax 
collection, and by privatising (fourth row in Figure 5.10). 
During the second period of the Fujimori administration (1995-2000), the economic 
performance declined into a long recession (1998-2001), domestic money as a percentage of 
GDP remained unchanged (Figure 5.12) and the foreign currency was the only source of credit 
growth (Figure 5.11): the increased amount of foreign claims of the private sector is also shown 
in the flow of funds matrix (Figure 5.10). Essentially, there was an increasing financing gap 
opening up for non-financial firms: since Fujimori took power in 1992, non-financial firms 
became increasingly dependent on external financing which decreased only in 2000. They were 
forced to search for external funding to compensate for the loss of revenues generated by the 
economic slowdown, and, especially those who could not generate dollar revenues, were 
penalised by an appreciating foreign currency. This aspect will be further investigated in the next 
chapter. 
The rest of the world positions show that, during the period 1991-1997, foreign capital 
funded a large negative current account position. After this, the international financial crisis 
marked a decrease in financial inflows leading to a recession, as reflected in a narrower current 
account deficit position (see Figure 5.14). 
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Figure 5.14: Financial account and current account (percentage of GDP) (1991-2002) 
 
Source: IMF (2011) 
 
As discussed, the third period is marked by the adoption of the inflation targeting 
framework and the start of the commodity boom. Consistently with the development of the new 
monetary framework, the main funding policy was the development of a domestic bond market, 
especially after 2007, while the outstanding amount of external debt of the private sector 
diminished (fourth column, fourth row, Figure 5.10). As expected, government revenues 
increased during the boom leading to an increase of savings and capital expenditure (second, 
column, first row). 
During this last period the dynamics of the rest of the world sector changed dramatically. 
Figure 5.10 shows how the sector became net borrower. However, the sector continued to 
increase its stock of foreign claims, the external debt of the private sector and to fund the private 
sector through private claims. The increase of the external debt in the private sector will be 
discussed and analysed further in the next chapter. The increase of private claims (FDI and 
portfolio flows) and the changes in the net lending position (the current account) are illustrated in 
the following figure (Figure 5.15): 
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Figure 5.15: Financial account and current account (percentage of GDP) (2002-2010) 
 
Source: IMF (2011) 
 
The flow of funds analysis assesses how the real and financial sectors evolved since the 
first days of the hyperinflation period. Specifically, it allows us to understand the effects of the 
flows of credit and money in both domestic and foreign currencies on the real side of the 
economy and the consequent limited role of the monetary policy. This will be discussed further 
in the next section which focuses on central bank policies since its independence. The policy can 
be summarised by the ideas of internal and external liquidities, as defined in the previous 
chapter. The importance of identifying these two factors is crucial to explain the actions of the 
central bank and the effectiveness of its monetary policy: given a highly dollarised economy, the 
policy should be oriented towards two main aims, namely, guaranteeing credit availability and 
liquidity of domestic and foreign money, and smoothing the exchange rate fluctuations. 
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5.5 Monetary Policy as an Internal and External Liquidity problem 
This section applies the framework identified in chapter three to the Peruvian monetary 
policy. Empirically, I consider two measures of liquidity: the internal one given by the changes 
in M2 year-on year of domestic money, and the external one provided by the absolute value of 
intervention per year in millions of US dollars.
47/48
 The two measures are provided in graphical 
terms in Figure 5.16. 
A decline of both base money and broad money growth can be observed during the 
process of inflation stabilisation during the 1990s. This indicates that the focus of the monetary 
policy in terms of internal liquidity was the control of money growth during a period of deflation 
(see dotted line Figure 5.16). In terms of external liquidity, the central bank intervened modestly 
during the 1990s and more intensively from 2003 onwards (Figure 5.16). 
However, liquidity dried up with the international financial turmoil. During these years, 
monetary policy was not activated to stimulate the economy: there was no change in money 
growth and credit (see Figure 5.16), and no central bank smoothing intervention was assumed to 
be needed, given the stagnation of both real and financial activities. Eventually, the interbank 
interest rate declined in 2001, when the central bank started to change its target. 
In the post crisis period, money growth remained contained while the size of intervention 
rapidly increased. Finally, both liquidities increased until 2007, when with the Great Recession, 
there was a sudden drop of international trade and financial flows. Once again, interventions and 
money growth turned out to be pro-cyclical and both were heavily reduced; as a result, the 
overall liquidity moved back towards the origin as it happened in the previous economic stall in 
the late 1990s. 
However, the interest rate channel had to be activated in conjunction with the interest rate 
of the rest of world. Furthermore, monetary policy had to be coordinated with a stimulative fiscal 
                                                 
47
 The result is the same whether one considers a broader measure of money in which also dollars are included. 
Also, given the process of deflation, real data show the same declining patterns of nominal figures during the 1990s. 
48
 The reason why I take the absolute value of interventions summing both sales and buys of US dollars is that the 
central bank intervenes only to smooth the exchange rate fluctuations without changing the trend. This measure can 
then give an idea of the overall interventions of the central bank. 
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policy: this is showed in the deteriorating government’s net lending position of the flow of funds 
matrix (Figure 5.10). Moreover, the sudden halt of the system during the commodity boom 
provides further confirmation that the quantity of credit and money, which depended also on 
foreigners’ behaviour, was as important as the price of money. After the co-ordinated worldwide 
governments’ intervention in 2010, the economy was fully functioning again as shown by the 
liquidity chart in the figure below (top right of the quadrant). 
 
Figure 5.16: Changes in M2 year-on-year versus absolute value of interventions (1992-2010) 
 
Source: author’s calculation on BCRP (2011) data 
 
Finally, the chart shows a sudden change in the size of the central bank interventions: the 
increase of external liquidity was driven by the increased pressure on the exchange rate since 
2003, when the trade balance started to improve dramatically because of the commodity 
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revenues. The rapid increase in interventions between 2005 and 2007 is explained not only by 
the trade balance, but also, and even more, by the financial account (Figure 5.15, Figure 5.17).  
 
Figure 5.17: Openness of the Peruvian economy (1991-2008) 
 
Source: IMF (2011) 
 
The exchange rate risk, for example, has been high only in the late 1990s, and 
depreciation has been relatively contained since. Unlike other Latin American countries which 
experienced dramatic episodes of monetary instability (for example, Brazil in 1998, 1999, and 
Argentina in 2001), the Peruvian economy enjoyed almost twenty years of relative monetary 
stability with respect to both inflation and the exchange rate. Despite this stability, however, it is 
only recently that the economy has been growing constantly and at significant rates. Only during 
these recent growth years, the dollarisation ratio, which has been stable and high until the 
commodity boom, started to decline (Table 5.15). 
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Table 5.15: Dollarisation, inflation and changes in exchange rate (percentage) (1992-2010) 
 
Source: BCRP (2011), IMF (2011) 
 
Moreover, consistent with the theory presented in chapter 3, the reduction of dollarisation 
may be due to expectations of appreciation of the local currency, given the commodity boom. 
However, this dissertation will discuss, in the next chapter, that the eradication of dollarisation 
can only be guaranteed by the development of a non-traditional export sector. This is in open 
polemic with mainstream economists (García-Escribano and Sosa, 2010), who believe that 
floating exchange rate, inflation targeting, and the development of the domestic bond market 
may achieve a financial-side led de-dollarisation process.  
 
Inflation Change in Currency (-depr.)
1992 73.5 -41.1
1993 48.6 -24.5
1994 23.7 -0.9
1995 11.1 -6.1
1996 11.5 -10.6
1997 8.6 -5.2
1998 7.2 -13.2
1999 3.5 -10.1
2000 3.8 -0.5
2001 2.0 2.4
2002 0.2 -2.0
2003 2.3 1.5
2004 3.7 5.0
2005 1.6 -3.6
2006 2.0 7.1
2007 1.8 6.6
2008 5.8 -4.6
2009 2.9 8.7
2010 1.5 2.9
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5.6 Conclusions 
This chapter showed that, since Peru is an open and highly dollarised economy, monetary 
policy intended in its mainstream interpretation, either in a money target or inflation target 
version, is inadequate since it is not able to cope with dollarisation in an effective way. 
Pragmatically, the central bank of Peru has tried to influence the dollar use and liquidity of dollar 
money by intervening in the forex market. Formally, the BCRP has been able to incorporate the 
exchange rate in their model, but this aspect remains at odds with the standard formulation of the 
IT framework. 
In reality, the money issues related to a dual monetary system require a more complex 
institutional framework than the one assigned by the conventional current central bank set up. To 
reach this conclusion a more profound understanding of the links between the real and financial 
side of the economy has been necessary: to this end, the flow of funds method has been used. 
Following this analysis, an alternative interpretation of the causes of the hyperinflation and the 
following stabilisation process emerged. In a nutshell, the Peruvian destabilising forces had 
nothing to do with excess fiscal spending and inadequate monetary policy. Rather, it was a 
matter of capital flight, credit availability and liquidity preference between domestic and foreign 
currency. 
From the flow of funds analysis, monetary policy can be framed as a dual choice between 
internal and external liquidity and the managing of these two parts. This new lens allows 
describing the action of the central bank since its independence. In compliance with its mandate, 
it appears that the central bank only concentrated on controlling money growth during the period 
of inflation stabilisation, and, unconventionally, avoided excess volatility of the exchange rate. 
The effect of this exchange rate policy will be investigated in the next chapter. 
Furthermore, the liquidity framework of the previous section showed that the central 
bank appeared to be powerless during the recession at the end of the 1990s; despite the switch to 
IT, it appeared to be ineffective during the sub-prime crisis in 2009. The ineffectiveness of the 
monetary policy in dealing with period of recessions appeared to be common feature throughout 
the period under consideration. Overall, the combination of a dollarised economy and the 
173 
 
dependence on money and credit availability, which is undermined by a banking/financial 
system linked to large conglomerates and foreign capital, have a fundamental role in the shape of 
the Peruvian business cycle. The change in the structure of the Peruvian economy will be the 
focus of next chapter where a brief discussion of the impact of the concentration of economic 
and political power of the Peruvian conglomerates on policy making is also presented. 
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Chapter 6 -The effects of RER policy on firms investments and on the structure of the 
economy in Peru (1991-2010) 
 
6.1 Introduction 
The present chapter focuses on the relationship between the real exchange rate 
fluctuations, smoothed by the central bank interventions, and the business cycle of the Peruvian 
economy between 1991 and 2010. The aim is to understand whether the exchange rate policy 
adopted had an effect on firms’ behaviour and the structure of the economy in terms of a more 
diversified export base. Available macro data are limited, so I integrate them with a micro 
analysis of 117 non-financial firms which allow me to make relevant inference on the balance 
sheets and ownership of these firms. 
In this chapter RER price patterns are analysed for the period 1991-2010 in order to set 
different phases of the business cycle. I have identified four phases depending on the price trend 
and volatility of the bilateral RER versus the US dollar. 
The chapter is divided in five sections. A part from this introduction, the second section 
aims to establish what factors affect investment. An investment function estimates whether the 
RER can be one of the factors through a balance sheet effect. The third section deepens the 
investigation through a business cycle analysis which is conducted at different levels according 
to three types of categorisation of the data set: analysis of different activities by sectors, analysis 
of the tradables and non-tradables sectors, and analysis of different types of ownerships. The 
fourth section focuses on the structural development of the Peruvian economy during the entire 
period. The fifth section draws the conclusions by summarising the findings of the chapter. 
 
6.2 The effects of RER fluctuations on non-financial firms’ investments 
The chapter follows a periodisation shown in Figure 8.1. The first period, from the 
beginning of 1991 to the end of 1992, was characterised by a very volatile RER. This depends on 
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large depreciations and the deflation that took place during the structural adjustments programme 
at the beginning of the Fujimori’s government. In a second phase, from 1993 to 1995, the RER 
appreciated mostly because of the large capital inflows attracted by the macro stabilisation 
programme. The nominal exchange rate and inflation started to stabilise, while the economy 
experienced an annual average real growth of eight percent over the three year period. The third 
period spans from 1996 until about September 2002 when the RER depreciated and the economy 
contracted first and then stagnated between 1998 and 2001. This period was characterised by 
external international financial crises and the domestic political turmoil of the early 2000. The 
last phase ends in 2010, during which the exchange rate appreciated during the commodities 
price boom. 
 
Figure 6.1: Price patterns and phases definitions of the Bilateral RER (1991-2010) 
 
Source: BCRP (2011) 
 
60
65
70
75
80
85
90
95
100
105
110
Ja
n
-9
1
Ju
l-
9
1
Ja
n
-9
2
Ju
l-
9
2
Ja
n
-9
3
Ju
l-
9
3
Ja
n
-9
4
Ju
l-
9
4
Ja
n
-9
5
Ju
l-
9
5
Ja
n
-9
6
Ju
l-
9
6
Ja
n
-9
7
Ju
l-
9
7
Ja
n
-9
8
Ju
l-
9
8
Ja
n
-9
9
Ju
l-
9
9
Ja
n
-0
0
Ju
l-
0
0
Ja
n
-0
1
Ju
l-
0
1
Ja
n
-0
2
Ju
l-
0
2
Ja
n
-0
3
Ju
l-
0
3
Ja
n
-0
4
Ju
l-
0
4
Ja
n
-0
5
Ju
l-
0
5
Ja
n
-0
6
Ju
l-
0
6
Ja
n
-0
7
Ju
l-
0
7
Ja
n
-0
8
Ju
l-
0
8
Ja
n
-0
9
Ju
l-
0
9
Ja
n
-1
0
Ju
l-
1
0
PHASE I
Volatile -
Deflation
(1991 - 1992)
PHASE II
Appreciation-
Privatisation
(1993 - 1995)
PHASE III
Depreciation - External and Political
Crisis (1996 - 2002)
PHASE IV
Appreciation - Commodity Boom 
(2002 - 2010)
176 
 
Generally, the empirical literature on the effects of the RER tends to focus on the 
performance of an economy in terms of growth. The theory suggests that RER devaluations have 
two opposite effects, an expansionary one caused by increasing competitiveness, and a 
contractionary one caused by firms’ currency mismatch between assets and liabilities, the so 
called balance sheet effect. This literature identifies a short-term contractionary effect during 
depreciations followed by an expansionary effect in the medium/long run (Kamin and Roger, 
1997 on Mexico; Hermet, 2003 on South Korea; Bonomo and Martins, 2003 on Brasil; Tovar, 
2005 on South Korea; Benavente et al., 2003, on Chile). Works on Peru on the effect of RER 
depreciations on the investment ratio of non-financial firms, between 1990 and early 2000 (Phase 
I, II and III of Figure 6.1) reached similar results: currency depreciations negatively affect firm’s 
investment behaviour as the balance sheet effect dominates the competitiveness effect 
(Rodriguez and Diaz, 1995; Carranza et al., 2003, Saldaña and Velasquez, 2007). 
Following the above empirical studies, I extend the period including Phase IV when the 
RER appreciates during the commodity boom. In this way, I will compare the results over two 
distinct parts of the exchange rate cycle, a period dominated by RER depreciation (1993-2002) 
and a period of appreciation (2003-2010), to see whether the effects on the investment ratio are 
symmetrical. 
The specification of the model is: 
                                                              (1) 
I= investment ratio given by 
  
    
  , where K is the stock of investment 
      = variation of Real Bilateral Exchange Rate in log terms 
   = ratio of dollar debt over total asset for each firm 
       = log of sales value for each firm 
     = leverage ratio for each firm (total debt over total asset) 
  = time dummies 
  = firm specific effect 
The inclusion of time dummies is used to control for all macro-variables given that    
may be capturing not only exchange rate movements but other factors such as aggregate credit 
conditions or political uncertainty. 
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In Table 6.1, I show the result for the first period (Phase I, II and III) by adopting 
different versions of equation 1 above in order to test for the various factors which might affect 
investment.  
Table 6.1: Investment function results (GMM estimation – Sample 1991-2002)  
Independent variables Equation1 Equation2 
 
Equation3 Equation4 Equation5 
 log(RER) -0.557*** 
(0.071) 
-0.493*** 
(0.084) 
-0.481*** 
(0.078) 
-0.257*** 
(0.071) 
 
 Dollar debt 
ratio*log(RER) 
    -0.179** 
(0.091) 
Firms 
Specific 
Lagged 
Investment Ratio 
0.744*** 
(0.019) 
0.730*** 
(0.021) 
0.736*** 
(0.018) 
0.168*** 
(0.026) 
0.704*** 
(0.020) 
 Sales 0.086*** 
(0.023) 
0.082*** 
(0.022) 
0.084*** 
(0.022) 
0.008 
(0.011) 
0.116*** 
(0.027) 
 Lagged Leverage 
Ratio 
(Total debt/Total 
asset ratio) 
0.226*** 
(0.070) 
0.211*** 
(0.069) 
0.210*** 
(0.071) 
0.077*** 
(0.022) 
0.192*** 
(0.064) 
 Lagged Dollar 
Debt Ratio 
0.058 
(0.063) 
0.073 
(0.230) 
0.075 
(0.065) 
-0.018 
(0.032) 
-0.015 
(0.062) 
Controls Lagged ROA   0.082 
(0.102) 
   
 Lagged Solvency 
Ratio  
  0.033*** 
(0.011) 
  
 Size (log asset)    0.736*** 
(0.087) 
 
Year 
Dummies 
    
 
  
 1997 -0.002 
(0.017) 
0.006 
(0.018) 
0.005 
(0.017) 
-0.006 
(0.011) 
0.020 
(0.016) 
 1998 0.128*** 
(0.018) 
0.132*** 
(0.018) 
0.129*** 
(0.018) 
0.044*** 
(0.011) 
0.123*** 
(0.018) 
 1999 0.089*** 
(0.012) 
0.088*** 
(0.012) 
0.084*** 
(0.012) 
0.034*** 
(0.009) 
0.063*** 
(0.013) 
 2000 0.047*** 
(0.009) 
0.049*** 
(0.009) 
0.048*** 
(0.009) 
0.041*** 
(0.008) 
0.025** 
(0.013) 
 2001 -0.022*** 
(0.026) 
-0.019** 
(0.008) 
-0.017*** 
(0.008) 
0.019***  
(0.007) 
-0.020** 
(0.011) 
Regression 
Statistics 
N. observations 928 927 927 928 925 
 Sargan Test (J-
statistic) 
48.7 50.2 49.8 49.3 45.6 
 p-value 0.48 0.42 0.44 0.42 0.61 
 First order 
Autocorrelation 
-0.51 -0.51 -0.51 -0.26 -0.47 
 p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 Second order 
Autocorrelation 
-0.10 -0.10 -0.11 0.04 -0.12 
 p-value 0.11 0.11 0.10 0.62 0.00 
Standard errors in parenthesis. */**/*** indicate statistical significance at the 10/05/01 level 
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First, equation 1 reveals a negative relation between investment ratios and RER. This is 
in line with other studies mentioned above and leads to the conclusion that the balance sheet 
effect had a more important role than the competitiveness effect during the depreciation period. 
This could be explained by the fact that most of the tradable sector firms are in the 
manufacturing sector which is mainly oriented to the domestic market. As expected, sales are 
positively correlated with investment. The leverage ratio, whose coefficient is positive and 
significant, indicates that investment expenditure is strongly related to financing access. This 
confirms that, in the late 1990s, restricted financing conditions determined by the international 
financial turmoil had a negative impact on the Peruvian economy. Since a significant part of 
borrowing was in foreign currency, equation 1 also includes the lagged dollar debt ratio to check 
whether dollar liabilities had any particular effect: the coefficient is positive but not significant. 
Second, the next equations (2, 3, and 4) include new controls such as firms’ profitability, 
solvency and size. The lagged return on assets (ROA) has a positive sign, but is not significant. 
The lagged solvency ratio is both positive and significant. Lastly, following the idea that there 
may be a bifurcation in the credit market, so that big and small firms have access to different 
financing conditions, equation 4 has been created to verify whether investment depends on firm 
size as measured in (log) terms of total asset: the coefficient is highly significant; this induced 
me to further investigate this issue through a qualitative analysis illustrated below (in section 
6.3.3). 
Third, the existence of a balance sheet effect is additionally proven by equation 5 which 
shows the interaction term between the RER and the dollar debt ratio as statistical significant.
 49
 
This, unlike the overall effect of the RER on investment, isolates the competitiveness effect from 
the balance sheet effect. 
The year dummy variables take into account the period of international financial turmoil 
from 1997 to 2001; they capture macroeconomic conditions, factors that are common to every 
firm, such as domestic credit availability and political climate. 
                                                 
49
 Applied research often estimate interaction terms to infer how the effect of one independent variable on the 
dependent variable depends on the magnitude of another independent variable (Norton et al., 2004) 
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Table 6.2: Investment function results (GMM estimation – Sample 2002-2010): 
Independent variables Equation1 Equation2 
 
Equation3 Equation4 Equation5 
 log(RER) -0.349*** 
(0.047) 
-0.217*** 
(0.053) 
-0.275*** 
(0.052) 
-0.641*** 
(0.106) 
 
 Dollar debt 
ratio*log(RER) 
    -0.018*** 
(0.000) 
Firms 
Specific 
Lagged 
Investment Ratio 
0.227*** 
(0.004) 
0.243*** 
(0.004) 
0.223*** 
(0.004) 
0.167*** 
(0.003) 
0.228*** 
(0.004) 
 Sales 0.277*** 
(0.006) 
0.274*** 
(0.006) 
0.275*** 
(0.006) 
0.160*** 
(0.009) 
0.254*** 
(0.007) 
 Lagged Leverage 
Ratio 
(Total debt/Total 
asset ratio) 
-0.126*** 
(0.010) 
-0.113*** 
(0.012) 
-0.109*** 
(0.009) 
-0.099** 
(0.014) 
-0.106*** 
(0.013) 
 Lagged Dollar 
Debt Ratio 
0.179*** 
(0.009) 
0.182*** 
(0.010) 
0.164*** 
(0.008) 
0.157*** 
(0.015) 
0.194 
(0.013) 
Controls Lagged ROA  0.290*** 
(0.006) 
   
 Lagged Solvency 
Ratio 
  0.031 
(0.003) 
  
 Size (log asset)    0.361*** 
(0.006) 
 
Year 
Dummies 
    
 
  
 2003 0.020*** 
(0.001) 
0.018*** 
(0.001) 
0.021*** 
(0.001) 
0.018*** 
(0.001) 
0.025*** 
(0.001) 
 2004 -0.009 
(0.004) 
-0.006 
(0.004) 
-0.006 
(0.004) 
-0.040*** 
(0.009) 
0.020*** 
(0.002) 
 2005 -0.043 
(0.003) 
-0.053*** 
(0.004) 
-0.045 
(0.004) 
-0.056*** 
(0.003) 
-0.035*** 
(0.003) 
 2006 -0.076*** 
(0.005) 
-0.090*** 
(0.005) 
-0.076*** 
(0.005) 
-0.120*** 
(0.009) 
-0.048*** 
(0.004) 
 2007 -0.102*** 
(0.008) 
-0.129*** 
(0.008) 
-0.101*** 
(0.008) 
-0.195*** 
(0.018) 
-0.043*** 
(0.005) 
 2008 -0.000 
(0.009) 
-0.022 
(0.010) 
0.002 
(0.001) 
-0.140*** 
(0.018) 
0.066*** 
(0.005) 
 2009 0.038*** 
(0.010) 
0.033*** 
(0.010) 
0.050*** 
(0.010) 
-0.113*** 
(0.021) 
0.143*** 
(0.004) 
 2010 0.004 
(0.012) 
0.009 
(0.012) 
0.018 
(0.012) 
-0.162*** 
(0.027) 
0.122*** 
(0.006) 
Regression 
Statistics 
N. observations 890 890 890 890 886 
 Sargan Test (J-
statistic) 
103.1 102.4 103.5 94.27 101.1 
 p-value 0.34 0.31 0.28 0.53 0.36 
 First order 
Autocorrelation 
-0.44 -0.45 -0.44 -0.42 -0.45 
 p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 Second order 
Autocorrelation 
-0.14 -0.14 -0.14 -0.13 -0.14 
 p-value 0.03 0.05 0.04 0.06 0.02 
Standard errors in parenthesis. */**/*** indicate statistical significance at the 10/05/01 level 
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Other variables and equations have been tried, but all additional factors have shown low 
and statistically insignificant coefficients: for example, the effect of interest rates has been tested 
in different forms such as the discount rate in nuevos pesos, or Tamex in US dollar, or the 
interaction between Tamex and dollar debt ratio.
50
 
The next step is to compare the results related to this period of depreciation with the 
results of the appreciation (Table 6.2). Equation 1 shows that the changes in the RER still 
negatively affect investment during this period, but to a lesser extent. This confirms that the 
balance sheet effect is a dominant factor over the competitive effect: the loss of investment 
explained by a loss of competitiveness, due to an appreciating currency, has a lower negative 
impact on investment ratio relatively to a period of depreciation, where the balance sheet effect 
prevails. However, two significant changes emerge in this second period. Firstly, sales acquire a 
more predominant role with a relatively higher coefficient confirming the expansionary effect of 
the commodity boom. Secondly, the coefficient of the lagged leverage ratio switches signs (from 
positive to negative) showing a negative correlation with investment. This suggests that, during 
this period, firms tended to cut down their stock of debt. For this reason, solvency presents a low 
and not significant coefficient as shown in equation 3. Equation 2 shows that, contrary to the 
previous period, profitability has a higher and significant correlation with investment. Overall, 
this is a period of higher profits and investments. For this reason, the lagged investment ratio 
retains its significance, but is less correlated than in the previous period. 
Overall, during the commodity boom period, the investment ratio is more correlated to 
profits, thus the leverage position at the end of the commodity boom period will be fundamental 
to assess the fragility of the economy (chapter 3). Firms may become more fragile in the case of 
a collapse of commodity prices if they migrate towards more speculative positions. 
Equation 4 still shows a significant positive coefficient once one controls for firms’ size. 
Equation 5 underlines the fact that, in the second period, firms are less sensitive to changes in 
RER, the interaction term’s coefficient is much lower, but still significant. 
 
                                                 
50
 Tamex: average lending rate in US dollars given by the outstanding commercial loans of the banking system. 
Source: Superintendentia de  Bancos y Segoros, BCRP (2011). 
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6.3 Business cycle and RER fluctuations 
In this section, data on the 117 non-financial firms listed at the Peruvian stock exchange 
CONASEV will be analysed using the database I have created. This section is divided in three 
subsections. Firstly, I will analyse the performance of each sector of the economy in terms of 
investments, profits, US dollar debt and financial ratios. Secondly, given that the RER influences 
the relationship between tradables and non-tradables, the database is used to analyse the same 
data grouped by tradables and non-tradables. Finally, I will use the database to analyse the data 
by type of ownerships categorised in chapter 4.  
 
6.3.1 Analysis by sector 
In the following subsections, I will analyse investments, profits, net debt in US dollar and 
financial ratios during the four RER phases defined previously. For each of these, I will first 
analyse total values (summing individual firms’ values) by sector using micro data from my 
database, I will then compare these with firms’ average values for each sector and, finally, with 
ratios of total values to GDP. 
 
Investments 
First, my database shows that listed firms’ investments changed pro-cyclically throughout 
the period: the first phase (1991-1993, volatile RER) was characterised by investments’ 
stagnation; listed companies increased their investments since privatisation, from 1993 (Phase II, 
appreciation) until the end of the 1990s (first half of Phase III, depreciation). From the end of the 
1990s until the commodity boom, investments decreased. At sectoral level, different tendencies 
can be teased out: the Services and Electricity sectors stand out for their high levels of 
investments during Phase II and the first half of Phase III, immediately after privatisation which 
attracted FDI (see previous chapter). However, investments in the Services sector declined since 
the recession years of the late 1990s to resume only after the beginning of the commodity boom. 
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Investments in the Mining sector present an increasing rate of growth which accelerated towards 
the end of the period. The Construction sector stands out in two moments, at the end of the 1990s 
and from 2006 onwards. (Figure 6.2) 
  
Figure 6.2: Investments by sector (Thousands of nuevos soles) (constant prices base year 2005) 
 
Source: Appendix C 
 
Second, I calculate, within each sector, the average investments by firm: privatised firms, 
mainly in Services and Electricity sectors, stand out for their highest levels of investments from 
1994 to 1999; the high growth rate of investments in the Construction sector during the 
commodity boom is remarkable; while the rate for the Mining sector appears mitigated. This is 
consistent with the fact that the Mining sector is over-represented in the sample (Figure 6.3). 
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Figure 6.3: Average firm investments by sector (Millions of nuevos soles) (constant prices base year 2005) 
 
Source: Appendix C 
 
Third, the total amount of investments by sector as a percentage of GDP shows a 
continuous increase of investments in the Services and Electricity sectors in the 1990s and a 
decline at the beginning of the new century. The commodity sector progressively increased the 
amount of investments, especially after the commodity boom (Figure 6.4).  
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Figure 6.4: Investments by sector (Millions of nuevos soles) (percentage of GDP) 
 
Source: Appendix C 
 
To sum up, my database shows that most of the investments went to the Services (in 
particular in Telecommunication) and the Electricity sectors after their privatisation in 1994. 
More specifically, most of the contribution comes from Telefonica del Peru 
(Telecommunication), Edegel and Edenor (Electricity). There was also a rapid increase in the 
Constructions/Real Estate Sector and the Mining sector during the years of high growth after 
2005. As expected, the commodity price boom had a positive effect on the Mining sector; finally, 
investments in Manufacturing lagged behind. 
In order to verify the reliability of my database, I implement a triangulation with central 
bank data on aggregate fixed investments and the government agency Proinversión sectoral data 
on foreign direct investments: my database is consistent with both sources. As shown in the 
figure below (Figure 6.5), since 1991, there have been two investment booms (1994-95 period, 
2006-2008 period) and two periods of low investment, because of the international financial 
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crises and the political turmoil during 1998-2002 period, and the blip during the Great Recession 
in 2009.
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Figure 6.5: Yearly growth rate of gross fixed investment at aggregate level (percentage) 
 
Source: BCRP (2011) 
 
However, the BCRP does not provide data by sectors. The only government agency which 
provides some indications on FDI is Proinversión which gathers data on a voluntary basis.  
Hence, data is not complete as only firms which want to publicise their brand and declare how 
much they are investing pass their data to Proinversión. Data gathered by sector show 
consistency with the database which I created in terms of investment connected to the privatised 
firms. Table 6.3 shows that Proinversión recorded large flows of investment in the 
Communication sector in 1994 and in 2000; the Energy sector attracted capital inflows from 
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 Aggregate data for investment is consistent with data shown in Figure 6.4, with the provision that the Service 
sector experienced a spectacular growth especially in 1994 (because of privatisation) and the Fishing sector 
experienced el niño. 
-30
-20
-10
0
10
20
30
40
50
1
9
9
1
1
9
9
2
1
9
9
3
1
9
9
4
1
9
9
5
1
9
9
6
1
9
9
7
1
9
9
8
1
9
9
9
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
1
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
3
2
0
0
4
2
0
0
5
2
0
0
6
2
0
0
7
2
0
0
8
2
0
0
9
2
0
1
0
Private 
Public
186 
 
1994 to 1999; during the commodity boom, the Mining, Construction and Housing sectors 
benefited from FDI. 
 
Table 6.3: FDI by sector (Millions of US$) (1991-2009) 
 
Source: Proinversión 
 
Net debt US Dollar Balance (US dollar debt-US dollar assets) 
First, my database shows that the net dollar debt stock started to increase significantly 
only during Phase II for Commerce and Manufacturing sectors and continued to rise during 
Phase III spreading to all sectors in a pro-cyclical pattern. However, the generalised increase of 
external liabilities contributed to the halt of the economy at the end of the 1990s, because of the 
effect of depreciation on firms’ balance sheets (Section 6.2; Carranza et al., 2003; Saldaña and 
Velasquez, 2007). The Service sector stands out as the most indebted at the end of the 1990s. 
Companies’ balance sheets were then cleaned in terms of external debt from 1999 until 2007, 
when a new cycle of indebtness started: this new cycle was particularly evident for the 
Construction sector; on the contrary, the Mining sector adopted a counter-cyclical behaviour by 
accumulating dollar cash (assets) since the beginning of the commodity boom in 2003, this was 
then used up in 2009 when financing conditions were tight (Figure 6.6). 
 
SECTOR 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 TOTAL
AGRIBUSINESS -            0.6             -            -            2.8             -0.5           0.5             18.5          15.9          2.3             -            -            -         -            -          0.0           -            0.3             -          40.5            
COMMERCE 8.4             4.4             14.8          29.0          8.8             118.6        70.0          106.1        11.1          38.0          21.2          -1.3           0.4          21.6          -2.0        36.0         9.1             15.3          30.1        539.7         
COMMUNICATION -            -            0.1             2,003.0    1.9             1.6             18.1          73.9          255.4        2,233.5    -220.7      302.5        28.1       -387.1      -622.4    -8.2          67.7          -100.4      28.1        3,675.0      
CONSTRUCTION 0.1             0.3             1.3             0.8             9.9             16.2          1.9             11.9          11.4          4.4             10.4          -            10.0       2.7             9.1          26.0         36.9          23.9          12.6        189.9         
ENERGY -            2.6             0.2             361.4        -            374.2        528.8        106.4        166.4        -3.5           88.6          0.7             5.8          15.7          -          16.5         8.8             839.5        90.8        2,602.7      
FINANCE 4.2             22.9          56.7          43.7          266.7        188.1        105.2        131.3        585.2        258.1        487.6        -194.1      -147.5   57.3          332.8     198.3       65.9          189.0        118.7      2,770.1      
MANUFACTURING 10.3          9.8             49.9          52.3          140.7        329.2        205.4        130.9        133.2        70.5          162.3        712.9        24.9       -81.6         -77.7      433.4       10.9          101.3        1.0           2,419.5      
MINING 8.7             119.3        8.9             310.3        202.7        129.6        116.7        174.9        320.2        34.9          5.1             3.1             0.9          239.9        278.2     616.1       66.3          456.2        443.0      3,534.9      
FISHING -0.1           -            1.0             0.5             -            0.8             -            -            -            -            -            -            -         4.5             4.5          118.5       30.0          -            -          159.7         
OIL 0.0             0.0             0.1             0.1             1.8             33.6          3.4             0.0             -            -            60.0          50.0          -         -            -          -           0.3             148.0        -          297.4         
SERVICES 1.1             0.3             0.4             1.8             3.2             12.7          15.9          24.5          34.7          23.2          147.3        46.4          17.1       6.8             11.7        10.7         25.0          24.1          40.9        447.9         
TRANSPORT 0.2             -0.5           3.4             0.4             1.4             0.3             6.3             64.7          -64.8         11.0          12.9          92.7          113.4     1.6             -          -           -            40.0          6.9           290.0         
TURISM -            2.1             0.0             6.2             7.0             10.0          0.6             5.6             16.6          -            -            -            3.7          -            1.1          0.1           0.2             0.3             0.5           54.0            
HOUSING 0.0             -            1.0             0.2             0.3             0.1             3.2             0.4             2.3             0.2             10.6          -0.7           0.4          1.1             0.3          0.6           -            500.1        -          520.1         
TOTAL 32.9          161.8        137.9        2,809.5    647.4        1,214.5    1,076.0    849.1        1,487.7    2,672.5    785.4        1,012.2    57.2       -117.6      -64.3      1,448.0   321.1        2,237.7    772.6      17,541.6   
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Figure 6.6: Net US dollar balance by sector (Thousands US$) (constant prices base year 2005) 
 
 
Source: Appendix C 
 
Second, in terms of averages by sector, the Telecommunication is dominant as in the 
previous figure, while the Construction sector is the most exposed in terms of dollar debt after 
the commodity boom. This would prove that real estates, as assets close to the financial ones 
(Toporowski, 2010), tend to build-up its fragility through leverage during boom years: when 
growth resumed in 2010, dollar debt of the Construction sector increased further. Finally, the 
level of dollar indebtness increased since 2007 for all sectors (Figure 6.7).  
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Figure 6.7: Average firm net US dollar balance by sector (Thousands of US$) (constant prices base year 2005) 
 
Source: Appendix C 
 
To sum up, my database identifies two periods of increasing dollar indebtedness. The 
first period corresponds to Phase II and first part of Phase III in which foreign capital entered the 
country attracted by the privatisation of state enterprises. The second period is during the second 
half of Phase IV and is characterised by large capital inflows and high revenues from the 
commodity boom. The accumulation of dollar debt stocks raises concerns in case of commodity 
prices decline and consequent depreciation of the domestic currency. 
In terms of consistency of data, and as a proof based on the triangulation method, these 
results are in line with the aggregate indebtness of the private sector, as shown in Figure 6.8. 
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Figure 6.8: Private non-guaranteed external debt stock (Millions of US$) (1991-2009) 
 
Source: World Development Finance (2011) 
 
Net Profits  
The database shows that the Mining sector appears dominant throughout the entire 
period: Figure 6.9 below shows its relative size compared to other sectors. Even considering the 
average by sectors, the Mining sector has the largest profits. However, this may be emphasised 
by the over-representation of the sector in the database (Section 4.3.2). 
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Figure 6.9: Net profit by sector (Thousands of nuevos soles) (constant prices base year 2005) 
 
Source: Appendix C 
 
In terms of averages, the Services, Construction and Fishing sectors appear to be the most 
cyclical; the Commerce sector benefits particularly form the commodity boom; the Electricity 
sector maintains its level of profits since the post-privatisation years; Manufacturing and 
Agribusiness remain constant at a low level for the whole period (Figure 6.10). 
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Figure 6.10: Average firm net profits by sector excluding Mining sector (Thousands of nuevos soles) (constant 
prices base year 2005) 
 
Source: Appendix C 
 
Finally, by observing total profits for each sector in relation to the business cycle (Figure 
6.11), the Service sector appears to be the most volatile. The Electricity sector maintains its level 
of profit after the first period post-privatisation; during Phase IV, Construction and Commerce 
increase their profits, while Manufacturing lags behind with the exception of a couple of years at 
the beginning of the commodity boom. 
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Figure 6.11: Net profits by sector excluding Mining sector (percentage of GDP) 
 
Source: Appendix C 
 
Ratios by sector 
In this sub-section, I analyse the financial ratios, leverage, liquidity, return on assets 
(ROA) and solvency, in terms of firms ‘average by sectors. 
 
Leverage ratio (Total Liabilities/ Total Asset) 
The leverage ratio confirms the macro picture displaying a pro-cyclical pattern with an 
average deterioration from 1996 until 2003, and a subsequent improvement at the beginning of 
the commodity boom. It increased during Phase III when firms accumulated more dollar debt, 
and decreased during Phase IV. 
-0.40 
-0.20 
-
0.20 
0.40 
0.60 
0.80 
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Agribusiness Commerce Construction Electricity
Fishing Manufacturing Services
193 
 
In terms of sectoral analysis, Service and Electricity sectors show an increasing leverage 
ratio. The Fishing sector remains significantly leveraged especially up to 2003 when, after el 
niño, it manages to converge to the average. The Construction sector also shows a pick of the 
leverage ratio in 1998 and then an increase in the last four years (Figure 6.12). 
 
Figure 6.12: Leverage ratio by sector  
 
Source: Appendix C 
 
Liquidity ratio (Current ratio = Current Asset/Current Liabilities) 
In terms of liquidity, the Fishing sector confirms to be the weakest one, followed by the 
Service and the Agribusiness sectors. The latter considerably improves with the commodity 
boom while the Construction sector deteriorates significantly during the same period. Also in this 
case, the general pattern is still pro-cyclical; the liquidity ratio decreases from mid 1990s to the 
beginning of the commodity boom when it improves (Figure 6.13). 
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Figure 6.13: Liquidity ratio by sector 
 
Source: Appendix C 
 
ROA ratio (Operating Profit/ Total Assets) 
The profitability, measured as ROA, displays a pro-cyclical pattern. Mining and 
Commerce sectors show an above average profitability; the Fishing sector retains its typical 
volatility and, finally, the Agribusiness is the worst performer (Figure 6.14). 
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Figure 6.14: Return on assets 
 
Source: Appendix C 
 
Solvency ratio (Net Profit/Total Debt) 
The solvency ratio shows a similar pro-cyclical pattern: a decrease can be observed from 
mid 1990s until the beginning of the commodity boom: the Mining sector has the best profile; 
the Fishing and Agribusiness sectors have the worst ratios during the recession period at the end 
of Phase III, and remain almost unchanged until the end of the period; the Construction sector 
shows a deteriorating ratio from Phase II to Phase III, it improves at the beginning of Phase IV, 
but its accumulation of debt in the second half of the period has a negative effect on the ratio 
(Figure 6.15). 
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Figure 6.15: Solvency ratio by sector  
 
Source: Appendix C 
 
Summary of findings 
This section discusses the above empirical findings by sectors in relation to the growth of 
the economy and the evolution of the RER across its four phases.  
First, the Mining sector shows a resilient capacity to invest throughout the period. 
However, there is a distinction between the first three phases of RER and the fourth one 
characterised by the commodity boom. Before Phase IV, the Mining sector, similarly to other 
sectors, accumulated US dollar debt to finance its expenditure during a period of lower 
profitability. However, during Phase IV, the abundance of profits, confirmed by the 
improvement of liquidity and ROA ratios, allowed for an accumulation of US dollar assets which 
formed a cushion against the recent shock.  
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Second, the Service and the Electricity sectors show common characteristics: these 
sectors were privatised, mainly during Phase II, and, residually, during Phase III. Their 
increasing indebtedness can be explained by the fact that state companies were privatised with 
clean balance sheets; this (subsidised) acquisition of large assets stimulated a new cycle of 
indebtedness. Investments seem to be driven by the FDI which were attracted by privatisation. 
Investments declined during Phase IV when the FDI flows were directed towards other sectors, 
especially Mining. As a result, the leverage ratio deteriorated throughout the two decades 
because of debt accumulation until Phase IV, and because of asset deterioration due to lack of 
investments in Phase IV. During the last phase, the liquidity ratio improved, but profitability 
remained below the economy’s average. Furthermore, both sectors showed pro-cyclicality in 
terms of profits. The Electricity sector’s development was stable during the business cycle, while 
the Service sector showed a higher volatility. 
Third, the Commerce sector followed a similar pro-cyclical pattern. It benefitted from the 
FDI flows during Phase II as shown by the increase of investments and profits. However, the 
level of indebtness, shown by the leverage ratio, increased during Phase II and III, and remained 
unchanged until 2010. During Phase IV the sector benefited from the boom and showed high 
profits and return on asset leading to an improvement in solvency. Typical of this sector’s 
operational characteristics, liquidity was high and remained stable throughout the two decades. 
Fourth, interesting dynamics are noticed for the Construction sector. This is the sector 
which showed the highest volatility in terms of investments and profits during the business cycle. 
Leverage increased during boom periods thanks to the access to the US dollar debt market. 
However, the sector is characterised by a high risk, indicated by the volatility of the financial 
ratios, and by a persistent high return on asset ratio.  
Fifth, the Manufacturing sector showed a certain struggle during the 1990s with low 
investments and low profits throughout the entire period with the exception of a couple of years 
during Phase IV. The analysis of financial ratios, however, does not indicate immediate concerns 
for its survival: leverage, profitability and solvency are in line with the economy and the sector is 
very liquid. However, given its strategic importance in terms of structure of production, the 
Manufacturing sector will be further analysed in more depth in the final section. 
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Sixth, the Fishing industry shows a volatile profile due to the seasonality of el niño, but it 
also tracks the business cycle in terms of investments and profits. The sector started from a 
position of high indebtness, as shown by the leverage ratio, and increased the US debt during 
Phase III in a volatile pattern. However, during Phase IV, it managed to reduce its level of 
indebtness. Overall, observing both the insolvency and liquidity ratios, the sector struggled 
throughout. 
Finally, the Agribusiness appears to be the sector with the worst profile. Investments only 
improved in 1990s with some FDI, but the sector remained with the lowest profits and returns. 
Given the low profitability, because of its lack of access to the credit market, it showed very low 
levels of US dollar debt; it has the worst solvency ratio. 
 
6.3.2 Analysis by tradables and non-tradables 
The above sector analysis leads to the tradable and non-tradable classification: the non-
tradable sector is composed by sum of the Construction, Electricity and Service Sectors, that 
means a total number of 27 firms. The tradable sector is composed by all the remaining sectors 
for a total number of 90 firms. In the next sub-sections the same variables analysed in the 
previous section will be considered and additional findings will arise from different 
categorisations, as anticipated in chapter 4. 
 
Investments 
The simple aggregation of absolute values shows that investments in the two sectors are 
strongly correlated and follow a pro-cyclical path. Investments increase during Phase II and 
Phase III and then decline from the recession of the late 1990s until 2007 (Figure 6.16).  
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Figure: 6.16 Investments by tradable and non-tradable (Thousands of nuevos soles) (constant prices base 
year 2005) 
 
Source: Appendix C 
 
When total values are divided by the number of firms in each sector, then the difference 
between tradables and non-tradables is even more evident (Figure 6.17).  
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Figure 6.17: Average investments by tradable and non tradable (Millions of nuevos soles) (constant prices 
base year 2005) 
 
Source: Appendix C 
 
Finally, in relation to the business cycle, the tradable sector is less volatile. Furthermore, 
it appears that there is some lag in relation to the RER Phases; despite the depreciation in Phase 
III, investments continue to increase (until 1999 for the non-tradable sector, until 1998 for the 
tradable sector) even when the economy shows no signs of growth and credit growth is 
declining. Finally, investments stabilise in relation to GDP only after three years of economic 
boom during Phase IV (Figure 6.18). 
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Figure: 6.18 Investments by tradable and non-tradable (percentage of GDP) 
 
Source: Appendix C 
 
Net Dollar Balance 
Similarly to investments, dollar balances show a pro-cyclical nature. It appears that 
the Service and Electricity sectors contribute to make the non-tradable sector relatively more 
volatile and more indebted than the tradable sector (Figure 6.19). 
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Figure: 6.19 Net US Dollar debt balance by tradable and non-tradable (Thousands of US$) (constant prices 
base year 2005) 
 
Source: Appendix C 
 
However, the sample is formed by a higher number of tradable firms, thus the picture 
changes once the average indebtness by firm is calculated. The average dollar indebtness is 
much higher for the non-tradable sector as shown in Figure 6.20 below. These findings 
confirm that the non-tradable sector is the one which benefits more by a stabilising exchange 
rate policy. 
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Figure: 6.20 Average net US Dollar debt balance by tradable and non-tradable (Thousands of US$) (constant 
prices base year 2005) 
 
Source: Appendix C 
 
Net Profits  
The pro-cyclicality of profits observed in the previous section and the extraordinary 
profits of the Mining sector induced by the commodity boom is confirmed here (Figure 6.21). 
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Figure: 6.21 Net profits by sector (Thousands of nuevos soles) (constant prices base year 2005) 
 
Source: Appendix C 
 
Two issues can be teased out from the observation of the average values of net profit 
by firm. Firstly, during the 1990s the non-tradable sector shows volatile profits: these are 
increasing after privatisation and rapidly decreasing in the late 1990s. This trend is similar to 
that of the dollar indebtness, but it precedes it. Secondly, during the commodity boom the 
tradable sector lifts the profits of the non-tradable sector which increase significantly only 
after 2007 (Figure 6.22). 
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Figure: 6.22 Average net profits by tradable and non-tradable (Thousands of nuevos soles) (constant prices 
base year 2005) 
 
Source: Appendix C 
 
With respect to the business cycle, the non-tradable sector experiences a rapid 
increase of net profits during Phase II and the beginning of Phase III; the recession has then 
an impact on the tradable sector in 1998 and 1999, which, eventually experiences  
extraordinary profits during Phase IV (Figure 6.23). 
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Figure 6.23: Net profits by sector (percentage of GDP) 
 
Source: Appendix C 
 
Financial ratios  
This sub-section analyses firms’ average financial ratios by tradable and non-tradable 
sectors. 
 
Leverage ratio (Total Liabilities/ Total Asset) 
The leverage ratio of the tradable sector shows a cyclical behaviour with an 
improvement during the periods of growth and exchange rate appreciation (Phase II and IV 
of RER) and a deterioration during the period of depreciation (Phase III). On the contrary, 
the non-tradable sector shows a continuous increase in leverage especially during the 
beginning of Phase III and in the last part of Phase IV (Figure 6.24). 
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Figure 6.24: Leverage ratio by tradable and non-tradable 
 
Source: Appendix C 
 
Liquidity ratio (Current ratio = Current Asset/Current Liabilities) 
The liquidity ratios show a bifurcation between the two sectors. The liquidity of the 
non-tradable sector deteriorates since Phase II, and mildly improves during Phase IV. The 
liquidity of the tradable sector remains almost constant throughout the whole period 
improving significantly during the commodity boom period (Figure 6.25). 
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Figure 6.25: Liquidity ratio by sector  
 
Source: Appendix C 
 
ROA ratio (Operating Profit/ Total Assets) 
 
The profitability ratios improve in two periods for both sectors, during Phase I and II, 
and during the commodity boom in Phase IV. Driven by the Mining sector, the tradable 
sector shows a higher profitability during phase IV. During Phase III the profitability remains 
unchanged for both sectors (Figure 6.26). 
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Figure 6.26: Return on assets 
 
Source: Appendix C 
 
Solvency ratio (Net Profit/Total Debt) 
 
The solvency ratios follow a similar path of the ROA ratios. The deterioration of the 
solvency ratio for the non-tradable sector during Phase III and the improvement of the 
tradable sector during Phase IV are shown in Figure 6.27. 
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Figure 6.27: Solvency ratio by sector 
 
Source: Appendix C 
 
Summary of findings 
This sub-section summarises the findings of the above analysis. In terms of investments, 
while the tradable sector shows a constant growth with an improvement during the second half of 
Phase IV, the non-tradable sector shows a rapid increase mostly during Phase II and, mildly, 
during Phase III and from 2007 onwards. This sudden increase is obviously linked to the 
privatisation process and the FDI allocated to the Utilities and Telecommunication sector as 
shown in the previous section. This coincides with an increase in profits which faded during 
Phase III. However, while profits are declining, the sector increases its indebtness: the leverage 
ratio deteriorates and the balances of US dollar liabilities increase. This process continued until 
the end of the 1990s confirming the findings of the previous section. 
An interesting observation is that the increase in indebtness happens not only during a 
period of lower profits, but also during the commodity boom period after 2007 when profits are 
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high. The composition of this indebtness has been analysed in the previous section at sectoral 
level, the Construction and the Electricity Sectors appeared the most indebted. The increase of 
foreign indebtness in the non-tradable sector confirms the hypothesis that the non-tradable 
sectors tend to have a higher pro-cyclicality and tend to grow, in terms of both assets and 
liabilities, at faster pace relatively to the tradable sectors during commodity booms. This 
development may be interpreted in terms of symptoms of Dutch disease, or, more appropriately 
to the argument of this thesis, to a source of financial fragility (adapting the Minskyian business 
cycle theory, see Chapter 3), according to which, margins of safety keep on shrinking as the 
commodity boom continues. 
This leads to two conclusions: first, the non-tradable sector is the one which benefits the 
most from central bank interventions since it is the one which tends to accumulate more 
liabilities in US dollars; second, debt is accumulated not only in periods of low profits, 
decreasing liquidity and solvency, but also during periods of above-average growth, high 
profitability, liquidity and solvency: during Phase III, the accumulation of foreign currency debt 
has different consequences relatively to the Phase IV given the different RER dynamics. 
The tradable sector has a crucial role in triggering the profits increase in the non-tradable 
sector during Phase IV. It shows a more stable path of all variables during the whole period: 
investments, liquidity, solvency and profitability maintain a pro-cyclical nature without any 
apparent contradictory results. The leverage and indebtness paths are similar to the non-tradable 
sector with increase in debt levels during Phase III and after 2007, but they are less pronounced. 
Overall the current section confirms that, beside the differences between the two sectors, 
firms have their operational financing priorities which are not completely dependent on RER 
phases. This is confirmed by the lags in the change of variables values relatively to the change of 
RER from one phase to the next. In reality, firms may follow other criteria in managing their 
balance sheet: for example, they accumulate foreign debt because it is the only credit available, 
or, alternatively, balance sheets are managed in consolidated fashion since many firms belong to 
conglomerates. This will be the focus of the next section. 
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6.3.3 Analysis by ownership 
This sub-section presents an analysis of investments, net profits, US dollar debt and 
financial ratios by using the categorisation of ownership (domestic conglomerates, small private 
ownership, foreign ownership, mixed ownership, semi public) as described in chapter 4. 
 
Investments 
Investments present a bifurcation between large (multinational and conglomerates) versus 
small corporations. Domestic Conglomerates and Foreign Ownership own most of the 
investments. Foreign owners benefit from the effect of the privatisation process (Phase II), while 
domestic conglomerates increase their investments especially during the commodity boom 
(Figure 6.28). 
 
Figure 6.28: Investments by ownership (Thousands of nuevos soles) (constant prices base year 2005) 
 
Source: Appendix C 
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Once the different types of ownership are weighted by the number of firms a clear 
hierarchy emerges and large capital is associated with higher investments: Foreign Ownership 
displays high levels of investments, followed by Domestic Conglomerates, then the mixed 
ownership, and lastly the single domestic private owners. 
The privatisation of state enterprises (mostly utilities), whether under state control (with 
only a small stake in the hands of private investors) or in foreign hands, produced the highest 
level of investments at the end of the period (Figure 6.29). 
 
Figure 6.29: Average investments by ownership (Thousands of nuevos soles) (constant prices base year 2005) 
 
Source: Appendix C 
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Construction sectors, associated to the non-tradable sector, as discussed in the previous section 
(Figure 6.30). 
 
Figure 6.30: Investments by ownership (percentage of GDP) 
 
Source: Appendix C 
 
Net US debt Dollar Balance (US dollar debt- US dollar assets): 
My database shows that, with respect to the net balance of dollar holdings, almost all the 
exchange rate risk is taken on by the same two largest groups with the highest levels of 
investments, Foreign Owners and Domestic Conglomerates. This shows that the credit market is 
bifurcated and that large corporatations are able to access US dollar credit more easily than other 
firms (Figure 6.31).  
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Figure 6.31: Net US Dollar debt balance (Thousands of US dollar) (constant prices base year 2005) 
 
Source: Appendix C 
 
The average value by firm shows that Foreigner Ownership is the most exposed to 
balance sheet effect during Phase III, while at the end of Phase IV the risk appears to be similar 
for Domestic Conglomerates and Mixed Ownership (Figure 6.32). 
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Figure 6.32: Average net US dollar debt balance by ownership (Thousands of US$) (constant prices base year 
2005) 
 
Source: Appendix C 
 
My database also provides an additional finding by aggregating results for different firms 
under the same ownership. This allows us to understand whether large domestic conglomerates 
manage their entire holding in order to offset their individual firms’ exchange rate risks. The 
figure below shows the sum of the net dollar balance for the three larger groups: the Banda group 
deals mostly in the Agribusiness and Commerce sectors; the Bentin group is involved in 
Manufacturing, Commerce and Services sectors; the Brescia group deals with Mining, Fishing, 
Services and Construction sectors. In the case of Brescia, it is interesting to note that there is a 
diversification of risk during Phase IV. The group holds firms in the Mining Sector (which is the 
sector with higher US dollar assets, less exchange rate risk) and the Construction Sector (which 
increases its level of debt during the second part of Phase IV). The overall balances are 
illustrated in Figure 6.33 below. 
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Figure 6.33: Net US dollar debt balance for the three larger domestic conglomerates (Thousands of US$) 
(constant prices base year 2005) 
 
Source: Appendix C 
 
Net Profits 
For each category, net profits follow the same ranking of investments. However, the pro-
cyclicality of profits is mostly concentrated in firms with Foreign Ownership between Phase II 
and III. Only during Phase IV, do firms with Mixed Ownership and Domestic Conglomerate 
show profits close to foreign firms. Foreign Ownership is spread across all sectors and especially 
in the Mining, Services and Commerce sectors which show high profits during Phase IV, as 
shown in the previous sub-section. The other sector which shows high profit is Construction 
which is mostly owned by Domestic Conglomerates (Figure 6.34). 
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Figure 6.34: Net profits by conglomerates (Thousands of nuevos soles) (constant prices base year 2005) 
 
Source: Appendix C 
 
 The average profit by firm type shows that the three categories mentioned above almost 
reach the same net profits during Phase IV. Figure 6.35 underlines once again the difference 
between firm belonging to large or foreign capital and the others. 
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Figure 6.35: Average net profits by conglomerates (Thousands of nuevos soles) (constant prices base year 
2005) 
 
Source: Appendix C 
 
In relation  to the business cycle fluctuations the Foreign Ownership remains the category with 
higher profits: 
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Figure 6.36: Net profit by conglomerates (percentage of GDP) 
 
Source: Appendix C 
 
Financial Ratios 
This section will analyse the financial ratios of firms grouped by type of ownership. 
 
Leverage ratio (Total Liabilities/ Total Asset) 
The path of the leverage ratio follows the pro-cyclicality commented in the previous 
sections. However, this categorisation shows that the most leveraged firms are owned by 
Peruvians, either Private Owners or large Domestic Conglomerates. As expected, semi-public 
companies are the least leveraged (Figure 6.37). 
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Figure 6.37: Leverage ratio by ownership 
 
Source: Appendix C 
 
Liquidity ratio (Current ratio = Current Asset/Current Liabilities) 
The current ratio shows no great divergence between different ownership categories apart 
from two instances which coincide with the two episodes of high growth rates and RER 
appreciation (Phase II and Phase IV). During Phase II, Semi-Public and Foreign Ownership are 
those involved in the privatisation process. During Phase IV the hierarchy changes as Mixed 
Ownership and Foreigner Ownership shows higher levels of liquidity ratio since these are the 
ones involved in the Mining sector (Figure 6.38). 
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Figure 6.38: Liquidity ratio by ownership  
 
Source: Appendix C 
 
ROA ratio (Operating Profit/ Total Assets) 
 
Following the previous analysis it is not a surprise that large corporations (Foreign 
Ownership and Domestic Conglomerates) have the best profitability, as shown by the ROA ratio 
in Figure 6.39.  
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Figure 6.39: Return on asset by ownership 
 
Source: Appendix C 
 
Solvency ratio (Net Profit/Total Debt) 
 
Within the pro-cyclicality of the ratios, firms in the category of Foreign Ownership have 
the higher solvency ratio. The worst are the firms co-owned with the public sector. Besides the 
latter, the Private ones appear to have the lowest levels of solvency (Figure 6.40). 
 
-0.40 
-0.30 
-0.20 
-0.10 
-
0.10 
0.20 
0.30 
Domestic Conglomerates Foreign Ownership Mixed Ownesrhip
Private+ Domestic Ownership Semi - Public
224 
 
Figure 6.40: Solvency ratio by ownership 
 
Source: Appendix C 
 
Summary of findings 
There is a hierarchy between large firms, either owned by foreigners and multinationals 
or by large domestic conglomerates, and small firms. This is reflected in the performance with 
respect to investments and profits. Best profitability is attached to foreign ownership and large 
domestic conglomerates, followed by mixed ownership. The same can be said relatively to the 
exchange rate risk: for example, the privatised Service Sector, which holds large US dollar debt 
balances, is in the hands of foreigners which demonstrate a higher capacity to access credit in 
dollars, along with large domestic conglomerates. Finally, leverage is a domestic issue 
irrespectively of the size of the firm. The leverage ratio shows that both privately owned and 
large conglomerates have the higher levels, with the latter also indebted in dollar term. Domestic 
fragilities are reflected in the solvency and liquidity ratios which have a pro-cyclical nature.  
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6.4 The development of the structure and its fragility 
 
The aim of this section is to analyse the growth breakdown by sector reported by the 
INEI (2001) to verify and elaborate the final conclusions on the structure of the Peruvian 
economy, its changes over the last twenty years, its prospective developments and its fragility. 
Data on sectoral contributions to GDP published by the INEI (2011) are reported in the 
next table (Table 6.3): the impressive conclusion is that, despite the 1990s reform, privatisations, 
opening up of trade and financial accounts, and financial deepening, the structure of the economy 
in 2010 remains almost exactly the same as in 1991. There are only relatively small differences: 
the Mining Sector now contributes to six percent of GDP (it was 4.5 percent in 1991); the 
Manufacturing Sector has shrunk from 16 percent of GDP to 15 percent, and most of the loss has 
been in the Textile and Leather industry. The Construction Sector has gained about 2.5 percent in 
share of GDP in the whole period. 
The next table (Table 6.4) shows the real growth rate at constant prices by sector which 
provides an idea on the dynamic transformations, if any. This table compares the growth rates of 
different periods. It shows which sectors benefited more from the commodity boom period.  
In terms of overall growth rates, the commodity boom period (2003-2010) shows an 
average growth rate of 6.5 percent, despite the inclusion of the blip related to the sub-prime 
crisis; the growth rate during the rest of the period under investigation (1991-2003) was of about 
four percent.  
In terms of the sectoral breakdown, surprisingly, the growth rate of the Mining Sector 
during the commodity boom is almost half the growth rate of the previous period, 3.9 percent 
versus 7.5 percent. This shows that most of the profits of the sector are due to changes in the 
prices of commodity rather than due to an increase of production even though I found an increase 
in investment expenditure.  
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Unexpectedly, the overall Manufacturing Sector reported higher growth rates during the 
commodity boom relatively to the previous period, 6.6 percent versus 3.4 percent. There is a 
recover of the Textile and Leather Sectors and a creation of an oil refining sector with its 
chemical linkages due to discover of new oil sites. Both the non-metallic production industry 
flourished and the metallic one have reached growth rate of about 12 percent.  
The Service Sector has mixed results, the utilities shows the same growth rate in the two 
periods (about 5.5 percent), while all other services (i.e Construction 11 percent, Transportation 
eight percent and Financial Services 11 percent) show particularly high rate of growth 
confirming that the non-tradable sector has the higher growth rate during the boom. 
Lastly, data for the 2009 recession provides information about the external fragility: the 
sectors which appear more fragile are the Manufacturing Sector (drop of growth of about 16 
percent between 2008 and 2009) and consequently the Commerce (-13 percent), the Utility (-6.5 
percent) and Transportation (-9.5 percent) sectors. Along the Manufacturing sector, the most 
dramatic drop is shown in the Construction sector (-10.5 percent) which I found to be the most 
leveraged sector and potentially fragile. 
In conclusion, if the Manufacturing Sector will continue to grow at the recent rate, it 
might regain the one percent drop in the share of GDP. However, the structure of the economy is 
essentially unchanged. Nonetheless, the development of the Manufacturing sector remains 
problematic given its performance and the ratio analysis. At the same time, the expansion of the 
non-tradable sector is accompanied by an exposure in dollar. 
The question of why the composition of output has not changed in the recent history of 
the Peruvian economy triggers doubts on the feasibility of development in terms of structural 
change away from primary commodities towards a more diversified production structure. More 
specifically, in the 1990s, at the time of deregulation, privatisation and trade opening up, the 
economy was dependent upon fishing, mining and oil. Entrance of foreign capital was 
considerable also as a result of privatisation: in the 1990s, the government approved 373 
contracts with mining, energy and oil firms (Durand, 2002). Average tariffs were lowered from 
66 to 15 per cent which contributed to an increase in import and a decrease in manufacturing 
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output (Klarén, 2000; Abugattás, 1999). The late 1990s financial crises also led to a restructuring 
and concentration of the banking system like in the rest of Latin America (Wierzba and Golla. 
2005). A number of new associations emerged in the export (COMEX) and in the financial 
sectors and new associations of foreign capital emerged such as the American Chamber of 
Commerce, the Peruvian-Spanish Chamber of Commerce (Durand, 2002). The Fujimori 
administration often selected representatives of the associations of the export and financial 
sectors for positions as economic ministers (Durand, 2002, for extensive list of examples). The 
intensification of associations representing specific economic interests and the government 
continued during the 2000s (Schneider, 2009). In the meantime, labour market reforms and the 
decline of labour organisations lost importance (Vidal-Bermúdez et al., 2012). 
 
228 
 
Table 6.3: Real GDP share by sector (constant 1994 prices) (percentage) (1992-2010) 
Source: INEI   
Eco no micA ctivit ies 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
A GR IC U LTU R E 8.0% 7.3% 7.6% 7.6% 7.7% 7.9% 7.8% 7.9% 8.6% 8.9% 8.9% 9.0% 8.9% 8.4% 8.2% 8.3% 7.9% 7.7% 7.8% 7.5%
F ISHIN G 0.5% 0.7% 0.7% 0.7% 0.6% 0.5% 0.5% 0.4% 0.5% 0.6% 0.5% 0.5% 0.4% 0.6% 0.5% 0.5% 0.5% 0.5% 0.4% 0.3%
M IN IN G 4.4% 4.5% 4.7% 4.7% 4.5% 4.6% 4.7% 4.9% 5.5% 5.5% 6.0% 6.4% 6.5% 6.5% 6.6% 6.2% 5.8% 5.7% 5.7% 5.3%
  OIL AND GAS EXTRACTION 0.9% 0.9% 0.9% 0.8% 0.7% 0.7% 0.6% 0.6% 0.6% 0.5% 0.5% 0.5% 0.4% 0.4% 0.5% 0.5% 0.5% 0.5% 0.6% 0.7%
  M INERALS EXTRACTIONS 3.2% 3.3% 3.5% 3.8% 3.8% 3.9% 4.1% 4.3% 4.9% 5.0% 5.5% 5.9% 6.0% 6.0% 6.1% 5.7% 5.4% 5.2% 5.1% 4.6%
M A N U FA C TU R IN G 16.1% 15.7% 15.5% 16.0% 15.5% 15.4% 15.1% 14.7% 14.5% 14.9% 14.9% 15.0% 15.0% 15.3% 15.4% 15.4% 15.7% 15.6% 14.3% 15.0%
FOOD INDUSTRY 4.8% 4.9% 4.8% 4.9% 4.4% 4.4% 4.3% 4.1% 4.6% 4.7% 4.7% 4.7% 4.6% 4.6% 4.5% 4.6% 4.7% 4.6% 4.6% 4.4%
  M ILK PRODUCTS 0.3% 0.2% 0.2% 0.2% 0.2% 0.2% 0.2% 0.2% 0.3% 0.3% 0.3% 0.3% 0.3% 0.4% 0.4% 0.4% 0.4% 0.4% 0.4% 0.4%
  FRESH AND PROCESSED FISH 0.3% 0.2% 0.2% 0.2% 0.2% 0.2% 0.3% 0.2% 0.2% 0.2% 0.2% 0.2% 0.3% 0.3% 0.3% 0.4% 0.4% 0.4% 0.3% 0.2%
 FLOUR AND FISHING OIL 0.5% 0.6% 0.7% 0.9% 0.6% 0.6% 0.5% 0.3% 0.6% 0.7% 0.5% 0.5% 0.3% 0.5% 0.4% 0.3% 0.3% 0.3% 0.2% 0.2%
  M ILL AND BAKERY 1.2% 1.3% 1.3% 1.2% 1.0% 1.0% 1.0% 1.1% 1.2% 1.1% 1.2% 1.2% 1.1% 1.0% 1.0% 1.0% 0.9% 0.9% 0.9% 0.8%
  SUGAR PRODUCTION 0.2% 0.1% 0.1% 0.2% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.2% 0.2% 0.2% 0.2% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1%
  OTHER FOOD PRODUCTION 1.6% 1.7% 1.6% 1.6% 1.5% 1.5% 1.5% 1.6% 1.7% 1.7% 1.7% 1.7% 1.7% 1.7% 1.7% 1.7% 1.9% 1.9% 1.9% 2.0%
 DRINKS AND TOBACCO 0.8% 0.8% 0.7% 0.7% 0.7% 0.6% 0.6% 0.6% 0.7% 0.6% 0.7% 0.7% 0.7% 0.7% 0.7% 0.7% 0.7% 0.7% 0.7% 0.7%
TEXTILE AND LEATHER INDUSTRY 3.2% 3.0% 2.8% 2.8% 2.7% 2.6% 2.6% 2.4% 2.2% 2.3% 2.3% 2.3% 2.4% 2.5% 2.4% 2.1% 2.1% 1.8% 1.3% 1.7%
  TEXTILES INDUSTRY 1.3% 1.2% 1.1% 1.0% 1.0% 1.0% 1.0% 0.9% 1.0% 1.0% 1.0% 1.1% 1.1% 1.2% 1.2% 1.1% 1.1% 0.8% 0.6% 0.7%
  GARM ENT INDUSTRY 1.4% 1.4% 1.3% 1.4% 1.4% 1.3% 1.2% 1.1% 1.0% 1.1% 1.1% 1.1% 1.1% 1.1% 1.1% 1.0% 1.0% 0.9% 0.6% 0.9%
  LEATHER INDUSTRY 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
  SHOE INDUSTRY 0.3% 0.3% 0.3% 0.3% 0.3% 0.3% 0.2% 0.2% 0.2% 0.2% 0.2% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.1% 0.1%
WODDEN AND M ETAL FORNITURE INDUSTRY 0.5% 0.5% 0.6% 0.6% 0.6% 0.7% 0.6% 0.5% 0.4% 0.5% 0.4% 0.5% 0.5% 0.5% 0.5% 0.5% 0.5% 0.5% 0.4% 0.4%
PAPER INDUSTRY 0.8% 0.7% 0.7% 0.8% 0.8% 0.8% 0.7% 0.8% 0.8% 0.9% 0.9% 1.0% 1.0% 1.1% 1.2% 1.2% 1.2% 1.4% 1.3% 1.4%
  PAPER INDUSTRY 0.3% 0.2% 0.2% 0.3% 0.3% 0.3% 0.3% 0.3% 0.4% 0.5% 0.5% 0.5% 0.5% 0.6% 0.6% 0.6% 0.7% 0.8% 0.7% 0.8%
  PRINTING AND PUBLICATION 0.5% 0.5% 0.5% 0.5% 0.5% 0.5% 0.4% 0.4% 0.4% 0.4% 0.4% 0.5% 0.5% 0.5% 0.6% 0.6% 0.6% 0.6% 0.6% 0.6%
CHEM ICALS INDUSTRY 2.8% 2.7% 2.7% 2.7% 2.5% 2.5% 2.6% 2.5% 2.5% 2.5% 2.6% 2.6% 2.5% 2.6% 2.7% 2.7% 2.7% 2.6% 2.6% 2.7%
  BASIC CHEM ICAL INDUSTRY 0.6% 0.5% 0.5% 0.5% 0.4% 0.5% 0.5% 0.5% 0.5% 0.5% 0.5% 0.5% 0.5% 0.5% 0.6% 0.5% 0.6% 0.5% 0.4% 0.4%
  PHARM ACEUTICALS 0.6% 0.5% 0.4% 0.4% 0.3% 0.3% 0.3% 0.2% 0.2% 0.2% 0.2% 0.2% 0.2% 0.2% 0.2% 0.2% 0.2% 0.2% 0.2% 0.2%
  OTHER CHEM ICAL PRODUCTS 0.5% 0.6% 0.6% 0.6% 0.6% 0.7% 0.7% 0.6% 0.6% 0.7% 0.7% 0.7% 0.7% 0.8% 0.8% 0.8% 0.9% 0.9% 0.8% 0.9%
  OIL REFINERING 0.8% 0.9% 0.9% 0.8% 0.8% 0.7% 0.7% 0.7% 0.7% 0.7% 0.7% 0.7% 0.6% 0.6% 0.7% 0.6% 0.6% 0.6% 0.7% 0.8%
  RUBBER AND PLASTIC PRODUCTS 0.3% 0.3% 0.4% 0.4% 0.4% 0.4% 0.4% 0.4% 0.4% 0.4% 0.5% 0.5% 0.5% 0.5% 0.5% 0.5% 0.5% 0.4% 0.4% 0.5%
NON M ETALLIC PRODUCTION INDUSTRY 0.8% 0.8% 0.8% 1.0% 1.1% 1.2% 1.2% 1.3% 1.1% 1.0% 1.0% 1.1% 1.1% 1.2% 1.2% 1.3% 1.4% 1.5% 1.5% 1.7%
BASIC M ETALL INDUSTRY 1.1% 1.2% 1.2% 1.1% 1.1% 1.1% 1.2% 1.2% 1.2% 1.3% 1.3% 1.3% 1.4% 1.4% 1.4% 1.3% 1.2% 1.2% 0.9% 0.8%
  IRON AND STEEL INDUSTRY 0.3% 0.3% 0.3% 0.4% 0.4% 0.4% 0.4% 0.5% 0.4% 0.4% 0.4% 0.4% 0.4% 0.5% 0.5% 0.5% 0.5% 0.5% 0.4% 0.4%
  NON FERROUS M ETAL INDUSTRY 0.8% 0.9% 0.9% 0.8% 0.7% 0.7% 0.7% 0.8% 0.8% 0.8% 0.8% 0.9% 1.0% 0.9% 0.9% 0.8% 0.7% 0.7% 0.5% 0.4%
M ETALLIC PRODUCTION INDUSTRY 1.6% 1.4% 1.3% 1.5% 1.6% 1.5% 1.5% 1.5% 1.2% 1.2% 1.2% 1.1% 1.1% 1.1% 1.1% 1.2% 1.4% 1.6% 1.3% 1.6%
  VARIOUS M ETALLIC PRODUCTION 0.5% 0.4% 0.5% 0.6% 0.6% 0.6% 0.7% 0.7% 0.6% 0.6% 0.6% 0.6% 0.7% 0.6% 0.7% 0.7% 0.8% 0.9% 0.7% 0.9%
  NON ELECTRIC M ACHINERY 0.3% 0.2% 0.2% 0.3% 0.3% 0.3% 0.3% 0.2% 0.2% 0.2% 0.2% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1%
  ELECTRIC M ACHINARY 0.6% 0.4% 0.4% 0.3% 0.4% 0.4% 0.4% 0.3% 0.3% 0.3% 0.3% 0.2% 0.2% 0.2% 0.2% 0.2% 0.3% 0.3% 0.2% 0.2%
 TRANSPORTATION M ATERIALS 0.4% 0.3% 0.2% 0.3% 0.3% 0.2% 0.2% 0.2% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.2% 0.2% 0.3% 0.3% 0.4%
OTHER M ANUFACTURING PRODUCTIONS 0.5% 0.5% 0.5% 0.6% 0.6% 0.5% 0.5% 0.5% 0.5% 0.4% 0.4% 0.4% 0.4% 0.4% 0.4% 0.4% 0.5% 0.4% 0.4% 0.4%
ELEC TR IC ITY  A N D  W A TER 1.9% 1.8% 1.9% 1.9% 1.8% 1.8% 1.9% 2.0% 2.1% 2.1% 2.1% 2.1% 2.1% 2.1% 2.1% 2.1% 2.1% 2.0% 2.0% 2.0%
C ON STR U C TION 4.0% 4.1% 4.6% 5.6% 6.0% 5.7% 6.2% 6.3% 5.6% 5.0% 4.7% 4.8% 4.8% 4.8% 4.9% 5.2% 5.6% 5.9% 6.2% 6.7%
C OM M ER C E 14.5% 14.4% 14.2% 14.6% 14.9% 14.7% 14.8% 14.4% 14.2% 14.3% 14.4% 14.1% 13.9% 14.1% 14.0% 14.5% 14.6% 15.0% 14.8% 15.0%
TR A N SPOR T A N D  C OM M U N IC A T ION S 7.6% 7.9% 7.9% 7.5% 7.7% 8.0% 7.9% 7.8% 7.9% 7.9% 7.8% 7.7% 7.8% 7.9% 8.0% 8.1% 8.9% 8.9% 8.9% 8.7%
F IN A N C IA L SER V IC ES 1.9% 1.6% 1.6% 1.6% 2.3% 2.6% 2.8% 2.9% 2.5% 2.3% 2.1% 2.1% 2.1% 2.0% 2.2% 2.3% 2.4% 2.5% 2.9% 2.9%
IN SU R A N C E 0.2% 0.2% 0.2% 0.2% 0.2% 0.2% 0.2% 0.2% 0.3% 0.4% 0.3% 0.4% 0.5% 0.4% 0.4% 0.4% 0.4% 0.4% 0.4% 0.4%
HOU SIN G R EN TS 3.0% 3.0% 2.9% 2.6% 2.4% 2.4% 2.4% 2.4% 2.5% 2.6% 2.7% 2.7% 2.6% 2.6% 2.5% 2.4% 2.3% 2.1% 2.2% 2.0%
LOA N  SER V IC ES TO F IR M S 7.2% 7.5% 7.4% 7.1% 7.0% 7.0% 6.9% 6.9% 7.0% 6.9% 7.0% 6.9% 6.8% 6.9% 6.8% 6.8% 6.8% 6.9% 7.0% 6.9%
R ESTA U R A N T A N D  HOTELES 4.4% 4.1% 4.1% 4.2% 4.0% 4.0% 4.0% 4.0% 4.0% 4.0% 3.9% 3.9% 3.9% 3.9% 3.8% 3.7% 3.7% 3.8% 3.8% 3.8%
C OM M ER C IA L LOA N S TO HHOLD S 4.0% 4.2% 4.2% 4.1% 3.8% 3.7% 3.6% 3.5% 3.6% 3.5% 3.5% 3.4% 3.4% 3.4% 3.3% 3.2% 3.2% 3.1% 3.2% 3.3%
N ON - C OM M ER C IA L LOA N S TO HHOLD S 0.7% 0.7% 0.7% 0.6% 0.6% 0.6% 0.6% 0.6% 0.6% 0.6% 0.6% 0.6% 0.6% 0.6% 0.5% 0.5% 0.5% 0.5% 0.5% 0.5%
PR IV A TE HEA LTH 1.7% 1.7% 1.6% 1.5% 1.4% 1.4% 1.4% 1.4% 1.6% 1.6% 1.6% 1.6% 1.6% 1.6% 1.5% 1.5% 1.4% 1.3% 1.4% 1.4%
PR IV A TE ED U C A TION 3.7% 3.9% 3.8% 3.5% 3.3% 3.3% 3.1% 3.2% 3.2% 3.2% 3.3% 3.2% 3.2% 3.2% 3.0% 2.9% 2.8% 2.6% 2.7% 2.7%
GOV ER N A M EN T SER V IC ES 6.9% 7.1% 6.9% 6.3% 6.2% 6.3% 6.0% 6.1% 6.3% 6.2% 6.1% 6.1% 6.2% 6.2% 6.3% 6.3% 5.9% 5.6% 6.2% 5.9%
A GGR EGA TE V A LU E 90.7% 90.4% 90.5% 90.3% 89.9% 90.0% 89.9% 89.8% 90.3% 90.3% 90.4% 90.5% 90.4% 90.3% 90.1% 90.3% 90.5% 90.3% 90.5% 90.3%
IM POR T TA X A TION 1.2% 1.4% 1.4% 1.7% 2.1% 2.0% 2.1% 2.1% 1.9% 1.9% 1.9% 1.8% 1.9% 2.0% 2.1% 1.9% 1.7% 1.7% 1.4% 1.6%
TA X A TION  ON  GOOD S 8.0% 8.2% 8.1% 8.0% 8.1% 7.9% 8.0% 8.1% 7.8% 7.8% 7.7% 7.6% 7.7% 7.7% 7.7% 7.8% 7.8% 7.9% 8.1% 8.0%
TOTA L V A LU E 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
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Table 6.4: Real GDP growth by sector (constant 1994 prices) (percentage) (1992-2010) 
Source: INEI 
Eco no micA ctivit ies 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
T OT A L -0.4% 4.8% 12.8% 8.6% 2.5% 6.8% -0.7% 0.9% 3.1% 0.2% 5.0% 4.0% 5.0% 6.8% 7.7% 8.9% 9.8% 0.9% 8.8%
A GR IC U LTU R E -9.1% 9.0% 13.2% 9.5% 5.2% 5.4% 0.5% 10.1% 6.6% 0.6% 6.1% 3.0% -1.4% 5.4% 8.4% 3.2% 7.2% 2.3% 4.3%
F ISHIN G 27.1% 3.9% 21.1% -13.9% -4.9% -1.7% -13.4% 28.2% 10.4% -11.1% 6.1% -10.3% 30.7% 3.2% 2.4% 6.9% 6.3% -7.9% -16.4%
M IN IN G 0.9% 10.2% 12.0% 4.2% 5.2% 9.0% 3.7% 13.1% 2.5% 9.9% 12.0% 5.5% 5.3% 8.4% 1.4% 2.7% 7.6% 0.6% -0.1%
  OIL AND GAS EXTRACTION 1.3% 7.4% -0.6% -9.6% -3.9% -2.0% -0.3% -7.0% -6.4% -2.0% 0.7% -4.3% 7.1% 23.4% 5.8% 6.4% 10.3% 16.1% 29.5%
  M INERALS EXTRACTIONS 0.8% 10.9% 24.7% 7.2% 6.8% 10.8% 4.3% 15.9% 3.4% 11.1% 13.0% 6.3% 5.1% 7.3% 1.0% 2.4% 7.4% -0.9% -3.4%
M A N U FA C TU R IN G -3.3% 3.4% 16.7% 5.5% 1.5% 5.3% -3.5% -0.7% 5.8% 0.7% 5.7% 3.6% 7.4% 7.5% 7.5% 11.1% 9.1% -7.2% 13.6%
FOOD INDUSTRY 0.8% 3.0% 15.0% -2.7% 2.4% 3.4% -5.3% 14.0% 6.1% 0.5% 4.3% 1.2% 5.4% 5.8% 8.4% 11.3% 8.8% -0.4% 3.5%
  M ILK PRODUCTS -5.6% 0.5% 10.2% 7.1% 1.2% 1.6% 7.6% 10.4% 17.9% 5.9% 7.4% 8.0% 18.5% 7.5% 9.5% 8.2% 11.1% -3.0% 13.1%
  FRESH AND PROCESSED FISH -37.0% 6.5% 38.1% 16.7% 10.1% 22.6% -43.8% 3.3% 23.9% 21.0% -16.4% 42.6% 13.7% 2.7% 54.4% 10.8% 9.6% -12.1% -29.1%
 FLOUR AND FISHING OIL 8.7% 24.7% 41.7% -25.6% 8.5% -16.0% -49.2% 120.3% 22.9% -29.6% 7.0% -29.0% 56.0% -2.1% -24.5% 5.7% 1.0% -12.1% -29.1%
  M ILL AND BAKERY 3.8% 3.7% 3.9% -5.7% 3.1% 5.5% 5.9% 9.1% -2.9% 10.8% 0.2% -2.0% -4.3% 8.3% 2.9% 6.1% 1.0% 4.4% -1.0%
  SUGAR PRODUCTION -16.9% -10.6% 34.5% 6.1% -5.7% 10.8% -29.9% 35.7% 34.2% 4.1% 15.5% 14.6% -29.8% -11.7% 15.8% 12.8% 10.5% 7.2% -4.2%
  OTHER FOOD PRODUCTION 7.6% -2.4% 11.3% 3.8% 3.0% 4.1% 6.9% 5.1% 2.9% 1.5% 6.2% 3.9% 3.9% 7.5% 10.8% 17.4% 10.8% 0.3% 12.8%
 DRINKS AND TOBACCO -4.4% 0.3% 9.7% 5.2% -6.1% 9.7% 0.1% 2.9% 1.5% 1.7% 8.0% 2.9% 2.7% 7.5% 12.1% 7.1% 15.3% 2.8% 7.0%
TEXTILE AND LEATHER INDUSTRY -5.7% -1.2% 11.4% 6.8% -0.8% 4.5% -8.9% -6.3% 7.3% -1.1% 5.8% 7.4% 9.7% 2.3% -2.1% 6.8% -6.5% -24.6% 36.5%
  TEXTILES INDUSTRY -7.7% -4.0% 6.6% 4.2% 5.1% 10.0% -9.9% 3.4% 10.0% -3.6% 13.4% 6.9% 15.5% 4.7% -0.2% 5.0% -12.7% -24.3% 22.2%
  GARM ENT INDUSTRY -4.7% 0.1% 19.1% 6.7% -4.9% 3.6% -7.1% -11.3% 8.7% 1.5% 4.7% 10.5% 6.0% 1.8% -2.5% 8.4% -2.4% -29.9% 56.7%
  LEATHER INDUSTRY 8.2% -4.7% -4.0% 11.3% 0.0% -8.3% -21.2% -15.4% -13.4% 0.9% -28.5% 38.1% 5.1% -16.5% -5.1% 2.8% 0.6% 10.2% 8.1%
  SHOE INDUSTRY -7.3% 4.7% 1.1% 15.6% -1.3% -6.5% -9.0% -19.1% -8.8% -2.2% -24.8% -26.9% -16.4% -20.0% -39.9% 25.4% 67.2% 50.5% 0.9%
WODDEN AND M ETAL FORNITURE INDUSTRY -7.1% 26.5% 20.7% 11.6% 7.9% -2.5% -18.6% -13.3% 8.2% -3.7% 20.6% -3.7% 20.0% 0.2% 3.2% 5.3% 8.2% -11.5% 12.8%
PAPER INDUSTRY -11.8% -0.2% 22.1% 17.4% 0.3% -0.5% 3.1% 6.2% 17.7% -1.1% 11.7% 7.3% 15.0% 15.8% 8.6% 11.4% 23.3% -8.9% 17.9%
  PAPER INDUSTRY -43.6% 7.0% 68.6% 16.1% 2.7% 4.4% 6.5% 28.6% 25.0% -3.0% 6.8% -0.4% 23.3% 19.3% 11.6% 14.5% 30.9% -14.4% 20.6%
  PRINTING AND PUBLICATION 9.7% -2.6% 4.3% 18.3% -1.1% -3.5% 0.8% -9.9% 10.1% 1.1% 17.3% 15.1% 7.6% 12.2% 5.4% 7.8% 14.1% -1.2% 14.7%
CHEM ICALS INDUSTRY -2.0% 4.8% 11.5% 1.2% 3.4% 8.7% -3.1% -1.2% 4.6% 3.7% 4.4% 2.8% 6.1% 10.7% 8.5% 10.9% 5.7% -0.2% 12.2%
  BASIC CHEM ICAL INDUSTRY -14.9% 9.9% 5.3% 0.2% 15.4% 1.1% 8.1% -1.7% 7.6% -3.5% 4.8% 7.0% 8.0% 17.0% 3.3% 11.9% -2.1% -18.0% 14.0%
  PHARM ACEUTICALS -12.3% -12.4% 15.0% -15.2% -15.9% 24.3% -24.6% -5.7% -0.7% 2.8% 15.7% -1.7% -20.9% 10.1% 27.8% 12.8% 9.1% -1.2% -8.0%
  OTHER CHEM ICAL PRODUCTS 10.6% 10.7% 17.8% 9.8% 7.2% 18.5% -11.3% 0.0% 6.9% 5.6% 5.9% 4.8% 13.6% 4.5% 18.6% 15.0% 11.9% -5.4% 11.1%
  OIL REFINERING 3.7% 2.7% 6.8% 1.0% 0.6% 2.0% 1.8% -3.9% -0.2% 3.5% -1.3% -0.5% 8.6% 16.3% -1.7% 5.3% 3.5% 28.1% 14.3%
  RUBBER AND PLASTIC PRODUCTS 4.3% 19.8% 17.1% 7.4% 6.4% 3.3% 8.3% 4.8% 8.1% 9.5% 4.8% 2.3% 3.0% 6.5% 6.2% 9.5% 4.5% -6.5% 19.7%
NON M ETALLIC PRODUCTION INDUSTRY -2.4% 13.7% 28.9% 21.3% 11.8% 10.6% 4.8% -15.2% -0.1% -0.7% 11.9% 5.6% 11.0% 12.9% 13.0% 16.3% 20.4% -0.9% 20.7%
BASIC M ETALL INDUSTRY 3.5% 3.7% 9.9% 7.1% 5.4% 9.4% 4.8% 1.5% 4.2% 2.4% 10.4% 9.2% 3.9% 4.7% 6.1% -2.1% 6.5% -21.6% -1.4%
  IRON AND STEEL INDUSTRY 1.3% 10.7% 36.0% 21.1% 4.5% 18.7% 3.2% -7.9% 6.3% 0.7% 2.4% 4.0% 9.8% 19.1% 12.6% 8.3% 7.4% -20.8% 3.5%
  NON FERROUS M ETAL INDUSTRY 4.2% 1.5% 0.9% 0.7% 5.9% 4.2% 5.8% 7.2% 3.1% 3.4% 14.7% 11.7% 1.3% -2.2% 2.3% -8.7% 5.9% -22.2% -5.3%
M ETALLIC PRODUCTION INDUSTRY -16.7% 0.4% 28.0% 19.5% -7.7% 8.2% -3.0% -16.8% 7.2% 0.5% -5.1% 2.2% 3.1% 10.3% 18.9% 22.7% 22.0% -13.2% 31.0%
  VARIOUS M ETALLIC PRODUCTION -7.1% 29.0% 24.0% 22.9% 1.2% 10.0% -0.4% -7.0% 8.3% 0.9% 3.1% 10.0% -0.6% 11.9% 19.2% 17.2% 22.2% -13.9% 30.3%
  NON ELECTRIC M ACHINERY -10.6% -6.2% 37.7% 23.0% -9.4% 15.7% -10.5% -27.5% 4.8% 1.4% -15.7% -14.4% -21.6% 9.1% 11.5% 15.2% 6.3% -27.8% 4.0%
  ELECTRIC M ACHINARY -21.9% -11.0% 3.7% 31.9% -4.3% 1.7% -7.4% -15.1% 4.2% -0.1% -12.4% -10.7% 26.0% -2.6% 17.5% 24.1% 9.9% -25.8% 14.6%
 TRANSPORTATION M ATERIALS -25.2% -19.9% 71.3% -3.2% -31.3% 5.3% 7.4% -38.2% 12.9% -0.9% -13.7% 8.3% 9.5% 29.8% 24.4% 49.4% 43.3% 5.7% 49.5%
OTHER M ANUFACTURING PRODUCTIONS 11.0% 1.4% 43.9% 2.1% -9.3% -1.0% 7.2% -11.2% -6.4% 1.4% 1.2% -5.8% 5.2% 9.9% 5.8% 32.2% -0.3% -2.9% 0.0%
ELEC TR IC ITY  A N D  W A TER -5.5% 14.2% 10.9% 0.2% 5.9% 12.7% 6.2% 3.0% 3.2% 1.6% 5.5% 3.7% 4.5% 5.6% 6.9% 8.5% 7.8% 1.2% 7.7%
C ON STR U C TION 2.3% 17.9% 36.1% 17.4% -2.3% 14.9% 0.6% -10.5% -6.5% -6.5% 7.7% 4.5% 4.7% 8.4% 14.8% 16.6% 16.5% 6.1% 17.4%
C OM M ER C E -0.9% 2.9% 15.9% 11.1% 0.9% 7.8% -3.1% -1.0% 3.9% 0.9% 3.3% 2.4% 6.2% 6.2% 11.7% 9.7% 12.8% -0.3% 9.7%
TR A N SPOR T A N D  C OM M U N IC A T ION S 3.9% 4.4% 7.2% 11.5% 5.6% 5.6% -1.0% 2.1% 2.6% -0.4% 3.7% 4.9% 6.4% 8.5% 9.2% 18.9% 10.0% 0.4% 6.7%
F IN A N C IA L SER V IC ES -15.6% 4.3% 18.0% 50.8% 15.0% 17.1% 3.2% -14.9% -3.9% -9.2% 6.7% 3.6% 2.2% 12.6% 14.7% 14.9% 13.5% 15.4% 11.6%
IN SU R A N C E -3.1% 2.1% 1.6% -1.0% 9.3% 34.1% -21.6% 43.2% 48.8% -23.1% 41.3% 24.5% -3.0% 2.4% 6.8% 2.9% 8.0% 5.7% 6.2%
HOU SIN G R EN TS 1.0% -0.2% 1.1% 2.8% 2.6% 3.6% 2.1% 3.0% 9.5% 2.9% 3.7% 2.4% 2.9% 3.6% 2.7% 3.5% 3.3% 2.1% 2.8%
LOA N  SER V IC ES TO F IR M S 4.8% 3.6% 7.5% 6.5% 3.0% 5.7% -0.7% 2.0% 1.8% 1.1% 3.3% 3.7% 5.3% 6.1% 7.0% 9.9% 11.5% 1.4% 8.2%
R ESTA U R A N T A N D  HOTELES -6.8% 4.6% 13.6% 4.6% 3.0% 6.4% -1.1% 1.1% 1.7% -0.2% 3.1% 4.7% 4.5% 5.4% 5.3% 8.9% 11.1% 2.3% 7.0%
C OM M ER C IA L LOA N S TO HHOLD S 4.4% 3.7% 9.9% 1.4% 0.9% 3.5% -2.8% 2.2% 0.7% -1.3% 3.6% 3.9% 3.6% 3.5% 5.1% 8.5% 8.6% 4.6% 9.6%
N ON - C OM M ER C IA L LOA N S TO HHOLD S 3.2% -2.4% 3.7% 4.2% 1.9% 2.9% 1.2% 0.4% 2.9% -0.7% 3.1% 3.8% 3.4% 3.8% 2.8% 3.3% 8.9% 8.9% 9.7%
PR IV A TE HEA LTH -2.4% 1.3% 3.7% 1.0% 3.2% 6.1% 2.4% 14.7% 1.1% 1.9% 4.0% 3.8% 2.6% 2.3% 4.7% 2.6% 4.6% 4.5% 9.6%
PR IV A TE ED U C A TION 4.9% 1.0% 6.0% 2.5% 1.0% 1.4% 1.4% 2.5% 2.7% 2.5% 2.0% 4.2% 3.6% 3.0% 3.8% 4.1% 3.4% 3.8% 9.6%
GOV ER N A M EN T SER V IC ES 1.2% 3.0% 3.1% 6.7% 3.2% 2.3% 1.2% 3.5% 1.8% -1.1% 4.6% 6.4% 4.3% 8.4% 7.6% 3.1% 3.9% 10.5% 3.6%
A GGR EGA TE V A LU E -0.8% 4.8% 12.6% 8.1% 2.7% 6.7% -0.8% 1.5% 3.1% 0.3% 5.1% 3.9% 4.8% 6.7% 7.9% 9.1% 9.6% 1.1% 8.5%
IM POR T TA X A TION 14.2% 8.3% 35.6% 29.9% 0.1% 10.3% 0.9% -12.3% 3.3% 1.9% 2.7% 6.5% 13.3% 11.9% -2.6% -4.9% 13.6% -18.3% 26.4%
TA X A TION  ON  GOOD S 1.3% 3.4% 11.7% 9.5% 0.6% 8.0% 0.1% -2.4% 3.0% -1.1% 4.3% 4.9% 4.7% 7.6% 8.7% 9.2% 11.4% 2.2% 8.3%
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6.5 Conclusions 
This first empirical chapter identifies whether firms’ investments are correlated to 
fluctuations of RER. It appears that, during a period in which dollar debt is accumulated and 
the currency depreciates, there is a strong negative effect of the RER, which is explained in 
the literature by the so-called balance sheet effect. This seems to override the positive effects 
due to the increases in competitiveness.  
The same relation has been tested during a period of appreciation when the stock of 
dollar debt has been initially depleted and then re-accumulated. In this case, the influence of 
the RER declines as profits/sales have a more predominant role. However, the RER has still a 
negative effect on investment because of the so-called competitiveness effect. These results 
have two implications. Firstly, they emphasise the non-ergodicity of the economic process 
with respect to changes in the structure of the economy associated to different financing 
conditions. Secondly, adopting the Post-Keynesian view, the nexus investment-finance is 
considered of primary importance in the determination of the business cycle. More 
specifically, with respect to the object of this thesis, RER fluctuations are just a consequence 
of the business cycle. Thus, the pattern of the RER may have a feedback on investment, but 
this depends on the structure of the economy and on the development of the financing 
conditions. In general, it is observed that variables respond with a lag to dynamics of the 
RER and most of the changes are driven by a diffuse scarcity in the availability of financing, 
mainly due to external conditions, given the limited role of the State in terms of credit 
provision after the 1990s. 
Consequently, and as explained in the methodological chapter, the present chapter 
addresses the questions related to the underlying structure of the economy in more depth, in 
order to try to identify possible feedback mechanisms. In addition, this second step represents 
a logic necessity given that the idea behind the exchange rate as a developmental tool is to 
induce a structural change of the economy, shifting away from the commodity dependence. 
Accordingly, findings across the entire period show that the economy maintains its 
dependence on the Mining sector which was re-enforced by the commodity boom. The most 
interesting dynamics are in other sectors. The actual change in the structure started in 1993 
with the privatisation of the Utility and Telecommunication sectors which has brought FDI to 
boost investments and profitability of these sectors. All the other sectors remained linked to 
the business cycle fluctuations with the Construction sector particularly volatile and the 
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Manufacturing sector lagging behind in both investments and profits throughout. The 
privatised firms, owned by foreigners/multinationals and large domestic conglomerates were 
mostly involved in debt accumulation and leveraging during the second half of the 1990s. 
This includes dollar debt accumulation which, given the domestic currency depreciation of 
that period, implies negative balance sheet effect during a long recession. This picture does 
not change until the commodity boom, in which, again, the non-tradable sectors (i.e. Service 
and Construction sectors), after an initial period in which firms repaired their balance sheet, 
start to leverage in both domestic and foreign debt. Again, the firms which hold this debt are 
owned by foreigners or belong to domestic conglomerates. 
The overall conclusion of this chapter is that the management of the RER, through 
intervention of the central bank, does not create, per se, the diversification towards non-
traditional exports, namely, Manufacturing, Fishing and Agribusiness Sectors. However, for 
all these sectors investments lagged behind. On the contrary, it appears that, beyond the 
sector categorisation, the only category which benefits from the reduction of the exchange 
rate risk, is the one with access to external credit, namely large foreigners/multinationals and 
large domestic conglomerates. However, these have been more active in highly profitable 
sectors such as the Mining, which tends to attract FDI during the commodity boom, and the 
non-tradable sector, which has attracted FDI during the privatisation process.  
There are three main implications from this: first, smoothing the RER has an effect 
that is the opposite of what the theoretical approach would suggest. This is shown in the 
analysis of activities growth rate by sector illustrated in the last part. Second, FDI may have a 
short-term beneficial effect, but, by re-enforcing the commodity trap dynamic, they may be a 
source of instability. A third implication is in terms of political economy: the increasing 
economic and political power of the Peruvian conglomerates has been discussed in the third 
and fourth sections of this chapter. There is extensive evidence (fourth section) that specific 
firms have been influencing, even directly by assuming government roles, the economic 
policy formation in the last two decades. This can certainly represent a constraint for the 
adoption of economic policies that should lead to development in terms of structural change 
of the economy (as defined in Chapter 1). In this respect, the indication of what is the correct 
policy to pursue in order to achieve a specific target (development in this case) is not a 
sufficient condition for to success of the policy. In fact, its adoption and enforcement may be 
opposed by powerful interests which can organise to influence policy formation. 
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In conclusion, according to the mainstream literature, the RER determines the 
business cycle. On the contrary, this chapter shows that, even though the Central Bank of 
Peru intervenes in the forex market to smooth the exchange rate pattern, the RER has not had 
a significant impact on the business cycle. On the contrary, the RER reflects the 
developments of the business cycle which depends on other factors, endogenous and 
exogenous. A determinant factor is given by FDI and foreign capital flows.  
Consequently, investment expenditure and profits may be either in dollar 
(tradable/commodity production) or in soles (non-tradables). When the central bank 
intervenes during a period of inflows, it maintains the nuevos soles cheaper, i.e. undervalued. 
This favours the non-tradable sector rather than stimulating the export sector. Following this 
shift, the FDI may become destabilising. 
How do firms respond to business cycle? Firms may adjust production to the price 
system; however, they may not be able to recognise shifts in relative prices. This chapter 
showed that firms respond to RER by financial (debt) operations. 
As a result, to escape the commodity trap, interventions in the economy should be 
more direct to incentivise the diversification away from primary commodities. Direct credit 
intervention should be aimed to those tradable sectors which remain behind. Unfortunately, 
the institutional framework of the orthodox central banking practice does not allow for credit 
supply, as credit is not conceived as a public good, while exchange is controversially 
manipulated favouring the most exposed large conglomerates and foreign multinationals. 
This will be taken up in the concluding chapter. Next chapter will concentrate on alternative 
proposal of PEP and, more specifically on a simulation analysis. 
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Chapter 7 -A critique of PEP from the empirical point of view: would it work for Peru?  
 
7.1 Introduction 
Chapter 2 showed how Peg the Export Price (PEP) and real exchange rate (RER) 
target could be reduced to similar equations; empirically the previous chapter showed that the 
RER target does not pursue the policy objective of supporting the diversification of the 
economy.  
As a result, this chapter attempts to investigate the validity of PEP through a 
simulation analysis, keeping in mind that while RER is supposed to be developmental, PEP 
should be counter-cyclical (chapter 2). 
Frankel (2003, 2006) shows how the PEP target could be beneficial in comparison to 
any other currency peg for a number of CDDCs. I run similar simulations in order to test the 
effect of such proposal in Peru between 1993 and 2009. In this chapter it is applied the Peg 
Export Price (PEP) solution to Peru. It shows in practice that this proposition is not feasible. 
The chapter is organised as follows: apart from this introduction, the second section 
shows Peru as a CDDC, the third section discusses the various models specifications and the 
fourth section runs the simulations. The fifth section draws additional considerations and the 
sixth section summarises the main findings of the chapter. 
 
7.2 Peru as a CDDC 
Peru is probably one of the most diversified primary commodity producer economy as 
shown in Table 7.1. 
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Table 7.1: Percentage exports on total exports by sector on a yearly basis (1992-2008) 
 
Source: author’s calculation on ITC data (UNCTAD/WTO 2011) 
 
The increase in the percentage of commodity exports relatively to total export in the 
period under consideration depends mostly on the increase in commodity prices discussed in 
chapter 1. However the economy also changed its degree of trade openness, defined in terms 
of the sum of imports and exports as a ratio to GDP, from 28.3 in 1990 to 33.9 in 2000, to 
43.6 in 2005 (IMF, 2011). The price behaviour, including the latest boom, of the three main 
mineral exports across the entire period is reported in Figure 7.1. Also, Peru exports 
hydrocarbons, but it is a net oil importer. Furthermore, prices of the main non-mineral 
commodities exported, coffee and fish, are shown in Figure 7.2. 
 
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Copper 23.8% 20.9% 19.6% 23.0% 18.8% 17.1% 14.7% 14.0% 14.7% 15.0% 16.8% 15.3% 20.7% 20.7% 27.1% 27.3% 25.9%
Gold 6.5% 6.5% 8.1% 9.0% 10.8% 9.8% 17.0% 20.1% 17.2% 17.9% 20.2% 23.5% 19.7% 18.3% 17.3% 15.4% 18.1%
Zinc 8.9% 8.2% 7.7% 7.0% 7.6% 7.5% 7.4% 7.3% 6.6% 5.9% 4.9% 5.1% 5.4% 5.3% 9.4% 10.1% 5.3%
Molybdenum 4.4% 3.6% 3.8% 3.8% 3.6% 3.6% 3.4% 3.2% 2.8% 2.7% 2.6% 2.8% 3.3% 6.7% 3.6% 3.5% 3.5%
Lead 3.5% 2.9% 3.0% 3.0% 3.2% 2.9% 3.0% 2.8% 2.4% 2.3% 2.2% 2.1% 2.6% 2.6% 2.6% 3.4% 3.4%
Silver 2.2% 2.2% 2.3% 2.0% 2.1% 1.8% 3.5% 3.0% 2.6% 2.3% 2.3% 2.2% 2.1% 1.6% 2.0% 2.0% 2.0%
Iron 1.7% 2.4% 2.5% 1.8% 1.4% 1.2% 1.7% 1.1% 1.0% 1.1% 1.1% 1.1% 1.0% 1.3% 1.1% 1.0% 1.2%
Tin 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.4% 0.8% 0.6% 0.3% 1.7% 0.1% 0.2% 0.2% 1.9% 1.2% 1.1% 1.3% 1.1%
Total Minerals 51.0% 46.7% 46.8% 49.8% 47.9% 44.7% 51.4% 51.8% 49.0% 47.3% 50.2% 52.3% 56.7% 57.7% 64.2% 64.0% 60.6%
Oil (Net Importer) 6.0% 6.0% 4.0% 4.9% 6.6% 5.9% 4.4% 4.2% 5.9% 6.1% 6.3% 7.6% 5.6% 9.3% 8.0% 8.7% 9.1%
Coffee 2.2% 1.8% 4.7% 5.3% 3.8% 5.9% 5.1% 4.5% 3.3% 2.6% 2.5% 2.1% 2.3% 1.8% 2.2% 1.5% 2.1%
Fish 2.6% 3.5% 3.8% 3.8% 3.5% 3.9% 3.9% 3.1% 2.6% 3.0% 2.3% 2.4% 2.2% 1.9% 1.8% 1.8% 2.0%
TOTAL 61.8% 58.0% 59.4% 63.8% 61.8% 60.5% 64.8% 63.6% 60.7% 59.0% 61.4% 64.3% 66.9% 70.7% 76.2% 75.9% 73.7%
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Figure 7.1: Prices of the three main mineral exports (1993-2010) 
 
Source: IMF (2011) 
 
Figure 7.2: Prices of Coffee Arabica and Fishmeal (1993-2010) 
 
Source: IMF (2011) 
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7.3 Simulation model specification  
7.3.1 Defining Peg Export Price (PEP) and Peg Export Price Index (PEPI) 
Following Frankel (2003; 2006), I will consider different specifications of the PEP in 
order to show various effects on the export revenues, exchange rate and domestic price 
inflation. 
Firstly, I will consider a simple case of pegging to the copper price only given that 
copper is the main commodity exported by Peru. This specification is defined as PEP 
(Copper) in the next sections. Copper can also be considered as the best proxy for all metal 
exports given the co-movement of metal prices. 
Secondly, I will consider a more complicated specification which refers to the PEPI 
target. The exchange rate is pegged to a basket of commodities which represent the main 
source of revenues for Peru. The basket is formed by the mining sector using the proportion 
of the revenue of each metal relative to total revenues as weights. This specification is 
defined as PEPI (Metal basket) in the next sections. 
Thirdly, I will consider a different specification of the PEPI in which all main 
commodity exports are considered: I will include the two small sectors of Coffee and Fish 
(Table 7.1). This is run to test a number of factors: firstly, the effects of the inclusion of other 
(non-metal) primary commodity sectors on the exchange rate and revenues. If a commodity is 
included in the pegged basket, producers of this commodity will have more stable revenues 
since the exchange rate is influenced by the price of commodities exported; secondly, to test 
whether a broader export diversification would guarantee higher stability of export revenues. 
Therefore, I use the basket calculated for the second simulation above (PEPI Metal basket), 
the Coffee and the Fishmeal sectors with the same weights, a third each. I increase the 
weights of the Fishmeal and Coffee (and correspondingly reduce the metal sector) to use 
PEPI as a developmental tool for these two non-traditional sectors. This specification is 
called PEPI All in the next sections. 
Frankel (2003; 2006) compares the two pegs PEP and PEPI to other currency pegs 
such as the US dollar, the Japanese Yen and the Euro. However, in the following simulations, 
I will compare the alternative specifications only to the current (floating) Peruvian exchange 
rate. This choice is dictated by the fact that Peru has abandoned the peg to the US dollar a 
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long time ago and that floating exchange rates are predominant in developing countries 
today. These simulations are run to check whether PEP target could be a feasible alternative 
to the current inflation target paradigm. 
 
7.3.2 Nominal versus real prices 
Once the exchange rate targets are specified, the issue of which prices to use arises: I 
follow Frankel (2003; 2006) and use nominal and real prices. For the nominal proposal, I 
calculate the effects on the exchange rate since 1993 for the three different specifications 
(PEP Copper, PEPI Metal Basket and PEPI All). There will be three new exchange rates 
derived by the monthly changes of the price of the commodities considered in each 
specification.  
I also calculate export revenues following Frankel, even though his assumptions on 
output exports and price elasticities have to be reviewed and criticised: his main assumption 
is that a one percent devaluation of the exchange rate generates a one percent increase in 
export in the same year. This is the result of three preliminary conditions. Firstly, the shares 
of the various commodity exports to GDP remain unchanged during the period: clearly, this 
is a static approach to the economy, it does not fit with small open economies which may be 
very dynamic given the linkages with and dependence on commodity prices, and does not 
assume any structural change. For example, this may be reflected in an underestimation of 
recalculated revenues if one assumes that GDP tends to growth during a commodity boom. 
Secondly, in Frankel (2003; 2006), prices are set in the international market and CDDCs are 
assumed to be price takers. In reality, depending on their market share, CDDCs may well be 
price makers.
52
 The price of non-tradable goods is set in the international markets and it is not 
influenced by domestic factors; the price of tradable goods is determined in terms of foreign 
prices. Thirdly, prices are expressed in US dollars, so price fluctuations do not necessary 
reflect real fluctuations. Finally, the local elasticity of supply is one, which is a condition that 
could be accepted only if absorptive capacity constraints disappear within a short time lag. 
In spite of the above limitations, I rely on Frankel‘s assumptions since the commodity 
boom was so extraordinary that it would strongly bias an estimation of the export elasticity 
                                                 
52
 For example, the main export of Peru is copper and Peru is the second exporter of copper in the world. 
However, it only exports about a fourth of Chile which is considered the main price maker of the copper market. 
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with respect to the exchange rate: since Peruvian new soles is a commodity currency, the 
boom makes the exchange rate more sensitive to the export revenues and not vice versa. In 
any case, this assumption becomes more relevant in the third simulation when I include the 
two small sectors of fishing and coffee. 
 
7.3.3 Calculation of exchange rate and export revenues 
Assuming that the starting date for the new peg regime is the 1st of January 1993, I 
construct the three series where the monthly change in the nominal commodity prices would 
be the same as the changes in the nominal exchange rate. 
In order to simulate the performance of the export revenues, I initially calculate the 
export revenues net of exchange rate changes: if the exchange rate depreciates monthly by 
one percent, I strip the extra benefit of the devaluation out from exports by taking off one 
percent from the monthly export revenues. In order to calculate the effects of the three 
different specifications (PEP Copper, PEPI Metal Basket and PEPI All) on the export 
revenue, I use the same process to add back to the clean series the monthly changes of the 
three new exchange rate pegs previously calculated. 
Frankel (2003, 2006) also analyses the effects the PEP proposal on GDP and on the 
debt to export ratio. However, since the assumption of constant GDP is considered too strong 
for a small open economy and since Peru is a highly dollarised economy, this will not be 
pursued in this study. 
Instead, I add the impact of the three specifications to domestic prices which Frankel 
does not engage with. Different exchange rate patterns could significantly affect domestic 
prices through the pass-through effect, becoming an issue for the IT of the central bank. In 
order to calculate the effect of the simulated exchange rates on domestic prices, I take the 
pass-through calculated by other researchers (Table 7.2): they all prove that Peru has a 
relatively low pass-through given that it mainly imports industrial inputs and machineries 
rather that food and consumer goods. 
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Table 7.2: Summary of pass-through studies for Peru 
 
Source: author’s review 
 
I will therefore use Miller’s (2003) pass through of 0.15 assuming a linear average life 
of 6 months.
53
 The process adopted for this simulation is similar to the previous ones. I will 
only consider nominal prices as inflation is calculated in nominal terms. Similarly to the 
calculation of the export revenues, initially, a nominal inflation series is created by stripping 
off the effects of the monthly nominal exchange rate variations from the official nominal 
inflation. From the clean series, I then add back the effect of the new nominal exchange rate 
patterns for the three specifications. 
Following Frankel, I also consider the case of pegging to the real price of 
commodities. To this end, I follow the same process described so far; the only difference is 
that the starting point becomes the real commodity prices calculated in terms of nominal 
prices discounted by domestic inflation. I will then calculate the effects of this price changes 
for the three specifications on exchange rates and revenues. In terms of the effects on 
inflation, other considerations will be included as it would be misleading to consider the 
effects of real pegs on inflation given that inflation is used to calculate the real commodity 
price.  
 
                                                 
53
 The main inflation forecasting model of the central bank uses an accumulation response of 0.15 percentage 
point within a year. 
Pass-Through Average Life Period
Gonzales (2000) 0.22 12 Months 1992-2000
Hausmann et al. (2000) 0.49 5 Months 1990-2000
Armas et al (2001) 0.12 1991-2000
Clinton Perrault (2001) 0.22 1990-2000
Mihaljek Klan (2001) 0.22 1990-2000
Morón Winkelried (2002) 0.1 30 Months 1992-2001
Miller (2003) 0.15 6 Months 1994-2002
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7.4 Simulations 
7.4.1 Peg to Nominal Commodity Prices 
Initially, I calculate the new exchange rate series for the three specifications: Figure 
7.3 shows that the increase of commodity prices in 1994-95 would have caused the exchange 
rate to appreciate with a subsequent depreciation until the end of the 1990s; while, in actual 
fact, the effective nominal exchange rate has depreciated constantly until the new 
millennium. 
 
Figure 7.3: Comparison of the nominal exchange rate with the three exchange rate proposals (1993-2009) 
 
Source: IMF (2011) and author’s calculations 
 
Figure 7.3 shows that with the 2003-2008 boom the exchange rate should have 
appreciated proportionally to levels below 0.5 nuevos soles/US dollar. 
Finally, from the figure above it is clear that the three specifications offer 
similar results: the exchange rate pegged only to the copper price (PEP Copper) would 
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be more volatile than a peg to the metal basket (PEP Metal basket). The main 
difference with the third simulation (PEPI All) is of a stronger appreciation at the 
beginning of the series, given the increase in coffee and fish prices in the early 1990s. 
Broader diversification translates in lower volatility of the exchange rate. 
 
Figure 7.4: Comparison of the cumulative export revenues with the three exchange rate proposals 
(Millions US$) (1993-2001) 
 
Source: IMF (2011) and author’s calculations 
 
Figure 7.4 compares the export revenues under the three simulations: it is evident that 
given the relatively low volatility of commodity prices in the 1990s, revenues are more stable 
and closer to the export revenues calculated net of the currency effect. They are just lower 
when commodity prices increase (given that the exchange rate would appreciate) and they are 
higher when commodity prices decrease in late 1990s. The PEPI All specification shows the 
largest effect given the increase of the prices of the two commodities, fish and coffee as 
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highlighted above, relatively to the metal ones in the early 1990s. The exchange rate of the 
PEPI All is the one that appreciates the most (Figure 7.5). 
 
Figure 7.5: Comparison of the cumulative export revenues with the three exchange rate proposals 
(Millions US$) (2002-2009) 
 
Source: IMF (2011) and author’s calculations 
 
Figure 2.5 shows how the boom of commodity prices had a stronger effect on 
revenues. The higher increase of the copper price relative to the other commodities has the 
effect of a stronger reduction in revenues (see PEP Copper). The more diversified 
specification (PEPI All) has less effect since at the boom has been much stronger in metals in 
general, and in copper in particular. 
 
-
10,000 
20,000 
30,000 
40,000 
50,000 
60,000 
70,000 
80,000 
90,000 
100,000 
110,000 
120,000 
130,000 
140,000 
150,000 
160,000 
Exports without Currency Effect
Export with PEP (Copper)
Export with PEPI (basket)
Export with PEPI All
243 
 
7.4.2 PEP to Real Prices 
If one considers the real commodity prices, instead of nominal prices, it is evident, 
from the Figure 7.6, that the pegged exchange rate would have been closer to the nominal 
exchange rate until the beginning of the commodity boom. This shows that, in an economy in 
which commodity exports are dominant and with other foreign flows irrelevant (i.e. capital 
flows), the exchange rate has been traded around fair values until the structural break 
modified its equilibrium level because of the rapid increase of commodity prices, the excess 
of world liquidity just before the sub-prime crisis. 
 
Figure 7.6 Three exchange rate proposals under peg to real commodity prices versus nominal exchange 
rate (1993-2009) 
 
Source: IMF (2011) and author’s calculations 
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The effects on export revenues lead to considerations similar to the nominal case for 
both periods. 
 
Figure 7.7: Comparison of the cumulative export revenues with the three exchange rate proposals 
(Millions US$) (1993-2001) 
 
Source: IMF (2011) and author’s calculations 
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Figure 7.8: Comparison of the cumulative export revenues with the three exchange rate proposals 
(Millions US$) (2002-2009) 
 
Source: IMF (2011) and author’s calculations 
 
7.5 Additional considerations 
From the above discussion, it is clear that there is a sudden bifurcation between the 
nominal exchange rate and the exchange rates under the real peg during the commodity 
boom. Since commodity revenues are the main source of foreign exchange, one wonders why 
the actual nominal exchange rate did not follow the appreciation during the commodity 
boom. Two reasons may explain this puzzle (neither of which are considered in Frankel’s 
framework): firstly, by looking at the balance-of-payments, the more commodity exports 
increase during the boom, the more profits are repatriated abroad given that most of the 
mining sector is owned by foreign capital (Table 7.3). 
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Table 7.3 Balance of payments analysis (Millions of US$) (2001-08) 
 
Source: Author’s calculation on IMF (2011) and BCRP (2011) where specified 
 
Second, a quite significant intervention in the foreign market to avoid appreciation 
happened in reflection to the financial account movements when in 2007 both portfolio and 
direct investment have been as strong as the trade balance. The central bank also intervened 
in the opposite way in 2008 when, given the burst of the crisis, there was a sudden freeze of 
portfolio investments and a significant drop of commodity prices. This is also neglected in 
Frankel’s proposal which tends to dismiss the financial account (Frankel 2003; 2006). 
Finally, and most importantly, Frankel does not consider the impact of his proposal on 
inflation which  is crucial given the priority of price stability of central banks (Frankel 2003; 
2006). 
Figure 7.9 shows the yearly changes in inflation since the Central Bank of Peru 
managed to control inflation at the beginning of 1990s. The clean CPI, the CPI without the 
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
GOODS EXPORTS (F.O.B.) 7025.7 7713.9 9090.7 12809.2 17367.7 23800.0 27955.6 31529.4
GOODS IMPORTS( F.O.B ) -7204.5 -7392.8 -8204.9 -9804.8 -12081.6 -14866.0 -19599.2 -28438.9
TRADE BALANCE -178.7 321.1 885.9 3004.4 5286.1 8934.0 8356.4 3090.5
SERVICES: CREDIT 1437.3 1455.0 1715.6 1993.3 2289.2 2647.1 3342.6 3636.5
SERVICES: DEBIT -2400.1 -2448.8 -2615.5 -2725.1 -3123.5 -3428.5 -4270.4 -5565.8
BALANCE AFTER GOODS AND SERVICES -1141.5 -672.7 -14.1 2272.6 4451.8 8152.6 7428.7 1161.1
INCOME: CREDIT 670.4 370.2 322.0 331.6 624.9 1033.5 1567.0 1813.7
INCOME: DEBIT -1771.4 -1827.3 -2465.8 -4017.5 -5701.1 -8616.0 -9985.1 -9957.7
       Private Sector (BCRP) 675.0 805.0 1367.0 2844.0 4420.0 7276.0 8535.0 8705.0
             Profit 131.0 479.0 1112.0 2567.0 4030.0 6741.0 7788.0 7687.0
             Interest Obligations 544.0 326.0 255.0 277.0 390.0 535.0 747.0 1018.0
       Public Sector (BCRP) 1096.0 1022.0 1099.0 1173.0 1282.0 1345.0 1406.0 1253.0
BALANCE AFTER GOODS, SERV. & INC. -2242.5 -2129.7 -2157.9 -1413.3 -624.3 570.1 -989.5 -6982.9
NET DIR. INVEST. IN REP. ECON. 1069.9 2155.8 1275.0 1599.0 2578.7 3466.5 5342.6 4079.2
PORTFOLIO INVESTMENT ASSETS -317.9 -316.0 -1286.9 -424.8 -817.0 -1991.9 -519.5 956.6
PORTFOLIO INVESTMENT LIAB. -54.0 1724.3 1210.5 1244.4 2578.7 155.3 3954.5 -1.0
OTHER INVESTMENT ASSETS 664.5 0.2 127.5 13.7 -1083.8 7.7 -29.6 1665.3
OTHER INVESTMENT LIAB. 171.5 -1581.4 -505.9 -146.4 -3232.9 -541.5 546.0 1015.6
FINANCIAL ACCOUNT 1533.9 1982.8 820.2 2285.9 23.8 1096.1 9294.0 7715.6
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effects of exchange rate fluctuation, results are almost identical to the official CPI given the 
relative low volatility of the nuevos soles and modest pass-through. On the contrary, 
Frankel’s proposal has a significant impact: for example, the appreciation induced by the 
latest commodity boom would have dragged the economy into significant deflation if one 
considers either the PEP (Copper) or PEPI (Metal Basket) nominal specifications. To avoid 
confusion, the third specification is not shown given that it would be very similar to the other 
two. 
 
Figure 7.9: Consumer price inflation for different exchange rate simulations, yearly changes (1993-2010) 
 
Source: IMF (2011) and author’s calculations 
 
It is clear that, given the more volatile exchange rate under a peg proposal, inflation 
would partially reflect such volatility offsetting central bank efforts towards price 
stabilisation. 
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In the table below (Table 7.4), the volatility of the nominal exchange rates and the 
three alternative proposals in their nominal version are reported. The volatility of PEP and 
PEPI is much higher if one considers the second period (Jan 2000 – July 2009) post-
depreciation of the 1990s in which macro stability has been achieved and the new inflation 
targeting monetary framework adopted. This result is similar to Setser’s (2007) who applied 
PEP to oil for Saudi Arabia. 
 
Table 7.4 Volatility of nominal exchange rates (standard deviations) 
 
Source: author’s calculations 
 
7.7 Conclusions 
The RER solution was preferred to Frankel’ proposal (2003; 2006) because of its 
developmental characteristics, as discussed in chapter 2 of the thesis. However, chapter 6 
empirically showed that a managed RER exchange rate proposition is unsuccessful. 
Consequently, this chapter empirically investigates the second proposal,  Frankel’ PEP 
(2003), through a simulation analysis for Peru. 
However, this chapter confirmed empirically the limitations anticipated at a 
theoretical level in chapter 2: in particular, besides the advantages of stabilising commodity 
revenues, negative repercussions on the other sectors are a major concern. From a 
macroeconomic perspective, inflation may become unstable while capital flows may be 
disruptive since they are not accounted for in the model. 
 
  
Nominal Rate PEP Copper PEPI Metal Basket PEPI All
Dec 92 - July 09 0.515 0.576 0.486 0.386
Jan 00 - July 09 0.206 0.599 0.516 0.347
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Chapter 8 –Conclusions 
 
8.1 Introduction 
This dissertation has presented a detailed study of the problems faced by a commodity 
dependent developing country (CDDC) with a specific analysis of Peru. It focused 
particularly on the inability of mainstream theoretical and policy paradigms to tackle the 
specific issues of CDDCs and to interpret the effects of recent changes in the international 
financial markets on the monetary policy autonomy of these countries.  
Furthermore, various exchange rate policy proposals have been assessed in terms of 
their effects on the real economy, which have been investigated by various quantitative and 
qualitative methods of analysis. The results have been frustrating since it seems that the 
exchange rate, alone, is not able to deliver what it promises. 
This chapter consists of four sections. Apart from this introduction, the second section 
summarises the dissertation chapter by chapter and concludes by re-assessing the research 
questions and hypotheses sketched in the introduction. The third section concentrates on both 
theoretical and policy implications of this research and, finally, the last section concludes 
with future avenues for research. 
 
8.2 Research summary 
This dissertation was divided in eight chapters. After an overview of the subject 
matter, a concise summary of the motivation, main contribution, research questions and 
structure of the thesis presented in the introductory chapter, chapter 2 presented a critical 
review of the literature concerning the specific monetary issues faced by CDDCs. After a 
brief historical overview of the literature on the stabilisation of the commodity prices, the 
chapter reviewed the two most recent monetary policy paradigms, namely the monetarist one 
and the New Keynesian one. Following the Post-Keynesian critique, these mainstream 
models, even if adapted to account for dollarisation, a problem typically faced by a Latin-
American CDDC, are shown to be inadequate to tackle the issues of a small open economy. 
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Finally, the chapter gave an original representation of two alternative policy paradigms, RER 
and PEP, in equation form in order to show their similarities.  
Stemming from the critical review of the literature presented in the previous chapter, 
chapter 3 outlined an alternative analytical framework for the analysis of the business cycle 
of a CDDC and the transmission mechanism of monetary policy. More specifically, the 
chapter addressed two issues that are left unresolved by mainstream theory. Firstly, a new 
theoretical framework is needed to explain the price fluctuations associated to the latest 
commodity boom. The Minskyan framework of the evolution of capitalism in different forms 
was adopted. Secondly, a Post-Keynesian approach was used to analyse dollarisation: two 
forms of liquidity were defined to describe the monetary policy in a partially dollarised 
economy. Finally, the chapter outlined the channels by which the real exchange rate can 
affect the economy. In particular, three channels are identified. Adapting Minsky’s Financial 
Instability Hypothesis to CDDCs, the chapter provided an analytical framework to focus on 
the finance channel determined by the effects of exchange rate fluctuations on firms’ balance 
sheets. 
Before moving to the empirical chapters of the thesis (chapters 5-7), chapter 4 
described the methods of investigations. The flow of funds analysis used in chapter 5 was 
described as a system of national accounts designed to bring the financial activities of an 
economy into explicit relationship with one another and into direct relation to the non-
financial activities that generate production and income. The chapter also described the 
mixed-method approach used in chapter 6 to identify the effect of the Peruvian exchange rate 
policy on non-financial firms. Finally, a discussion about the data used in the thesis closed 
the chapter. 
Chapter 5 is the first of the three empirical chapters of the thesis. It contextualised the 
Peruvian monetary policy in historical terms, with a particular focus on the issues of 
dollarisation and inflation stabilisation. The chapter showed how the Central Bank of Peru 
followed the consensus on monetary policy shifting from the monetarist to the New 
Keynesian framework. Given the dramatic changes that the Peruvian economy experienced 
throughout the period (i.e. hyperinflation, opening of trading and capital accounts, currency 
flights), the flow of funds analysis validated the theoretical conjectures derived in chapter 3 
and the Peruvian monetary policy was explained applying the two forms of liquidity defined 
in the theoretical chapter. 
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Chapter 6 presented the empirical finding related to the effects of the Peruvian 
exchange rate policy for non-financial firms listed at the stock exchange in Lima. The chapter 
combined two types of analyses. First, it identified the effects of both depreciations and 
appreciations of the Peruvian currency on firms’ investments. Second, it presented a 
qualitative analysis derived by a database I created by investigating the firms’ capital 
structure according to three types of categorisation of the data set: analysis of different 
activities by sectors, analysis of the tradables and non-tradables sectors, and analysis of 
different types of ownerships (conglomerates, multinationals, smaller private, mixed state-
private). Given the policy changes Peru experienced during the period under consideration, 
the last section analysed the structural development of the Peruvian economy and found that 
this had not changed. 
Chapter 7 closed the circle in terms of alternative exchange rate solutions for CDDCs 
by simulating, for Peru, two different proposals. Both Peg the Export Price (PEP) and the Peg 
the Export Price Index (PEPI) were analysed in both nominal and real terms. The 
disappointing results, as anticipated in the literature review, led to the re-assessment of the 
exchange rate as an actual developmental tool for commodity dependent countries. 
Finally, the present chapter summarises the thesis and outlines theoretical and policy 
implications in the next section, and avenues for future research in the final section.  
In terms of research questions, the thesis has shown that neither the monetarist nor the 
New Keynesian theoretical and policy paradigms were able to address the issues of the 
CDDCs. This is because they were theoretically very similar both in general terms and in 
terms of the adaptation to the issues of a CDDC. Also, there was no actual shift in terms of 
policy and FX interventions by the central bank.  
Additionally, the thesis found that the alternatives to inflation targeting are, at best 
insufficient to tackle the problems of a country like Peru. This inadequacy has been found in 
theoretical terms (with respect to RER and PEP) and empirically with a simulation analysis 
of the PEP. 
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8.3 Theoretical and policy implications 
This section shows how this dissertation has provided a theoretical critique of 
mainstream, both monetarist and New Keynesian, analytical apparatus to deal with the 
problems of a primary commodity developing country specifically on dollarisation and on the 
ability to address the complex international insertion of a small CDDC.  
In terms of policy implications, the dissertation has provided a similar critique, since 
the central bank has not been using the potential of the exchange rate as a developmental 
policy instrument. To be more specific about the process of development and the particular 
policies which should foster it, it is necessary to consider that industrial policy does not exist 
in abstract and should not be generally defined; it should be drawn from the specific 
economic conditions of the reality under consideration the analysis of which is beyond the 
scope of this thesis. 
The above considerations with respect to commodity dependent developing countries 
and Peru have to be contextualised within the recent developments of the financialisation of 
both primary commodity developing countries and internationalisation of currencies. These 
phenomena have fundamental implications for monetary policy autonomy and 
macromanagement. 
As outlined above, the diversity of the Peruvian monetary policy experience during 
the last two decades brings the question of the macromanagement to the forefront of the 
debate. After the international financial turmoil at the end of the 1990s and the beginning of 
the 2000s, countries with open capital accounts were recommended to adopt inflation 
targeting. This allegedly new policy framework prescribes a floating exchange rate regime 
since, it was argued, it would provide a nominal anchor against inflation. However, it would 
also provide these countries with enough flexibility to adjust to adverse shocks and avoid 
current account deficits, often experienced during the previous decade of fixed exchange rate 
regimes (for example in Argentina or Brazil amongst others), and could be used as a 
monetary policy tool domestically (to this end, for example, Obstfeld and Rogoff, 1995; 
Frankel, 1999; 2003).  
However, this thesis followed the Post-Keynesian critique of the effectiveness of the 
recent monetary policy paradigm (IT) not only because of its lack of originality in 
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comparison to the previous monetarist paradigm, but also, originally, because of its inability 
to conceptualise issues typical of a developing country in general and of primary dependent 
developing country in particular at a theoretical level (chapter 2). Empirically, in the context 
of Peru, the adoption of the IT regime has not translated into a substantial change in the 
management of the exchange rate: the central bank has tended to adopt the same kind of 
foreign exchange interventions envisaged by the monetarist paradigm adopted in the previous 
decade. These interventions have been ascribed to the “fear of floating”. In the literature, this 
is said to be due to liability dollarisation, the need to increase competitiveness or high pass-
through (Calvo and Reinhart, 2002; Hausmann et al., 2000).  
Additionally, neither policy paradigms have been able to address dollarisation. This 
thesis has shown how dollarisation is difficult to conceptualise within a mainstream 
theoretical apparatus and has provided an alternative framework to analyse it. This new 
framework stems from a different idea of money within the Post-Keynesian tradition: 
dollarisation is better considered in its multidimensional nature. The analytical framework 
presented in this thesis was able to show only two of these dimensions, external and internal, 
along which, empirically, dollarisation was shown to have been persistent during the last two 
decades.  
The persistence of dollarisation has to be read in conjunction with the fact that, 
empirically, neither policy paradigm seemed to have been able to address it: this may have 
been because the two frameworks were not very dissimilar and because the kinds of 
intervention that the central bank implemented remained essentially the same. However, the 
empirical investigation of the thesis shows that dollarisation may be reduced when the 
structure of the economy is diversified away from primary commodity production. 
In terms of the implementation of inflation targeting as a monetary policy paradigm, 
the amalgamation of the management of the exchange rate within this target is particularly 
complex (chapter 2): during depreciations, liability dollarisation and high pass-through can 
endanger the inflation target, while in periods of appreciations, interventions imply 
sterilisation and hence high domestic interest rates which may attract further (possibly short-
term) capital inflows.  
However, this dissertation has a specific emphasis on the exchange rate as a real 
sector developmental tool, with, potentially, important distributional implications across 
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sectors (tradable vs. non tradable and traditional vs. non-traditional export) and in terms of 
productive diversification away from primary products towards more value added sectors. 
Hence, periods of appreciations as well as abrupt depreciations may have detrimental effects 
on the real economy.  
With the above considerations in mind, the thesis has assessed the effects of the two 
mainstream policy paradigms on the real economy during the last two decades by 
implementing a flows of funds analysis in relation to the specific issue of dollarisation (both 
in chapter 5), and in terms of various sectors and types of ownership (chapter 6). It then 
addressed various alternatives to mainstream policy paradigms at theoretical level (chapter 2) 
and with empirical simulations (chapter 7). 
The RER target has been found to be the one with highest developmental implications 
in comparison to PEP which stabilises commodity revenues in countercyclical fashion. 
However, the empirical simulation of the PEP in chapter 7 reveals that, as suggested by the 
theory, it may have negative repercussions on the other sectors of the economy and 
difficulties in controlling inflation. Overall, however, the thesis concludes that the exchange 
rate solution is a myth: the objectives that the various exchange rate policy proposals seek to 
address, namely economic stability, cannot be pursued by monetary policy alone and may be 
resolved only by a structural change of the economy. That is, the exchange rate is not 
sufficient to bring about development. 
Moreover, due to space constraint, only a few observations can be made on the work 
Minsky dedicated to developing countries. The thesis aimed at  the conclusion that even the 
best designed exchange rate regime would be insufficient to bring about development since it 
becomes ineffective because of the way in which the economy is structured around the 
presence of large conglomerates: despite central bank’ interventions with the aim to stabilise 
the exchange rate and provide a safe investment environment for the non-traditional sector. 
This has not been developing in the last two decades. Instead, investment has been 
channelled in the traditional sector and in the non-tradable sector (because of privatisation in 
the utility sector and, partially, in construction). As a result, the exchange rate management 
has been ineffective in pursuing a diversification away from primary commodities that would 
provide the country with economic stability, let alone, development. It is with these 
considerations in mind that I considered the policy prescriptions advocated my Minsky 
decades ago. 
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In the Kaleckian tradition, Minsky recognised that the problem of “semi-
industrialised” countries, as he dubbed Latin American economies (Minsky, 1990), is one of 
financing: the financial structure should force surplus towards productive channels. The 
banking function that cannot be escaped in this process is the investment banking which 
industrialised countries enjoyed in the financing of investment during a recent stage of their 
development. Commercial capitalism only needed financing for trade and production of 
goods, while in industrial capitalism investment bankers seek out and finance new and 
developing industries.  
However, there are difficulties for semi-industrialised countries: large corporations in 
a phase of managerial capitalism do not depend on financial houses for their financing of 
investment and foreign resources have so far, led to a number of problematic results, as a 
consequence, internal sources of financing should be developed. 
Within this contextualisation, Minsky had a precise idea of the function of the central 
bank in developing countries: more specifically, first, the central bank should use its 
discretionary potential in managing the country’s foreign balance to support domestic 
development (hence there should be cooperation between a domestic developmental authority 
and the central bank). Second, to support the investment banking function which may be 
lacking within the private sector in developing countries, the central bank should pursue 
direct intervention into financing activity, which may take the form of the organisation of 
specialised financial institutions to provide direct credit (Minsky, 1977).  
From a more specific monetary policy viewpoint, Minsky addresses a currently 
debated issue: the problem of bypassing the existing set of financial institutions and directly 
financing business activity. From a theoretical point of view, this is addressed consistently 
with his idea of money and credit away from the quantity of money and based on “the terms 
upon which financing is available to the units of the economy” (Minsky, 1977, p. 20). 
Finally, to avoid inflation risk and trade balance deficits, investment could be financing 
labour-intensive consumption good sector. Minsky went even further and recommended to 
that the central bank should be ready to import consumer goods in the economy; it should act 
as a merchant bank financed through commodity revenues (Minsky, 1977).  
A final consideration is necessary: this thesis adopts a Post-Keynesian approach and it 
is critical of mainstream economics. The approach adopted in this thesis implies a pervasive 
256 
 
industrial policy aimed at the development of the non-traditional export sector. However, 
whether there are the political economy conditions for an industrial policy that should 
encourage such a diversification away from primary commodities toward the non-traditional 
export sector, is a questions overlooked in this approach, as suggested in the second section 
of Chapter 1. In that section development is defined in terms of the process of moving from a 
set of assets based on primary products to one based on skills, technology and knowledge, a 
process in which state intervention plays a crucial role (Amsden, 2001). Throughout the 
thesis (in the second and third sections of Chapter 5 and in the fourth section of Chapter 6) 
however, the issue of political economy constraints that could undermine the state’s ability to 
promote the developmental process has been addressed. The empirical chapters have 
discussed the problematic relations between state and business and have briefly mentioned 
the analytical framework of the developmental state and its pivotal concept of state 
autonomy. More generally, the developmental state literature has provided a theoretical 
support for comparative studies on the successful East Asian policies versus the unsuccessful 
examples of Latin American countries. 
 
8.4 Avenues for future research  
Besides the policy implications presented above, there are at least four main areas 
relevant for future research. 
The first is that the simultaneous integration of Peru in the international financial 
markets and the financialisation of the primary commodities gives rise to a complex 
interaction within the balance of payments of a small primary commodity developing 
economy. The question is very relevant in terms of macroeconomic management. An 
integrated analysis of these two issues which may interplay in a mutually reinforcing fashion 
has not been investigated so far.  
The second area is how the financialisation and the internationalisation of various 
currencies (the fact that, increasingly, emerging markets‘currencies are traded in financial 
markets) may, as further determinant of the exchange rate, impact the ability of the central 
bank to control and influence the exchange rate.  To this end, heterodox economics in general 
and the Post-Keynesian tradition in particular, may fill in gap left within mainstream 
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literature which, so far, has ignored these recent developments regarding the international 
insertion of economies in general and the effect on small open economies in particular, also 
through the integration of the domestic dollar market with the international dollar market.  
Third, the introductory chapter has defined development in terms of a movement 
away from primary commodities towards an economy based on skills, technology and 
knowledge fostered by pervasive and specifically aimed state intervention in the form of 
industrial policy. Successful industrial policy experiences seem to have been the result of the 
fostering of linkages from primary product exports to manufacturing. However, given the 
necessity to be specific about the process of development and the particular policies which 
should support it, it is essential to consider that industrial policy does not exist in abstract and 
should not be generally defined; it should be drawn from the specific economic conditions of 
the reality under consideration. As a result, an analysis of the activities that could maximise 
linkages from primary product exports to manufacturing would give a more accurate policy 
indication than the one provided in this thesis. 
Finally, a future research should address what this dissertation has only started to 
consider: the introduction stated that this thesis has been motivated by the consideration that, 
especially for a small primary commodity dependent developing economy, exchange rate 
dynamics have a considerable impact on the real economy in terms of growth, employment 
and distribution of income and wealth. A recent research into these themes that accounts for 
the recent developments (in terms of financialisation of both the primary commodities and 
the domestic currency) has not been developed as of yet. Some studies have investigated the 
impact of the exchange rate on growth and employment but these analyses have not gone far 
as to analyse the implications in terms of distribution. 
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Appendix A 
Appendix A presents the balance sheet matrices for the Peruvian economy from 1985 
to 2010. As shown in chapter 4, the objective of this matrix is to show the changes in 
financial stocks of assets and debts for the Peruvian economy. Specifically, the table here 
follow the adaptation shown in Table 4.3 in which the public sector is formed by the central 
bank and the government sectors, the private sector is formed by the banking system and the 
non-banking system, and the rest of the world. Additionally, matrices show private credit, 
money and quasi-money in both domestic and foreign currencies in order to take into account 
of the partial dollarisation of the economy. All data are presented as a percentage of GDP. 
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Table A1: Flow of funds analysis for the year 1985 (percentage of GDP) (Source: IMF, BCRP) 
 
 
Table A2: Flow of funds analysis for the year 1986 (percentage of GDP) (Source: IMF, BCRP) 
 
 
Table A3: Flow of funds analysis for the year 1987 (percentage of GDP) (Source: IMF, BCRP) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Rest of the World
Central Bank Government Banks F& H
Net Lending -4.0 3.6 0.5
Net Foreign Claims 9.9 5.0 8.8 -2.4 -21.4
Net Domestic Debt -1.2 8.5 -0.1 -7.1
Net Private Credit 3.8 0.0 15.2 -23.9 4.9
Peruvian soles 3.8 0.0 9.5 -13.2 0.0
US$ 5.7 -10.6 4.9
Money and Quasi-Money -15.6 -21.7 37.3 0.0
Peruvian soles -11.7 -14.7 26.4 0.0
US$ -3.9 -7.0 10.9 0.0
Private SectorPublic Sector
1985
Rest of the World
Central Bank Government Banks F& H
Net Lending -7.4 0.5 6.9
Net Foreign Claims 3.3 4.5 3.0 -1.5 -9.3
Net Domestic Debt 0.4 10.2 2.2 -12.8
Net Private Credit 4.0 0.0 13.4 -17.5 0.1
Peruvian soles 4.0 0.0 10.4 -14.4 0.0
US$ 3.0 -3.1 0.1
Money and Quasi-Money -11.4 -17.6 29.0 0.0
Peruvian soles -10.3 -15.3 25.6 0.0
US$ -1.1 -2.3 3.3 0.0
1986
Public Sector Private Sector
Rest of the World
Central Bank Government Banks F& H
Net Lending -9.8 2.5 7.4
Net Foreign Claims 0.0 4.2 0.2 -0.9 -3.4
Net Domestic Debt 3.2 13.6 5.8 -22.7
Net Private Credit 5.2 0.0 13.5 -20.3 1.5
Peruvian soles 5.2 0.0 10.5 -15.8 0.0
US$ 3.0 -4.5 1.5
Money and Quasi-Money -12.2 -18.8 31.0 0.0
Peruvian soles -11.0 -16.6 27.6 0.0
US$ -1.3 -2.2 3.4 0.0
1987
Public Sector Private Sector
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Table A4: Flow of funds analysis for the year 1988 (percentage of GDP) (Source: IMF, BCRP) 
 
 
Table A5: Flow of funds analysis for the year 1989 (percentage of GDP) (Source: IMF, BCRP) 
 
 
Table A6: Flow of funds analysis for the year 1990 (percentage of GDP) (Source: IMF, BCRP) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Rest of the World
Central Bank Government Banks F& H
Net Lending -11.3 3.4 8.0
Net Foreign Claims -4.6 6.0 -3.8 -1.2 3.5
Net Domestic Debt -2.2 17.8 3.6 -19.1
Net Private Credit 6.3 0.0 13.5 -22.5 2.7
Peruvian soles 6.3 0.0 7.4 -13.6 0.0
US$ 6.1 -8.9 2.7
Money and Quasi-Money -14.7 -22.9 37.6 0.0
Peruvian soles -9.8 -14.8 24.6 0.0
US$ -5.0 -8.0 13.0 0.0
1988
Public Sector Private Sector
Rest of the World
Central Bank Government Banks F& H
Net Lending -10.9 8.7 2.3
Net Foreign Claims 1.6 3.9 2.9 -1.0 -7.4
Net Domestic Debt -1.0 10.6 3.0 -14.8
Net Private Credit 6.4 0.0 10.9 -19.0 1.8
Peruvian soles 6.4 0.0 7.2 -13.5 0.0
US$ 3.7 -5.5 1.8
Money and Quasi-Money -9.2 -20.0 29.2 0.0
Peruvian soles -7.6 -15.3 22.9 0.0
US$ -1.6 -4.7 6.3 0.0
1989
Public Sector Private Sector
Rest of the World
Central Bank Government Banks F& H
Net Lending -8.7 3.9 4.9
Net Foreign Claims 4.6 2.0 6.8 -1.0 -12.5
Net Domestic Debt -2.4 13.3 3.1 -14.0
Net Private Credit 3.9 0.0 11.8 -14.5 -1.2
Peruvian soles 3.9 0.0 5.6 -9.5 0.0
US$ 6.2 -5.1 -1.2
Money and Quasi-Money -11.1 -20.1 31.2 0.0
Peruvian soles -7.8 -10.7 18.5 0.0
US$ -3.3 -9.4 12.8 0.0
1990
Public Sector Private Sector
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Table A7: Flow of funds analysis for the year 1991 (percentage of GDP) (Source: IMF, BCRP) 
 
 
Table A8: Flow of funds analysis for the year 1992 (percentage of GDP) (Source: IMF, BCRP) 
 
 
Table A9: Flow of funds analysis for the year 1993 (percentage of GDP) (Source: IMF, BCRP) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Rest of the World
Central Bank Government Banks F& H
Net Lending -2.8 -1.7 4.5
Net Foreign Claims 4.4 -0.1 6.8 -0.5 -10.6
Net Domestic Debt -0.6 5.1 -0.1 -7.1
Net Private Credit 1.0 0.0 9.3 -10.0 -0.2
Peruvian soles 1.0 0.0 3.6 -4.6 0.0
US$ 5.6 -5.4 -0.2
Money and Quasi-Money -6.2 -14.4 20.6 0.0
Peruvian soles -3.1 -5.8 8.9 0.0
US$ -3.1 -8.6 11.7 0.0
1991
Public Sector Private Sector
Rest of the World
Central Bank Government Banks F& H
Net Lending -3.4 -1.9 5.3
Net Foreign Claims 7.0 0.9 8.8 -0.5 -16.1
Net Domestic Debt -0.9 6.9 -0.9 -5.7
Net Private Credit 0.8 0.2 10.8 -8.6 -2.9
Peruvian soles 0.8 0.2 3.2 -4.0 -0.2
US$ 7.6 -4.6 -3.0
Money and Quasi-Money -7.4 -15.6 23.1 0.0
Peruvian soles -3.0 -5.5 8.5 0.0
US$ -4.4 -10.2 14.6 0.0
1992
Public Sector Private Sector
Rest of the World
Central Bank Government Banks F& H
Net Lending -2.5 -4.6 7.1
Net Foreign Claims 8.5 -0.8 9.2 -1.4 -15.5
Net Domestic Debt -0.9 5.4 -1.2 -3.2
Net Private Credit 0.5 0.4 12.2 -8.2 -4.1
Peruvian soles 0.5 0.4 2.9 -3.4 -0.4
US$ 9.3 -4.7 -4.6
Money and Quasi-Money -7.7 -17.3 24.9 0.0
Peruvian soles -2.6 -5.3 8.0 0.0
US$ -5.1 -11.9 17.0 0.0
1993
Public Sector Private Sector
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Table A10: Flow of funds analysis for the year 1994 (percentage of GDP) (Source: IMF, BCRP) 
 
 
Table A11: Flow of funds analysis for the year 1995 (percentage of GDP) (Source: IMF, BCRP) 
 
 
Table A12: Flow of funds analysis for the year 1996 (percentage of GDP) (Source: IMF, BCRP) 
 
 
 
 
 
Rest of the World
Central Bank Government Banks F& H
Net Lending -1.9 -4.2 6.1
Net Foreign Claims 12.6 1.0 13.4 -2.6 -24.4
Net Domestic Debt -3.7 8.1 -5.9 1.5
Net Private Credit -0.2 5.1 14.0 0.5 -9.2
Peruvian soles -0.2 5.1 3.7 -3.5 -5.1
US$ 10.3 4.0 -14.3
Money and Quasi-Money -7.9 -18.0 25.9 0.0
Peruvian soles -3.1 -6.5 9.5 0.0
US$ -4.8 -11.6 16.4 0.0
1994
Public Sector Private Sector
Rest of the World
Central Bank Government Banks F& H
Net Lending -2.4 -6.2 8.6
Net Foreign Claims 12.7 0.3 12.7 -2.4 -23.3
Net Domestic Debt -4.0 11.6 -6.5 -1.0
Net Private Credit -0.1 1.8 16.2 -7.1 -7.3
Peruvian soles -0.1 1.8 4.7 -4.6 -1.8
US$ 11.5 -2.4 -9.1
Money and Quasi-Money -8.4 -18.7 27.1 0.0
Peruvian soles -3.4 -7.0 10.4 0.0
US$ -5.0 -11.7 16.7 0.0
1995
Public Sector Private Sector
Rest of the World
Central Bank Government Banks F& H
Net Lending -0.5 -6.1 6.5
Net Foreign Claims 16.2 0.8 16.7 -2.5 -31.3
Net Domestic Debt -5.8 15.0 -10.8 1.6
Net Private Credit -0.8 3.9 21.2 -8.8 -7.7
Peruvian soles -0.8 3.9 5.5 -4.7 -3.9
US$ 15.7 -4.1 -11.6
Money and Quasi-Money -9.0 -22.8 31.9 0.0
Peruvian soles -3.0 -7.5 10.5 0.0
US$ -6.1 -15.3 21.4 0.0
1996
Public Sector Private Sector
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Table A13: Flow of funds analysis for the year 1997 (percentage of GDP) (Source: IMF, BCRP) 
 
 
Table A14: Flow of funds analysis for the year 1998 (percentage of GDP) (Source: IMF, BCRP) 
 
 
Table A15: Flow of funds analysis for the year 1999 (percentage of GDP) (Source: IMF, BCRP) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Rest of the World
Central Bank Government Banks F& H
Net Lending 0.7 -6.4 5.7
Net Foreign Claims 17.6 -0.8 13.7 -4.9 -25.6
Net Domestic Debt -6.8 19.5 -10.6 -2.1
Net Private Credit -0.5 0.9 24.4 -14.0 -9.0
Peruvian soles -0.5 0.9 5.5 -5.0 -0.9
US$ 18.9 -8.9 -9.9
Money and Quasi-Money -9.7 -23.5 33.2 0.0
Peruvian soles -3.4 -8.2 11.6 0.0
US$ -6.3 -15.3 21.6 0.0
1997
Public Sector Private Sector
Rest of the World
Central Bank Government Banks F& H
Net Lending -0.7 -5.2 5.9
Net Foreign Claims 17.4 0.0 13.7 -7.1 -24.1
Net Domestic Debt -7.2 22.2 -11.2 -3.8
Net Private Credit -0.2 0.5 28.0 -24.3 -3.0
Peruvian soles -0.2 0.5 5.6 -5.4 -0.5
US$ 22.4 -18.9 -3.5
Money and Quasi-Money -8.8 -24.6 33.4 0.0
Peruvian soles -3.2 -7.6 10.8 0.0
US$ -5.6 -17.0 22.6 0.0
1998
Public Sector Private Sector
Rest of the World
Central Bank Government Banks F& H
Net Lending -3.1 0.4 2.7
Net Foreign Claims 17.0 0.2 15.4 -8.5 -24.0
Net Domestic Debt -5.8 21.9 -9.5 -6.6
Net Private Credit 0.0 0.8 28.5 -27.4 -0.4
Peruvian soles 0.0 0.8 5.0 -5.1 -0.8
US$ 23.5 -22.3 -1.1
Money and Quasi-Money -9.5 -26.6 36.1 0.0
Peruvian soles -3.6 -8.1 11.7 0.0
US$ -5.9 -18.5 24.5 0.0
1999
Public Sector Private Sector
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Table A16: Flow of funds analysis for the year 2000 (percentage of GDP) (Source: IMF, BCRP) 
 
 
Table A17: Flow of funds analysis for the year 2001 (percentage of GDP) (Source: IMF, BCRP) 
 
 
Table A18: Flow of funds analysis for the year 2002 (percentage of GDP) (Source: IMF, BCRP) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Rest of the World
Central Bank Government Banks F& H
Net Lending -3.2 0.3 2.9
Net Foreign Claims 15.6 -1.3 14.3 -9.3 -19.2
Net Domestic Debt -5.1 17.3 -7.5 -4.8
Net Private Credit -0.3 0.8 25.9 -23.5 -1.4
Peruvian soles -0.3 0.8 4.7 -4.5 -0.8
US$ 21.1 -19.0 -2.2
Money and Quasi-Money -9.1 -25.5 34.6 0.0
Peruvian soles -3.8 -7.8 11.5 0.0
US$ -5.3 -17.7 23.0 0.0
2000
Public Sector Private Sector
Rest of the World
Central Bank Government Banks F& H
Net Lending -2.5 0.3 2.2
Net Foreign Claims 15.8 -0.9 15.5 -9.8 -20.6
Net Domestic Debt -4.5 15.8 -5.9 -5.4
Net Private Credit -0.4 0.6 24.3 -21.2 -2.2
Peruvian soles -0.4 0.6 4.8 -4.4 -0.6
US$ 19.5 -16.8 -2.8
Money and Quasi-Money -9.7 -26.2 35.8 0.0
Peruvian soles -4.2 -8.7 12.9 0.0
US$ -5.4 -17.5 22.9 0.0
2001
Public Sector Private Sector
Rest of the World
Central Bank Government Banks F& H
Net Lending -2.1 0.1 2.0
Net Foreign Claims 17.0 -2.1 17.3 -8.0 -24.3
Net Domestic Debt -5.1 14.6 -6.0 -3.5
Net Private Credit -0.4 0.8 23.1 -20.6 -1.3
Peruvian soles -0.4 0.8 4.9 -4.4 -0.8
US$ 18.2 -16.1 -2.1
Money and Quasi-Money -9.9 -26.2 36.1 0.0
Peruvian soles -4.4 -9.1 13.5 0.0
US$ -5.5 -17.1 22.6 0.0
2002
Public Sector Private Sector
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Table A19: Flow of funds analysis for the year 2003 (percentage of GDP) (Source: IMF, BCRP) 
 
 
Table A20: Flow of funds analysis for the year 2004 (percentage of GDP) (Source: IMF, BCRP) 
 
 
Table A21: Flow of funds analysis for the year 2005 (percentage of GDP) (Source: IMF, BCRP) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Rest of the World
Central Bank Government Banks F& H
Net Lending -1.6 0.0 1.5
Net Foreign Claims 16.7 -1.3 17.3 -7.1 -25.7
Net Domestic Debt -4.6 14.0 -5.5 -3.9
Net Private Credit -0.7 0.1 20.7 -19.9 -0.1
Peruvian soles -0.7 0.1 4.8 -4.1 -0.1
US$ 15.9 -15.7 -0.2
Money and Quasi-Money -9.9 -24.9 34.9 0.0
Peruvian soles -5.4 -9.5 14.9 0.0
US$ -4.5 -15.5 20.0 0.0
2003
Public Sector Private Sector
Rest of the World
Central Bank Government Banks F& H
Net Lending -1.0 1.0 0.0
Net Foreign Claims 17.4 -1.5 17.6 -5.7 -27.8
Net Domestic Debt -4.4 12.5 -5.9 -2.2
Net Private Credit -0.8 0.2 18.4 -15.7 -1.7
Peruvian soles -0.8 0.2 4.8 -4.0 -0.2
US$ 13.6 -11.7 -1.8
Money and Quasi-Money -11.3 -24.0 35.3 0.0
Peruvian soles -7.3 -10.8 18.1 0.0
US$ -4.0 -13.2 17.2 0.0
2004
Public Sector Private Sector
Rest of the World
Central Bank Government Banks F& H
Net Lending -0.4 1.8 -1.4
Net Foreign Claims 18.5 1.6 18.6 -4.0 -34.6
Net Domestic Debt -3.7 13.9 -5.8 -4.4
Net Private Credit -0.4 0.1 19.4 -16.9 -2.0
Peruvian soles -0.4 0.1 5.9 -5.4 -0.1
US$ 13.5 -11.5 -2.1
Money and Quasi-Money -13.3 -25.8 39.1 0.0
Peruvian soles -7.8 -11.7 19.5 0.0
US$ -5.4 -14.1 19.5 0.0
2005
Public Sector Private Sector
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Table A22: Flow of funds analysis for the year 2006 (percentage of GDP) (Source: IMF, BCRP) 
 
 
Table A23: Flow of funds analysis for the year 2007 (percentage of GDP) (Source: IMF, BCRP) 
 
 
Table A24: Flow of funds analysis for the year 2008 (percentage of GDP) (Source: IMF, BCRP) 
 
 
 
 
 
Rest of the World
Central Bank Government Banks F& H
Net Lending 2.4 0.7 -3.1
Net Foreign Claims 18.3 0.6 19.1 -3.9 -34.1
Net Domestic Debt -4.3 11.3 -7.1 0.1
Net Private Credit -2.2 0.1 17.8 -14.4 -1.2
Peruvian soles -2.2 0.1 6.6 -4.4 -0.1
US$ 11.3 -10.0 -1.3
Money and Quasi-Money -10.8 -24.3 35.2 0.0
Peruvian soles -7.2 -12.0 19.2 0.0
US$ -3.6 -12.4 16.0 0.0
2006
Public Sector Private Sector
Rest of the World
Central Bank Government Banks F& H
Net Lending 3.1 -1.7 -1.4
Net Foreign Claims 24.0 2.0 21.5 -6.1 -41.3
Net Domestic Debt -5.2 15.8 -10.3 -0.3
Net Private Credit -3.4 0.1 21.0 -7.4 -10.1
Peruvian soles -3.4 0.1 8.4 -5.1 -0.1
US$ 12.6 -2.3 -10.3
Money and Quasi-Money -14.5 -26.9 41.4 0.0
Peruvian soles -10.6 -14.5 25.0 0.0
US$ -4.0 -12.4 16.4 0.0
2007
Public Sector Private Sector
Rest of the World
Central Bank Government Banks F& H
Net Lending 2.4 -6.6 4.2
Net Foreign Claims 25.7 1.0 23.4 -7.2 -42.8
Net Domestic Debt -6.6 18.2 -11.4 -0.2
Net Private Credit -1.4 0.0 25.1 -15.7 -7.9
Peruvian soles -1.4 0.0 11.2 -9.7 0.0
US$ 13.9 -5.9 -8.0
Money and Quasi-Money -15.5 -30.3 45.8 0.0
Peruvian soles -10.2 -16.0 26.3 0.0
US$ -5.3 -14.2 19.5 0.0
2008
Public Sector Private Sector
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Table A25: Flow of funds analysis for the year 2009 (percentage of GDP) (Source: IMF, BCRP) 
 
 
Table A26: Flow of funds analysis for the year 2010 (percentage of GDP) (Source: IMF, BCRP) 
 
Rest of the World
Central Bank Government Banks F& H
Net Lending -0.9 1.1 -0.2
Net Foreign Claims 25.0 -1.0 23.6 -8.2 -39.5
Net Domestic Debt -6.6 19.8 -10.4 -2.8
Net Private Credit -2.5 0.0 24.8 -21.9 -0.4
Peruvian soles -2.5 0.0 12.2 -9.7 0.0
US$ 12.6 -12.2 -0.4
Money and Quasi-Money -14.1 -31.2 45.3 0.0
Peruvian soles -9.9 -17.4 27.3 0.0
US$ -4.2 -13.8 18.0 0.0
2009
Public Sector Private Sector
Rest of the World
Central Bank Government Banks F& H
Net Lending -0.1 -1.4 1.5
Net Foreign Claims 28.5 0.5 25.2 -9.3 -44.9
Net Domestic Debt -7.0 19.9 -10.2 -2.8
Net Private Credit -2.3 0.1 24.8 -13.6 -8.8
Peruvian soles -2.3 0.1 12.7 -10.4 -0.1
US$ 12.1 -3.1 -8.9
Money and Quasi-Money -18.0 -33.7 51.8 0.0
Peruvian soles -13.7 -20.6 34.2 0.0
US$ -4.4 -13.2 17.5 0.0
2010
Public Sector Private Sector
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Appendix B 
 
Database B 
 
Name Sector Size –
Empl. 
History Corporate Actions Conasev ownership 
history 
Owner detail Ownership 
Classificati
on 
AGRO INDUSTRIAL 
PARAMONGA S.A.A. Y 
SUBSIDIARIAS 
Agribusiness 
 
1000 Founded in 
1970,. In 
1994 
changed 
from 
Cooperativa 
to SA. 
 RIO PATIVILCA 
S.A 
In 1996 Barroco Sa 
(Kimberly  SA) through 
Rio Pativilca SA) buys 
it. 
Foreign 
Conglomer
ate from 
1996 
AGRO PUCALA S.A.A. Agribusiness 
 
2400 Founded in 
1970 as 
Cooperativa. 
 CROMWELL 
ASSETS S.A. 
(51%, Virgin Isl.) 
Cromwell Assets SA Foreign 
Firm from 
1999 
AGRO-INDUSTRIAS SAN 
JACINTO S.A.A. 
Agribusiness 
 
900 to 
1300 
Founded in 
1992 as SA 
In 2000 includes subsidiary 
Compania Peruana de Azucar. In 
2001, merger with Valle del Santa 
SAC 
CORPORACION 
AZUCARERA 
DEL PERU 
SOCIEDAD 
ANONIMA - 
COAZUCAR DEL 
PERU S.A. (83%) 
Corporacion Azucarera 
del Peru SA is formed 
by: Complejo 
Agroindustrial Cartavio 
SAA, Empresa Agraria 
Chiquitoy SA, Empresa 
Agricola Sintuco SA, 
Empresa Agroindustrial 
Casa Grande SAA. 
Banda 
295 
 
ALICORP, SOCIEDAD 
ANONIMA 
Commerce 2200 Founded in 
1956 
Acquisition of Nicolini and Mopesa 
in Dec. 1996, Alimentum in 2004. 
In Sept  2005 buys from Colgate 
Peru SA the Planta de Detergentes 
(1.3 us mil).In Nov 2005 buys from 
Industria Pacocha SA the firm 
Marsella (22.5mil $). In Oct 2006, 
buys Molinera Inca from 
Contigroup Companies and 
Farmington Enterprise Inc. for 17.5 
mil USD.. Also buys Asa 
Alimentos for 20.8 Mil USD. In 
May 2007, buys Eskimo SA 
(Ecuador) FOR 8.3 mil USD. In 
May 2008, buys The Value Brands 
Company de Argentina S.C.A., 
TVBC S.C.A., The Value Brands 
Company de San Juan S.A. and 
Sulfargén S.A.(Argentina),  The 
Value Brands Company de Perú 
S.R.L. and The Value Brands 
Company de Uruguay S.R.L., for 
US$65,000 mil. In Jult 2008, buys 
Productos Personales S.A. 
(Propersa, Colombia) and 
Downford Corporation for 
US$1,138.4 mil. 
BIRMINGHAM 
MERCHANT S.A. 
(11%, Panama), 
GRUPO PIURANO 
DE 
INVERSIONES 
S.A. (8%), Fondos 
Grupo Romero Romero 
ALMACENERA PERUANA 
DE COMERCIO S.A. - 
ALPECO 
Commerce 20 Founded in 
1981 
 Romero Family 
(62%), 
INVERSIONES 
CENTENARIO 
S.A.A (25%), 
MARAY S.A. 
(10%) 
Banco de comercio, 
later Caja de Pensiones 
Militar Policial  
Romero 
296 
 
ASEA BROWN BOVERI S.A. Manufacturi
ng (Capital 
Goods) 
200 Founded in 
1923 
In 1993, it merges with ABBFRE 
SA (electr.) 
ABB-ASEA 
BROWN BOVERI 
LTD, SUIZA 
Southward Securities 
(Canada) in 1992, Asea 
Broown Swiss 1994 
Foreign 
Firm 
AUSTRAL GROUP S.A.A. - 
EN REESTRUCTURACION 
Fishing 2200 Founded 
1996, called 
Pesquera 
Industrial 
Pacifico SA 
then Austral 
Chancay SA 
, in 1998 
called 
Austral 
(fusion of 
Pesquera 
Austral SA 
and Pesquera 
Arco Iris). It 
owns 
Metalpack 
(package), 
Camposol 
(Asparagous
), Aereo 
Chavin 
(flight 
service) and 
Minera 
Volcan. 
In 1999, re-structuring debt. In 
2004, Octagon Financial Services 
int LLC buys it. Tomma SAC 
bought 66.67% and 296ransferred 
equities to Dordogne Holdings 
Inc.In 2005, sells Metalpack to 
Nogat Corp (Panama, 8.825 mil$). 
In 2008, it buys 50% of Cormar – 
Corporation de Mar SA.  
DORDOGNE 
HOLDINGS INC. 
(87%, Panama) 
Laco SA (Norway) 
through Holdings 
Dordogne (Panama). 
Foreign 
Conglomer
ate 
297 
 
BAKELITA Y ANEXOS S.A. 
EN INSOLVENCIA 
Manufacturi
ng (Plastic) 
350 Founded in 
1949 
It owns Elba SA (Real Estate) DENEUMOSTIER 
family 
Private owned 
(Deneumostier) 
Private 
Ownership 
BAYER S.A. Commerce 
(Pharmaceut
icals) 
150 Founded in 
1947 
In 2002, it buys Cropsa SAC Bayer (Germany) Bayer Foreign 
Investments Ltd., 
Toronto, Canada. In 
1994, Bayer 
Gesellschaft, Germany. 
Foreign 
Firm 
BELLSOUTH PERU S.A. Y 
SUBSIDIARIAS 
Services 
(Telecommu
nication) 
900 Founded as 
Telemovil 
SA in 1990, 
it becomes 
BellSouth 
Peru SA in 
1999 
 TELEFONICA 
DEL PERU S.A.A. 
 Foreign 
Firm 
CARBOLAN S.A. Fishing 200 Founded in 
1988 as 
Farmocean 
de 
Sudamarica. 
In 1995 
 Rossel Family Group Private 
Ownership 
298 
 
changed to 
Carbolan. In 
1995 starts 
Carbolan 
Graphics del 
Peru 
(Graphic 
industry), in 
1996 had a 
fusion with 
Cohipesa 
(Consorcio 
Hidrobiologi
co del Peru). 
CASTROVIRREYNA 
COMPAÑIA MINERA S.A. 
Mining 220 Founded in 
1942. 
In 1997, it buys 18%  of AD Minas 
SA which is the main holder of 
Corporacion Minera 
Castrovirreyna. In 1998, reaches 
40.93%. In 2004, merger with 
Minera El Palomo SA. 
Tode Family 
(42%), SELWAY 
HOLDINGS 
CORP. (18%, 
Bahamas), SOUTH 
TRADE METALS 
INC (7%, Virgin 
Isl) 
 Mixed 
Ownership 
CEMA COMUNICACIONES 
S.A. EN INSOLVENCIA 
Services(Tel
ecommunica
tion)  
 Founded In 
1981 
In restructuring since 2000 ACCIONISTAS 
PREFERENCIALE
S (80%), P.T. 
GLOBAL 
CORPORATION 
(20%) 
 Mixed 
Ownership 
299 
 
CEMENTOS LIMA S.A. Construction 350 Founded in 
1967 . 
Subsidiaries 
after 2007 
are :  Skanon 
Investments 
inc (Drake 
Cem 
LLC),Inveco 
(Inversiones 
en 
Concreto), 
Gea 
(Generacion 
Electrica de 
Atocongo), 
Celepsa 
(Compania 
Electrica El 
Platanal),De
cosa 
(Deposito 
Aduanero 
Cochan), 
Cochan 
(naviera), 
Adelaida 
(Mining), 
Preansa 
(Prefabricato 
Andinos). In 
2009 , also 
Transportes 
Lurin (State 
Island LLC). 
In 2003 , the is the fusion with Lar 
Carbon SA. In 2005, it forms with 
Cemento Andino and Corp Aceros 
Arequipa the firm CELEPSA. In 
2007 joint venture with Drake 
Cement LLC in the USA for a 
projct in Arizona. 
SINDICATO DE 
INVERSIONES Y 
ADMINISTRACIO
N S.A.(68%) 
SINDICATO DE 
INVERSIONES Y 
ADMINISTRACION 
S.A. (Nuevas 
Inversiones S.A.) 
Domestic 
Conglomer
ate 
300 
 
CEMENTOS PACASMAYO 
S.A.A.and SUBSIDIARIAS 
Construction 400 Founded in 
1957. 
Privitised 
state stake 
(49%) in 
1994 
In 2000, sells its subsidiary 
Cementos Norte Pacasmayo 
Energia to Nordic Power 
(Vattenfall Int hold, swiss, 22.2 mil 
USD). In 2003, it buys Zemex Corp 
(USA-Canada , 80.4 mil USD) with 
its subbssidiaries. In 2006 it buys 
the subsidiaries Invernor SA and 
Immobiliaria CNP SA.Subsidiarias: 
Zemex LLC y Subsidiarias, 
Cementos Selva S.A. y Subsidiarias 
(founded in 2000), Distribuidora 
Norte Pacasmayo S.R.L. (Cement), 
Corianta S.A. (Mining), Empresa 
de Transmisión Guadalupe S.A.C. 
y Tinku Generación S.A.C  
(Energy), Fosfatos del Pacífico 
S.A. 
INVERSIONES 
PACASMAYO 
S.A. 
Inversiones Pacasmayo 
of Group Pacasmayo 
(Hochschild Group) 
(FARRAGUT 
HOLDINGS INC. , 
Caiman). Hochscield 
Group owns also golden 
mines: Compania 
Minera Sipan, Ares, 
Arcata, Afrodita, 
Argento, Corianta, 
Pativilca, Selene.  
Hochschiel
d 
CENTRAL AZUCARERA 
CHUCARAPI-PAMPA 
BLANCA S.A. And 
Subsidiaries 
Agribusiness 100 Founded in 
1992 from 
the 
Cooperativa 
Agraria Az 
Ch-pam 
Blanca. 
Subsidiary: 
Industrial 
Chucarapi 
Pampa 
blanca 
SA(Food and 
drinks) 
 INVERSIONES 
QUEBRADA 
HONDA 
S.A.(25%) and 
chirinos family 
(16%),COMFE 
INVESTMENT 
INC (15%), Oporto 
Family (13%) and 
KEMAGRO 
INDUSTRIALES 
INC. (18%, 
Bahamas) 
 Mixed 
Ownership 
CENTROS COMERCIALES 
DEL PERU S.A. 
Commerce 250 Founded in 
1995 
 INMOBILIARIA 
ALTO LIMA S.A. 
(79%, Panama), 
INVERSIONES 
PUERTO NUEVO 
S.A.(21%) 
 Cosapi 
301 
 
CERVECERIA SAN JUAN 
S.A.A. 
Commerce 400 Founded in 
1971 
In 2003, there is the fusion with 
oits subsidiary Agricola San Juan. 
Dollars in active. Lots in 2006 after 
restaurations. 
UNION DE 
CERVECERIAS 
PERUANAS 
BACKUS Y 
JOHNSTON 
S.A.A. 
Union de Cerveceria 
Backus and Johnston 
from 1998 
Bentin  
CIA. INDUSTRIAL NUEVO 
MUNDO S. A. 
Manufacturi
ng (Textile) 
850 Founded in 
1949 
1998, fusion of Compañía 
Desmotadora Peruana S.A. and 
Compañía Industrial Nuevo Mundo 
S.A. To form Cia. Industrial Nuevo 
Mundo S.A. 
Mayo and 
SCHWARTZMAN  
families 
Mayo family Private 
Ownership 
COMPAÑIA CERVECERA 
DEL SUR DEL PERU S.A.A. 
CERVESUR 
Commerce 1100 Founded in 
1898,and 
1929 as SA.  
In 1993, subsidiaries are: 
Embotelladora del Sur SA, 
Embotelladora Frontera SA, 
Embotelladora Caplina 
(Containers) ;  Transportes 
Generales Altiplano SA (transport), 
Comercio Servicios e Inversiones 
SA (services); Alimentos 
Procesados SA, Procesos 
Agroindustriales SA, Productos del 
Campo SA, Oleginosas y 
Derivados Majes SA (Food); 
Hilanderias Pimafina SA (Textile); 
Inmobiliaria 301 SA (Real Estate); 
Analistas y Consultores de Seguros 
SA (Finance). In 1997, it buys 
Compania Cervecera SA (Drinks) 
and sells Hilanderias Pimafina SA. 
In 1998, owns Comercial Excel SA 
(Drinks Distribution) and Servicios 
Aereos AQP SA. 
UNION DE 
CERVECERIAS 
PERUANAS 
BACKUS Y 
JOHNSTON 
S.A.A. 
Union de Cerveceria 
Backus and Johnston 
from 2000. Backus and 
Johnson arrived in 1997 
in Peru 
Bentin  
302 
 
COMPAÑIA DE MINAS 
BUENAVENTURA S.A.A. Y 
SUBSIDIARIAS 
Mining 1000 
(2000 
con.) 
Founded in 
1953 
In 1992, 6 % owned by IFC (WB). 
In 1996, merger with subsidiaries 
Compania de Minas Orcopampa 
SA, Compania de Minas 
Recuperada SA. It also owns 
Minera Yanacocha SRL and 
Minera Condesa SA and Sociedad 
Minera Cerro Vierde. Subs are 
many (see reports). In 2006, buys 
21.96% of Inv Mineras del Sur SA 
(reaching 100%) and Minas 
Poracota SA.  In 2009, buys 
additional 19.8% of Inversiones 
Colquijirca , which owns El Brocal 
SA. So indirectly owns more than 
40% of it. 
Benavides Family 
(14%), 
BLACKROCK 
INVESTMENT  
(10%, UK), CIA 
MINERA 
CONDESA S A 
(7%) 
 Mixed 
Ownership 
COMPAÑIA GOOD YEAR 
DEL PERU S.A. 
Commerce 
(Auto) 
 Founded in 
1942. 
 THE GOODYEAR 
TIRE & RUBBER 
COMPANY 
 Foreign 
Firm 
COMPAÑIA INDUSTRIAL 
TEXTIL CREDISA - TRUTEX 
S.A.A. - CREDITEX 
Manufacturi
ng (Textile) 
500, 
then 
2000 
Founded in 
1961 
in 1997, fusion with Credisa SA. In 
1998, fusion with El Progreso SA. 
Subsidiaries are: Texgroup SA, 
Servicios Aereo. In 2007, opens in 
Chile. 
CORPORACION 
CERVESUR 
S.A.A. (80%), 
AMARANTE 
INVESTMENTS 
N.V. (12%, Netherl. 
Antilles) 
 Bentin  
COMPAÑIA 
MANUFACTURERA DE 
VIDRIO DEL PERU 
LIMITADA S.A. 
Manufacturi
ng 
(Containers 
& 
Packaging) 
260 Founded in 
1922 . After 
1999 with 
the crisis it 
was 
abandoned 
opting for 
importing 
glasses. 
In 1993, fusion with Viplan SA . In 
1999, Vidrio industrial buys 85%. 
Also there is a spin-off of 
Inmobiliaria Pariachi. 
 Vidrio Industrial 
(Owens Group , USA) 
from 1999 
Bentin to 
Foreign in 
1999 
303 
 
COMPAÑIA MINERA 
ATACOCHA S.A.A. Y 
SUBSIDIARIAS 
Mining 400 Founded in 
1936 
Consolidaded includes subsidiaries: 
Inversiones Mineras SA(IMSA), 
Corporacion Minera San Manuel 
SA and Empresa Energetica de 
Chaprin SA (Chaprin). Other subs 
in 2000s. No difference in balance 
sheet data. 
MILPO ANDINA 
PERU S.A.C. 
(70%), Fondos 
In 2008, belongs to 
Votorantim Andina Peru 
SAC (Grupo Milpo) 
Brescia 
COMPAÑIA MINERA 
CONDESTABLE S.A.A. 
Mining 30 Founded in 
1964. In 
1992, 
privatised. 
In 1998, stopped production and 
selling extraction rights to 
Compania Minera Pativilca SA 
URION 
WORLDWIDE 
INVESTMENT 
(92%, Bahamas), 
NIKKO COOPER 
INC (7%, South 
Korea ) 
Trafigura Beheer BV 
(Swiss) until 2006. Then 
Urion Worldwide 
Investment (Trafigura 
Group , Bahamas). 
Foreign 
Firm 
COMPAÑIA MINERA MILPO 
S.A.A. Y SUBSIDIARIAS 
Mining 380 - 
800(all 
conglo
merate) 
Founded in 
1949. 
Subsidiariaries are: Sindicato 
Minero Pacococha SA, Minera el 
Muki SA, Gestion Minera SA, 
Compania Minera Hilarion SA, 
Minera Cusipata SA, Cuyuma SA. 
In 1999, it owns also Milpo 
Finance Ltda and Milpo 
Investments Ltda. In 2002, buys 
Compania Minera Atacocha SAA. 
It buys Minera Rayrock 
Antofagasta. 
VOTORANTIM 
METAIS - 
CAJAMARQUILL
A S.A. (45%), 
COMPAÑIA 
MINERA MILPO 
S.A.A. (10%), 
CARVEL INC. 
(7.5%), Fondos 
 Brescia 
COMPAÑIA MINERA 
RAURA S.A. Y 
SUBSIDIARIAS 
Mining 200 Founded in 
1960 
Subsidiariaries are: Negocios y 
Servicios Santa Ines SA, 
Agroindustrias Cerro Negro SA y 
Sociedad Minera Huarimanta SA. 
In 1999, Agroindustria Cerro Negro 
SA is consolidaded. 
GREAT 
YELLOWSTONE 
CORP. (63%), 
INVERSIONES 
SAN BORJA S A 
(37%) 
Since 2002,Great 
Yellowstone Corp. 
(Panama), Inversiones 
Nacionales de Turismo 
SA 
Brescia and 
Foreign 
Investment 
(since 
1995) 
304 
 
COMPAÑIA MINERA SAN 
IGNACIO DE MOROCOCHA 
S.A. Y SUBSIDIARIAS 
Mining 700 Founded in 
1942. 
Subs. are: Servicios Selva Central 
SA, Exploraciones Mineras San 
RamonSA and Exploraciones 
Mineras SA. No large difference in 
balance sheet. 
CLARION 
HOLDING LTD. 
(49%), ORANGE 
BAY 
COMMERCIAL 
INC. (25%, 
Panama), 
TALINGO 
CORPORATION 
(23%, Virgin Isl.) 
 Foreign 
Conglomer
ate 
COMPAÑIA MINERA 
SANTA LUISA S.A. 
Mining  Founded in 
1964 
 MITSUI LTD. 
(Japan) 
Mitsui Mining & 
Smelting Co.Ltd. 
(Japan) 
Foreign 
Firm 
COMPAÑIA PERUANA DE 
ENVASES S.A. EN 
LIQUIDACION 
Manufacturi
ng 
(Containers 
& 
Packaging) 
 Founded 
before 1990. 
In 1994, merger of Compania 
Peruana de Envases SA with its 
subsidiary Envases Varios SA 
 Sociedad Minera 
Austria Duvas SA 
Bentin  
COMPAÑIA UNIVERSAL 
TEXTIL S.A. 
Manufacturi
ng (Textile) 
650 
then 
1000 
Founded 
before 1980. 
Compania Universal Textil SA is 
founded in 1998 as merger of 
Compania Universal Textil SA 
(before Confecciones Flyer SA) 
and Universal Textil SA (Founded 
in 1952). 
INVERSIONES 
PIURANAS (18%, 
Romero), 
CENTENARIO 
S.A.A.(5%, Raffo), 
EL PACIFICO 
PERUANO-SUIZA 
CIA DE SEGUROS 
Y REASEGUROS 
(14%, group Raffo), 
CIA. DE JESUS 
PROVINCIA DEL 
PERU (11%), 
Alvarez family 
(7%) 
 Romero - 
Raffa 
305 
 
CONDUCTORES 
ELECTRICOS PERUANOS 
S.A. CEPER - EN 
REESTRUCTURACION 
Manufacturi
ng (Capital 
Goods) 
220 Founded in 
1965 as 
Pirelli 
Industria de 
Conductores 
Electricos 
SA. In 1975 
changed 
name.then it 
pays 1.5% 
on sales to 
Pirelli Cavi 
Spa 
Subsidiaries: CISSA (1992) and 
Laran (1986).In 1996, Colacon 
buys Cobre continuo SA from 
Ceper that only owns 49.9% later. 
Subsidiaries are: Ceper inversiones 
and servicios, Ceper Inmobiliaria, 
Ceper Agricola La Portata and 
Ceper Agricola Chavimochic. From 
2004 in reconstruction 
MONVISO CORP 
S.A. (49%, 
Panama), CEPER- 
INVERSIONES Y 
SERVICIOS S.A. 
(CISSA)(33%) 
 Foreign 
Firm 
CONSORCIO INDUSTRIAL 
DE AREQUIPA S.A. Manufacturi
ng 
(Household 
Products 
200 Founded in 
1966 
 CANNOCK family 
(24%,PERU), 
LANMAN & 
KEMP BARCLAY 
(24%, USA), 
Carrillo family 
(9%) 
 Mixed 
Ownership 
CONSTRUCCIONES 
ELECTROMECANICAS 
DELCROSA S.A. 
Manufacturi
ng (Capital 
Goods) 
50 Founded in 
1954 
In 1997, stoped producing electric 
engine because int and ext 
competition. 
GASHAKI 
CORPORATION 
(virgin isl.) 
 Foreign 
Firm 
CORPORACION ACEROS 
AREQUIPA S.A. Y 
SUBSIDIARIAS 
Manufacturi
ng (Metals) 
1000 Founded in 
1964 
It owns Transporte Bacino, Aceros 
Calibrato, Aceros del Sur SA. In 
1997 merger of Aceros Arequipa 
and Aceros Calibrados SA 
OLESA 
INVESTMENT 
CORPORATION 
(10%, Bahamas), 
Transportes 
Barcino SA (5%) 
and CILLONIZ 
family (31%) 
 Mixed 
Ownership 
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CORPORACION CERAMICA 
S.A. Manufacturi
ng 
(Household 
Products) 
400 Founded in 
1967, then 
changed to 
Ceramica 
Lima in 
1994 
In 1994 it merges with Ceramica 
del Pacifico (CERPAC) and 
Ceramica Mosaicos (CERMOSA) 
INVERSIONES 
CERAMICA 
S.A.C. 
Inversiones Ceramicas. 
Subs are Centro 
Ceramico Las Flores 
SAC, Ceramica Lima 
SA,Certrans SAC, 
Compania Minera Las 
Camelias SA, 
Corporacion Ceramica 
SA 
Mixed 
Ownership 
CORPORACION CERVESUR 
S.A.A. Y SUBSIDIARIAS 
Construction 3000 Founded in 
1997 as spin 
off of 
CERVESUR 
(1898) 
It is formed by: CREDITEX; 
ALPROSA; TRANSALTISA; 
COMERCIO, SERVICIOS E 
INVERSIONES; PROAGRO; 
SERVICIOS AÉREOS AQP; 
ANACONSA, e INMOBILIARIA 
301. It also partecipate in:AFP 
Profuturo, Compañía de Seguros La 
Positiva, Corporación Aceros 
Arequipa, Investa S.A.B., Investa 
Consultores y Edificaciones El 
Pacífico. 
INTERGAMA 
(30%, Virgin Isls) 
and Interbeta 
CORPORATION 
(23%, Virgin Isls), 
La Positiva Vida 
Seguros (12%), 
Ningo Center (7%, 
Panama) 
 Bentin  
CORPORACION JOSE R. 
LINDLEY S.A. Consolidaded 
Commerce 2500 Found 1928. 
it is linked 
with Coca 
Inka. 80% of 
sales are in 
Lima. 
in 1995,subsidiaries are 
EmbotelladoraBagua and 
Embotelladora Lambayeque. In 
1999,Lindsley family sells 19.9%  
it is affiliated with Peru Beverage 
Ltda. (coca-cola company). The 
consolidaded includes Emb La 
Selva and Piura. From 2004, the 
consolidade shows Sociedad de 
Inversiones Lindsley and Sociedad 
de Cartera del Pacifico 
Lindley Family  Lindley 
DEL MAR S.A. Y 
SUBSIDIARIAS 
Fishing 500 Founded in 
1978. 
Consolidaded in 1994 includes 
Pesquera Joaquin SA. In 1996 
merger with Pescanova. In 1997, it 
buys Pesca Peru Huarney. 
CORPORACION 
PESQUERA INCA 
S.A COPEINCA 
become subsidiary of 
Banco Wiese Sudameris 
in 2001 
Wiese 
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DERIVADOS DEL MAIZ S.A. 
And subsidiary 
Agribusiness 150 Founded in 
1961 
In 1998, it merges with Provita SA. 
In 1999, CPG Holdings Inc. buys 
56.93% (Cayman Islands). In 2002 
, there is spin off of holdings 
Deraroma SA (shown in 
consolidaded). In 2008 it 
disappears, bought by Corn 
Products International Inc. 
PRODUCTOS DE 
MAIZ S.A. 
(Argentina) 
Corn Products 
International Inc. 
Ferreyros 
to Foreign 
in 1999 
DUKE ENERGY 
INTERNATIONAL EGENOR 
S.A.A. 
Electricity 180 Privatised in 
1994 from 
Electroperu. 
 In 1996,  Inversiones Dominion 
Peru, of Duke Energy Inc. (USA), 
buys 60%. In 1997, Empresa de 
Generacion Electrica Nor Peru SA 
(EGENOR) is founded. In 1997. 
Chilgener SA bought 49% of 
Inversiones Dominion Peru SA. In 
1999, Chilgener transfers its equity 
to Duke Energy Int. Peru Holdings. 
DUKE ENERGY Duke Energy  Foreign 
Firm 
EDEGEL S.A.A. Electricity 150 Founded in 
1994 as 60% 
is privitised: 
onwed by 
Consorcio 
Generandes 
Co. 
In 2006, merger with Empresa de 
Generacion Termoelectrica de 
Ventanilla SA (Etevensa). In 2008, 
owns Chinango as only subsidiary. 
GENERANDES 
PERU S.A. (54%), 
ENDESA CHILE 
(30%), Fondos 
Generandes Peru SA 
(Onwed by Endesa 
Chile , Spain) 
Foreign 
Firm 
EDELNOR S.A.A. Electricity 700 Founded in 
1994. 
 INVERSIONES 
DISTRILIMA S A 
(52%), ENERSIS 
S.A. (24%, 
Chile),Credicorp 
(5%) 
Inversiones Distrilima 
SA (owning also 
EDECHANCAY) 
,onwed by Endesa 
(Spain). In 2007, Enel 
Energy Europe srl and 
Acciona SA bought 67% 
and 25% of Endesa. In 
2009 Enel bought the 
25% from Acciona SA. 
Foreign 
Firm 
ELECTRO SUR ESTE S.A.A. Electricity 200 to 
400 
Founded in 
1983 
 FONAFE (99%), Private (1%) 
 
FONAFE (99%), Private 
(1%) 
Semi-
Public 
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ELECTRO SUR MEDIO 
S.A.A. 
Electricity 225 Founded in 
1912, was 
privatised in 
1997. In 
1997, Hica 
Inversiones 
sa was 
formed and 
bought 
Electro Sur 
Medio. In 
2009 , 
changes to 
Electro 
Dunas SA 
 DUNAS ENERGIA 
SRL 
 Mixed 
Ownership 
EMBOTELLADORA 
LATINOAMERICANA S.A. - 
ELSA Y SUBSIDIARIAS 
Commerce 2000 Founded 
1947. Stops 
in 2004 
In 1995 merger with Indo Quina, 
Sabores Amazonicos, 
Distribuciones Geminis SA, Cural 
(transport), La purezza, Discofassa, 
Tisco. In 1997, merger with 
Porvent SA. In 1997, merger with 
firms which were no related: 
Negociacion Sur Peruana, Comp 
Industrial Nor Peruana, 
Emproplast, Traspordadora 
Lambayeque, Costos and 
Margenes. The consolidaded 
balance includes Comp Indus. Nor 
Oriente(Ciinorsa) and Industrial 
Iquitos SA (IISA). 
SOCIEDAD DE 
CARTERA DEL 
PACIFICO S.R.L. 
SOCAP (81%, 
Coca Cola), and 
Lindley (11%) 
Embonor Holdings 
through SOCAP 
(Sociedad de Cartera del 
Pacifico SRL). In 2004 
SOCAP transfer to 
Corporacion Jose R. 
Lindley SA. 
Foreign 
Firm 
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EMPRESA AGRARIA 
AZUCARERA ANDAHUASI 
S.A.A. 
Agribusiness 1300 to 
2000 
Founded in 
1996 from 
cooperativa 
Its subsidiaries are Industrial 
Andahuasi and  Empresa Agraria 
Andahuasi Manco Capac 
RIO PATIVILCA 
S.A (28%), 
DUCKTOWN 
HOLDINGS S.A. 
(17%, Panama), 
ABACO 
CORPORACION 
SOC. ANONIMA 
CERRADA (16%), 
ZABUCK 
INTERNATIONAL 
INC (13%, 
Panama), 
INDUSTRIAL 
ANDAHUASI 
S.A.C. (9%) 
 Foreign 
Conglomer
ate 
EMPRESA AGRARIA 
CHIQUITOY S.A. 
Agribusiness 200 to 
450 
Founded in 
1992 
Sell most of its product to the 
parent company and Casa Grande 
sa. 
CARTAVIO S.A.A 
(50%), 
AGROHOLDING 
S.A.C. (49%),  
Complejo 
Agroindustrial Cartavio 
S.A.A 
Banda 
EMPRESA AGRICOLA 
BARRAZA S.A. 
Agribusiness 50 Founded in 
1996 
in 2009, Spin off of subsidiaries: 
Compania Agricola Miraflores, 
Comp Agricola Chocas SAC, 
Vallesol SAC, Inmobiliaria Barraza 
SAC, Fruit and Vegetables Peru. 
Mantilla 
Family(48%), J.P. 
FLETCHER 
SUGAR 
ENGINERING 
CORPORATION 
(20%, Panama), 
AGRUPACION 
DE FINANZAS 
BANELCO S.A 
(13%, Panama), 
MISKI 
INVERSIONES Y 
NEGOCIOS S.R.L. 
(7%) 
 Mixed 
Ownership 
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EMPRESA AGRICOLA 
GANADERA SALAMANCA 
S.A.A. 
Agribusiness 100 Founded in 
1992 
 Private 
(VASQUEZ, 
SANCHEZ, 
PAJARES, 
ESTEVES), 
DESTILERIA 
CHICLAYO S.A.C 
(7%) 
 Private 
Ownership 
EMPRESA AGRICOLA SAN 
JUAN S.A.A. 
Agribusiness 70 Founded in 
1986 
 CORPORACION 
PERHUSA S.A 
PERHUSA Domestic 
Conglomer
ate 
EMPRESA AGRICOLA 
SINTUCO S.A. 
Agribusiness 160 Founded in 
1996 
 CORPORACION 
AZUCARERA 
DEL PERU 
SOCIEDAD 
ANONIMA - 
COAZUCAR DEL 
PERU S.A. 
(58%),CARTAVIO 
S.A.A (15%), 
Galloso family 
(13%) 
In 1999, Azucagro SA 
buys 51%. 
Banda 
EMPRESA 
AGROINDUSTRIAL 
LAREDO S.A.A. 
Agribusiness 800 Founded in 
1970 
 MANUELITA 
INTERNACIONA
L S.A. (64%, 
Colombia), 
INVERSIONES 
MANUELITA S.A. 
(14%, Colombia), 
Family Velarde 
(6%) 
In 1998, Manuelita SA 
bought 64.21% 
(Colombia). In 2006 
reached 78.75%. 
Foreign 
Firm 
311 
 
EMPRESA 
AGROINDUSTRIAL 
POMALCA 
Agribusiness 3000 Founed in 
1970 as 
Cooperativa. 
 Family Oviedo 
(14%), 
CORPORACION 
AGROINDUSTRI
AL DEL NORTE 
SAC (13%), 
FONAFE(15%), 
SEGURO SOCIAL 
DE SALUD (9%), 
OFICINA DE 
NORMALIZACIO
N PREVISIONAL 
ONP (8%) 
 Mixed 
Ownership 
EMPRESA 
AGROINDUSTRIAL TUMAN 
S.A.A. 
Agribusiness 3000 Founded in 
1970 as 
Cooperativa. 
Changes 
status in 
1995. 
 Family Oviedo 
(6%), 
BORLINGHTON 
TRADING CORP 
(14%, Panama) 
 Mixed 
Ownership 
EMPRESA AZUCARERA "EL 
INGENIO" S.A. 
Agribusiness 300 Founded in 
1992. 
Sells its products to Agro Industrial 
Paramonga SA  
CONSORCIO 
ALCOHOLERO 
DEL NORTE 
S.A.(48%), 
ARGEX 
TRADING 
FINANCE LTD. 
(11%,Virgin Isl) 
and HARKEITH 
CORPORATION 
(11%,Virgin Isl) 
 Mixed 
Ownership 
EMPRESA DE LA SAL S.A. Commerce 100 Founded in 
1969 
 QUIMPAC S.A Quimpac SA from 1994 Fishman 
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EMPRESA EDITORA EL 
COMERCIO S.A. Y 
SUBSIDIARIAS 
Services 
(Media) 
600 Founed in 
1928 
In 1996, merger between "El 
Comercio" and Servicios 
Teleinformaticos SA, Estabilimento 
Grafico Amauta SA, Derivados 
Generales SA. It buys Orbis 
Ventures S.A.C. (2000), Zetta 
Comunicadores del Perú 
S.A.E.M.A.(1995), Inmobiliaria El 
Sol del Perú S.A. (1954) and Ec 
JobShark S.A.C. (2001), Grupo TV 
Peru (2003), Producciones 
Cantabria SAC (2006), Punto y 
Coma Editores SAC (2006), 
Subscripciones Integrales SAC 
(2006). 
Miro Quesada 
Family  (20%) 
 Private 
Ownership 
EMPRESA REGIONAL DE 
SERVICIO PUBLICO DE 
ELECTRICIDAD 
ELECTRONORTE MEDIO 
S.A. - HIDRANDINA 
Electricity 200 to 
300 
Founded in 
1984 within 
Electroperu. 
From 1990 administers the Lesser 
Hydraulic Thermic Generation 
Stations and the Interconnected 
Grid's electricity 
FONAFE  Grupo Distriluz which 
owns: Electronorte SA, 
Electrocentro SA, 
Electronoroeste SA, 
Hidrandina SA 
Semi-
Public 
EMPRESA SIDERURGICA 
DEL PERU S.A.A. - 
SIDERPERU 
Manufacturi
ng (Capital 
Goods) 
1000 Founded in 
1971, 
privatised 
process 
started in 
1992. In 
1996 Sider 
Corp 
(Acerco SA, 
Wiese 
Inversiones 
Finacieras 
SA and  
Stanton 
Funding 
LDC) buys it 
for US$ 163 
mil.  
In 1998, merger between Compania 
Siderurgica del Peru and Empresa 
Siderurgica del Peru SA 
(Siderperu) and its subsidiarias 
(Tubos y Alcantarillas SAC and 
Tubos y Estructuras SA) 
GERDAU S.A. 
(87%,Brazil) 
Gerdau SA de Brasil 
from 2006 
Wiese to 
Foreign 
Conglomer
ate in 2006 
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EXSA S.A. Y SUBSIDIARIAS 
Manufacturi
ng (Capital 
Goods) 
250-500 Founded in 
1954 
In 1995, subsidiaries are: Fontargen 
Latinoamericana SA, Servicios 
Tecnico SA, Exsa Comercial SA. 
In 1996, merger Fontargen -Exsa. 
In 1996,Acquisition of Valores 
Lurin SA (holding). In 2000, buys 
Quimica Sola SA (Chemicals). In 
2002 it buys ALW Chile (same 
industry) and Nitrocorp SA 
(Chemicals). Subsidiaris in 2002 
are the last two plus Valore Lurin 
SAC. 
INVERSIONES 
SAN BORJA S A  
(35%), 
INVERSIONES 
BRECA S A (23%), 
MINSUR SA 
(17%), other 
 Brescia 
FABRICA NACIONAL DE 
ACUMULADORES ETNA 
S.A. 
Manufacturi
ng(Capital 
Goods) 
200 Founded in 
1945 
In 2008, open branch in Chile, not 
much diff with consolidaded 
balance. 
PEYON Family   Private 
Ownership 
FABRICA PERUANA 
ETERNIT S.A. 
Manufacturi
ng 
130 Founded in 
1940 
Subsidairias: Nicoll Eterplast (99% 
then 39% in 1995), and Ceramica 
SAn Lorenzo (50%). Huge 
injection of capital in 1995. In 1995 
there is the merger with 
PROVISSA (Compania 
constructoria Inmobiliaria y 
promotora de vivienda social) and 
COMINCA (compania Industrial 
comercial) 
ETEX PERU 
S.A.C. 
From 1998, Etex Peru 
SAC 
Foreign 
Conglomer
ate 
FABRITEX PERUANA S.A. 
EN INSOLVENCIA 
Manufacturi
ng (Textile) 
1100 Founded in 
1947. 
Insolvency 
in 2002 
In 1996, merger with : Negociacion 
Don Leon SA, Textil Maritima Kid 
Lan Peruana, Corporacion Textil 
Mina, Textil Don Alejandro, 
Inmobiliaria Davisa, Peru Teje, 
Compania Industrial Ibatex, 
Desmotadora San Jorge. 
GORYN Family 
(73%) , 
DISCOUNT 
ENTERPRISES 
CORP. (17%, 
Virgin Isl.) and 
CIGNA 
ENTERPRISES 
CORP. (9%, Virgin 
Isl.) 
 Private 
Ownership 
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FERREYROS S.A.A. Y 
SUBSIDIARIAS 
Commerce 1500-
2500 
Founded in 
1922. 
Subsidiarieas in 1992 are : 
Organizacion Victoria, Fca de 
Implementos Agricolas Nacionales, 
Motorindustria, Exco, Trevor, 
Fersil, Depositos Efe, Motored 
(sold in 1997). Later in mid 1990s 
added Heavy machineries services, 
Domingo Rodas. In time changes, 
in 2006 they are: Ferreyros SAA, 
Unimaq SA, Orvisa SA, Domingo 
Rodas, Fiansa, Motorindustria, 
Depositos Efe, Ferreenergy, 
Consorcio CERES. In 2007 adds 
Cresko, Mega Cauch. 
Varios Fondos  Ferreyros 
FILAMENTOS 
INDUSTRIALES S.A. 
Manufacturi
ng (Textile) 
100-150 Founded in 
1974 
 MUSIRIS Family  Private 
Ownership 
FIMA S.A. Manufacturi
ng (Capital 
Goods) 
90 Founded in 
1993 as 
merger of 
Fabricacion 
Industrial de 
Maquinarias 
SA and 
Select wood 
SA 
all transactions in USD Zoia and Nesta 
family, 
JANSVILLE 
TRADING & CO. 
(17% panama), 
WOODLEY 
CONTINENTAL 
INC (16%, 
Panama) 
 Mixed 
Ownership 
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GLORIA S.A. Commerce 500-
1000 
Founded in 
1941. In 
1993 merges 
with 
Deprodeca 
(Distribution 
Exclusiva de 
Productos de 
Calidad SA) 
and Farpasa( 
Farmaceutic
a del 
Pacifico) and 
Centro 
Papelero SA 
In 1999, it absorbes Carnilac SA. 
The consolidaded balance since 
2006 includes also Yura (Cement), 
Cemento Sur, Industria Cachimayo 
SA (Chemicals), Empresa Oriental 
de Emprendimientos (EMOM) 
(Investments in Bolivia), Pil 
Andina (Milk products in 
Bolivia).In 2007, also 
Agroindustial del Peru. In 2008 
Trupal SA mergers with Centro 
Papelero SA and Manufacturera de 
Papeles Y Cartones del Peru SA. In 
addition, spinn-off of Consorcio 
Cementero del Sur which takes, 
Cemento Sur, Yura Sa, Industrias 
Cachimayo SA. In 2009 sells 
Farmaceutica del Pacifico for 
19.718 mil S.  
BANDA FAMILY 
(75%), 
RACIONALIZATI
ON 
EMPRESARIAL 
SA, SILVERSTON 
HOLDINGS INC 
(USA) 
 Banda 
GRAÑA Y MONTERO S.A.A. 
Y SUBSIDIARIES 
Construction 3600 The SAA 
was founded 
in 1996 
(Holding). 
The group is 
involved in 
Ing. And 
Infrastructur
e (70%), Oil 
(11%), 
Estate 
(8%),System
s (10%) 
 GH HOLDING 
GROUP CORP. 
(21%, panama), 
BETHEL 
ENTERPRISES 
(Panama), other  
 Domestic 
conglomera
te 
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GRUPO SINDICATO 
PESQUERO DEL PERU S.A. 
Fishing 1800 Founded in 
1992, starts 
in 1994. The 
group was 
called 
Empresa 
Almex SA 
until 1996. 
For the group. Empresa 
relacionadas: Inversiones Maritima 
Chiclayp SA, Inversiones Andraix 
SA, Empresa Almex SA. Subs: 
Pesca Peru Chicama SA, Consorcio 
de exportanciones sindicato pesq 
del peru sA, Pesqueria don Miguel 
SRL, Pes Don Rodriguez SRL, Pes. 
Don Enrique SRL, Pes. Waljourzu 
SRL, P. Constancia SRL, P. AMbar 
SA, Pacifico del Norte SA. Main 
group is formed by Sind Pes 
Matarani SA, Electro Cahua SA, 
Sociedad distributora de alimentos 
SA, Empresa de Acesoria Y 
Servicio SA, Industrias Navales SA 
and Servicios Aeronauticos Sipesa 
SA 
INVERSIONES 
BRECA S A (60%), 
INVERSIONES 
SAN BORJA S A 
(17%), 
URBANIZACION 
JARDIN S.A. 
(17%), 
URBANIZACION 
SANTA MARINA 
S A (5%) 
 Brescia 
HIDROSTAL S.A. Manufacturi
ng (Capital 
Goods) 
150 - 
400 
Founded in 
1955 
 HIDROSTAL 
HOLDING A.G. 
(Swiss, Panama) 
From 2006 , Hidrostal 
Holding SA (Swiss) 
Foreign 
Firm 
INCA TOPS S.A. Manufacturi
ng (Textile) 
300-
1000 
Founded in 
1965 
 AMSUD 
ANSTALT 
(51%,swiss), 
CARABAYA 
INVERSIONES Y 
FINANZAS S.A. 
(41%) 
 Mixed 
Ownership 
INDECO S.A. Manufacturi
ng (Capital 
Goods) 
250 Founded in 
1952 
In 1995 , big merger with 
subsidiaries and other copper 
manufacturers which is reflected in 
1994 statement. (see list in 1995). 
In 1999, merger with Invercob SA ,  
a subsidiarty of Madeco. The 
consolidaded balance for 2000 
includes Productos Industriales 
Varias Aplicaciones SA. 
INVERCABLE 
S.A. (Chile) 
Subsidiary of Madeco 
SA del Chile. In 2009 is 
subsidisry of Nexans SA 
(France) through 
Invercable SA (Chile) 
Foreign 
Conglomer
ate 
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INDUSTRIA TEXTIL PIURA 
S.A. 
Manufacturi
ng (Textile) 
600 Founded in 
1972 
 INVERSIONES 
TULIPAN S.A. 
(33%), CERNICAL 
GROUP S.A. 
(13%), Bouillon 
Family (7%), 
INVERSIONES 
PIURANAS S.A. 
(7%), 
NEGOCIACION 
AGRICOLA 
MALLARES S.A. 
(5%) 
 Romero 
INDUSTRIAS DEL ENVASE 
S.A. 
Manufacturi
ng 
(Containers 
& 
Packaging) 
250 Founded in 
1971 as 
Industrial 
Cacer S.A. 
In 1994 , it merges with Editorial 
Imprenta Amarú S.A. Changing 
name in Industrias del Envase S.A. 
From 1998 it appears as subsudy of 
Backus 
Unión de 
Cervecerías 
Peruanas Backus y 
Johnston S.A.A 
Unión de Cervecerías 
Peruanas Backus y 
Johnston S.A.A 
Bentin  
INDUSTRIAS ELECTRO 
QUIMICAS S.A. IEQSA 
Manufacturi
ng 
(Chemicals) 
400 Founded in 
1963 
In 2003,Umicore (Belgium) buys 
40%. In 2005, is a subsidiary of 
Parma Holdings SA (Panama 
Republic) buying 60%. 
PARMA 
HOLDINGS S.A 
(60%), UMICORE 
(40%) 
 Foreign 
Firm 
INDUSTRIAS VENCEDOR 
S.A. And subsidiary 
Manufacturi
ng 
(Chemicals) 
350 Founded in 
1969 
The consolidaded includes Tinta 
Graficas SA 
INDUSTRIAS 
TRICOLOR PERU 
S.A. 
Industrias Tricolor Peru 
SA (Chile) 
Foreign 
Firm 
INTRADEVCO INDUSTRIAL 
S.A. 
Manufacturi
ng 
(Chemicals) 
200-
1200 
Inter 
American 
Trade 
Developmen
t Company 
Sa founded 
in 1949 
In 1998, spin off of Intradevco 
Industrial SA from Intradevco SA. 
In 2005 it is owed by Tecnología 
Aplicada (99% Virgin Islands) 
TECNOLOGIA 
APLICADA S.A. 
(Virgin Isl) 
 Foreign 
Firm 
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INVERSIONES 
CENTENARIO S.A.A. Y 
SUBSIDIARIAS 
Construction 50 Founded in 
1986 
In 1993, merger between 
Inversiones Centenario SA and La 
Inmobiliaria SA. Subsidiaries: 
Edificaciones Macrocomercio SA, 
Promotora Santo Domingo SA, 
Cosmosan Anstalt, Inversiones 
Nueva Metropoli SA, Edificaciones  
Melgarejo SAC, Promotora San 
Pedro SAC, Promocion 
Inmobiliaria del Sur SA, Centro 
Empresarial El Derby SA, Paz - 
Centenario SA, IDK SA.  
CREDICORP LTD. 
(13%), ATLANTIC 
SECURITY BANK 
(11%, 
Caiman),GOOD 
RATE 
CORPORATION 
(5%, Panama), 
Romero Family 
(12%), RIMAC 
INTERNACIONA
L COMPAÑIA DE 
SEGUROS  (5%)  
 Mixed 
Ownership 
INVERSIONES EN TURISMO 
S.A. INVERTUR Y 
SUBSIDIARIAS 
Services 300 Founded in 
1975 
During 2000 subsidiaries become: 
La Angostura SA, Inversiones en 
Turismo SA 
PAYKEL 
DEVELOPMENT 
INC (25%), 
LUKEVILLE 
CONSULTANCE 
INC (23%), 
SARRAN 
TRADING (21%), 
INVERSIONES 
VERDUN (13%) 
 Foreign 
Firm 
INVERSIONES 
NACIONALES DE TURISMO 
S.A. INTURSA 
Services 500 Founded in 
1971 
 INVERSIONES 
BRECA S A (48%), 
URBANIZADORA 
JARDIN S A 
(30%), 
INVERSIONES 
SAN BORJA S A 
(14%) 
 Brescia 
INVERSIONES 
PACASMAYO S.A. Y 
SUBSIDIARIAS 
Construction 1400 Founded in 
1973 
In 1995 subsidiaries are : Cementos 
Norte Pacasmayo SA, Distribudora 
Norte Pacasmayo S.R. Ltda., 
Invernor S.A. and Cordasa. In 
1997, Cementos Norte Pacasmayo 
Energia. 
FARRAGUT 
HOLDINGS INC. 
(95%, Caiman) 
 Hochschiel
d 
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IQF DEL PERU S.A. Y 
SUBSIDIARIAS 
Commerce 800 Founded in 
1987 
In 1998, the consolidaded balance 
includes Sociedad Agricola 
Tacaraca SA (50% and more later, 
founded in 1995) and Ecomar 
SA(50%, founded in 1995). In 
2004 merger with Tacaraca SA. 
Fernandini Family, 
Andean Holding 
Inc. (10.3%, Chile) 
Fernandini Family , 
10% Andean Holdings 
Chile 
Private 
Ownership 
LAIVE S.A. Agribusiness 200 Founded in 
1994, 
changed 
name from 
Sociedad 
Ganadera del 
Centro  SA. 
In 1995, 
recives 11.85 
mil USD 
from State 
over 2 years 
 COMERCIAL 
VICTOR 
MANUEL S.A. 
(38%), VALORES 
AGROINDUSTRI
ALES S.A. (38%) 
Empresa Sta. Carolina 
(Cayman) and Valores 
Agroindustriales 
Mixed 
Ownership 
LAPICES Y CONEXOS S.A. 
LAYCONSA Y 
SUBSIDIARIAS 
Commerce 50 to 
400 
Founded in 
1965. 
In 1999, buys Agricola Pampa Baja 
SAC as shown in the consolidaded 
balance. 
HOLDING EL 
SOL S.A.C. 
(Parede Family) 
 Private 
Ownership 
LIMA CAUCHO S.A. Manufacturi
ng (Auto) 
50 to 
400 
Founded in 
1955 
 BLUE ORBIS 
CORP. (37% 
Panama), 
COMERCIALIZA
DORA DE 
LLANTAS 
UNIDAS S.A. 
(37%, 
Colombia),CLEAT
ONE BUSINESS, 
INC. (12% UK),  
Universal Investors Ltd. 
until 1995, after 
Industria Colombiana de 
Llantas SA. In 1998, 
bought by Mavalle Ltda. 
In 199, bought by 
Season Group Limited 
(Bahamas). In 2005, 
Season sells half of the 
shares to 
Comercializadora 
Llantas Unidas SA 
(Colombia). In 2008 
Season Group transfered 
Foreign 
Firm 
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its share to Blue Orbis 
Corp. (Panama). 
LP HOLDING Y 
SUBSIDIARIAS 
Construction 500 In 1996 
changed 
from Los 
Portales to 
LP Holdings 
It owns Textil San Cristobal SA, 
Los Portales SA, Compania Minera 
Caudalosa SA,. In 2007 buys 50% 
of Inversiones de Estacionamientos 
SA. In 2008, it buys 50% of 
Inversiones en Inmuebles SA 
  Raffo 
LOS PORTALES  Construction 100 Founded in 
1977 
   Raffo 
LUZ DEL SUR S.A.A. Y 
SUBSIDIARIAS 
Electricity 600 Founded in 
1994, It was 
Edelsur 
(Empresa de 
Distribucion 
Electrica de 
Lima Sur 
SA) 
In 1996 includes the subsidiaries 
Empresa de Distribucion Electrica 
de Canete SA, Inmobiliaria Luz del 
Sur SA, Luz del Sur International 
AVV. 
ONTARIO - 
QUINTA S.R.L. 
(61%), PERUVIAN 
OPPORTUNITY 
COMPANY S.A.C. 
(13%) 
Consorcio Ontario 
Quinta AVV (Chilquinta 
SA , Chile, and Ontario 
Hydro Int. Inc., 
Canada). In 
2004,Peruvian 
Opportunity Company 
SAC (PSEG Americas 
Ltd and Sempra Energy 
International Holding 
BV)  
Foreign 
Conglomer
ate 
MALTERIA LIMA S.A. Commerce 120 Founded in 
1955 
  Unión de Cervecerías 
Peruanas Backus y 
Johnston S.A.A 
Bentin  
MANUFACTURA DE 
METALES Y ALUMINIO 
"RECORD" S.A. 
Manufacturi
ng (Metals) 
200 to 
300 
Founded in 
1934 
 SCHWARZ family, 
FREITAG family, 
HAUSTEIN family 
 Private 
Ownership 
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MARMOLES Y GRANITOS 
S.A. 
Mining 50 Founded in 
1940 
 Menchelli 
Family(87%) , 
GREEN FEE 
INVESTMENT 
S.A. (13%) 
 Menchelli 
METALURGICA PERUANA 
S.A. - MEPSA 
Manufacturi
ng (Metals) 
250 Founded in 
1960 
 SUDAMERICANA 
DE FIBRAS S.A. 
(44%), 
INVERSIONES 
AEGIS S.A. (29%, 
Chile), SOUTH 
AMERICAN 
MINERALS INC. 
(15%, Panama), 
SPRING CREST 
LTD. (12%) 
Since 
1995,Sudamericana 
through Sudamericana 
de Fibras SA (44%)and 
Inversiones Aegis SA 
(29%,Chile) 
Ferreyros 
and Mixed 
MICHELL Y CIA. S.A. Manufacturi
ng (Textile) 
400 - 
850 
Founded in 
1957 
Changed name from Alpalana SA 
in 1999. 
Michell Family  Private 
Ownership 
MINSUR S.A. Y 
SUBSIDIARIAS 
Mining 400 Founded in 
1966 
Subsidiaries are Funsur SA (until 
2007), Minera Carabaya SA. In 
2005 includes Cumbres Andina SA 
and  Compania Minera Barbastro 
SA (subsidiary of Cumbres). In 
2007  also Minera Sillustri SA. In 
2008, Minera Latinoamericana 
SAC and its subsidiary Serra de 
Madeira Participacoes Ltda (Brazil) 
and Mineracao Taboca SA (Brazil). 
In 2009, a subsidiary of Minera 
Latinoamericana, Inversiones 
Cordillera del Sur Ltda. (founded in 
Chile) buys Blue Circle Chilean 
Holdings Ltda (Chile) which have 
subs in Chile such as Cementos 
Melon SA. 
INVERSIONES 
BRECA S A (99%) 
Inversiones Breca SA Brescia 
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MOTORES DIESEL 
ANDINOS S.A. - MODASA 
Manufacturi
ng (Capital 
Goods) 
90 Founded in 
1974 
Since 1995, balance includes 
subsidiary Modasa Comercial SA 
GRUPO SAN 
JUAN 
INVERSIONES 
S.A. (50%), 
INVERSIONES 
EUROMAQ S.A.C. 
(50%) 
Semi-state: Cofide 
owned  48%, Grupo San 
Juan SA 26%, Perkins 
Engines Ltd. 26%. 
Semi-
Public to 
Foreign 
(2005) 
NEGOCIACION AGRICOLA 
VISTA ALEGRE S.A. 
Agribusiness 30 Founded as 
Cooperativa 
, it changes 
in 1997. 
Since 2006 it stops production AGRUPACION 
DE FINANZAS 
BANELCO S.A 
(24%), Family 
Burga (20%), J.P. 
FLETCHER 
SUGAR 
ENGINERING 
CORPORATION 
(15%, Panama), 
Arbulo Family 
(16%), Arambulo 
(8%), B.B.F. S.A. 
(7%, Panama) 
 Mixed 
Ownership 
NEGOCIOS E INMUEBLES 
S.A. 
Construction 30 Founded 
before 1990. 
In 1993, Agro Empaques SA 
absorbeb Negocios y Inmuebles 
SA. Adopting the name. 
HELMSLEY 
MANEGEMENT 
INC (18%, USA), 
FUNDACION 
WIESE (13%), 
ADMINISTRACIO
N MOBILIARIA E 
INMOBILIARIA 
S.A. (6%) 
 Menchelli, 
Wiese and 
others 
NUEVAS INVERSIONES SA 
Y SUBSIDIARIES 
Construction 700 Founded in 
1965 
Consolidaded: Sindicato de 
Inversiones y Administracion SA 
(53%), Cemento Lima SA (68%), 
Inversiones en Concreto y Afines 
SA (60%), Generacion Electrica de 
Atocongo SA, Transportes Lurin 
SA, Deposito Aduanero Cochan 
SA, Minera Adelaida SA, Naviera 
Conchan. Later CELEPSA 60%, 
  Domestic 
Conglomer
ate 
323 
 
Drake Cement 77% 
PERU REAL ESTATE S.A.A. Construction 300 Founded in 
1991 as 
Constructora 
Manzanilla 
SA. In 1993, 
changed to 
1993. In 
2000, 
changed to 
Peru Holding 
de Turismo 
SAA 
 RONCESVALLES 
S.A (20%, 
Panama), 
PERUVAL CORP 
S.A. (24%, peru 
and panama), 
LATIN 
SECURITY 
CORPORATION 
(18%, Panama), 
SHEARSON 
LEHMAN 
BROTHERS (11%, 
USA), MIYASATO 
ONAGA Family 
(6%) 
 Mixed 
Ownership 
PERUANA DE ENERGIA 
S.A.A. 
Electricity 2 Founded in 
1996 
In 1997, merger with Compania 
Electrica del Perene SA. 
FARNELL 
RESOURCES INC. 
(23%, Panama), 
MONTE AZUL 
INVESTMENTS 
S.A. (21%, 
Panama), 
EDGEMONT 
CORP. (15%, 
Panama), SAINT 
PAUL HOLDING 
GLOBAL CORP. 
(15%, Panama) 
  Foreign 
Conglomer
ate 
PERUBAR S.A. Manufacturi
ng (Metals) 
60 Founded in 
1957 
In 2000,  concession to Empresa 
Minera Yauliyacu 
GLENCORE 
MINERA AG 
(Swiss) 
Marc Rich & Co. 
Minera SA, then 
Glencore Minera  
Foreign 
Conglomer
ate 
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PROMOTORA CLUB 
EMPRESARIAL S.A. 
Services 50 Founded in 
1995, start 
operation in 
1998. 
 COLOCACIONES 
PUBLICITARIAS 
S.A. (25%), Banco 
Latino (5%),  
Banco de credito  
(2%), Family Vega 
(5%), Family 
Zamorano (5%), 
Telefonica Peru 
(2%) 
 Domestic 
Ownership 
QUIMPAC S.A. And 
subsidiary 
Manufacturi
ng 
(Chemicals) 
400 Founded in 
1996 from 
merger of 
Quimica del 
Pacifico SA 
(privitised in 
1992)and 
Servicios 
Quimicos 
Optimos SA 
In 2005, buys Empresa de la Sal 
SA (colombia) 
QUIMPAC 
CORP.S.A.C. 
Arinco SA (Grupo 
Marcos Fishman, Israel) 
Fishman 
REACTIVOS NACIONALES 
S.A. RENASA 
Manufacturi
ng 
(Chemicals) 
50 to 90 Founded in 
1961. 
 IMPERA 
CORPORATION 
(68%), 
LUKEVILLE 
CONSULTANCE 
INC. (22%) 
Empresa Minera del 
Centro del Peru sa - 
CENTROMIN PERU 
until 1993 when 
privatised. Then Impera 
Corporation (65%, 
Panama), Friars 
Corporation (15% , 
USA), ING Baring 
(13%, USA), Sociedada 
Minera  Puquio Cocha 
(7%, Peru) 
Foreign 
Firm 
RED BICOLOR DE 
COMUNICACIONES S.A.A. - 
RBC TV S.A.A. 
Services 
(Media) 
 Founded in 
1984 
In 2003, consolidaded balance 
sheet includes Radio Tigre SAC. 
Vallarino Family  Private 
Ownership 
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REFINERIA LA PAMPILLA 
SAA 
Manufacturi
ng 
 Founded in 
1994, 
operative 
from 1996 
 
 REPSOL YPF 
PERU 
Repsol YPF Peru 
 
Foreign 
Firm 
SAGA FALABELLA S.A. Services 3000 Founded in 
1953. called 
Sociedad 
Andina de 
los grandes 
Almacenes 
SA from 
1984 to 1999 
 FALABELLA 
PERU S.A.A. 
Inversora Falken SA, 
Grupo Falabella de 
Chile  
Foreign 
Firm 
SHOUGANG GENERACION 
ELECTRICA S.A.A. 
Electricity 50 Founded in 
1997, spinn-
off from 
Shougang 
Hierro Peru 
SAA 
 SHOUGANG 
CORPORATION 
Shougang Corporation 
(China) 
Foreign 
Firm 
SHOUGANG HIERRO PERU 
S.A.A. 
Mining 1500 Founded in 
1952 as 
Marcona 
Mining 
Company. 
Changed 
name in 
1975 in 
Hierro Peru, 
privatised in 
1993. 
 SHOUGANG 
CORPORATION 
(China) 
 Foreign 
Conglomer
ate 
SOCIEDAD INDUSTRIAL DE 
ARTICULOS DE METAL 
S.A.C. - SIAM 
Manufacturi
ng (Metal) 
60-180 Founded in 
1937., ex 
SIAM Mario 
Canepa y 
Cia. 
 Canepa Family, 
COLOCACIONES 
E INVERSIONES 
LATINAS S.A. 
(15%) 
 Private 
Ownership 
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SOCIEDAD MINERA EL 
BROCAL S.A. 
Mining 300 Founded in 
1956 
 INVERSIONES 
COLQUIJIRCA 
S.A. (51%), 
Fernandini Family 
(8%) 
Inversiones Colquijira 
SA (Grupo 
Buenaventura) 
Mixed 
Ownership 
SOUTHERN PERU COPPER 
CORPORATION, SUCURSAL 
DEL PERU 
Mining 3500 Founded in 
1954 
 SOUTHERN 
COPPER 
CORPORATION 
Southern Copper Corp. 
(USA, owned by Grupo 
Mexico SA de C.V.) 
Foreign 
Firm 
TABACALERA NACIONAL 
S.A.A. -TANASA (Now British 
American Tobacco del Peru 
Holdings SAA) 
Commerce 200 Founded in 
1964. In mid 
1990s the 
owner were 
York 
International 
Ind. And 
|Kentucky 
Industries 
Corp. 
IN 2003 bought by Brit Am tob. YORK 
INTERNATIONAL 
INDUSTRIES and 
KENTUCKY 
INDUSTRIES 
CORPORATION, 
panama 
British American 
Tobacco Peru Holding 
Limited  
Foreign 
Firm 
TELEFONICA DEL PERU 
S.A.A. Y SUBSIDIARIAS 
Services 
(Telecommu
nication) 
6000 Founded in 
1920. 
Privitised in 
1994. In 
1995 
changed 
from 
Compania 
Peruana de 
Telefonos 
SA into 
Telefonica 
de Peru SA. 
CPT merged 
with ENTEL 
Peru. 
Since 1997 owns Telefonica 
Soluciones Globales SA, 
Telefonica Multimedia SA, 
Telefonica Servicios Financieros 
SA, Telefonica Producciones SA, 
Telefonica Servicios Internet del 
Peru SA. In 2002, Transporte 
Urgente de Mensajeria SAC, 
Servicios Editoriales del Peru SAC. 
In 2007, it buys Telefonica Moviles 
SA 
Telefonica Telefonica (Spain) Foreign 
Firm 
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TELEFONICA MOVILES 
PERU HOLDING S.A.A. 
Services 
(Telecommu
nication) 
1200 Founded in 
1990 as 
Telemovil 
SA, became 
in 1992 Tele 
2000 until 
1999, then 
BellSouth 
Peru SA. In 
2004, 
becomes 
Comunicacio
nes Moviles 
del Peru SA 
y subsidiaria 
(subsidiary 
of Latin 
America 
Cellular 
Holdings BV 
,Holland, 
which 
belongs to 
Grupo 
Telefonica 
Moviles , 
Spain) after 
the 
acquisition 
from Grupo 
Telefonica 
(97.43%). In 
2005, 
reorganisatio
n and merger 
with 
Telefonica 
Moviles 
SAC. In 
 TELEFONICA 
DEL PERU S.A.A. 
 Foreign 
Firm 
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2008, 
telefonica 
del Peru 
becomes the 
main owner. 
TEXTIL SAN CRISTOBAL 
S.A. 
Manufacturi
ng (Textile) 
2000 Founded in 
1942. 
In 1993, merger with Consorcio 
Peruano de Confecciones SA 
SCOTIA 
SOCIEDAD 
TITULIZADORA 
S.A. (LP 
Holding,39%), LA 
FIDUCIARIA S.A. 
(33%), ATLANTIC 
SECURITY BANK 
(9%, Caiman) 
 Raffo and 
Mixed 
TICINO DEL PERU S.A. Commerce 40 Founded in 
1961 
In 1995, it buys M. Componentes 
Metalicos SA 
BTICINO S.P.A. 
(Italy) 
Ticino SPA (49% Italy) Foreign 
Firm 
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UNION DE CERVECERIAS 
PERUANAS BACKUS Y 
JOHNSTON S.A.A. Y 
SUBSIDIARIAS 
Commerce 1300 to 
5500 
(cons) 
Founded in 
1879. from 
1955 is 
Peruvian. 
The business 
is divided in 
5 divisions: 
Drinks, 
Boxes and 
containers, 
Food, 
Transport 
and 
Financials. 
In 1991, it owns Cerveceria San 
Juan SA, Cerveceria del Norte SA, 
Jugos del Norte SA (Drinks); Cia. 
Manufacturera de Vidrio del Peru 
(Containers); Industrial Cacer SA, 
Backus Y Johnson trading SA, 
Backus Y Johnson, Corporacion 
Transportes San Luis SA, Editorial 
Imprenta Amaru SA, Quipudata 
SA, Odracir SA, Asbe SA, 
Aficomo SA. In 1992, it buys 
Animadores del Agro SA, Malteria 
Lima SA and Industrias Fast SA.In 
1994, it buys Industrias del Envase 
SA (Containers) and Inversiones 
Los Descalzos (transport). In 1996, 
merger with Compania nacional de 
Cerveza SA, Sociedad Cervecera 
de Trujillo SA and Cerveceria del 
Norte SA. It buys Agua San Matia 
(Drinks). In 1999, it buys 
Inmobiliaria Parachi SA (Real 
Estate) and sells Cia Manufacturera 
de Vidrio del Peru Ltda SA.In 2006 
large merger: Comp Cerveceria del 
Sur del Peru, Embot. San Marco, 
Quipudata, Corporacion Backus 
and John., Backus and John 
Trading, Vidrios Planos del Peru, 
Inmobiliaria Pariachi, Inversiones 
Nuevo Mundo 2000, Munoz. 
RACETRACK 
PERU S.R.L. 
(67%), BAVARIA 
S.A. (30%, 
Colombia) 
In 1989 established in 
UK, under Bavaria 
(Colombia). In 2005 
under SABMiller 
plc.(UK) through 
Bavaria SA and 
subsidiary of Racetrack 
Peru SRL. 
Bentin  
VIDRIOS INDUSTRIALES 
S.A. - VINSA 
Manufacturi
ng 
(Containers 
& 
Packaging) 
 Founded in 
1965 
In 1992, investment by Owens 
illinois Inc, and its subsidiary 
Cristaleria Pedlar SA 
Owens belongs to 
OI PERU STS INC. 
(Peru) 
Owens Ilinois Inc Bentin to 
Foreign in 
1992 
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VIDRIOS PLANOS DEL 
PERU S.A.A 
Manufacturi
ng 
(Containers 
& 
Packaging) 
 Founded in 
1943 
In 1992, buys 11% of  Compania 
Manufacturera de Vidrio del Peru 
INVERSIONES 
NUEVO MUNDO 
2000 S.A. (83%), 
UNION DE 
CERVECERIAS 
PERUANAS 
BACKUS Y 
JOHNSTON 
S.A.A. (15%) 
Inversiones Nuevo 
Mundo 2000 SA 
Bentin  
VOLCAN COMPAÑIA 
MINERA S.A.A. Y 
SUBSIDIARIAS 
Mining 2000 Founded in 
1943. In 
1998, 
Volcan 
Compania 
Minera SAA 
is formed 
from the 
merger. 
In 1997, merger with the privatised 
Empresa Minera Mahr Tunel SA. 
For the consolidated: In 1999, it 
buys Empresa Minera Paragsha 
SAC. In 2000, Empresa 
Administradora Chungar SAC and 
Exploradora de Vinchos Ltda SAC. 
In 2007, it buys Compañía Minera 
El Pilar SAC, Compañía Minera 
Alpamarca S.A.C., Shalca 
Compañía Minera S.A.C and 
Minera Aurífera Toruna S.A.C. In 
2008, buys Compañía Minera 
Huascarán S.A.C. 
GREENVILLE 
OVERSEAS 
INVESTMENTS 
LTD.(19%), 
Fondos 
 Mixed 
Ownership 
YURA S.A. Construction 380 Founded in 
1958 
In 1994, buys Urquiaga SA. In 
1995, 15% of capital for Industria 
de Cemento SRL. In 1995, merger 
of Cemento Yura and Concorcio de 
Concreto y Cemento SA to form 
Yura SA. 
CONSORCIO 
CEMENTERO 
DEL SUR S.A. 
Grupo Gloria SA for 
US$ 67,100 mil. In 2008 
, concorcio Cementeros 
del Sur SA.  
Domestic 
conglomera
te 
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Table C1: List of companies  
 
 
 
AGRO INDUSTRIAL PARAMONGA S.A.A. FABRICA NACIONAL DE ACUMULADORES ETNA S.A.
AGRO PUCALA S.A.A. FABRICA PERUANA ETERNIT S.A.
AGRO-INDUSTRIAS SAN JACINTO S.A.A. FABRITEX PERUANA S.A.
ALICORP, SOCIEDAD ANONIMA FERREYROS S.A.A.
ALMACENERA PERUANA DE COMERCIO S.A. - ALPECO FILAMENTOS INDUSTRIALES S.A.
ASEA BROWN BOVERI S.A. FIMA S.A.
AUSTRAL GROUP S.A.A. GLORIA S.A.
BAKELITA Y ANEXOS S.A. GRAÑA Y MONTERO S.A.A.
BAYER S.A. GRUPO SINDICATO PESQUERO DEL PERU S.A.
BELLSOUTH PERU S.A. HIDROSTAL S.A.
CARBOLAN S.A. INCA TOPS S.A.
CASTROVIRREYNA COMPAÑIA MINERA S.A. INDECO S.A.
CENTRAL AZUCARERA CHUCARAPI-PAMPA BLANCA S.A. INDUSTRIA TEXTIL PIURA S.A.
CENTROS COMERCIALES DEL PERU S.A. INDUSTRIAS ELECTRO QUIMICAS S.A. IEQSA
CIA. INDUSTRIAL NUEVO MUNDO S. A. INDUSTRIAS VENCEDOR S.A.
COMPAÑIA CERVECERA DEL SUR DEL PERU S.A.A. CERVESUR INTRADEVCO INDUSTRIAL S.A.
COMPAÑIA DE MINAS BUENAVENTURA S.A.A. INVERSIONES CENTENARIO S.A.A.
COMPAÑIA GOOD YEAR DEL PERU S.A. INVERSIONES EN TURISMO S.A. INVERTUR
COMPAÑIA INDUSTRIAL TEXTIL CREDISA - TRUTEX S.A.A. - CREDITEX INVERSIONES NACIONALES DE TURISMO S.A. INTURSA
COMPAÑIA MANUFACTURERA DE VIDRIO DEL PERU LIMITADA S.A. INVERSIONES PACASMAYO S.A.
COMPAÑIA MINERA ATACOCHA S.A.A. IQF DEL PERU S.A.
COMPAÑIA MINERA CONDESTABLE S.A.A. LAIVE S.A.
COMPAÑIA MINERA MILPO S.A.A. LAPICES Y CONEXOS S.A. LAYCONSA
COMPAÑIA MINERA RAURA S.A. LIMA CAUCHO S.A.
COMPAÑIA MINERA SAN IGNACIO DE MOROCOCHA S.A. LP HOLDING
COMPAÑIA MINERA SANTA LUISA S.A. LUZ DEL SUR S.A.A.
COMPAÑIA PERUANA DE ENVASES S.A. MANUFACTURA DE METALES Y ALUMINIO "RECORD" S.A.
COMPAÑIA UNIVERSAL TEXTIL S.A. MARMOLES Y GRANITOS S.A.
CONDUCTORES ELECTRICOS PERUANOS S.A. CEPER METALURGICA PERUANA S.A. - MEPSA
CONSORCIO INDUSTRIAL DE AREQUIPA S.A. MICHELL Y CIA. S.A.
CONSTRUCCIONES ELECTROMECANICAS DELCROSA S.A. MINSUR S.A.
CORPORACION ACEROS AREQUIPA S.A. MOTORES DIESEL ANDINOS S.A. - MODASA
CORPORACION CERAMICA S.A. NEGOCIACION AGRICOLA VISTA ALEGRE S.A.
CORPORACION CERVESUR S.A.A. NEGOCIOS E INMUEBLES S.A.
CORPORACION JOSE R. LINDLEY S.A. NUEVAS INVERSIONES SA
DEL MAR S.A. Y SUBSIDIARIAS PERU REAL ESTATE S.A.A.
DERIVADOS DEL MAIZ S.A. PERUANA DE ENERGIA S.A.A.
DUKE ENERGY INTERNATIONAL EGENOR S.A.A. PERUBAR S.A.
EDEGEL S.A.A. PROMOTORA CLUB EMPRESARIAL S.A.
EDELNOR S.A.A. QUIMPAC S.A.
ELECTRO SUR ESTE S.A.A. REACTIVOS NACIONALES S.A. RENASA
ELECTRO SUR MEDIO S.A.A. RED BICOLOR DE COMUNICACIONES S.A.A. - RBC TV S.A.A.
EMBOTELLADORA LATINOAMERICANA S.A. - ELSA REFINERIA LA PAMPILLA S.A.A.
EMPRESA AGRARIA AZUCARERA ANDAHUASI S.A.A. SAGA FALABELLA S.A.
EMPRESA AGRARIA CHIQUITOY S.A. SHOUGANG GENERACION ELECTRICA S.A.A.
EMPRESA AGRICOLA BARRAZA S.A. SHOUGANG HIERRO PERU S.A.A.
EMPRESA AGRICOLA GANADERA SALAMANCA S.A.A. SOCIEDAD INDUSTRIAL DE ARTICULOS DE METAL S.A.C. - SIAM
EMPRESA AGRICOLA SAN JUAN S.A.A. SOCIEDAD MINERA CORONA S.A.
EMPRESA AGRICOLA SINTUCO S.A. SOCIEDAD MINERA EL BROCAL S.A.
EMPRESA AGROINDUSTRIAL LAREDO S.A.A. SOUTHERN PERU COPPER CORPORATION, SUCURSAL DEL PERU
EMPRESA AGROINDUSTRIAL POMALCA TABACALERA NACIONAL S.A.A. (Now British American Tobacco del Peru Holdings SAA)
EMPRESA AGROINDUSTRIAL TUMAN S.A.A. TELEFONICA DEL PERU S.A.A. Y SUBSIDIARIAS
EMPRESA AZUCARERA "EL INGENIO" S.A. TEXTIL SAN CRISTOBAL S.A.
EMPRESA DE LA SAL S.A. TICINO DEL PERU S.A.
EMPRESA EDITORA EL COMERCIO S.A. UNION DE CERVECERIAS PERUANAS BACKUS Y JOHNSTON S.A.A.
EMPRESA ELECTRICA DE PIURA S.A. VIDRIOS INDUSTRIALES S.A. - VINSA
EMPRESA REGIONAL DE SERVICIO PUBLICO DE ELECTRICIDAD ELECTRONORTE MEDIO S.A. - Hidrandina VOLCAN COMPAÑIA MINERA S.A.A.
EMPRESA SIDERURGICA DEL PERU S.A.A. - SIDERPERU YURA S.A.
EXSA S.A.
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Table C2: Balance Sheet Data available by sector by year (Number of firms and percentage) 
   
Year 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Agribusiness 1          2          3          4          13        17        17        17        17        17        17        17        16        15        15        15        15        14        13        12        
Commerce 11        14        15        15        16        17        17        17        17        17        17        17        17        16        15        13        13        12        12        11        
Construction 3          5          5          6          6          6          6          8          8          8          8          8          8          8          8          8          8          8          8          8          
Electricity 2          2          1          5          6          6          7          9          10        10        10        10        10        10        10        10        10        10        10        10        
Fishing 1          1          2          2          2          3          4          4          4          4          4          4          3          3          2          1          1          1          1          1          
Manufacturing 27        30        32        33        34        35        35        36        36        36        35        36        33        32        32        32        32        32        31        31        
Mining 12        12        12        13        13        13        13        15        15        15        15        15        15        15        15        15        15        14        14        14        
Services 3          3          4          5          6          7          8          9          9          9          9          9          9          9          8          8          8          8          8          8          
Total 60        69        74        83        96        104      107      115      116      116      115      116      111      108      105      102      102      99        97        95        
Year 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Agribusiness 2% 3% 4% 5% 14% 16% 16% 15% 15% 15% 15% 15% 14% 14% 14% 15% 15% 14% 13% 13%
Commerce 18% 20% 20% 18% 17% 16% 16% 15% 15% 15% 15% 15% 15% 15% 14% 13% 13% 12% 12% 12%
Construction 5% 7% 7% 7% 6% 6% 6% 7% 7% 7% 7% 7% 7% 7% 8% 8% 8% 8% 8% 8%
Electricity 3% 3% 1% 6% 6% 6% 7% 8% 9% 9% 9% 9% 9% 9% 10% 10% 10% 10% 10% 11%
Fishing 2% 1% 3% 2% 2% 3% 4% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 2% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1%
Manufacturing 45% 43% 43% 40% 35% 34% 33% 31% 31% 31% 30% 31% 30% 30% 30% 31% 31% 32% 32% 33%
Mining 20% 17% 16% 16% 14% 13% 12% 13% 13% 13% 13% 13% 14% 14% 14% 15% 15% 14% 14% 15%
Services 5% 4% 5% 6% 6% 7% 7% 8% 8% 8% 8% 8% 8% 8% 8% 8% 8% 8% 8% 8%
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
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Table C3: Dollar Balance available by sector by year (Number of firms) 
   
Year 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Agribusiness 1          1          1          1          8          12        14        16        16        15        15        16        13        13        14        13        13        12        11        10        
Commerce 10        13        15        15        15        16        17        17        17        17        17        17        17        16        15        13        13        12        11        11        
Construction 3          5          5          5          6          6          6          8          8          8          8          8          8          8          8          8          8          8          8          8          
Electricity 1          2          1          4          5          6          7          9          10        10        10        10        10        10        10        10        10        10        10        10        
Fishing 1          1          1          2          2          3          4          4          4          4          4          4          3          3          2          1          1          1          1          1          
Manufacturing 23        25        27        30        31        32        32        35        36        36        35        35        33        32        32        32        32        32        31        31        
Mining 11        11        12        13        13        13        13        15        15        15        15        15        15        15        14        13        13        12        12        11        
Services 3          3          4          5          6          7          8          9          9          9          9          9          9          9          8          8          8          8          8          8          
Total 53 61 66 75 86 95 101 113 115 114 113 114 108 106 103 98 98 95 92 90
Year 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Agribusiness 2% 2% 2% 1% 9% 13% 14% 14% 14% 13% 13% 14% 12% 12% 14% 13% 13% 13% 12% 11%
Commerce 19% 21% 23% 20% 17% 17% 17% 15% 15% 15% 15% 15% 16% 15% 15% 13% 13% 13% 12% 12%
Construction 6% 8% 8% 7% 7% 6% 6% 7% 7% 7% 7% 7% 7% 8% 8% 8% 8% 8% 9% 9%
Electricity 2% 3% 2% 5% 6% 6% 7% 8% 9% 9% 9% 9% 9% 9% 10% 10% 10% 11% 11% 11%
Fishing 2% 2% 2% 3% 2% 3% 4% 4% 3% 4% 4% 4% 3% 3% 2% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1%
Manufacturing 43% 41% 41% 40% 36% 34% 32% 31% 31% 32% 31% 31% 31% 30% 31% 33% 33% 34% 34% 34%
Mining 21% 18% 18% 17% 15% 14% 13% 13% 13% 13% 13% 13% 14% 14% 14% 13% 13% 13% 13% 12%
Services 6% 5% 6% 7% 7% 7% 8% 8% 8% 8% 8% 8% 8% 8% 8% 8% 8% 8% 9% 9%
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
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Table C4:Investments by sector (Thousands of nuevos soles) (constant prices base year 2005) 
 
 
Source: CONASEV, data manipulated by author 
 
  
Values Agribusiness Commerce Construction Electricity Fishing Manufacturing Mining Services Grand Total
Sum of 1991 1,317                 159,828              131,348              122,763              8,650                  223,112                 289,495              13,830                950,343              
Sum of 1992 7,556                 322,958              260,330              191,216              30,031                347,712                 389,448              16,982                1,566,235          
Sum of 1993 25,235               579,149              198,045              127,947              44,333                589,673                 569,331              40,560                2,174,273          
Sum of 1994 191,926             1,292,024          378,124              2,490,275          57,964                875,496                 1,189,000          1,901,411          8,376,221          
Sum of 1995 1,209,646         2,085,576          540,805              4,463,280          94,705                1,051,648             1,691,816          3,622,947          14,760,424        
Sum of 1996 2,021,203         2,822,804          800,420              6,199,851          501,772              1,405,410             1,980,857          5,832,810          21,565,129        
Sum of 1997 2,142,775         3,201,837          1,074,500          6,690,728          678,768              1,717,351             2,286,523          7,312,709          25,105,190        
Sum of 1998 2,417,506         3,810,250          2,403,672          8,079,056          1,683,941          2,986,004             3,151,583          8,873,126          33,405,138        
Sum of 1999 2,627,374         3,921,360          2,705,326          8,861,466          1,685,698          3,187,263             3,869,816          9,957,376          36,815,678        
Sum of 2000 2,648,970         4,397,971          2,189,892          9,388,043          1,758,049          3,203,100             4,224,151          10,062,806        37,872,981        
Sum of 2001 3,013,909         4,023,390          2,034,487          9,149,665          1,747,148          3,052,648             4,419,631          7,907,511          35,348,389        
Sum of 2002 3,104,787         3,813,810          1,923,902          9,250,102          1,663,239          3,089,709             4,364,386          8,190,449          35,400,384        
Sum of 2003 3,117,545         3,990,113          2,080,702          9,439,349          1,476,671          3,028,463             4,503,718          7,701,904          35,338,466        
Sum of 2004 2,808,682         4,052,871          2,049,528          9,876,755          1,446,125          3,129,688             5,196,806          7,495,992          36,056,448        
Sum of 2005 2,912,263         3,656,441          1,970,502          9,866,283          1,310,992          3,092,216             6,404,986          6,774,837          35,988,521        
Sum of 2006 2,871,382         3,069,029          2,172,091          10,821,350        537,297              2,883,637             7,006,872          6,245,132          35,606,791        
Sum of 2007 2,997,544         3,428,710          2,573,460          10,621,652        566,491              3,067,864             8,552,137          5,784,173          37,592,032        
Sum of 2008 3,018,686         3,961,467          3,382,672          11,067,047        661,740              3,273,814             10,405,210        7,252,834          43,023,470        
Sum of 2009 2,769,426         4,390,616          4,375,619          11,501,811        639,818              3,178,797             11,355,976        7,405,555          45,617,618        
Sum of 2010 2,817,629         4,908,132          5,119,197          11,639,647        565,067              3,417,192             12,633,993        7,543,773          48,644,630        
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Table C5: Average Investment by sector (thousands of nuevos soles) (constant prices base year 2005) 
 
Source: CONASEV, data manipulated by author 
 
  
YEAR Agribusiness Commerce Construction Electricity Fishing Manufacturing Mining Services Grand Total
1991 1,317                 14,530                43,783                61,381                8,650                  8,263                      24,125                4,610                  166,659              
1992 3,778                 23,068                52,066                95,608                30,031                11,590                   32,454                5,661                  254,257              
1993 8,412                 38,610                39,609                127,947              22,167                18,427                   47,444                10,140                312,755              
1994 47,982               86,135                63,021                498,055              28,982                26,530                   91,462                380,282              1,222,448          
1995 93,050               130,348              90,134                743,880              47,353                30,931                   130,140              603,825              1,869,660          
1996 118,894             166,047              133,403              1,033,308          167,257              40,155                   152,374              833,259              2,644,698          
1997 126,046             188,343              179,083              955,818              169,692              49,067                   175,886              914,089              2,758,025          
1998 142,206             224,132              300,459              897,673              420,985              82,945                   210,106              985,903              3,264,409          
1999 154,551             230,668              338,166              886,147              421,424              88,535                   257,988              1,106,375          3,483,854          
2000 155,822             258,704              273,737              938,804              439,512              88,975                   281,610              1,118,090          3,555,254          
2001 177,289             236,670              254,311              914,967              436,787              87,219                   294,642              878,612              3,280,496          
2002 182,635             224,342              240,488              925,010              415,810              109,050                 290,959              817,149              3,205,442          
2003 194,847             234,713              260,088              943,935              492,224              121,044                 300,248              748,437              3,295,534          
2004 187,245             253,304              256,191              987,676              482,042              129,927                 346,454              718,668              3,361,507          
2005 194,151             243,763              246,313              986,628              655,496              126,566                 426,999              727,117              3,607,033          
2006 191,425             236,079              271,511              1,082,135          537,297              123,656                 467,125              646,474              3,555,702          
2007 199,836             263,747              321,682              1,062,165          566,491              129,568                 570,142              588,233              3,701,865          
2008 215,620             330,122              422,834              1,106,705          661,740              132,684                 743,229              785,093              4,398,029          
2009 213,033             365,885              546,952              1,150,181          639,818              129,860                 811,141              819,838              4,676,707          
2010 234,802             446,194              639,900              1,163,965          565,067              136,471                 902,428              841,294              4,930,121          
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Table C6: Foreign Currency Balances (Debt minus Asset) by sector (thousands of US dollars) (constant prices base year 2005) 
 
 
Source: CONASEV, data manipulated by author 
 
  
Values Agribusiness Commerce Construction Electricity Fishing Manufacturing Mining Services Grand Total
Sum of 1991 350 -6,350 5,194 -12,506 12,109 44,156 -10,512 -57,853 -25,411 
Sum of 1992 -513 47,266 24,581 13,177 20,937 61,660 -6,155 28,661 189,613
Sum of 1993 76,697 69,570 -504 11,218 18,866 65,287 29,782 23,232 294,149
Sum of 1994 22,910 180,280 1,977 -7,542 25,164 105,305 10,164 -293,168 45,090
Sum of 1995 39,251 211,293 29,888 -58,972 27,969 193,311 -176,571 164,233 430,401
Sum of 1996 55,974 235,243 102,939 22,946 130,792 145,631 -199,289 376,495 870,731
Sum of 1997 83,620 516,870 184,212 166,089 324,861 144,166 -184,034 576,301 1,812,085
Sum of 1998 112,763 541,229 441,860 214,571 405,497 385,184 116,579 1,533,102 3,750,785
Sum of 1999 124,829 496,645 416,695 318,505 415,650 306,986 307,642 1,588,568 3,975,520
Sum of 2000 120,620 538,990 228,612 407,827 373,774 304,156 291,739 1,496,992 3,762,710
Sum of 2001 127,405 522,093 172,172 296,463 369,156 278,322 399,521 866,927 3,032,061
Sum of 2002 112,953 465,232 152,269 151,093 344,059 288,854 207,821 514,745 2,237,027
Sum of 2003 75,945 366,744 200,829 176,863 331,219 310,721 -57,261 464,755 1,869,816
Sum of 2004 88,326 450,587 180,746 179,416 277,197 359,584 -838,019 547,603 1,245,441
Sum of 2005 85,357 318,901 132,538 249,253 207,462 308,576 -752,875 117,491 666,703
Sum of 2006 83,967 268,060 126,608 404,660 83,566 380,139 -753,491 -331,802 261,706
Sum of 2007 87,483 428,318 136,650 272,841 97,719 365,029 -544,356 -47,393 796,292
Sum of 2008 110,332 557,740 448,236 490,749 109,793 882,379 -733,841 -175,763 1,689,625
Sum of 2009 92,772 333,358 439,470 482,810 73,807 520,895 26,352 -116,419 1,853,045
Sum of 2010 85,466 261,983 682,420 500,126 69,619 512,443 20,073 -54,971 2,077,159
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Table C7: Average Foreign Currency Balance (Debt minus Asset) by firm by sector (thousands of US dollars) (constant prices base year 2005) 
 
 
Source: CONASEV, data manipulated by author 
 
  
Year Agribusiness Commerce Construction Electricity Fishing Manufacturing Mining Services Grand Total
1991 350 -1,261 -17,695 -12,506 12,109 2,160 -956 388 -17,411 
1992 -513 5,910 4,992 6,588 20,937 2,428 -560 -110 39,673
1993 134 10,603 -137 11,218 18,866 2,786 2,482 143 46,096
1994 -647 16,824 675 -1,885 12,582 3,922 782 -71,089 -38,837 
1995 1,072 20,117 9,813 -11,794 13,984 6,472 -13,582 11,355 37,436
1996 2,901 16,873 21,598 3,824 43,597 4,958 -15,330 46,182 124,603
1997 3,379 33,647 37,719 23,727 81,215 5,137 -14,156 61,896 232,564
1998 3,744 36,650 61,085 23,841 101,374 11,595 7,772 159,634 405,694
1999 5,918 34,329 55,837 31,850 103,912 9,146 20,509 164,388 425,891
2000 6,769 35,403 31,401 40,783 93,443 9,108 19,449 156,321 392,678
2001 7,952 35,243 25,531 29,646 92,289 8,652 26,635 82,381 308,329
2002 6,887 30,396 22,885 15,109 86,015 12,224 13,855 32,909 220,281
2003 7,784 22,013 25,490 17,686 110,406 15,425 -3,817 25,625 220,613
2004 7,791 29,382 23,157 17,942 92,399 20,767 -55,868 22,850 158,420
2005 7,304 21,461 16,725 24,925 103,731 15,471 -53,777 -11,272 124,568
2006 6,956 19,896 15,295 40,466 83,566 6,281 -57,961 -18,180 96,318
2007 7,176 30,382 18,868 27,284 97,719 8,320 -41,874 8,082 155,957
2008 9,631 45,883 56,169 49,075 109,793 18,658 -61,153 13,795 241,849
2009 8,801 29,528 55,470 48,281 73,807 9,491 2,196 13,809 241,383
2010 9,078 23,643 86,457 50,013 69,619 10,466 1,825 15,047 266,147
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Table C8: Assets by sector (thousands of nuevos soles) (constant prices base year 2005) 
 
Table C9: Assets by sector (percentage) 
 
Source: CONASEV, data manipulated by author  
Values Agribusiness Commerce Construction Electricity Fishing Manufacturing Mining Services Grand Total
Sum of 1991 3,203                 390,997              188,265              183,548              22,370                 505,438                    571,313              16,076                1,881,209           
Sum of 1992 12,352               924,105              382,722              290,831              46,299                 840,109                    852,702              20,460                3,369,580           
Sum of 1993 38,305               1,592,429          624,772              279,939              83,412                 1,343,082                1,222,716          76,269                5,260,924           
Sum of 1994 250,457             2,945,674          811,779              3,320,445          96,597                 1,897,440                2,440,509          3,389,484          15,152,385        
Sum of 1995 1,549,951         4,456,180          1,250,002          5,225,177          150,193              2,469,982                3,724,166          4,907,016          23,732,668        
Sum of 1996 2,396,088         5,940,947          1,576,401          7,048,449          899,335              3,014,493                4,608,224          7,440,028          32,923,965        
Sum of 1997 2,589,530         7,622,317          2,027,733          8,092,979          2,021,618           3,751,244                6,145,977          9,695,085          41,946,484        
Sum of 1998 3,006,165         8,517,649          5,158,491          9,642,864          2,454,010           5,736,535                7,413,217          12,500,481        54,429,411        
Sum of 1999 3,391,027         9,181,274          5,510,840          10,628,834        2,430,451           6,332,921                8,600,772          13,548,606        59,624,725        
Sum of 2000 3,421,178         9,235,659          4,897,298          11,120,582        2,318,285           6,354,813                10,309,067        13,793,537        61,450,418        
Sum of 2001 3,720,385         8,817,108          4,270,769          10,740,370        2,057,150           5,944,899                10,645,572        11,578,526        57,774,779        
Sum of 2002 3,830,445         8,931,764          4,109,110          10,993,676        2,049,647           5,765,481                11,357,294        11,701,497        58,738,914        
Sum of 2003 3,898,868         8,679,467          4,580,029          10,614,172        1,812,563           5,724,602                13,231,440        10,674,275        59,215,417        
Sum of 2004 3,564,829         9,864,853          4,698,631          11,317,098        1,838,926           6,165,080                17,367,637        10,440,307        65,257,361        
Sum of 2005 3,640,260         9,094,880          4,934,286          11,275,499        1,664,215           6,328,503                19,155,481        10,536,435        66,629,559        
Sum of 2006 3,643,732         9,506,454          5,502,649          12,347,693        805,739              6,704,345                20,969,645        12,092,041        71,572,300        
Sum of 2007 3,878,378         10,596,363        6,819,662          12,587,519        845,652              7,165,770                26,407,432        14,185,364        82,486,140        
Sum of 2008 3,903,125         11,816,347        8,325,857          13,052,168        1,166,355           9,795,229                29,672,953        16,413,610        94,145,643        
Sum of 2009 3,350,475         11,885,138        10,024,022        13,485,347        1,192,315           8,195,060                31,490,474        16,209,762        95,832,593        
Sum of 2010 3,541,247         13,380,598        12,151,205        13,726,357        1,025,272           9,000,304                37,005,613        16,909,051        106,739,648      
Sector 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Agribusiness 0% 0% 1% 2% 7% 7% 6% 6% 6% 6% 6% 7% 7% 5% 5% 5% 5% 4% 3% 3%
Commerce 21% 27% 30% 19% 19% 18% 18% 16% 15% 15% 15% 15% 15% 15% 14% 13% 13% 13% 12% 13%
Construction 10% 11% 12% 5% 5% 5% 5% 9% 9% 8% 7% 7% 8% 7% 7% 8% 8% 9% 10% 11%
Electricity 10% 9% 5% 22% 22% 21% 19% 18% 18% 18% 19% 19% 18% 17% 17% 17% 15% 14% 14% 13%
Fishing 1% 1% 2% 1% 1% 3% 5% 5% 4% 4% 4% 3% 3% 3% 2% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1%
Manufacturing 27% 25% 26% 13% 10% 9% 9% 11% 11% 10% 10% 12% 12% 12% 13% 13% 13% 13% 11% 11%
Mining 30% 25% 23% 16% 16% 14% 15% 14% 14% 17% 18% 19% 22% 27% 29% 29% 32% 32% 33% 35%
Services 1% 1% 1% 22% 21% 23% 23% 23% 23% 22% 20% 17% 15% 13% 13% 13% 13% 14% 14% 13%
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
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Table:C10 Average Assets by firm by sector (thousands of nuevos soles) (constant prices base year 2005) 
 
Source: CONASEV, data manipulated by author 
 
  
Values Agribusiness Commerce Construction Electricity Fishing Manufacturing Mining Services Grand Total
Sum of 1991 3,203                 390,997              188,265              183,548              22,370                 505,438                   571,313              16,076                1,881,209           
Sum of 1992 12,352               924,105              382,722              290,831              46,299                 840,109                   852,702              20,460                3,369,580           
Sum of 1993 38,305               1,592,429          624,772              279,939              83,412                 1,343,082               1,222,716          76,269                5,260,924           
Sum of 1994 250,457             2,945,674          811,779              3,320,445          96,597                 1,897,440               2,440,509          3,389,484          15,152,385        
Sum of 1995 1,549,951         4,456,180          1,250,002          5,225,177          150,193              2,469,982               3,724,166          4,907,016          23,732,668        
Sum of 1996 2,396,088         5,940,947          1,576,401          7,048,449          899,335              3,014,493               4,608,224          7,440,028          32,923,965        
Sum of 1997 2,589,530         7,622,317          2,027,733          8,092,979          2,021,618           3,751,244               6,145,977          9,695,085          41,946,484        
Sum of 1998 3,006,165         8,517,649          5,158,491          9,642,864          2,454,010           5,736,535               7,413,217          12,500,481        54,429,411        
Sum of 1999 3,391,027         9,181,274          5,510,840          10,628,834        2,430,451           6,332,921               8,600,772          13,548,606        59,624,725        
Sum of 2000 3,421,178         9,235,659          4,897,298          11,120,582        2,318,285           6,354,813               10,309,067        13,793,537        61,450,418        
Sum of 2001 3,720,385         8,817,108          4,270,769          10,740,370        2,057,150           5,944,899               10,645,572        11,578,526        57,774,779        
Sum of 2002 3,830,445         8,931,764          4,109,110          10,993,676        2,049,647           5,765,481               11,357,294        11,701,497        58,738,914        
Sum of 2003 3,898,868         8,679,467          4,580,029          10,614,172        1,812,563           5,724,602               13,231,440        10,674,275        59,215,417        
Sum of 2004 3,564,829         9,864,853          4,698,631          11,317,098        1,838,926           6,165,080               17,367,637        10,440,307        65,257,361        
Sum of 2005 3,640,260         9,094,880          4,934,286          11,275,499        1,664,215           6,328,503               19,155,481        10,536,435        66,629,559        
Sum of 2006 3,643,732         9,506,454          5,502,649          12,347,693        805,739              6,704,345               20,969,645        12,092,041        71,572,300        
Sum of 2007 3,878,378         10,596,363        6,819,662          12,587,519        845,652              7,165,770               26,407,432        14,185,364        82,486,140        
Sum of 2008 3,903,125         11,816,347        8,325,857          13,052,168        1,166,355           9,795,229               29,672,953        16,413,610        94,145,643        
Sum of 2009 3,350,475         11,885,138        10,024,022        13,485,347        1,192,315           8,195,060               31,490,474        16,209,762        95,832,593        
Sum of 2010 3,541,247         13,380,598        12,151,205        13,726,357        1,025,272           9,000,304               37,005,613        16,909,051        106,739,648      
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Table C11: Liabilities by sector (thousands of nuevos soles) (constant prices base year 2005) 
 
Source: CONASEV, data manipulated by author 
 
  
Values Agribusiness Commerce Construction Electricity Fishing Manufacturing Mining Services Grand Total
Sum of 1991 1,640                 131,430              30,956                69,804                20,001                244,548                240,171              1,634                  740,185              
Sum of 1992 7,174                 355,267              80,806                124,178              38,922                491,869                329,180              2,678                  1,430,075           
Sum of 1993 19,010               703,520              142,928              152,610              69,984                728,366                433,705              34,365                2,284,488           
Sum of 1994 144,169             1,756,055          201,662              872,650              70,309                961,182                942,433              663,159              5,611,619           
Sum of 1995 1,123,357         2,538,819          422,191              676,775              90,782                1,228,403            1,187,978          1,404,883          8,673,188           
Sum of 1996 667,697             3,040,549          572,471              990,030              563,657              1,522,181            1,177,247          2,869,192          11,403,024        
Sum of 1997 844,057             3,648,821          855,566              2,911,798          1,248,314          1,904,786            1,638,058          4,069,918          17,121,318        
Sum of 1998 1,228,384         4,317,395          2,957,010          2,478,850          1,628,237          2,860,430            2,293,337          7,177,777          24,941,418        
Sum of 1999 1,318,685         4,572,437          3,029,043          3,085,587          1,911,921          3,108,231            2,984,850          7,928,068          27,938,822        
Sum of 2000 1,403,227         4,755,798          2,482,544          3,557,585          1,748,605          3,387,310            3,677,774          8,078,382          29,091,224        
Sum of 2001 1,426,161         4,479,597          1,898,586          3,629,475          1,608,097          3,296,773            3,861,394          7,541,808          27,741,890        
Sum of 2002 1,590,236         4,118,694          1,907,296          3,665,175          1,565,279          3,178,342            4,482,430          6,218,519          26,725,972        
Sum of 2003 1,587,750         3,970,148          2,083,830          3,851,037          1,490,587          2,972,959            6,151,713          5,197,911          27,305,935        
Sum of 2004 1,404,929         4,228,771          1,909,923          4,654,592          1,230,018          3,068,088            7,639,981          5,237,905          29,374,206        
Sum of 2005 1,422,883         3,855,399          1,966,825          5,629,996          1,068,603          3,155,855            7,335,759          5,661,250          30,096,569        
Sum of 2006 1,507,401         3,715,370          1,976,878          6,398,912          519,476              3,415,559            7,813,562          5,860,269          31,207,427        
Sum of 2007 1,593,064         4,599,551          2,766,862          6,269,006          505,192              3,622,788            8,665,049          6,983,329          35,004,842        
Sum of 2008 1,803,468         5,977,150          4,327,339          6,728,465          634,835              5,620,670            11,781,137        8,714,029          45,587,092        
Sum of 2009 1,864,044         5,620,776          5,220,693          6,739,588          591,525              3,828,502            11,043,611        8,829,913          43,738,651        
Sum of 2010 1,934,227         6,477,027          6,444,199          6,518,025          415,173              4,240,209            12,419,302        8,978,378          47,426,541        
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Table C12: Average Liabilities by sector (thousands of nuevos soles) (constant prices base year 2005) 
 
Source: CONASEV, data manipulated by author 
 
  
Year Agribusiness Commerce Construction Electricity Fishing Manufacturing Mining Services Grand Total
1991 1,640 11,948 10,319 34,902 20,001 9,057 20,014 545 108,426
1992 3,587 25,376 16,161 62,089 38,922 16,396 27,432 893 190,856
1993 6,337 46,901 28,586 152,610 34,992 22,761 36,142 8,591 336,920
1994 36,042 117,070 33,610 174,530 35,155 29,127 72,495 132,632 630,661
1995 86,412 158,676 70,365 112,796 45,391 36,129 91,383 234,147 835,300
1996 39,276 178,856 95,412 165,005 187,886 43,491 90,557 409,885 1,210,368
1997 49,650 214,637 142,594 415,971 312,079 54,422 126,004 508,740 1,824,098
1998 72,258 253,964 369,626 275,428 407,059 79,456 152,889 797,531 2,408,212
1999 77,570 268,967 378,630 308,559 477,980 86,340 198,990 880,896 2,677,932
2000 82,543 279,753 310,318 355,758 437,151 94,092 245,185 897,598 2,702,398
2001 83,892 263,506 237,323 362,948 402,024 94,194 257,426 837,979 2,539,291
2002 93,543 242,276 238,412 366,518 391,320 111,268 243,675 782,869 2,377,958
2003 99,234 233,538 260,479 385,104 496,862 120,350 343,542 688,499 2,516,655
2004 93,662 264,298 238,740 465,459 410,006 135,427 424,960 722,610 2,614,542
2005 94,859 257,027 245,853 563,000 534,302 135,071 411,290 853,457 2,949,057
2006 100,493 285,798 247,110 639,891 519,476 159,805 407,692 944,807 3,092,798
2007 106,204 353,812 345,858 626,901 505,192 179,953 435,289 1,139,880 3,426,125
2008 128,819 498,096 540,917 672,846 634,835 240,639 692,953 1,349,227 4,498,360
2009 143,388 468,398 652,587 673,959 591,525 182,037 659,211 1,330,571 4,474,844
2010 161,186 588,821 805,525 651,802 415,173 203,668 738,987 1,381,483 4,687,458
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Table C13: Net profits by sector (thousands of nuevos soles) (constant prices base year 2005) 
 
Source: CONASEV, data manipulated by author 
 
  
Values Agribusiness Commerce Construction Electricity Fishing Manufacturing Mining Services Grand Total
Sum of 1991 -319 17,672 -16,803 7,676 -5,573 -46,057 -29,578 -1,744 -74,726 
Sum of 1992 -716 73,482 5,530 13 -6,752 -40,279 80,897 -354 111,820
Sum of 1993 1,953 112,894 55,505 -9,807 -1,340 13,492 80,663 367 253,728
Sum of 1994 -17,375 156,342 100,306 114,881 12,501 46,459 386,980 94,625 894,719
Sum of 1995 -273,632 63,837 130,201 267,521 7,799 33,650 726,118 720,028 1,675,522
Sum of 1996 6,431 110,058 149,517 378,471 63,511 -21,517 596,506 944,490 2,227,467
Sum of 1997 -98,593 200,896 179,256 417,119 95,164 81,331 797,340 1,128,249 2,800,763
Sum of 1998 -296,728 7,472 274,167 403,439 -186,042 -147,365 294,820 416,583 766,346
Sum of 1999 -56,192 -17,072 95,424 437,086 -269,681 -148,818 373,131 567,500 981,378
Sum of 2000 -66,229 -9,879 118,674 502,823 -58,700 33,908 1,054,213 34,198 1,609,007
Sum of 2001 -16,061 126,236 92,162 467,619 -89,853 72,735 507,977 -265,650 895,164
Sum of 2002 -55,564 409,333 58,644 458,615 3,539 65,210 1,197,293 59,233 2,196,303
Sum of 2003 13,457 348,967 191,280 462,466 -120,059 90,082 1,318,155 48,957 2,353,305
Sum of 2004 39,728 473,354 222,930 443,507 228,091 238,711 3,813,711 32,104 5,492,135
Sum of 2005 15,954 467,305 291,532 549,718 -2,126 234,644 5,034,753 594,822 7,186,602
Sum of 2006 66,000 769,858 541,430 627,327 62,883 475,631 7,684,276 384,053 10,611,458
Sum of 2007 29,556 904,000 560,698 768,562 54,155 547,167 9,211,594 383,257 12,458,990
Sum of 2008 -78,040 1,043,005 644,774 546,770 30,242 559,846 6,127,742 427,684 9,302,022
Sum of 2009 19,193 1,206,107 711,410 910,726 71,447 77,504 5,646,580 1,125,234 9,768,201
Sum of 2010 142,710 1,341,724 1,002,985 919,094 43,056 420,761 8,938,453 1,211,045 14,019,828
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Table C14: Average net profits by firm by sector (thousands of nuevos soles) (constant prices base year 2005) 
 
Source: CONASEV, data manipulated by author 
  
Year Agribusiness Commerce Construction Electricity Fishing Manufacturing Mining Services Grand Total
1991 -319 1,607 -5,601 3,838 -5,573 -1,706 -2,465 -581 -10,800 
1992 -358 5,249 1,106 6 -6,752 -1,343 6,741 -118 4,531
1993 651 7,526 11,101 -9,807 -670 422 6,722 92 16,036
1994 -4,344 10,423 16,718 22,976 6,251 1,408 29,768 18,925 102,124
1995 -21,049 3,990 21,700 44,587 3,899 990 55,855 120,005 229,977
1996 378 6,474 24,919 63,079 21,170 -615 45,885 134,927 296,218
1997 -5,800 11,817 29,876 59,588 23,791 2,324 61,334 141,031 323,962
1998 -17,455 440 34,271 44,827 -46,510 -4,093 19,655 46,287 77,420
1999 -3,305 -1,004 11,928 43,709 -67,420 -4,134 24,875 63,056 67,704
2000 -3,896 -581 14,834 50,282 -14,675 942 70,281 3,800 120,987
2001 -945 7,426 11,520 46,762 -22,463 2,078 33,865 -29,517 48,726
2002 -3,268 24,078 7,331 45,862 885 3,713 79,820 -1,024 157,395
2003 841 20,527 23,910 46,247 -40,020 3,311 87,877 3,307 146,001
2004 2,649 29,585 27,866 44,351 76,030 7,469 254,247 3,535 445,732
2005 1,064 31,154 36,442 54,972 -1,063 16,275 335,650 38,585 513,077
2006 4,400 59,220 67,679 62,733 62,883 18,292 512,285 34,294 821,785
2007 1,970 69,538 70,087 76,856 54,155 26,566 614,106 10,038 923,318
2008 -5,574 86,917 80,597 54,677 30,242 9,728 437,696 84,530 778,812
2009 1,476 100,509 88,926 91,073 71,447 7,076 403,327 122,922 886,756
2010 11,893 121,975 125,373 91,909 43,056 17,558 638,461 135,938 1,186,163
345 
 
Table C15:Fixed Investments by ownership by year (Thousands of nuevos soles) (constant prices base year 2005) 
 
 
Source: CONASEV, data manipulated by author 
  
YEAR Domestic Conglomerates Foreign Ownership Mixed Ownership Private+ Domestic Ownership Semi-Public Total
1991 432,999 287,093 52,656 50,245 127,350 950,343
1992 821,938 372,680 94,293 79,184 198,139 1,566,235
1993 1,165,010 540,429 200,322 130,688 137,824 2,174,273
1994 2,201,730 4,952,679 544,481 153,572 523,759 8,376,221
1995 3,360,484 9,333,447 921,641 550,599 594,252 14,760,423
1996 5,046,138 13,446,688 1,473,698 824,356 774,249 21,565,129
1997 5,927,376 15,760,701 1,760,521 985,202 671,390 25,105,190
1998 9,114,552 20,055,361 1,994,960 1,142,905 1,097,361 33,405,138
1999 9,664,558 23,050,853 2,434,643 831,418 834,206 36,815,678
2000 9,972,403 23,645,583 2,582,608 792,675 879,712 37,872,981
2001 9,611,395 21,263,010 2,899,386 734,103 840,495 35,348,389
2002 9,192,545 21,658,971 2,942,252 749,742 856,873 35,400,384
2003 9,612,849 21,180,618 3,054,050 440,736 1,050,212 35,338,466
2004 9,724,110 21,613,744 3,306,835 468,497 943,262 36,056,448
2005 9,547,190 21,580,990 3,426,546 447,871 985,924 35,988,521
2006 8,172,379 21,979,709 3,778,358 426,145 1,250,201 35,606,791
2007 9,248,552 22,682,810 4,071,041 439,124 1,150,506 37,592,032
2008 12,022,709 24,862,669 4,393,645 426,023 1,318,425 43,023,470
2009 14,200,205 24,909,339 4,649,890 421,759 1,436,425 45,617,618
2010 15,913,354 25,240,372 5,467,674 422,941 1,600,289 48,644,630
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Table C16:Average Fixed Investments by firm by ownership (thousands of nuevos soles) (constant prices base year 2005) 
 
 
Source: CONASEV, data manipulated by author 
  
YEAR Domestic Conglomerates Foreign Ownership Mixed Ownership Private+ Domestic Ownership Semi-Public Total
1991 18,826 14,355 10,531 5,583 42,450 91,745
1992 31,613 16,940 13,470 7,199 66,046 135,268
1993 44,808 23,497 20,032 10,053 68,912 167,302
1994 78,633 183,433 45,373 11,813 174,586 493,839
1995 105,015 301,079 57,603 39,329 198,084 701,109
1996 144,175 420,209 81,872 51,522 258,083 955,862
1997 169,354 463,550 92,659 61,575 223,797 1,010,934
1998 233,706 527,773 104,998 71,432 365,787 1,303,695
1999 261,204 548,830 128,139 55,428 278,069 1,271,670
2000 269,524 562,990 135,927 52,845 293,237 1,314,524
2001 266,983 506,262 152,599 48,940 280,165 1,254,950
2002 255,348 503,697 154,855 49,983 285,624 1,249,508
2003 267,024 504,300 160,739 40,067 350,071 1,322,201
2004 277,832 540,344 174,044 42,591 314,421 1,349,231
2005 280,800 553,359 180,345 40,716 492,962 1,548,181
2006 263,625 563,582 198,861 38,740 625,101 1,689,909
2007 308,285 567,070 214,265 39,920 575,253 1,704,794
2008 400,757 654,281 231,244 42,602 659,212 1,988,097
2009 473,340 691,926 244,731 42,176 718,212 2,170,385
2010 548,736 701,121 303,760 42,294 800,144 2,396,056
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Table C17: Foreign Currency Balances (Debt minus Asset) by ownership (thousands of US dollars) (constant prices base year 2005) 
 
 
Source: CONASEV, data manipulated by author 
  
YEAR Domestic Conglomerates Foreign Ownership Mixed Ownership Private+ Domestic Ownership Semi-Public Total
1991 3,519 -68,550 26,197 27,452 -14,030 -25,411 
1992 139,869 -19,210 24,821 31,402 12,731 189,613
1993 219,168 17,060 23,591 24,565 9,766 294,149
1994 274,992 -276,468 42,793 31,452 -27,679 45,090
1995 441,365 -103,359 54,502 75,363 -37,469 430,401
1996 594,437 250,447 -44,407 79,072 -8,819 870,731
1997 1,051,699 672,098 9,480 81,044 -2,236 1,812,085
1998 1,590,086 1,973,970 75,762 104,774 6,193 3,750,785
1999 1,419,160 2,317,720 144,521 88,629 5,490 3,975,520
2000 1,205,372 2,245,706 191,784 112,537 7,310 3,762,710
2001 1,292,902 1,448,387 184,977 99,679 6,116 3,032,061
2002 1,003,586 917,655 243,475 67,689 4,623 2,237,027
2003 834,866 811,946 183,266 39,610 127 1,869,816
2004 608,593 364,050 211,252 62,283 -737 1,245,441
2005 375,916 -3,932 231,707 61,085 1,926 666,703
2006 403,413 -225,524 30,639 52,580 598 261,706
2007 375,997 133,425 185,528 99,920 1,422 796,292
2008 829,576 790,387 -48,805 115,867 2,600 1,689,625
2009 725,676 827,618 228,022 71,179 551 1,853,045
2010 890,025 708,847 406,603 72,253 -569 2,077,159
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Table C18: Average Foreign Currency Balances (Debt minus Asset) by firm by ownership (thousands of US dollars) (constant prices base year 
2005) 
 
 
Source: CONASEV, data manipulated by author 
  
YEAR Domestic Conglomerates Foreign Ownership Mixed Ownership Private+ Domestic Ownership Semi-Public Total
1991 168 -3,808 6,549 3,432 -7,015 -675 
1992 5,828 -960 4,137 3,140 4,244 16,388
1993 8,430 812 3,370 2,456 4,883 19,952
1994 10,577 -11,059 4,279 2,621 -13,839 -7,421 
1995 15,763 -3,564 3,893 5,797 -18,735 3,154
1996 18,576 8,079 -2,960 5,648 -2,940 26,403
1997 30,932 20,367 593 5,403 -745 56,549
1998 40,771 51,947 4,209 6,985 2,064 105,976
1999 38,356 55,184 8,029 5,909 1,830 109,307
2000 32,578 53,469 11,281 7,502 2,437 107,267
2001 36,940 34,485 10,277 6,645 2,039 90,386
2002 27,877 21,849 12,814 4,835 1,541 68,917
2003 23,853 19,804 10,181 3,601 42 57,482
2004 17,900 9,101 11,736 5,662 -246 44,154
2005 11,391 -101 12,873 5,553 963 30,680
2006 13,447 -5,783 1,915 4,780 299 14,658
2007 12,965 3,336 11,595 9,084 711 37,691
2008 28,606 20,800 -3,050 11,587 1,300 59,242
2009 25,023 23,646 14,251 7,118 275 70,314
2010 31,787 20,253 27,107 7,225 -285 86,087
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Table C19: Assets by ownership (thousands of nuevos soles) (constant prices base year 2005) 
 
Source: CONASEV, data manipulated by author 
  
YEAR Domestic Conglomerates Foreign Ownership Mixed Ownership Private+ Domestic Ownership Semi-Public Total
1991 850,241 592,311 113,193 121,824 203,640 1,881,209
1992 1,721,176 883,895 232,241 211,846 320,422 3,369,580
1993 2,801,491 1,336,894 447,024 367,096 308,419 5,260,924
1994 4,568,552 8,314,301 1,112,342 468,200 688,990 15,152,385
1995 6,903,856 13,160,596 1,899,438 981,689 787,028 23,732,608
1996 9,889,477 17,698,165 3,083,474 1,368,309 884,540 32,923,965
1997 11,934,210 23,510,480 4,004,201 1,654,570 843,022 41,946,484
1998 18,406,161 28,727,827 4,320,151 1,715,643 1,259,629 54,429,411
1999 19,864,089 31,819,550 5,544,379 1,403,449 993,258 59,624,725
2000 19,667,194 33,122,254 6,252,286 1,358,704 1,049,980 61,450,418
2001 18,380,169 30,353,077 6,811,297 1,246,853 983,383 57,774,779
2002 18,580,551 30,693,261 7,196,560 1,254,901 1,013,642 58,738,914
2003 19,024,248 30,000,829 8,238,569 926,298 1,025,472 59,215,417
2004 21,297,041 32,598,601 9,256,577 983,500 1,121,642 65,257,361
2005 21,365,256 32,970,233 10,119,302 1,037,553 1,137,214 66,629,559
2006 21,310,692 35,035,009 13,006,085 1,033,363 1,187,151 71,572,300
2007 25,111,506 39,917,059 14,920,128 1,198,149 1,339,298 82,486,140
2008 31,068,431 41,757,733 18,505,579 1,343,467 1,470,433 94,145,643
2009 33,113,618 41,644,779 18,148,587 1,277,594 1,648,013 95,832,593
2010 37,890,797 44,906,396 20,706,364 1,439,934 1,796,156 106,739,648
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Table C20:Average Assets by firm by ownership (thousands of nuevos soles) (constant prices base year 2005) 
 
Source: CONASEV, data manipulated by author 
  
YEAR Domestic Conglomerates Foreign Ownership Mixed Ownership Private+ Domestic Ownership Semi-Public Total
1991 36,967 29,616 22,639 13,536 67,880 170,637
1992 66,199 40,177 33,177 19,259 106,807 265,620
1993 107,750 58,126 44,702 28,238 154,210 393,026
1994 163,163 307,937 92,695 36,015 229,663 829,473
1995 215,746 424,535 118,715 70,121 262,343 1,091,459
1996 282,556 553,068 171,304 85,519 294,847 1,387,294
1997 340,977 691,485 210,747 103,411 281,007 1,627,628
1998 471,953 755,995 227,376 107,228 419,876 1,982,429
1999 536,867 757,608 291,809 93,563 331,086 2,010,934
2000 531,546 788,625 329,068 90,580 349,993 2,089,812
2001 510,560 722,692 358,489 83,124 327,794 2,002,660
2002 516,126 713,797 378,766 83,660 337,881 2,030,230
2003 528,451 714,305 433,609 84,209 341,824 2,102,399
2004 608,487 814,965 487,188 89,409 373,881 2,373,930
2005 628,390 845,391 532,595 94,323 568,607 2,669,305
2006 687,442 898,334 684,531 93,942 593,576 2,957,824
2007 837,050 997,926 785,270 108,923 669,649 3,398,818
2008 1,035,614 1,098,888 973,978 134,347 735,217 3,978,043
2009 1,103,787 1,156,799 955,189 127,759 824,007 4,167,542
2010 1,306,579 1,247,400 1,150,354 143,993 898,078 4,746,404
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Table C21: Liabilities by ownership (thousands of nuevos soles) (constant prices base year 2005) 
 
Source: CONASEV, data manipulated by author 
  
YEAR Domestic Conglomerates Foreign Ownership Mixed Ownership Private+ Domestic Ownership Semi-Public Total
1991 277,154 242,316 73,112 67,597 80,005 740,185
1992 666,764 362,428 134,050 127,806 139,028 1,430,075
1993 1,099,164 559,973 248,185 218,097 159,069 2,284,488
1994 2,137,705 2,426,235 623,535 265,632 158,513 5,611,619
1995 3,356,547 3,516,203 1,099,678 596,145 104,577 8,673,150
1996 4,638,377 4,906,544 1,019,346 640,975 197,781 11,403,024
1997 5,594,646 9,319,594 1,227,848 805,948 173,283 17,121,318
1998 9,408,894 12,667,063 1,448,689 1,033,985 382,787 24,941,418
1999 9,853,737 15,044,793 1,979,375 927,951 132,967 27,938,822
2000 9,760,226 15,967,328 2,255,814 983,180 124,675 29,091,224
2001 9,024,920 15,328,709 2,406,885 868,476 112,901 27,741,890
2002 8,661,921 14,569,569 2,477,392 886,468 130,622 26,725,972
2003 8,603,166 14,373,195 3,694,061 523,615 111,899 27,305,935
2004 9,035,360 15,781,486 3,879,641 551,194 126,525 29,374,206
2005 8,491,657 16,942,517 3,964,287 567,931 130,177 30,096,569
2006 8,007,300 18,355,246 4,147,997 547,476 149,409 31,207,427
2007 9,662,313 20,186,177 4,229,418 727,773 199,161 35,004,842
2008 15,027,531 22,959,270 6,591,336 788,277 220,678 45,587,092
2009 15,171,338 21,908,260 5,689,361 656,848 312,845 43,738,652
2010 17,055,338 23,216,962 6,099,304 734,381 320,556 47,426,541
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Table C22: Average Liabilities by firm by ownership (thousands of nuevos soles) (constant prices base year 2005) 
 
Source: CONASEV, data manipulated by author 
  
YEAR Domestic Conglomerates Foreign Ownership Mixed Ownership Private+ Domestic Ownership Semi-Public Total
1991 12,050 12,116 14,622 7,511 26,668 72,968
1992 25,645 16,474 19,150 11,619 46,343 119,230
1993 42,276 24,347 24,819 16,777 79,535 187,752
1994 76,347 89,861 51,961 20,433 52,838 291,439
1995 104,892 113,426 68,730 42,582 34,859 364,489
1996 132,525 153,330 56,630 40,061 65,927 448,473
1997 159,847 274,106 64,624 50,372 57,761 606,709
1998 241,254 333,344 76,247 64,624 127,596 843,064
1999 266,317 358,209 104,178 61,863 44,322 834,890
2000 263,790 380,174 118,727 65,545 41,558 869,795
2001 250,692 364,969 126,678 57,898 37,634 837,872
2002 240,609 338,827 130,389 59,098 43,541 812,464
2003 238,977 342,219 194,424 47,601 37,300 860,521
2004 258,153 394,537 204,192 50,109 42,175 949,165
2005 249,755 434,424 208,647 51,630 65,089 1,009,543
2006 258,300 470,647 218,316 49,771 74,705 1,071,738
2007 322,077 504,654 222,601 66,161 99,581 1,215,074
2008 500,918 604,191 346,912 78,828 110,339 1,641,188
2009 505,711 608,563 299,440 65,685 156,423 1,635,822
2010 588,115 644,916 338,850 73,438 160,278 1,805,597
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Table C23: Net profits by ownership (thousands of nuevos soles) (constant prices base year 2005) 
 
Source: CONASEV, data manipulated by author 
  
YEAR Domestic Conglomerates Foreign Ownership Mixed Ownership Private+ Domestic Ownership Semi-Public Total
1991 -31,521 -21,264 -11,290 -20,902 10,250 -74,726 
1992 76,935 42,073 -1,979 -7,121 1,913 111,820
1993 164,970 102,588 -4,344 -1,202 -8,284 253,728
1994 341,619 491,254 32,631 20,050 9,166 894,719
1995 269,416 1,526,077 90 -124,137 4,073 1,675,520
1996 398,477 1,742,675 117,213 -26,520 -4,378 2,227,467
1997 574,672 2,119,067 135,752 -36,338 7,610 2,800,763
1998 352,791 728,497 -7,742 -252,675 -54,526 766,346
1999 174,267 697,329 181,731 -72,838 889 981,378
2000 427,235 744,524 398,744 17,054 21,451 1,609,007
2001 340,297 362,616 209,824 -9,999 -7,574 895,164
2002 1,033,079 832,917 328,319 -4,142 6,130 2,196,303
2003 976,783 954,081 366,547 43,174 12,720 2,353,305
2004 1,544,158 3,055,217 835,925 32,447 24,388 5,492,135
2005 1,409,235 4,577,487 1,123,831 53,720 22,329 7,186,602
2006 2,263,092 5,903,170 2,333,656 81,038 30,502 10,611,458
2007 2,853,074 6,726,419 2,674,279 162,838 42,380 12,458,990
2008 2,640,356 5,048,079 1,453,895 118,948 40,744 9,302,022
2009 2,606,374 4,360,144 2,643,837 105,527 52,318 9,768,201
2010 3,915,454 6,610,225 3,268,088 178,137 47,924 14,019,828
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Table C24: Average net profits by firm by ownership (thousands of nuevos soles) (constant prices base year 2005) 
 
Source: CONASEV, data manipulated by author 
YEAR Domestic Conglomerates Foreign Ownership Mixed Ownership Private+ Domestic Ownership Semi-Public Total
1991 -1,370 -1,063 -2,258 -2,322 3,417 -3,597 
1992 2,959 1,912 -283 -647 638 4,579
1993 6,345 4,460 -434 -92 -4,142 6,137
1994 12,201 18,195 2,719 1,542 3,055 37,712
1995 8,419 49,228 6 -8,867 1,358 50,144
1996 11,385 54,459 6,512 -1,658 -1,459 69,239
1997 16,419 62,325 7,145 -2,271 2,537 86,155
1998 9,046 19,171 -407 -15,792 -18,175 -6,158 
1999 4,710 16,603 9,565 -4,856 296 26,318
2000 11,547 17,727 20,987 1,137 7,150 58,547
2001 9,453 8,634 11,043 -667 -2,525 25,939
2002 28,697 19,370 17,280 -276 2,043 67,114
2003 27,133 22,716 19,292 3,925 4,240 77,306
2004 44,119 76,380 43,996 2,950 8,129 175,574
2005 41,448 117,371 59,149 4,884 11,164 234,017
2006 73,003 151,363 122,824 7,367 15,251 369,808
2007 95,102 168,160 140,752 14,803 21,190 440,008
2008 88,012 132,844 76,521 11,895 20,372 329,644
2009 86,879 121,115 139,149 10,553 26,159 383,855
2010 135,016 183,617 181,560 17,814 23,962 541,969
